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Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected to persist into early 2025

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected to persist into early 2025

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  • Key Messages
  • Outlook by country
  • Most likely food security outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance
  • Key Messages
    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Afghanistan from June to September in multiple areas across the country. Overall, the areas of highest concern include the central and northeastern highlands; earthquake-affected households in Herat; returnees from Pakistan residing in the south and east of the country; flood-affected households in the northeast, north, and west; and poor households in urban areas. Poor macroeconomic conditions and the impact of weather shocks continue to constrain access to food and income for poor households. Humanitarian food assistance needs will likely persist through at least January 2025. However, household food access is expected to improve through the May through September harvest period.  
    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in northern and northeastern Lebanon and are likely to persist through at least September. Poor households and refugees in the north and northeast are facing poor macroeconomic conditions compounded by well above-average food prices and limited income-earning opportunities amid reductions in humanitarian food assistance. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through at least January 2025 among poor and displaced households in southern Lebanon. The ongoing conflict in southern Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has displaced over 98,000 people from early October through mid-July, driving below-average harvests and limiting labor opportunities. Climate models forecast extremely high temperatures from July to September, followed by below-average rainfall at the onset of the rainy season in November. A poor start to the season across the country is likely to negatively impact the harvest, water availability, and rangeland carrying capacities.  
    • In Yemen, lasting impacts of protracted conflict on livelihoods and the economy are being exacerbated by recent escalation in economic warfare between the major parties to the conflict, largely counteracting positive impacts of the decline in conflict levels since the 2022 truce. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist through at least January 2025 in the Sana’a-Based Authority (SBA) areas, despite typical seasonal improvements from late September to November. Protracted economic contention with the internationally-recognized government (IRG), coupled with impacts of the July to September semi-lean season, continue to limit earning-opportunities for poor households. The pause in the WFP’s general food assistance, ongoing since December, has eliminated an important food source from poor households in SBA areas. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are prevalent in IRG-controlled areas facing impacts of continuous currency depreciation, lack of income, and high food prices. As consumption gaps continue to expand, food insecurity outcomes are likely to shift to Emergency (IPC Phase 4), including households with limited income sources and those overwhelmingly dependent on humanitarian food assistance. 
    • While Gaza is not a regularly monitored FEWS NET country and therefore not typically included in regional summaries, FEWS NET’s targeted analyses on Gaza can be accessed here. To prevent widespread loss of life, an immediate cessation of hostilities is required, alongside a large-scale, multisectoral response with unrestricted access to populations in need. 
    Outlook by country

    Afghanistan

    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Afghanistan from June to September. Recent flooding, the lingering impacts of drought, and poor macroeconomic conditions are hindering household access to food and income. Household food access is expected to improve with the ongoing harvest in most of the country's lower-elevation areas, supported by typical seasonal income improvements associated with the availability of casual labor opportunities. However, households affected by recent floods in northeastern, northern, and western parts of the country are likely in need of emergency humanitarian food assistance following the loss of their crops and livestock.  
    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in some areas from October to January, while other areas remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Forecasted below-average rainfall in late 2024 is expected to impact agricultural labor opportunities, but households are still likely to plant winter wheat at average rates to try and maximize production. Acute food insecurity will likely increase seasonally during this period as household access to income-earning opportunities declines in the winter, particularly in urban areas and some parts of the northern and central highlands.  
    • The areas of highest concern include the central and northeastern highlands, urban areas, earthquake-affected households in Herat, and returnees from Pakistan located largely in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to increase seasonally through the projection period, particularly during the winter as households deplete their food stocks from the 2023/24 harvest in a context of limited income-earning opportunities. As the lean season begins to peak in early 2025, an estimated 8 to 9 million people will still need food assistance by January.  

    For more information, including events that would change the most likely scenario, see the Afghanistan Food Security Outlook from June 2024 – January 2025. 

    Yemen 

    • In Yemen, lasting impacts of protracted conflict on livelihoods and the economy are being exacerbated by recent escalation in economic warfare between the major parties to the conflict, largely counteracting positive impacts of declining conflict levels which had persisted following the end of 2022 truce. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist nationwide, with assistance needs peaking in the range of 18.0-18.99 million people during the August-September period, prior to the main harvest. 
    • In rural areas, the favorable March-May first rainy season and stable fuel availability/prices are benefiting the agricultural sector and creating relatively more agricultural job opportunities compared to last year. However, farmers are still struggling with high input costs which limit production capacity. Meanwhile, the ongoing economic slowdown and associated challenges in the construction sector are further limiting income-earning opportunities for millions of casual laborers
    • Across areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA), all WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance has been paused since December 2023, affecting 9.5 million beneficiaries. Despite seasonal improvements in food availability from harvests in late September to November, food from own-production is limited and insufficient to mitigate food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist, with the worst outcomes expected in areas where more than 50 percent of the population previously received assistance. 
    • Millions of households in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG) are also expected to face persisting food consumption gaps due to severely poor economic conditions characterized by currency depreciation, high food prices, and lack of income-earning opportunities. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes will remain widespread, with some households expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly those who lack food and income sources and are fully dependent on assistance.  

    For more information, including events that would change the most likely scenario, see the Yemen Food Security Outlook from June 2024 – January 2025. 

    Remotely monitored countries 

    Lebanon 

    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in southern, northern, and northeastern Lebanon from June to September. In the South, the ongoing conflict negatively impacted the harvest and limited labor opportunities, while in the North and northeast, poor Lebanese and refugees are facing reported reductions in humanitarian food assistance , limited access to income-earning opportunities, and high food prices amid the poor macroeconomic conditions.  
    • Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in southern Lebanon from October to January, as the conflict in the South continues to impact access to agricultural labor opportunities during the start of the 2024/25 production season. Meanwhile, high competition over labor opportunities and poor economic conditions are expected to keep refugee households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the North and northeast. However, area-levelStressed (IPC Phase 2)outcomes are expected in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and elsewhere as economic activity is likely to remain restricted due to the ongoing macroeconomic crisis and limited income-earning opportunities for many urban poor households who rely on casual labor or humanitarian food assistance as a main or secondary income source.  
    • The areas of highest concern are poor households and IDPs in southern Lebanon and refugee populations in northern Lebanon who are likely to have limited access to income-earning opportunities.  
    • Lebanon continues to grapple with concurrent crises and faces chronic macroeconomic imbalances compounded by wider regional conflict in the Middle East and the cross-border fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. An estimated 1.0-1.5 million people will likely need food assistance through at least January 2025.  
    • The recent stabilization of the informal exchange rate at 89,700 LBP/USD is expected to support stability in the cost of the food basket while maintaining relatively low headline inflation. However, the absence of additional foreign funding by international financial institutions or donor states will likely prevent economic recovery in Lebanon and lead to higher consumer prices from October through January amid escalating conflict with Israel and persisting shortages of humanitarian funding. 

    For more information, including events that would change the most likely scenario, see the Lebanon Remote Monitoring Report from June 2024 – January 2025. 

    Most likely food security outcomes and areas receiving significant levels of humanitarian assistance

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Middle East and Asia Food Security Outlook June 2024 - January 2025: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected to persist into early 2025, 2024.

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

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