March to May spring rains are expected to support national wheat production

• At the peak of the lean season, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are present in northern, northeastern, and western parts of the county following the early depletion of food stocks from 2023's below-average harvest, limited income-earning opportunities, and a decline in remittances from Iran, which is keeping household purchasing power low. In urban areas, at least one in five households are engaging in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as high unemployment rates amid a large influx of returnees from Pakistan and Iran keep household access to casual labor opportunities low despite declining food prices. However, average March to May rainfall is expected to support wheat production and agricultural labor opportunities, improving household access to food and income. The start of the harvest in June is expected to improve household food access across the country, with area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes emerging in northern parts of the country as they recover from the multi-year drought. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to remain present in higher elevation areas, where the harvest does not typically occur until October, and household access to income for food purchases is expected to remain low.
• Although cumulative precipitation from October through February was below average across the country, deficits are declining following good precipitation in late February. Average precipitation from March to May will further reduce cumulative deficits across the country and support wheat production in the spring. However, forecast high temperatures and likely below-average snowpack may impact water availability for irrigation during the summer. Snowpack development in March and April will be important for water availability in the summer for downstream areas where irrigated crops are cultivated. 
• In January 2024, WFP assisted 7.4 million people through emergency food, cash, and nutrition support, distributing around 25,500 metric tons of food. At the end of January, WFP had 42,420 metric tons of food available in its in-country warehouses, while another 34,000 metric tons were either in transit or stored in WFP warehouses located outside the country, indicating there is HFA available through at least April 2024. Beneficiaries of the ongoing distribution of HFA will likely be Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) through at least the peak of the lean season. 
• In January 2024, staple food prices in Afghanistan continued a declining trend, with prices around 1 to 3 percent lower than December 2023 and 20 to 25 percent lower than last year. The price decline can primarily be attributed to the appreciation of the Afghan Afghani (AFN). Despite a 3 percent depreciation in January, the currency remains relatively stronger than before September 2023. This appreciation of the AFN has benefited Afghan traders who import various goods, including food items. Furthermore, the ongoing importation of food commodities from neighboring countries, particularly Kazakhstan, Iran, and Pakistan, has played a significant role in maintaining a stable market supply, contributing to lower prices for essential food items. 

Current Situation

Rainfall performance: Cumulative precipitation from October 1, 2023, to February 10, 2024, was historically below average, particularly across eastern and central Afghanistan, with far northern areas also impacted. In general, cumulative precipitation from October to February has been well below the 40-year average, with most of the country receiving less than 75 percent of normal precipitation with the worst affected areas receiving less than 60 percent of the 40-year average. However, in mid-to-late February, precipitation has been above-average to average, slowly reducing precipitation deficits and supporting water-stressed crops. 

 Based on ground information during the last week of January and early February, snow and rainfall are supporting the recovery of stressed crops in lower elevation areas. However, the precipitation in February and March is unlikely to make up cumulative deficits, leading to cumulatively below-average precipitation during the winter. This is also reflected in the near-record low snow-water volumes that have been recorded through much of the winter. 

Agriculture: Cultivation of winter wheat typically begins in October across the country, especially at lower elevations where most winter wheat is grown. Irrigated wheat typically makes up around 85 to 90 percent of national wheat production, with rainfed wheat contributing around 10 to 15 percent. Due to the historically dry progression of the 2023/24 winter precipitation season, the normal winter wheat planning process was delayed. Soil moisture was already low at the start of the precipitation season following the multi-year drought. However, farmers still planted, expecting better precipitation due to the ongoing El Niño. By late January, the irrigated crops planted in October were stressed due to a lack of available water for irrigation, low rainfall, and poor soil moisture. Above-average temperatures from October 2023 to January 2024 also resulted in early germination of the planted wheat in lower elevated areas of eastern and some parts of southeastern, northern, and northeastern Afghanistan, leading to a need for moisture earlier than normal during the agricultural season. However, average to above-average precipitation in late January through mid-February is supporting the recovery of previously stressed crops (Figure 1).

