High food assistance needs and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) expected in early 2026

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through late 2025 in the central highlands and northern rainfed belt. A poor 2025 harvest and decline in agricultural labor demand due to drought have reduced household income and access to food. In early 2026, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge at the peak of the lean season in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces. Household access to food is expected to decline further during the lean season, resulting in large food consumption deficits. Atypically high levels of acute malnutrition are expected among children under five due to reduced food intake.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across the northern and western highlands until the start of the next harvest in May 2026. Poor households are expected to deplete their food stocks from the below-average 2025 harvest during the winter months, and the seasonal absence of agricultural and casual labor income will limit capacity to purchase food. At the same time, household income from remittances is expected to be low due to the mass deportation of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan. By May, however, household food consumption is expected to relatively improve with the availability of the 2026 harvest.
• The northern rainfed belt – particularly Faryab, Daykundi, and Ghor provinces – are the areas of highest concern. These provinces have been the most severely affected by the ongoing, four-year drought in Afghanistan, which resulted in the failure of rainfed wheat crops in 2025. These areas have also seen the highest influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan, who have increased the labor supply in an already weak labor market.
• FEWS NET estimates that food assistance needs in Afghanistan will be among the highest recorded since FEWS NET first began estimating the population in need in the country in 2014. An estimated 10.0 to 10.99 million people are expected to be in need of humanitarian food assistance at the peak of the February to April lean season. In May, once the harvest begins in lowland areas, the population in need will most likely start to moderately decrease as household and market food stocks increase.
• The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025.

Afghanistan's staple food supply is dependent on a mixture of wheat imports, primarily from Kazakhstan, as well as domestic production. Both food and cash crop production are important to rural livelihoods, with opportunities for labor linked to seasonal activity. Most agricultural areas have a mix of rainfed and irrigated crop production. Most crop production (75-80 percent) is irrigated, largely from snowmelt from the mountains using gravity or solar irrigation systems. In the rainfed areas of northern Afghanistan, rainfall during the winter precipitation season (October-March) and the spring wet season (March-May) are important for crop production outcomes. Meanwhile, in the lowland irrigated areas – responsible for most of the national-level wheat production – the amount of snowfall deposited during the winter months, as well as the rate at which it melts during the spring, are important for crop production. As such, the availability of sufficient water is important for both rainfed and irrigated crop production and, consequently, for food security in rural areas.

From September to December, land preparation and planting of winter wheat occurs, along with the second season harvest of rice and maize. During the winter (November-March), much of the winter wheat is dormant, but can be impacted by warm temperatures or fluctuations in temperature. It is during this time that snow accumulation in the highlands is important to monitor, as spring snowmelt is an important source of water for the winter wheat and summer crops. Beginning in April/May, as snow melts, households begin land preparation activities for the spring season, and harvesting activities for wheat begin in eastern and northeastern areas.

Household cereal stocks typically last five to seven months following a normal harvest with some regional variability. In surplus-producing provinces such as Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Helmand, cereal stocks can last up to seven months, as households typically have access to their own land and own-produced food. Conversely, in deficit-producing provinces that have limited access to land, cereal stocks from own production typically only last up to three months. Once households exhaust their own-produced food stocks, they depend on food from markets.

Afghanistan is prone to weather shocks, including earthquakes, floods, and, during La Niña years, a tendency for below-average precipitation. The last four (2020-2024) October to May precipitation seasons have been marked by drought conditions. The compounding impacts of consecutive years of drought, a stagnant economy, and high volumes of returnees have resulted in reductions in household assets, which were sold to access food, further reducing households’ abilities to cope with further shocks.

The influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan in early 2025 will further strain already limited labor opportunities. The situation is worsening following the September 6 deadline for Afghan deportations from Iran and the expiration of Pakistan’s Proof of Registration cards. Returnees often settle in urban areas with strained labor markets or return to their village of origin due to the high cost of living in urban areas.

