Below-average precipitation likely for 2024/25 season despite early season rainfall

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected from October 2024 through January 2025 in the central highlands and northern areas of the country as the slow recovery from three years of consecutive drought continues. These outcomes are expected to expand during the peak of the lean season from February to May 2025 as household food stocks deplete and households become market dependent. Food aid is expected to mitigate food consumption deficits with Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes likely in some areas. In addition, households adversely impacted by floods during the summer in northeastern, northern, and western parts of the country lost some of their crops and livestock, and are expected to be in need of humanitarian food assistance. 
• The second season harvest is expected to support food consumption, especially in northern, eastern, and southern parts of the country, leading to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes from October 2024 to January 2025. Simultaneously, food consumption gaps are anticipated to be reduced in the central highlands as potato production and income from livestock is likely to meet essential food needs until January 2025. However, recent woodcutting bans to prevent deforestation in local communities in Paktika and Paktya provinces are reducing income sources, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected through the end of the outlook period. 
• The northeast, southeast, north, central highlands, and main urban areas remain the areas of highest concern due to recent floods, woodcutting bans, lower than normal 2024 harvest, and likely pressure of returnees from Pakistan and Iran. 
• Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to increase during the winter and will reach its peak during February to April 2025 at around 8-8.99 million people. Agriculture and livestock-dependent households adversely impacted by the last three years of drought are the most vulnerable and are expected to face higher food insecurity. These households will not be able to meet their food needs due to below-average food stocks from own production and below-average income. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 28, 2024.

Strained economic conditions, a poor labor market, and limited recovery from the 2020 to 2023 droughts are resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes across Afghanistan through May 2025. Some areas of the country – notably the central and northern highlands and northern areas – are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to expand in the winter months as household food stocks are exhausted and labor opportunities decrease. 

Afghanistan continues to experience limited economic activity following the political transition in 2021. In the aftermath of the political transition, food prices rose sharply, driven largely by depreciation of the Afghani (AFN) against the USD. Over the past two years, however, food prices have been declining, supported by stable imports and the appreciation of the Afghani. The availability of labor opportunities – an important source of income for poor households in both urban and rural areas – as well as wage rates have remained relatively stagnant over the past three years after declining sharply in the aftermath of the transition. Competition for limited available labor opportunities has also recently increased following the forced return of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023. 

Planting has begun for winter wheat, supported by light October precipitation as the second season of harvest of maize and rice wraps up in lowland areas of the country. Some households will continue to access agricultural labor opportunities through the end of the winter planting period in December. Planting of winter wheat is expected to be near average. In the spring, planting of spring wheat will occur; however, due to the likelihood of below-average precipitation, area planted is expected to be below average (Figure 1). While some uncertainty exists, the 2025 wheat harvest is expected to be below average, given expectations for below-average planting, below-average precipitation, and below-average groundwater and reservoir levels negatively impacting crop development and yields.

Most of the second projection period, February to April 2025, coincides with the peak of the lean season, which will result in increasing food assistance needs in rural and urban areas. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to become more widespread across central and northern areas of the country. Humanitarian food assistance is expected to mitigate food consumption deficits in areas of the country resulting in Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. Households are expected to rely on decreasing food stocks along with some remittances and below-average livestock sales to access food. Overall income is not expected to be sufficient alongside food stocks to mitigate consumption deficits. This will result in more people in need of food assistance, notably during the February to April period. As spring begins, households are expected to start accessing labor opportunities as they become available; however, this will happen slowly. 

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely to persist in many eastern, southern, and southeastern areas, with the number of people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes increasing over the projection period. In these areas of the country, household food stocks and income from remittances and livestock are expected to support household food consumption during the projection period.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest: Afghanistan Food Security Outlook: June 2024 to January 2025 
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Afghanistan's staple food supply is dependent on a mixture of wheat imports, primarily from Kazakhstan, as well as domestic production. Both food and cash crop production are important to rural livelihoods, with opportunities for labor linked to seasonal activity throughout agricultural production and marketing chains. Most agricultural areas have a mix of rainfed and irrigated crop production. Most crop production (75-80 percent) is irrigated, largely from snowmelt from the mountains using gravity or solar irrigation systems. In the rainfed areas of northern Afghanistan, rainfall during the winter precipitation season (October to March) and the spring wet season (March to May) are important for crop production outcomes. Meanwhile, in the lowland irrigated areas – responsible for most of the national-level wheat production – the amount of snowfall deposited during the winter months as well as the rate at which it melts during the spring are important for crop production. As such, the availability of sufficient water is important for both rainfed and irrigated crop production and, consequently, for food security in rural areas.