Normally, 70-75 percent of the rainfed crops are planted from October to November in lower elevated flat areas, with the remaining 25-30 percent of rainfed crops planted in the spring months (end of February and March) mostly in higher elevated areas. According to key informants, an estimated 10-15 percent of the lower elevated areas under rainfed wheat were cultivated in October and November due to the below-average precipitation through the winter. However, the improvement in precipitation in late January and early February increased planting rates, with estimates from key informants indicating that around 50 percent of the area typically planted to rainfed winter wheat has now been planted. Overall, the area planted to winter rainfed wheat is likely similar to last year but lower than the five-year average, which will likely result in a below-average rainfed wheat harvest. Despite some more recent improvements to soil moisture, the winter wheat planting window has closed as the planting window is typically quite short, and many farmers use oxen to till the land, which is slow and time-consuming. However, if precipitation is available, farmers will try to recover their harvest by planting oil seeds like sesame and pulses in February and March.

Markets: Wheat imports and supply from Kazakhstan have remained stable throughout the year. According to USDA reports, wheat flour exports increased to 1.99 MMT during the 2022/23 marketing year, a 12 percent increase compared to 2021/22 and 27 percent higher than the five-year average due to the drought's impact on production over the past few years. Unfortunately, there is no official data available on domestic production, but given the increased export volume from source markets, it's assumed that domestic production for the 2022/23 market year (MY) was lower than the 2021/22 MY and the five-year average. Relatedly, the World Bank reported that imports in 2023 surged to 7.8 billion USD, a 23 percent increase compared to 2022, with food imports accounting for 22 percent of the total, growing by 9 percent to 1.7 billion USD. 

Consumer prices are continuing to decline, driven mainly by reduced aggregated demand. Other factors contributing to the decline in prices are the appreciation of the Afghan Afghani (AFN), depletion of household savings due to limited income-earning opportunities and a high unemployment rate, lower public spending, and loss of farmers' income from opium. In December 2023, the World Bank reported that headline inflation in Afghanistan reached -9.7 percent year-on-year (Y-o-Y), primarily driven by a 14.5 percent Y-o-Y decline in food prices and a 4.2 percent Y-o-Y decline for non-food goods. Relatedly, core inflation, excluding food and energy, also declined by 6 percent compared to last year. The decline in prices is improving household purchasing power.

Staple food prices have largely continued to decline. In January 2024, low-quality wheat flour was retailing at around 28 AFN/kg nationally, around 29 percent lower than last year and 32 percent lower than the three-year average (Figure 2). Similar price declines have been observed for wheat grain and cooking oil. However, the price of pulses is similar to the three-year average. The decline in prices is attributed to the stability of the AFN, stable market supply, and market control prices by the current government. Relatedly, imported wheat flour prices declined slightly and are 34 percent lower than last year and 29 percent lower than the five-year average. Compared to last year, a significant decline in the prices (35-40 Percent) of wheat flour was reported from central highland provinces such as Bamyan and Daikundi and the north that were adversely impacted by the drought last year. 

In January, the monthly cost of the national average WFP Food Basket remained relatively stable compared to December 2023 at 5,321 AFN (73.48 USD), with the price of the food basket on average around 24 percent lower than last year and 19 percent lower than the three-year average. However, the price of the WFP food basket did increase by around 5 to 7 percent in Jawzjan and Takhar due to atemporary supply shortage in the market. Often, the price of wheat flour is a key driver in price variations, with the main fluctuations in the prices of food baskets often associated with changes in its price. 

Labor opportunities and wages: In January 2024, casual labor opportunities declined to an average of 1.9 days per week, down from 2.1 days in December 2023 (Figure 3). However, the decline in labor opportunities is largely seasonal and typical during winter, as very few labor opportunities are available in the country's main urban markets. Nevertheless, the number of working days available is 17 percent higher than the three-year average of 1.6 days a week and around 18 percent higher than last year. The improvement in the number of days per week is likely associated with temporary casual labor opportunities due to the implementation of some construction work run by the government. Generally, wage rates for skilled and unskilled laborers have largely remained stable since May 2020, with wages in January 2024 around 5 percent higher than the three-year average and 3 to 5 percent higher than January 2023 (Figure 4).