A common source of income is agricultural labor. Better-off households will typically own larger farms that grow crops to be sold at market, while low- or medium-income households will work on these farms. Non-agricultural labor opportunities are typically concentrated in urban areas, and include construction workers, street cleaners, garbage collectors, and porters. Casual labor opportunities in rural areas are typically limited during the lean season, while second season harvests will provide some agricultural labor opportunities. Reliance on remittances has remained high and has provided a relatively stable source of income. However, deportations from Iran and Pakistan have reduced the inflow of remittances, leading to the deterioration of a key source of income for many poor households.

Regional economic pressures, including sanctions on Iran and increased returnee flows from Pakistan, have reduced economic activity, cutting jobs and wages in construction, agriculture, and informal sectors where Afghans typically work. Weakened economic conditions in Iran have further eroded the value of remittances sent home. Additionally, economic pressure has intensified the enforcement of migration policies, leading to the return of undocumented Afghans and further limiting remittance flows. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information:

•  Latest Afghanistan Key Message Update: July and August 2025
• Latest Afghanistan Key Message Update: September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Crop production: Provinces in the northern and western regions, including Samangan, Faryab, Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Ghor, and Badghis, were most severely impacted by the 2024/25 drought, where 70-80 percent of rainfed wheat crops failed. Crops that failed for human consumption are typically wilted and salvaged as livestock feed as a last resort for households to rescue some income losses. However, this year wilted rainfed wheat crops were of such poor quality, that farmers earned minimal income. Rainfed wheat and barley production moderately declined in other regions, while irrigated wheat production was near average.

Second season crop production is below average nationally, with subnational variability. Irrigated second season crop production, including spring wheat, vegetables, rice, maize, and pulses, is average in areas with adequate irrigation infrastructure (such as in Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar provinces). Compared to the previous year, orchard harvests, particularly grapes, figs, and pistachios, increased in well-irrigated zones due to groundwater extraction, but declined in drought-affected provinces. Rice and maize harvests were negatively affected in eastern regions in downstream areas, while harvests in northeastern provinces (such as Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar) were close to average.

Land preparation: Winter wheat land preparation and planting started in October and will continue through December. In severely drought-affected areas, notably in northern regions, land preparation is atypically delayed due to below-average soil moisture, pushing planting into the spring. Despite some land preparation, concerns remain about rainfed wheat planting, which depends heavily on upcoming precipitation.

Livestock conditions: Mixed pasture availability and fodder access are driving varied livestock conditions countrywide. The limited supply of fodder has resulted in worsening livestock body conditions in northern and western regions. In contrast, livestock in the eastern, southeastern, and southern regions remain largely stable despite poor pasture conditions, with only minor localized impacts from pasture degradation, water shortages, or limited feed availability. In these regions, livestock are consuming crop residues, fodder crops such as alfalfa, drought-resistant pasture, and purchased feed.

Limited income has constrained households’ ability to secure feed and prepare for winter, reducing herd sizes and income. When households are unable to secure enough feed for livestock, they will typically begin to sell their animals. Households engage in distress sales of livestock, which is a common coping capacity to allocate limited feed to other animals, resulting in reduced herd sizes. Currently, fodder and water scarcity force herders to make difficult decisions, with many compelled to either migrate in search of viable pastures or sell their animals to avoid total losses. Overall, livestock herd sizes have declined due to consecutive years of drought. Estimates from the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO indicate losses of up to 40 to 50 percent of herds in some of the most affected areas.

Livestock prices: Drought-affected areas face increased market supply and declining prices from distress sales, while less-affected areas maintain stronger prices due to limited supply and better livestock conditions. According to WFP, in Ghor, where severe drought and fodder shortages have worsened livestock body conditions, livestock prices are nearly 23 percent below the five-year average. Conversely, in Nuristan, prices remain 20 percent above both last year and the five-year average due to better conditions, healthier livestock, and limited distress sales.

Returnee influx: The large-scale influx of Afghan returnees from Iran and Pakistan is driving increased pressure on strained resources and intensifying competition for already limited income-earning opportunities. As of October 2025, 2.9 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since the start of the year, while around 250,000 Afghans have returned in October 2025. According to IOM data, most returnees have settled in Kabul, Kunduz, and Nangarhar provinces (Figure 1). While some deadlines (set by the governments of Iran and Pakistan) for deportations have passed, Afghans continue to return from Iran and Pakistan. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, around 7 million Afghans still reside in Iran and Pakistan and remain highly vulnerable to potential deportation at any time.