From September to December, land preparation and planting of winter wheat occurs, along with the second season harvest of rice and maize (Figure 2). During the winter (November to March), much of the winter wheat is dormant, but can be impacted by warm temperatures or fluctuations in temperature. It is during this time that snow accumulation in the highlands is important to monitor as spring snowmelt is an important source of water for the winter wheat and summer crops. Beginning in April/May, as snow melts, households begin land preparation activities for the spring season and harvesting activities for wheat begin in eastern and northeastern areas.  

Afghanistan remains prone to weather shocks, including earthquakes, floods, and during La Niña, frequent drought. Three years of drought (from 2020 to 2023) resulted in household loss of assets which were sold to access food, further reducing households’ abilities to cope with further shocks. In October 2023, four large earthquakes struck Herat Province in western Afghanistan, causing mass destruction. More recently, flooding during spring/summer 2024 in northern, eastern, and southern Afghanistan following a historically wet March, April, and May resulted in the destruction of homes and crops, along with the loss of lives and livestock. 

Since August 2021, households have increased their reliance on cropping and livestock for income, notably in rural areas. Furthermore, tangible labor migration to western countries and reliance on remittances increased in both rural and urban areas in the country.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards

Weather 

Despite the anticipated La Niña forecast, recent light rainfall across the country has facilitated the winter wheat planting, except for some rainfed pockets in the north and northeastern areas (Figure 3). Heavy rainfall in late October was associated with storms and flooding in Herat Province, destroying greenhouses and vegetable production in the capital, Herat, and surrounding districts. 

Flooding

According to OCHA, between early May to early October over 104,500 people were negatively affected by natural disasters, almost all related to flooding. Ghor, Baghlan, Nangarhar, and Faryab provinces were among the worst affected. In Ghor and Baghlan around 32,000 and 17,000 people were negatively impacted, respectively. The impacts include disruptions to standing crops and livestock. In August, according to OCHA, the flash flooding associated with the monsoon rains severely affected eastern parts of the country, where around 20,000 people were negatively affected and experienced disruptions to their livelihoods. 

Economic conditions

Despite modest economic improvements in 2023 and 2024, economic conditions remain poor and stagnant amid deflation and the government’s lack of recognition in the international community. Economic sanctions persist and private investments are significantly decreased. According to the World Bank, annual headline inflation dropped to 6.7 percent in August, driven by food price decreases (by 11.5 percent year-on-year in August) (Figure 4). Non-food inflation dropped by 1.8 percent year-on-year. The decrease in food inflation is driven by improvements in supply chains and declines in global food and fuel prices. However, tariff increases, border closures, and anti-smuggling efforts have limited exports, thus the oversupply of food is also contributing to decreased prices. 

As of September, the national average diesel prices have been stable in recent months and near the four-year average. The temporary increase in diesel prices is linked to ongoing Salang Pass rehabilitation work where trucks now have to travel on dirt roads. Price increases have only been observed in diesel prices in Kabul, Ghazni, Nangarhar, and Nimroz provinces. 

The value of the AFN has remained relatively stable against the USD, ranging 70 to 72 AFN/USD since March. Moderate appreciation has occurred in other currencies. The limited supply of hard currency, UN induction of USD into the economy, improved supply, and the Central Bank’s implementation of monetary policy tools have contributed to the stability of the currency. 

The new government performed limited rehiring of former employees, especially former national security forces personnel (an estimated 500,000 people), stopped new hiring of women, is not permitting women to work, and decreased the salaries of female employees by over 50 percent. These changes will have negative impacts on purchasing capacity among affected households.  