Terms of Trade: In January 2024, households can purchase around 10kg more wheat grain each week compared to last year (Figure 5). On average, nationally, households engaged in unskilled labor work around two days a week and earn around 306 AFN (4.23 USD) per day of labor. With the decline in wheat grain prices, a household of seven with one earner can purchase around 21 kilograms a week, enough kilocalories to feed the household for five days if they only eat wheat grain. However, a household must earn around 5,320 AFN monthly (73.47 USD) to afford the WFP Food Basket. Given the low wheat prices and that a week's worth of wages can purchase enough wheat grain to satisfy five days of kilocalorie needs, poor households are likely to reduce their diet diversity and eat smaller meals to meet their food needs. Overall, although household purchasing power is improving due to the decline in food prices, household access to labor remains the main constraint to household food access. Generally, a household of seven likely needs at least two earners, each working at least two days a week to afford the WFP Food Basket (Figure 6).

However, WFP's data for January 2024 indicates that the weekly casual labor earnings-to-wheat grain terms-of-trade in Laghman, Badakhshan, and Paktika declined due to limited access to labor opportunities. Poor households in these areas are likely relying on savings, relying on credit, borrowing from family and friends, or selling assets to meet their food needs as labor opportunities decline in the winter. 

Livestock: As a result of the early depletion of pasture and grazing areas last year and below-average straw availability following below-average domestic production, fodder availability for livestock in January and February, the peak of the lean season, is at below normal levels, which is negatively impacting livestock body conditions. Overall, herd sizes remain at below-normal levels as households are still recovering their herd sizes following the drought, but herd sizes are near average levels in the eastern, northeastern, and some parts of the southeast that were not impacted by the drought. According to field reports, the livestock sector has been significantly impacted by the drought in northern (Samangan, Faryab, and Jawzjan) provinces due to a lack of fodder and insufficient drinking water during the winter and the peak of the lean season, resulting in poor body condition and productivity. 

According to WFP, as of January 2024, national average livestock prices remained stable compared to December 2023 but were around 50 percent higher than in January 2023. However, livestock prices in Nuristan, Samangan, Balkh, Faryab, Zabul, and Herat declined by 5 to nearly 40 percent in the last month and are 5 to 33 percent lower compared to last year due to the impact of the drought. In Nuristan, the nearly 40 percent decline in livestock prices from December to January is due to high market supply and low demand following a significant spike in prices in October when livestock prices rose to 9000 AFN per sheep (124.29 USD), with prices declining rapidly since then. Often, livestock prices spike ahead of the winter season due to higher demand for meat. In January 2024, livestock were sold for 3,800 AFN (52.48 USD) compared to 4,000 AFN in January 2023. 

In general, the livestock-to-wheat grain terms-of-trade (TOT) has remained stable nationally compared to December 2023 but is 52 and 38 percent higher than the TOT last year and the three-year average, driven by the decline in wheat grain prices alongside stable livestock prices. However, the livestock-to-wheat grain TOT has declined by 10-20 percent in Bamyan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, Saripul, Badakhshan, Takhar, and Badghis compared to last month due to declines in livestock prices as households struggle to find feed and fodder for their livestock. 

Remittances: Ongoing economic constraints and higher unemployment rates in the public and private sectors have increased the reliance on remittances, particularly from Iran, the Gulf, and Western countries where the Afghan diaspora is located. According to field information, the recent arrival of returnees from Iran and seasonally limited labor opportunities in Iran have negatively impacted the inflow of remittances from there since September 2023. However, remittances to rural areas, based on information from key informants, indicate that remittances from Western countries and the Gulf to most of the rural areas of Afghanistan have remained stable due to labor opportunities and no significant change in the policies and regulations of host countries regarding migrants. 