Labor opportunities: Weak labor market conditions have reduced the average number of working days per week in urban areas by 10 percent compared to September 2024. Agricultural labor demand during the September to October land preparation period has decreased as middle- and high-income households increasingly perform this work themselves rather than hiring laborers, notably in drought-affected areas. More significant declines of 20 to 40 percent in working days have been observed in Nangarhar, Khost, Takhar, and Farah provinces, where the influx of returnees is concentrated. Declines in income-earning opportunities are largely attributed to the influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan.

Economic conditions: Economic conditions remain weak; however, there are signs of moderate growth. According to the World Bank, external shocks continue to dictate economic performance, including sharp reductions in foreign assistance, prolonged drought, and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Inflation, as of September 2025, stands at 2.2 percent (up from -6.5 percent in July 2024), primarily driven by a 3.9 percent increase in non-food prices reflecting a recovery in domestic demand. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, reached 4.2 percent, further indicating strengthening underlying domestic demand.

Remittances: Remittances to poor households are below average due to the mass deportations of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan, rising visa costs, and employment eligibility restrictions abroad. Field observations confirm that remittances remain critical for households that rely on family members in Iran and Pakistan. However, the inflow of remittances from Gulf countries has remained close to average levels, mainly benefiting households in the southeastern and eastern provinces.

Humanitarian food assistance

Approximately 1.3 million individuals are likely to receive humanitarian food assistance through national winterization programs in September and October. In hard-to-reach provinces such as Ghor, Bayman, Badakhshan, Daykundi, and Nuristan, distributions are timed to conclude before heavy snowfall cuts off road access for the winter. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi are ongoing as households struggle with four consecutive years of drought. Some households are facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, likely those that had a near or total failure of crop harvests, do not own livestock, faced a sharp reduction in remittances, and have been unable to find income-earning opportunities. In 2025, rainfed crop production largely failed, reducing food and income for many households. As a result, households lack own produced food stocks and must rely entirely on market purchases to meet their food needs. Livestock body conditions have deteriorated due to a lack of fodder and land for grazing, resulting in an increase in livestock sales in exchange for food or income that can bridge food consumption gaps; however, income from livestock sales is lower compared to last year due to poor body conditions, further constraining poor household income. Purchasing power remains weak, where real terms of trade for casual labor have declined by 10 percent compared to September 2025, while a 25 percent decline has been reported in Faryab compared to the previous year. Additionally, the influx of Afghan returnees is adding further pressure to already limited labor opportunities. Food consumption deficits are ongoing due to a sharp reduction in remittances from Iran, below-average availability of agricultural labor opportunities, and worsening livestock body conditions, resulting in a reduction in household purchasing power and income. As a result, households are engaging in coping strategies such as selling productive assets and livestock, reducing essential non-food expenditures (e.g., health and education), taking on high-interest debt, and relying on informal credit networks.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in northern, eastern, and western regions as households face the impacts of four consecutive years of drought, driving no food stocks from own production and below-average casual labor opportunities. Poor harvests have left households without food stocks or surpluses to sell, forcing market dependence atypically early. Furthermore, purchasing power is constrained as incomes fall short of allowing households to purchase food. In northern regions, households dependent on remittances face additional constraints following the ongoing large-scale deportations of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan. In western regions, households face minimal food stocks, declining rainfed crop production, and constrained labor opportunities from returnee influxes. In eastern regions, households are market dependent with below-average casual labor opportunities and reduced income due to commodity export disruptions from Pakistan-Afghanistan border closures. In order to earn income for food purchases, households are engaging in coping strategies, including atypically selling livestock, selling land and seeds, taking on high-interest debt, and relying on community support and informal credit networks.