Undocumented returnees 

Between mid-September 2023 and mid-October 2024, nearly 750,000 Afghans returned from Pakistan and are currently residing in eastern and southern provinces. According to the IOM, from January to October 2024 the inflow data shows over 858,000 people entered Afghanistan, while the outflow is higher (around 995,694) during the same period. 

In 2024, according to IOM, the number of people coming into Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan was largely stable; however, inflows from Iran notably increased to record levels in September (Figure 5). Between January to October, around 1.0 million Afghans returned from Iran, with most of the returnees settling in Ghor, Bamyan, and Herat provinces. During September, 255,404 people returned from Iran, likely due to pressure from the Iranian government to deport undocumented foreign nationals. 

The high number of returnees is leading to further competition in an already tight labor market in urban areas and wherever returnees settle. An increase in returnees is also leading to decreased remittances, a key income source for many poor households. 

Crop production: 

• According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), 2024 wheat production is estimated at 4,827,000 MT, an increase of 11 percent compared to 2023 output (Figure 6). In rainfed areas, predominately Faryab, Jawzjan, Sari-Pul, Balkh, and Samang provinces, wheat production increased by over 25 percent compared to last year. In the western region, mainly in Herat, Farah, and Badgis, wheat production increased by 10 percent compared to last year. After poppy crops were replaced with wheat, Helmand Province is the highest wheat producing province in 2024 with around 821,000 MT, followed by Kunduz with 423,000 MT. 
• The second season maize harvest is nearly complete in eastern and southern parts of the country, and yields are near average.
• The second season rice harvest started in September in western, southeastern, and eastern (mainly low elevation) areas. The rice harvest is finished in Baghlan Province and is anticipated to be completed in mid-November in Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar provinces. Rice crops are in good condition and production prospects are favorable. 
• In some lower-elevation areas, winter wheat planting has already started, with further land preparation and planting expected as the maize and rice harvests finish. According to FAO, until the end of March, around 700,000 farmers will be targeted for certified seed and associated fertilizer distributions; around 55,000 farmers in Helmand and around 44,000 farmers in Herat will be assisted. 

Livestock production: 

Livestock body conditions and productivity have improved compared to last year and the average due to sufficient grazing pasture in the summer and early fall months. In September and October, pasture availability started to decline with the onset of winter, leading to modest declines in livestock body conditions. Households have also started to stock fodder the winter. 

According to field information, livestock herd sizes have improved compared to recent years, but remain below average across the country, especially in livestock-dominant provinces such as Nuristan, Bamyan, and Ghor. Livestock herd sizes are near average in the central highlands and southern and eastern areas. Meanwhile, herds are lower than normal in the northeast, west, and areas of the southeast. Total national livestock population is below average.

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Macroeconomic challenges – including decreased employment opportunities, decreased remittances from Iran, and intense labor market competition in both urban and rural areas – are contributing to persistent below-average availability of wage labor opportunities. However, following removal of taxation on construction and petty trades, there have been modest improvements in casual labor in the main urban markets when 

compared to the last two years . The casual labor opportunities in rural areas are typically low while heading into the lean season, but the ongoing second-season harvest (mainly rice) has facilitated some agricultural labor opportunities in relevant provinces. In September, wage rates for non-agricultural labor were similar to last year and slightly higher (by 6 percent) than the four-year average. In September, skilled and unskilled labor wage rates ranged from 250 to 1,000 AFN/day (Figure 7). 

Amid a high unemployment rate and economic slowdown in neighboring countries (notably Iran), the flow of remittances has a vital role in maintaining the food security of Afghans. Reliance on remittances from Gulf and western countries has significantly increased over the past three years and has been a stable income source, especially for eastern, central, southern, and southeastern parts of the country. Due to recent forced deportations from Iran, the flow of remittances has been significantly reduced, notably affecting western and central highlands provinces. 

Market supplies:

According to MAIL, Afghanistan is expected to import around 2.5-3.0 million MT of wheat from external markets in the next harvesting season to meet its internal deficit. After Pakistani imposed border restrictions, the trade flow has changed to Iran, which now accounts for 30 percent of the total imports (an almost 80 percent increase compared to the first eight months of 2024). However, despite continued tensions with Pakistan, imports from Pakistan to Afghanistan are now smooth. 