Undocumented Returnees: According to IOM and UNHCR joint reports, from September 15, 2023, to January 27, 2024, around 508,600 Afghani have returned through the Torkam and Spin Boldak border crossings following Pakistan's enforcement of repatriation of undocumented migrants. Reports indicate that the influx is largely made up of forced returnees and a large number of deportations. The number of individuals crossing these official border points is back to pre-crisis levels, but partners are continuing to monitor the situation closely to anticipate any future influx. Humanitarian partners have progressively scaled up and adjusted operations at Spin Boldak and Torkham Border Points in coordination with the government to respond to the increase in returnees since mid-September 2023. Currently, the capacity of partners at these locations allows for the provision of assistance on the day of arrival, with around 95 percent of returnees receiving assistance. In addition to the Consortium partners' response, the government provides each family with cash assistance of 10,000 AFN (138 USD) and a sim card. Cumulative data collected by partners during the provision of assistance at the Spin Boldak and Torkham border crossing points indicate that nearly 90 percent of returnees aim to return to their provinces of origin, with just over 80 percent planning to resettle to their district of origin. Most returnees aim to resettle in Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kunar, Kabul, and Kunduz.

Undocumented returns from Iran are also higher than in 2022/23 following ongoing political tensions between Afghanistan and Iran. In January 2024, there were 82,864 undocumented returns compared to 65,702 in January 2023, around a 26 percent increase. From September 2023 to January 2024, there have been around 501,000 undocumented returns from Iran, around a 15 percent increase compared to September 2022 to January 2024. 

According to the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, almost 2.4 million people have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran since August 2021, of which only 6 percent have returned to their place of origin, with most still residing in urban areas of the country. The large influx of returnees leads to increased competition for labor opportunities as households seek to earn income for food purchases. 

Nutrition: Currently, FEWS NET does not have access to any new data on nutrition outcomes at the national level; however, the ongoing lean season coupled with macroeconomic impediments, ongoing recovery from the drought, and reports of limited access to nutritious foods, particularly for recent returnees, have raised concerns about potential increases in acute malnutrition rates. In 2023, UNICEF screened over 15 million children under the age of five through mobile and fixed health facilities, out of which 715,000 children (57 percent girls) were admitted for treatment with severe wasting. This would indicate that around 4.8 percent of the children screened had severe wasting. UNICEF also states that although there was a 20 percent increase in the number of children treated for severe wasting in 2023 compared to 2022, it is attributed to improved access and coverage of nutrition interventions. 

Humanitarian Assistance: In January 2024, WFP provided food and cash assistance to around 7.4 million people across the country, compared to January 2023, when around 15 million people were targeted. According to the winterization plan, WFP has scaled up its assistance to 7.4 million people each month with food assistance. In 2023, WFP targeted around 19 million people nationwide with emergency food, cash, and livelihood support, compared to around 23 million in 2022. Since September 2023, WFP has provided around 308,595 returnees from Pakistan with fortified biscuits and food, multi-purpose cash, cash for food, and nutritional assistance. 

Current Food Security Outcomes

In February, the peak of the lean season, household food access is impacted by a high unemployment rate and limited access to casual labor opportunities, leading to poor purchasing power despite the decline in food prices. Additionally, a relative decline in remittances from Iran limits households in northern Afghanistan from an important source of income during the lean season. As the lean season peaks, poor households are increasing their engagement in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to meet their food needs, particularly in the northern, western, and central highlands. In urban areas, the continued deflation of food commodity prices is providing short-term relief to households, but the limited number of days of available work for casual labor-dependent households and increased competition for opportunities following the influx of returnees are keeping household purchasing power low. As the lean season peaks, humanitarian assistance continues to help poor households in urban and rural areas meet their food needs.  