In contrast, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes persist in most southern and southeastern provinces due to above-average wheat, maize, and rice production that is supporting households in meeting their minimally basic food needs. However, households are unable to afford essential non-food commodities without engaging in coping strategies such as borrowing food and reducing non-food expenses.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are most likely across urban areas of the country. The influx of returnees to Afghanistan due to Iran and Pakistan’s deportation programs has resulted in high populations of returnees settling in urban areas. Returnees are adding additional pressure to the labor markets, as they compete for income-earning opportunities, resulting in below-average income levels and reduced access to food

• The onset of the 2025/26 wet season from October through December is anticipated to be erratic, with below-average precipitation. Despite the likely poor start to the season, cumulative precipitation for the October 2025 to May 2026 season will likely be average. Precipitation will most likely be average from January to May 2026, the critical period during which the majority of precipitation occurs.
• While drought conditions are expected to moderately ease between January and May, the likely favorable 2025/26 season, hydrological and meteorological drought conditions are expected to persist through at least May 2026, notably in the northern rainfed belt, marking the fifth consecutive year of meteorological drought.
• Snowpack and snow water volumes are expected to remain below average through May 2026, despite the forecast for average precipitation.
• Pasture conditions between October and February are expected to be limited due to the winter season. The likely average precipitation from February to May 2026 is expected to drive replenished and improved pasture availability as spring begins, although the lasting impacts of drought will likely prevent full pasture recovery.
• Land preparation and planting will most likely be below average for winter wheat planting in late 2025 due to seed shortages and ongoing drought conditions; however, this is dependent on storm tracks that may entice farmers to plant. Households that are unable to plant in the fall will likely plant in the spring, particularly for rainfed wheat planting in northern and northeastern areas. The spring wheat planting season between February and April 2026 is expected to be above average due to an average January to May precipitation season, but while planting will expand, employment opportunities will remain limited. Cumulative area planted for both winter and spring wheat is expected to be near average. Still, the rainfed wheat harvest starting in May 2026 is expected to be below average due to high temperatures and persistent meteorological drought conditions.
• Iran is expected to begin a second phase of deportations in late 2025, while Pakistan has a deadline of November 1, 2025. Despite the deadlines, the ongoing large-scale deportations of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan are likely to continue at the current rate through the end of the projection period based on the consistent expulsions of Afghans living in Iran and Pakistan to date.
• Returnees from Iran and Pakistan are settling in both rural and urban areas. Those who decide to return to their place of origin will likely reintegrate into agricultural livelihoods if they have their own home. However, returnees who do not own a home or land will be competing for other casual labor opportunities, typically in urban areas.
• Afghanistan’s economy will remain generally stable through 2025 and is expected to remain stable in 2026, with growth expected to be constrained by high unemployment, limited business and investment opportunities, and import dependence. Domestic revenue is expected to grow moderately while government spending remains stable.
• Availability for agricultural labor is expected to be below average through May 2026 as better-off households have lower purchasing power and are increasingly working on their own farms rather than hiring.
• Casual labor opportunities in urban areas are expected to remain below average, given high competition for already limited jobs and compounded by the high returnee influx. Typically, casual labor in rural areas is rare, as most individuals rely on agricultural labor.
• Staple food prices will most likely be stable at below-average levels (Figure 2), similar to 2024, due to stable imports (mainly from Kazakhstan), and a stable AFN against the USD. Due to greater geographic isolation, regional exceptions in the provinces of Ghor and Nuristan have the highest food and non-food commodity prices.
• Remittances from Iran and Pakistan are anticipated to continue at below-average levels due to the high number of returnees and limited labor opportunities for Afghan migrants, while remittances from Gulf and western countries are expected to be average.
• Livestock herd sizes are expected to remain stable at slightly below-average levels through the end of the projection period, with regional variations. A decline in herd sizes is expected in the northern, western, and southern regions due to a lack of fodder, poor pasture conditions, and disease, while herd sizes in central and eastern regions will remain near average through the projection period.
• Despite a slight decline in herd sizes and poor livestock body conditions, prices are expected to remain stable due to an expected increase in distress sales of weaker livestock. Distress sales in drought-affected areas are expected to increase market supply and drive prices down. In contrast, regions less affected by drought are likely to maintain normal market supplies, with prices remaining close to average levels.

Humanitarian food assistance

As of October 2025, no new funding commitments have been confirmed for food assistance beyond that month, and therefore assistance is not incorporated into the most likely scenario. 

In Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces, the acute impacts of drought are expected to be most significant, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected from October to January 2026 as households have some food stocks to consume and the ability to earn some income for market purchases before winter sets in. Households are conserving food stocks to last as long as possible due to the constrained ability to access income. Despite the stability in food prices, households are likely to face difficulty accessing market foods, as reduced income limits food access. Households are also expected to engage in coping strategies such as taking on further debt, atypically selling livestock, and reducing meal size and quantity. Some households experiencing the most severe impacts of consecutive droughts will most likely experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. These households had minimal to no 2025 harvest and face extreme difficulty accessing income, as they have either no livestock, access to remittances, and/or labor opportunities that are minimally available.  

By January 2026, most food stocks will likely be exhausted, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge in these provinces, coinciding with the peak of the lean season due to the compounding impacts of drought, the depletion of food stocks, and the absence of agricultural and casual labor opportunities. Food consumption deficits are expected to expand as households will most likely face extreme challenges in accessing food. Households had limited ability to stock food for winter amid declines in income and low own production. Income-earning opportunities during the winter months are typically limited in these areas and are expected to remain constrained. Households typically access income from remittances at this time of year; however, due to declines in this income source, purchasing power is expected to be low. Households are expected to rely on negative coping strategies such as selling their last female livestock, early marriage of underage girls, selling home or land, taking out high-interest loans, and resorting to begging. Levels of acute malnutrition among children under five are expected to rise and be at atypically high levels through at least April 2026 due to reduced food intake. In May, acute food security outcomes are expected to improve as the 2026 wheat harvest is likely to support improvements in food consumption, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

In the rest of the northern, western, and central highlands, including Jawzjan, Samangan, Sari Pul, Badghis, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely to persist through April/May 2026. The lingering impacts of the drought are expected to drive moderate food consumption deficits in these areas as households face difficulty accessing food. Poor households will likely continue to have below-average income, mainly due to reduced remittances from Iran, constraining households’ abilities to purchase food despite declines in food prices. Agricultural labor opportunities will likely remain limited until spring, though they are anticipated to improve moderately between February to May. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes at a minimum are most likely to emerge at the end of the lean season, likely in May, as households start accessing income from agricultural labor and the harvest gradually becomes available.

In the eastern region, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to occur during the projection period. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to expand during the peak of the lean season in early 2026. Lean season decreases in agricultural labor and reduced income from cross-border trade due to intermittent border closures are expected to further drive poor household income and low purchasing power, limiting households' ability to access food. The influx of returnees from Pakistan is expected to continue through early 2026, adding further pressure on already limited urban labor opportunities and basic services (such as health facilities and education centers).

In most southern and southeastern provinces, particularly Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, and Khost, average to above-average 2025 harvests and continued access to markets will help households maintain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through May 2026. Despite drought conditions, the second season rice and maize harvests in the south and southeast are anticipated to reach near-average levels, supporting food consumption among households. Households are likely to access food from own production and earn some income from crop sales. The erosion of purchasing power due to rising food prices and reduced remittance inflows will result in some poor households, particularly in drought-affected areas, experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the peak of the lean season.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are most likely across urban areas of the country. In urban areas with high returnee populations, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely. In these areas, returnees and the host community are competing for limited income-earning opportunities, resulting in below-average income. As urban households are predominantly market dependent, access to food is expected to be moderately constrained. 

• Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future.
• FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.
• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advanced information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Scale-up of humanitarian food assistance.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If humanitarian food assistance is planned and reaches at least 25 percent of monthly kilocalorie needs, and reaches over 20 percent of the population, the proportion of people classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the projection period would decrease to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!).

Below-average precipitation for the October 2025 to May 2026 precipitation season.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Below-average cumulative precipitation during the 2025/26 precipitation season would likely drive a below-average 2026 wheat harvest. Another poor season could mark a fifth consecutive year of drought, constraining rainfed agriculture and snow-fed water resources, such as rivers and streams, useful for irrigated agriculture later in the year. Additionally, this would continue to reduce annual groundwater recharge and lead to even higher demand for groundwater, which has been extracted at increasing rates during recent years of below-average precipitation. Overall, this would result in continued high levels of the expected population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes in the harvesting period starting in May 2025. 