In September 2024, food prices were generally stable compared to recent months but below last year at the same time and the four-year average (Figure 8). For example, wheat grain prices are nearly 20 percent lower than last year and over 30 percent lower than the four-year average. High-quality wheat flour, mainly sourced from Kazakhstan, is stable month-on-month but remains 7 percent lower than the previous year and 22 percent below the four-year average. The price declines since last year and the average are mainly due to the completion of local harvests, which boosted local wheat supply in June through August and led to temporary price decreases.

The prices of high-quality rice were stable, marking an 18 percent decrease from last year and an 11 percent decrease from the four-year average. Pulse prices are stable month-on-month, 9 percent lower than last year, but near the four-year average. The favorable rice harvest in Pakistan, smooth inflow of imports to Afghanistan with appreciated AFN, the ongoing pulse harvest, and expected favorable upcoming domestic rice production are the major drivers for these price declines.

The Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) food basket (89 kg of wheat flour, 7 kg of cooking oil, 21 kg of rice, 9 kg of pulses, and 1 kg of salt) was stable from August to September at 5,620 AFN. This represents a roughly 15 percent decrease from the four-year average (Figure 9).

According to field information, livestock sales typically increase during September and October (before the onset of winter) due to relatively improved livestock body conditions and a slight recovery in herd sizes; as a result, the supply of livestock has also improved. The average price of a one-year female sheep was 7,919 AFN in September 2024; a slight improvement of 6 and 2 percent compared to last year's and the four-year average, respectively. 

Follow this link for more information on prices in key reference markets.

Household purchasing capacity: 

Despite the very slight improvement in work availability and decrease in wheat prices, labor-to-wheat terms of trade (TOT) increased by 23 and 44 percent on average nationally compared to last year and the four-year average, respectively (Figure 10). Based on the prices of food in the WFP Food Basket (100 kg of wheat, 12.5 kg of pulses, 9.1 kg of vegetable oil, and 1 kg of salt), a single wage laborer who has eight days of work a week (two days per week are available on average) can only purchase around 50 percent of the basket items for a household of seven each month.

Due to the slight increase in livestock prices and significant decrease of wheat prices, livestock-to-wheat TOT increased by over 25 and 35 percent compared to last year and the four-year average, respectively (Figure 11). September and October coincide with the peak of livestock sales across the country, and livestock TOT has thus improved in livestock-dependent provinces such as Nuristan, Ghor, Daikundi, and Bamyan provinces, which have experienced more than 50 percent improvement in TOT compared to last year, and around 40 percent compared to an average level. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

In September, WFP provided emergency food assistance to 1.3 million beneficiaries, with approximately 42 percent receiving cash-based transfers and commodity vouchers. This food assistance helped vulnerable households address urgent food and nutritional requirements. Moreover, WFP supported 523,230 children under five and acutely malnourished pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls (PBW/G) by delivering specialized nutritious foods to treat moderate acute malnutrition.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Central and northern highlands: 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in the northern and central highlands and western parts of the country due to the lingering effects of drought and adverse impacts of natural disasters, mainly floods, on households' livelihoods. Households in these areas continue to have below-average income, mainly due to reduced remittances from Iran which is constraining households’ abilities to purchase food, despite declines in food prices. Seasonal short-term improvements in food access in Bamyan Province due to potato production and income from livestock is supporting moderate food consumption deficits.

Rest of country: 

Households in northern, southern, and eastern areas of the country are currently supported by food stocks and income from the main season harvest. As such, households are able to consume their own food stocks to meet their basic food needs, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. Income and consumption from second season crops, such as vegetables and fruits, are also supporting households in mitigating food gaps. Additionally, there is a stable inflow of remittances to southeastern parts of the country, and relatively higher employment opportunities in southern provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan. 

