Labor opportunities remain limited due to poor economic conditions

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in southern, northern, and northeastern Lebanon from June to September. In the South, the ongoing conflict negatively impacted the harvest and limited labor opportunities, while in the North and northeast, poor Lebanese and refugees are facing reported reductions in humanitarian food assistance (HFA), limited access to income-earning opportunities, and high food prices amid the poor macroeconomic conditions. 
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely remain present in southern Lebanon from October to January, as the conflict in the South continues to impact access to agricultural labor opportunities during the start of the 2024/25 production season. Meanwhile, high competition over labor opportunities and poor economic conditions are expected to keep refugee households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the North and northeast. However, area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and elsewhere as economic activity is likely to remain restricted due to the ongoing macroeconomic crisis and limited income-earning opportunities for many urban poor households who rely on casual labor or HFA as a main or secondary income source. 
• The areas of highest concern are poor households and IDPs in southern Lebanon and refugee populations in northern Lebanon who are likely to have limited access to income-earning opportunities. 
• Lebanon continues to grapple with concurrent crises and faces chronic macroeconomic imbalances compounded by wider regional conflict in the Middle East and the cross-border fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. An estimated 1.0-1.5 million people will likely need food assistance through at least January 2025. 
• The recent stabilization of the informal exchange rate at 89,700 LBP/USD is expected to support stability in the cost of the food basket while maintaining relatively low headline inflation. However, the absence of additional foreign funding by international financial institutions or donor states will likely prevent economic recovery in Lebanon and lead to higher consumer prices from October through January amid escalating conflict with Israel and persisting shortages of humanitarian funding.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Previous Lebanon Remote Monitoring Report: February 2024
• Latest Lebanon Key Message Update: May 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET's scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET's approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET's approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Lebanon has a Mediterranean-type climate characterized by hot and dry summers (June to September) and cool and rainy winters (December to mid-March). Planting of cereal crops typically takes place from October into January, with the harvest from May through August, whereas the olive harvest typically  starts in October and ends in November. 

Lebanon primarily relies on food imports, which provide around 80 percent of its consumption, with local production providing up to 30 percent of national consumption requirements. Nevertheless, agriculture is still an important livelihood for many poor households. Lebanon's main agriculture areas are the Coastal Strip, Akkar plain with upper Mount Lebanon, Beqaa Valley, the Mountainous region, the Western slope of the anti-Lebanon range, and the Southern Hills. The main crops grown include cereals (mainly wheat and barley), fruits and vegetables, olives, grapes, and tobacco, while pastoralist households engage mainly in sheep and goat herding. Tobacco and figs are grown in the South, citrus fruits and bananas along the coast, olives in the North and around the Chouf Mountains, and fruits and vegetables in the Beqaa Valley. More exotic crops include avocados grown near Byblos and hashish (a major cash crop in the Beqaa Valley). However, over the last five decades, increasing urbanization and mismanagement of natural resources have diminished available arable land for agriculture. 

Fruit and olive trees occupy around 45 percent of the total cultivated area and have increased over the years. Greenhouse production has also significantly increased over the past years. Most agricultural production is concentrated in the Beqaa Valley, which accounts for around 40 percent of total cultivated land. The Beqaa Valley also hosts around 60 percent of the total area used for industrial crops (including sugar beet, tobacco, and vineyards) and nearly 60 percent of the total area used for cereal production. The North (Akkar and Koura regions) hosts around 40 percent of the area used for olive production in the country. 

Farmers, like other occupations in the local economy, continue to cope with the impacts of the protracted financial and economic crisis. Agricultural inputs, including seeds, fuel, fertilizers, plant protection materials, and feed are available on markets in adequate quantities, but their access continues to be constrained by high prices. Up to 2019, credit was provided by input distributors, but is now almost nonexistent.

Since the start of the financial crisis in 2019, farmers have been concerned that farm gate prices are very low and not covering production costs. Although there are cases of substituting imported agricultural inputs with domestic ones, such as using smaller amounts of imported chemical fertilizers and relying more on manure from cows, goats, and chickens or using domestically produced seeds, most of the agricultural inputs are still imported. Prices of imported inputs are denominated in USD, using the exchange rate on the parallel market. In contrast, prices of agricultural outputs are denominated in Lebanese pounds,  without accounting for  any depreciation of the Lebanese pound vis-à-vis the USD on the parallel market, resulting in significant discrepancies in earnings for farmers.