Context

The fourth consecutive year of meteorological drought is ongoing across much of Afghanistan, with many areas not receiving a favorable precipitation season since the 2019/20 season. Over the last four years, not only has there been low cumulative precipitation, but snowpack and snow water volumes were below average, stream flows have decreased, and reservoir levels have declined to historic lows. The compounding impacts of multiple years of drought are putting increasing pressure on surface and groundwater resources countrywide. As of September 2025, groundwater levels countrywide are in the bottom 30^th percentile, with the majority of the country in the bottom 5^th percentile (Figure 3). Furthermore, the declines in water availability have negatively impacted irrigated and rainfed crop, vegetable, and orchard production countrywide.

Extended periods of reduced precipitation have had cascading effects on water availability across different regions and time frames. The drought's hydrological impact began manifesting in the northeastern and northern regions as early as May 2020, when water resources in these areas started experiencing sustained deficits. By February 2021, these cascading hydrological drought conditions had expanded to encompass the central, western, southeastern, and southern regions of the country. Streamflow has declined considerably, particularly in the Kunduz River and Helmand River, which bring water from central areas to the north and southwest. 

Pasture and water resources have become increasingly scarce as the drought intensified. Simultaneously, traditional water sources for animals, such as springs and shallow wells that pastoral communities have relied upon, dried up completely. Currently, fodder and water scarcity force herders to make difficult decisions, with many compelled to either migrate in search of viable pastures or engage in distress sales to avoid total losses.

As a result, the agricultural-based livelihood systems in Afghanistan are constrained, even in areas where livelihood systems are more dominated by irrigated crops. Households have had to sell assets, including productive assets like livestock, seeds, and tools for planting, to earn income for food purchases, undermining their future production potential and capacity to cope with future shocks.

Forecast October 2025 to May 2026 precipitation season

Despite the poor start of the season, precipitation for the October 2025 to May 2026 season will likely be average, as the majority of precipitation for the season occurs from January to May. Weak La Niña conditions began to develop in late September, with forecasts indicating continuation through December 2025 to February 2026. Typically, a La Niña results in below-average rainfall in Afghanistan from November to May. In January to March 2026, a transition to El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)-neutral is likely, and will likely last through at least May. Models suggest over 50 percent likelihood of below-average precipitation to start the season in October to December. While precipitation is expected to be below-average, it is possible for a large storm to come through the region, which could decrease accumulated precipitation deficits quickly.

In early 2026, while forecast models indicate equal chances of below-average, average, and above-average precipitation, the forecast provided by the FEWS NET Agroclimatology Team, which focused on global and regional climate drivers, forecasted ENSO-neutral conditions to return in early 2026. As such, it is most likely that precipitation for the second half of the season, January to May 2026, will be average; however, close monitoring will continue as forecast models evolve.  

Above-average temperatures are also forecast, which will likely lead to some drying out of soil and vegetation through atypically high evapotranspiration. In pastoral areas, the combination of high temperatures and poor precipitation is likely to substantially reduce pasture quality and water access. 

Impacts on food security

Prolonged drought conditions have significantly reduced agricultural production countrywide, but have particularly impacted several provinces, such as Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, Ghor, Badghis, Zabul, Nimroz, and Daykundi. This resulted in the near failure of 2025 production for income-earning crops such as rainfed wheat. Affected households are unable to sell crops at markets, a key source of income, and are not producing sufficient food for their own consumption. Drought impacts on agriculture are compounding an already weak labor market. Typically, low- and medium-income individuals seek agricultural labor on better-off households' farms. However, due to sharply reduced harvests, better-off households are no longer hiring laborers and are instead working their own farms. Livestock body conditions have significantly worsened due to minimal land for grazing and a lack of fodder, depleting a key source of income for households. As agricultural output continues to decline and agricultural wage labor becomes increasingly scarce, households are unable to purchase food at markets or produce adequate crops for consumption, driving deteriorating food security outcomes.