Due to government-imposed woodcutting bans in Paktia and Paktya provinces, households have lost a significant source of income from forest products. As a result of significant declines in households' abilities to earn income to purchase food, food consumption gaps are now ongoing, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

Urban areas: 

Households in some urban areas are experiencing food consumption gaps due to high unemployment rates and macroeconomic constraints; households will likely employ Crisis-level coping strategies to reduce their food consumption gaps and are also facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. In some urban areas of the country, the indirect impacts of the ongoing second season harvest is supporting increases in food access, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• Cumulative precipitation at the start of the precipitation season (October to November) is forecast to be below average, linked to expectations for La Niña conditions.
• Precipitation for the 2025 March to May spring precipitation season will most likely be below average.
• The 2024/25 precipitation season running from October to May will most likely be below average due to La Niña. 
• Snowpack and snow water volumes are expected to decline in September/October 2024 as is typical and remain below average in areas where snowpack tends to persist this time of year. Snow water volumes are anticipated to remain below average in most basins through May 2025.
• Above-average daily mean temperatures are most likely through at least May 2025. 
• Winter wheat area planted is likely to be near average, with northern rainfed areas at greatest risk of reduced area planted due to soil moisture deficits.
• Farmers who reduce winter planting will likely seek to compensate during the spring planting window (March/April in lower elevations and April/May in higher elevations). Overall, spring wheat planting is expected to be below average due to the likelihood of below-average precipitation.
• While uncertainty exists, the 2025 wheat harvest is expected to be below average, given expectations for below-average precipitation, below-average area planted, and below-average groundwater and reservoir levels negatively impacting crop development and yield.
• Vegetation and pasture will likely remain seasonally sparse through February 2025. In February/March, the forecasted high temperatures and below-average precipitation are expected to result in below-average pasture availability in most areas, as vegetative conditions remain stable or deteriorate. Vegetation conditions are expected to gradually improve, but at slower rates than typical, with negative anomalies expected to increase notably from March to May.
• Groundwater is generally at its lowest recorded level despite the recent season's (2023/24) precipitation. The imbalance between recharge and discharge is similar to that last year. If the extraction rate remains constant or increases due to the forecasted below-average precipitation, further deterioration is likely in the coming season. 
• The early winter months will likely neither be severely cold nor receive excessive snow, which will most likely extend the availability for labor opportunities in urban markets for about one month (through December).
• Livestock body conditions are expected to be typically low related to a lack of access to pasture and fodder due to the poor economy. Winter temperatures will not be atypically low, therefore winter livestock deaths in January and February should not exceed normal rates. Livestock body conditions are expected to improve to normal levels in the spring as pasture slowly improves (despite being below average). 
• Livestock prices are anticipated to follow normal trends and near-average levels through the outlook period. In the areas of highest concern in the central and northeastern highlands, limited access to other food sources is expected to drive excessive livestock sales, increasing market supply and lowering prices between January and May 2025. 
• Economic growth is expected to continue its slow trend over the outlook period. Additionally, the expected stability of the AFN during the outlook period is likely due to the inflow of US dollars through humanitarian aid, remittances (despite significantly reduced remittances from working in Iran), and the central bank's USD auctions. 
• Prices are expected to remain stable at below-average levels throughout the projection period. 
• Remittances from Iran are anticipated to continue at below-average levels, primarily due to forced deportations and limited labor opportunities for Afghan migrants, worsened by ongoing economic sanctions on Iran. The impact of already returned Afghan migrants from Pakistan is expected to suppress the labor market in the main urban provinces and lead to below-average labor income. 
• Afghanistan's borders will likely remain open for trade and transit throughout the outlook period. Imports of wheat are expected to be near average and sufficient to fulfill Afghanistan’s import needs. However, ongoing political tension in Iran and Pakistan might occasionally disrupt cross-border trade, especially during harvesting periods for fruits and cash crops; imports from Kazakhstan are anticipated to be normal.
• Casual labor opportunities in urban areas are expected to remain below average through the end of the outlook period due to high competition for already limited opportunities. Below-normal labor availability will persist due to poor economic conditions and high numbers of returnees from Pakistan and Iran returning to urban areas. 