The enduring economic crisis in Lebanon—sustained by concurrent shocks including the Beirut Port explosion and the COVID-19 pandemic—has led to the inevitable devaluation of the Lebanese pound (LBP), which lost 95 percent of its value against the US dollar since 2019. The country's deepening economic crisis, exacerbated by political deadlock, has severely affected the agricultural sector, leading to increased costs for vital imports like seeds and fertilizers. The economic strain intensifies preexisting difficulties for farmers, encompassing escalating debts and inefficient agricultural practices. As a result, farmers are witnessing declining revenues and facing difficulties in meeting their loan repayment obligations.

National

• Below-average national wheat production. The Ministry of Agriculture expects yields from the land under wheat cultivation (around 30,000 hectares) not to exceed 125,000 tons, around 10 percent below USDA's estimate. Wheat production in the southern districts of Marjayyoun, Hasbaya, and Nabatieh normally provides around 30 percent of annual domestic requirements (450,000–550,000 MT), with the remaining wheat supplied through imports. However, these districts have been exposed to heavy bombardment by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since the outbreak of conflict in October 2023. As such, many farmers in villages across southern Lebanon harvested their wheat early to avoid losing their crops to potential wildfires igniting near their lands, especially as temperatures have risen rapidly in recent weeks. 
• The escalating cross-border conflict between Hezbollah and the IDF has directly impacted agricultural production. The National Council for Scientific Research estimates that Israel has launched over 4,440 airstrikes and incendiary bombs into southern Lebanon between October 8, 2023, and April 11, 2024, resulting in the burning and destruction of 1,600 hectares of land, including 52 hectares of olive groves (around 50,000 olive trees) and hundreds of oak and fruit trees. The conflict resulted in estimations of around 10 percent of the olive harvest getting picked in November 2023, while the avocado and walnut harvest, which typically generates significant income from export demand, was negligible due to heavy shelling in cultivated areas. 
• Human Rights Watch also identified the use of white phosphorus munitions in 17 municipalities across southern Lebanon since October 2023, and reports suggest a significant increase in the use of white phosphorous munitions by the IDF since May 25, 2024. Other negative factors affecting wheat production this season (which accounts for 40 percent of total land under cultivation in Marjayyoun) include high costs of agricultural inputs, lack of access to equipment due to farmers' reluctance to transport them from Beqaa Valley to Marjayyoun for fear of being targeted by airstrikes, and heightened security concerns limiting the availability of casual workers in frontline border villages during the cereal planting season. As such, many conflict-affected households have been forced to flee to safer areas despite high labor demand. Similarly, households who rely on their own-crop production across southern Lebanon have sustained at least minor damage to their homes or farmland from IDF strikes and artillery shelling, whereby many have lost income and access to their livelihoods in the wake of their displacement.
• Reported cuts to humanitarian food assistance resulting in smaller rations and less access to medical and sanitation services for beneficiaries. The reported cuts are likely to impact affected household’s access to food and increase their reliance on market purchases to meet their food needs. Increased reliance on market purchases will also likely lower the the purchasing capacity of households affected. 

 Humanitarian food assistance

• The number of beneficiaries WFP is supporting has reportedly declined as part of a retargeting exercise. The cash assistance modality currently targets around 709,100 Syrian refugees and 627,600 Lebanese nationals in May, according to the latest report from WFP. Extremely vulnerable Syrian refugee households are receiving multipurpose assistance to cover their basic food and non-food needs, with further modifications applied in calculating transfer values, reflecting a strategic effort to optimize support within the constraints of available funding. Although some extremely vulnerable households who had previously not received regular humanitarian assistance are currently being targeted with multipurpose assistance, key informants report that there has been a significant decline in total beneficiary numbers on the sub-national level. Meanwhile, around 74,000 Lebanese households receive around 20 USD every two months through the National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) instead of 20 USD each month. 
• UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the main agency responsible for supporting the Palestine refugee community in Lebanon, is facing a funding crisis threatening its ability to continue providing humanitarian assistance. The agency’s program is implemented through a cash assistance modality targeting 65 percent of Lebanon's 250,000 Palestinian refugees, 80 percent of whom live under the national poverty line. This is a key income source for most Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (PRL) and Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS).

