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Water scarcity from conflict and drought drive food insecurity in Lebanon

Water scarcity from conflict and drought drive food insecurity in Lebanon

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  • Key Messages
  • Key Messages
    • In late 2024, FEWS NET anticipated Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes to persist through May 2025 in South, El-Nabatieh, Baalbek–El Hermel, Akkar, and North Lebanon due to widespread conflict-driven damage, displacement, and limited income access. This was primarily driven by the escalation of cross-border hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah beginning in October 2023, characterized by sustained shelling, targeted air and drone strikes, and the destruction of civilian and agricultural infrastructure across southern Lebanon. While the November 2024 ceasefire reduced the intensity of violence and improved market functionality, recovery varies across the country. Many southern and eastern localities continue to face restricted movement, unexploded ordnance contamination, damaged irrigation systems, and limited access to orchards and cropland. Currently, these constraints continue to prevent land preparation, reduce labor demand, and limit household income. Combined, these factors continue to result in food consumption gaps, especially among poor, internally displaced, and refugee households.
    • Although the November 2024 ceasefire reduced the overall conflict intensity, intermittent IDF operations and localized clashes continue in El-Nabatieh and South governorates, periodically disrupting market access and livelihoods. While the ceasefire has largely held, tensions remain elevated, and there is a heightened risk of renewed hostilities in early 2026, particularly following the December 31 disarmament deadline, due to disagreements about the pace of Hezbollah disarmament efforts. Even short-term escalations could drive displacement, increase transportation costs, sustain high food prices, and reduce daily labor opportunities in affected areas. For displaced and low-income households already facing reduced purchasing power, these disruptions could further constrain food access and delay recovery.
    • High annual food inflation continues to constrain household food access. Although annual headline inflation declined in early 2025, food inflation remains elevated at 23.9 percent year-on-year as of September 2025, well above headline inflation at 15.1 percent. Food prices were broadly stable in November compared to October but remain about 10 to 15 percent higher than mid-2025 levels, particularly for horticultural crops, consistent with seasonal patterns. Meanwhile, household income remains stagnant. Domestic food production has been strained since the onset of conflict and was further reduced by the 2024-2025 drought, increasing reliance on imports. Despite some easing in global food prices, imports remain expensive due to the depreciated currency and high transport and logistics costs in Lebanon. Near-term price pressure is expected to persist, with imported commodities likely to remain expensive through early 2026. While a slight seasonal easing may occur toward May, overall price levels will remain well above average, continuing to strain household purchasing power and limit food access.
    • Lebanon has been experiencing severe drought conditions since last year. Drought conditions were observed from August to November, and La Niña is likely to drive below-average rainfall between November 2025 and January 2026. As a result, groundwater and reservoir levels are likely to continue to decline.
    • Drought conditions have negatively affected agricultural productivity. This includes the irrigated summer season, which ended in October with below-average production, as both surface and groundwater sources were dry. The drought has also delayed land preparation for the main winter rainfed season (October–December). Cereals and legumes are typically sown with the onset of the November rains, but this year’s late and below-average rainfall has resulted in delayed and reduced planting, especially in eastern areas including Bekaa and Baalbek–El Hermel. In South and El-Nabatieh, damaged irrigation networks combined with UXO risks, prevent farmers from accessing irrigation and fields, sharply limiting land preparation and planting activities and also reducing expected winter production.
    • Agricultural labor opportunities are constrained by the below-average 2025 summer harvest and delayed start of the 2025/2026 winter season. Unfavorable production reduced income for poor farming households and reduced seasonal labor opportunities for poor and refugee households. Typically, seasonal agricultural labor demand increases in November for land preparation and early planting for the winter cereal and legume season; however, agricultural labor opportunities are atypically low this year due to delayed rains, lack of irrigation, and insecurity. Reduced labor income during the current planting season limits food access entering the winter months and into early 2026. Other sources of income, such as seasonal construction work, are also constrained as the weather becomes colder.
    • High costs for non-food essentials in November are further constraining food access, as households adjust budgets by buying cheaper and less preferred foods, reducing portion sizes, and relying more heavily on credit. The cost of water, fuel, and utilities remains atypically high countrywide. Drought and infrastructure damage have sharply reduced municipal water supply in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, forcing many households to rely on trucked water, now costing around 60 percent more than pre-drought levels. In conflict-affected South and El-Nabatieh, market functionality continues to be disrupted, contributing to localized price volatility and supply constraints. High essential expenditures reduce the share of income available for food at a time when food prices remain elevated.
    • Broadly, food security across Lebanon is strained. Even in areas where markets have largely recovered at the national level, localized access constraints and weak purchasing power continue to limit households' ability to meet minimum food needs. Poor households are increasingly deploying negative coping strategies to meet their food needs, including relying on informal credit and reducing meal frequency and quality. The seasonal increase in winter heating and fuel needs beginning in November will further strain already tight budgets. Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) data, collected through telephone-based surveys that primarily sampled agricultural households, was published from the 2026 Lebanon Response Plans in October and indicates moderate to severe food insecurity in many areas, including Baalbek (59 percent), Marjaayoun (57 percent), El-Nabatieh (45 percent), Bint Jbeil (46 percent), and Sour (36 percent).
    • According to the Food Security Cluster Dashboard, 2.1 million people received humanitarian food assistance between January and September 2025.Budgetary constraints remain a challenge for humanitarian assistance. Given ongoing conflict impacts, prolonged drought, below-average harvests, limited winter cultivation, reduced labor income, and high essential costs, humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to remain high through mid-2026. 

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Lebanon Key Message Update November 2025: Water scarcity from conflict and drought drive food insecurity in Lebanon, 2025.

    This Key Message Update provides a high-level analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography. Learn more here.

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