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• WFP plans to assist over 6 million beneficiaries with a monthly half-basket ration from November 2024 to March 2025, accounting for 50 percent of beneficiaries' kilocalorie needs. Assistance will be strategically pre-positioned in remote and hard-to-access districts in highland regions, and in areas where road access is anticipated to close during winter months. Selected beneficiaries will receive a consolidated winterization ration for five months, either in November or December. In other targeted regions, distributions will occur monthly. Historical trend data shows a gradual decline in the numbers of beneficiaries assisted during April and May, but a substantial portion of the most vulnerable households are expected to continue receiving humanitarian food assistance during these months. 
• In addition, FAO plans to support a total of 728,400 households over the same period with essential livelihood support. This aid package includes wheat assistance for 20,000 households, livestock assistance for 8,400 households, and distribution of poultry, home gardening, and summer crop assistance to 20,000 households.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Central and northern highlands and northern areas: 

In areas of Faryab, Jawzjan, Panjsher, Daykundi, Bamyan, and Ghazni provinces Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely through May 2024. Savings from the 2024 harvest and food stocks are expected to support household access to food and income in the November to January period – which coincides with the start of the lean season across the country – and often a decline in causal labor opportunities, especially in central and central highlands provinces. However, as food stocks from the 2024 harvest dwindle and household reliance on market purchases increases amid below-average purchasing capacity, food consumption deficits are expected to emerge. In addition, the forced deportation of Afghan migrants has negatively impacted the flow of remittances from Iran, further contributing to food consumption gaps for remittance-dependent households. 

Planned food assistance is expected to mitigate food consumption deficits in many areas, notably Ghor, Badghis, Sar-e-Pul, Samangan, Nuristan, Paktika, and Badakhshan provinces, driving Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes throughout the projection period. However, in Badakhshan Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge in early 2025 as humanitarian food assistance is not expected to be sufficient to mitigate food consumption deficits. Furthermore, in Balkh, Bamyan, Maidan Wardak, and Uruzgan provinces, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge in early 2025, as households increase reliance on markets as household food stocks dwindle. Across these areas, households are also expected to engage in Crisis-level coping strategies. 

Rest of country: 

In the some northern, southern, and eastern parts of the country, income from second season crops such as maize and rice is expected to improve household food security, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through May 2025. Consistent vegetable production throughout the outlook period will also support stable income in rural areas of the eastern provinces such as Laghman and Nangarhar. 

Despite adverse economic impacts of the poppy ban which affected households in southern provinces (such as Helmand and Kandahar), considerable improvements in the security situation over the past three years and enhanced access to agricultural lands are expected to improve food security for the majority of agriculture- and livestock-dependent households. The cotton harvest is expected in March 2025; this high-value cash crop will likely contribute to improved household income and food access. 

In northeastern provinces such as Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar, favorable rice production is expected and anticipated to mitigate household food consumption gaps through own production and surplus sales. The majority of households will be able to meet their essential food and non-food needs without engaging in typical coping strategies, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

In urban areas such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, and Jalal Abad, economic impediments associated with high unemployment rates and competition over limited job opportunities are expected to result in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes until May 2025. The expected influx of returnees from Pakistan and Iran is likely to constrain food security conditions in urban settlements and will put further pressure on already limited casual labor opportunities in main urban areas. Due to decreased income-earning opportunities, poor households will likely continue to buy less nutritious/less preferred foods and consume less food. 

In April and May 2025, seasonal access to food and income from harvesting labor opportunities and crop production will reduce the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes nationally, with improvements in the severity of acute food insecurity in northern and eastern lowlands.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Average or above-average precipitation December 2024 through May 2025 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Average or above-average cumulative precipitation during the 2024/25 precipitation season would likely support an average 2025 wheat harvest, improving projected wheat production and domestic supply. This would result in a decline in the expected population in need in the harvesting period starting in May 2025. 

Average to above-average temperatures during the projection period 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If the outlook is associated with below-average or near-average anticipated temperature, it will help to support snowpack development, which will ensure sufficient water availability for the irrigation of crops during March and May before the commencement of the 2024/25 harvest. This would further decrease the population in need during the harvest and post-harvest period starting in May 2025. 

Higher than assumed number of returnees from Iran and Pakistan 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Over the period of the last year, around 1.0 million Afghans have been deported from Pakistan and Iran. Due to ongoing political tension with Afghan migrants in Iran, an even larger number of forced returnees from Iran would further deteriorate the food security situation in Afghanistan and increase the number of people in need through the outlook period.