National assumptions

• Wheat prices will likely increase in October as the government transitions from a generalized wheat subsidy to more targeted assistance. 
• Monthly prices of subsidized wheat are expected to increase incrementally as the price cap continues to be revised by the caretaker government. The availability of subsidized wheat is unlikely to be sufficient past September and will likely result in rapid increases in the price of bread in the absence of an extension of the World Bank’s recently expired loan agreement with Lebanon, or renewed funding by international financial institutions/donor states to support the wheat subsidy.
• According to international forecast models, the start of the 2024/25 precipitation season in Lebanon will likely be below average from November to January.
• According to international forecast models, above-average daily mean temperatures are most likely through at least November. Extreme temperatures during July-September and September-November (exceeding the upper quintile) are two to three times more likely than climatology. The extreme temperatures may result in moisture stress in rangelands and reduce water availability.
• Olive production in 2024 will likely be significantly below average, given the widespread destruction of olive groves in southern Lebanon. 
• The total area of land under wheat cultivation for the 2024/25 agricultural season is likely to be below average and similar to or slightly less than the area planted during the 2023/24 season (approximately 30,000 hectares).
• Labor opportunities during the planting season will be available in southern Lebanon despite expectations for continued conflict, but the availability of labor will likely remain limited due to the displacement of households. Access to income from crop sales and casual wages will likely be constrained for middle-income farmers and poor rural households, given the lasting impacts of conflict and poor macroeconomic conditions on the agriculture sector.
• Many poor households will likely continue to have limited income from informal work due to high competition for labor opportunities. Also, low casual labor wages will likely keep household purchasing capacity low. 
• Limited employment opportunities in key industries, including agriculture, tourism, and construction will continue limiting household income access. At the same time, remittances will remain an important source of income for some poor and middle-income Lebanese households.
• Limited economic activity in the tourism sector because of the threat of escalating conflict will likely limit income-earning opportunities and negatively impact the economy. Restricted access to income from the tourism sector will keep household purchasing power low and impact food access amid high market prices.
• The collection of tax and tariffs by the caretaker government will be insufficient to recover Banque du Liban (BDL)'s depleted foreign currency reserves.
• Families accessing the Sayrafa platform to exchange their LBP salaries for USD will be better placed to avert exchange rate volatility. Most poor households, refugees, and civil servants will likely continue to receive their wages in LBP, leaving them more exposed to the depreciation of their wages from currency exchange transactions in the parallel market. 
• Poor households are likely to increasingly engage in coping strategies to meet their food and non-food needs, such as eating less preferred foods, eating smaller meals, reducing the number of meals a day, and reducing healthcare expenses, with the most vulnerable likely to sell productive assets or rely on children to work for household income to meet their food needs. 
• IDF strikes against southern Lebanon are likely to persist while the conflict in Gaza continues and potentially following a cessation of hostilities. The significant displacement from cross-border fire will likely continue through September 2024.  
• There is a low-to-moderate but increasing likelihood that Israel will invade southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River, either as a pre-emptive measure or in retaliation for a Hezbollah attack that crossed an Israeli red line. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• The distribution of humanitarian food assistance is expected to decline due to ongoing reports of a lack of funding and retargeting of beneficiaries.
• Cash assistance to Syrian refugees is expected to remain a key source of income for poor households while extremely vulnerable households among the Syrian refugee community are expected to continue to rely heavily on multipurpose assistance to cover both food and non-food basic needs. 
• Most Lebanese beneficiaries of the NPTP are expected to have lower purchasing capacity due to the reduced value of assistance, while most Syrian refugee beneficiaries of the cash assistance modality are also expected to have lower purchasing capacity due to the reduction of the cash transfer value. 
• Syrian refugees classified by WFP as extremely vulnerable are expected to continue receiving multipurpose cash assistance. 
• Humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue to support displaced households across southern Lebanon, in Baabda and Beirut, most of whom are living in host settings and some in collective shelters.

From June to September 2023, the main wheat and barley harvest (mid-May to July) will likely improve household access to food, particularly in southern Lebanon, where more than 70 percent of households are employed in the agricultural sector. However, household food stocks are unlikely to last through the summer months due to a lower-than-normal harvest and the ongoing conflict that is limiting household access to income-earning opportunities and restricting access to typical sources of food and income. 

In Akkar, the early season potato crop (April to mid-June) typically improves food consumption for farming households; however, significantly above-average temperatures in June have adversely affected agricultural production, especially as access to inputs and fuel remains restricted for most poor farmers during the planting of fodder corn and mid-season potatoes. The ongoing potato harvest is likely supporting some farming households with improved income from crop sales and access to food from their own production. However, eroded household budgets across wealth groups are likely limiting demand for casual labor among the poor, as hot and dry conditions in Beqaa Valley negatively impact production levels. In the eastern part of the Beqaa Valley, market functionality continues to be disrupted due to IDF attacks, which is likely limiting household access to market food purchases. 

Preexisting socioeconomic challenges are likely to keep fueling inter-communal tensions as further cuts to humanitarian assistance affect more poor Lebanese households in areas where refugees comprise a large share of the local population. In such areas, including Baalbek El-Hermel, Mount Lebanon, and Beqaa Governorates, the escalation of attacks by the IDF in frequency and intensity is leading to heightened security concerns, causing significant transport and business disruptions, according to key informants.

In urban areas, disruptions to the tourism sector are likely to limit access to income for poor urban households, forcing many to employ coping strategies indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) to meet their food needs, while the most vulnerable very poor households are likely to engage in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) amid cuts to humanitarian assistance. The drop in tourism in coastal towns such as Batroun, Tyre, Saida, and Byblos is likely to continue to heavily affect poor households who rely primarily on tourist activity for seasonal improvements in income. 

From October to January, across Lebanon, the ongoing poor macroeconomic situation is likely to be compounded by the conflict with Israel, continuing to restrict access to key food and income sources for many poor and vulnerable households. The likely poor start to the 2024/25 precipitation season will likely limit agricultural labor opportunities for wheat planting as poor soil moisture conditions and warmer-than-normal air temperatures lead to moisture stress for planted winter wheat. Additionally, the conflict in southern Lebanon and La Niña will likely negatively impact the olive harvest. The decline in labor opportunities is expected to constrain household access to income and keep household purchasing power low.

In southern Lebanon, the conflict with Israel will likely result in more households being displaced. Households that remain in conflict-affected areas of southern Lebanon will likely continue to have limited access to income due to a lack of available labor opportunities. Additionally, market access is also likely to be impacted by the conflict, with some markets likely to experience periods of commodity shortages due to trade disruptions. IDP households are likely to remain highly dependent on limited labor opportunities and humanitarian assistance to meet their food needs after being separated from their assets and typical sources of income. 

In northern Lebanon, household purchasing capacity will likely remain low due to high food prices and limited income-earning opportunities. At least one in five households is likely to engage in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) amid anticipated cuts to HFA and limited social protection coverage.

National 

Full-scale war between Hezbollah and Israel 

If the conflict escalates further into a full-scale war, market disruptions could expand to areas beyond southern Lebanon. However, food importation will likely continue to supply main markets despite a potential temporary suspension or reduction of humanitarian operations. A full-scale war would also disrupt harvesting and planting across the nation, but particularly in the agriculturally important Bekaa Valley. Areas affected by the conflict will have an increase in humanitarian food needs as household access to food and income will be limited, with widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes likely emerging across the country.

De-escalation of conflict between Hezbollah and Isreal

If there is a de-escalation of conflict, area-level outcomes indicative of Stressed (IPC Phase 2) might begin to emerge in southern, northern, and northeastern Lebanon from October to January as households will likely have increased access to labor opportunities with the start of the cereal planting season and harvest of main fruits crops, including grapes. However, agricultural labor opportunities are likely to remain constrained for several years as households recover from the conflict, and, as farmland and olive groves are rehabilitated.