The recent returnees from Pakistan and Iran remain one of the more food-insecure populations, particularly in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, where many returnees are located before moving on to their areas of origin. Most of the forced returnees are poor households dependent on casual labor opportunities, but a lack of reliable labor opportunities limits their ability to restore their livelihoods. Many returnees continue to rely on humanitarian assistance from relief organizations at the borders as they slowly restore their livelihoods. In the border areas with Iran, such as Ghor, Bamiyan, and Daikundi provinces, the reduction in remittances from Iran following the influx of returnees is likely impacting household earnings and access to an important source of income for food purchases. Many returnees and their families are likely facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes due to limited access to labor for income despite the decline in food prices. 

Assumptions

The most likely scenario from February to September 2024 is based on the following national-level assumptions:

• Precipitation for the 2023/24 winter wet season, from October 2023 to March 2024, is most likely to be below average with areas of average in Afghanistan. Average precipitation in Afghanistan is most likely for the March to May 2024 Spring wet season. Spring rains are expected to have normal timing and distribution, with minimal adverse impact on typical agricultural activities through flooding.
• Rainfed winter crop conditions are expected to be below normal across Afghanistan due to cumulatively below-average precipitation. However, crop conditions will likely improve in the March to May season with near-average precipitation.
• Rainfed spring wheat planting is anticipated to be near average given the average precipitation forecast for the spring season from March to May spring wet season.
• Above-average temperatures will likely result in early snowmelt from March to May 2024. Temperature variations during January and February may lead to early blooming of stone fruits that can be damaged by following frosts and freezing temperatures in February and March 2024. 
• Snowpack, snow depth, and snow water volumes are likely to be below normal due to below-average precipitation during the winter. Early snowmelt due to high temperatures will negatively influence water availability in downstream areas. 
• Above-average temperatures during April and May 2024 will likely result in high evapotranspiration rates and potential moisture stress for pasture and rainfed crops. 
• Due to anticipated higher humidity levels, there is the risk of Yellow rust impacting the yield and productivity of wheat crops in the eastern, northern, northeastern, and southern provinces. 
• The spring rainfed wheat harvest is expected to be lower than normal due to the drier start of the wet season, a reduction in planted area for rainfed wheat production, low snowpack development that will be important for water for irrigation during the dry season, and high temperatures. However, irrigated wheat production is likely to be average.   
• National wheat production is expected to be below average due to the cumulative impact of three years of drought and the poor start to the October to May precipitation season that negatively impacted winter wheat planting. 
• Vegetable production in eastern, southern, and central parts of the country is expected to be near average, with the harvest likely in April and May. Cotton production in southern Afghanistan is expected to be near average as it was not significantly impacted by the drier start of the wet season and is supported by groundwater. Second-season crop and horticulture production is anticipated to be below average due to limited water access for irrigation, high temperatures, and lower-than-normal water availability in the main water basins. 
• Pasture is expected to regenerate to at least average levels with the average March to May spring rains and remain at those levels through at least May. From May to September, pasture conditions in lower elevation areas of the country will decline and be below average due to high temperatures, leading to high evapotranspiration rates. 
• Livestock body conditions are anticipated to be below average from February to April due to lower-than-normal fodder availability and lack of grazing areas, specifically in northern, central, and western parts of the county. However, livestock body conditions will improve seasonally through September due to improved access to fodder and grazing areas following the anticipated average March to May spring rains.
• Livestock milk production is expected to be below average nationally due to poor conception rates over the past three years. However, livestock milk production is expected to be better than last year as regenerating pastures during the March to May rains support livestock access to food. 
• Livestock prices are expected to be lower than the five-year average through most of the scenario period due to below-average body conditions, lower-than-normal demand, and below-average pasture conditions.
• Afghanistan's borders will likely remain open for trade and transit through the scenario period. However, ongoing political tension in Iran and Pakistan might disrupt cross-border trade occasionally. 
• Wheat and wheat flour imports from Kazakhstan are expected to remain average and stable through the scenario period. Afghanistan is expected to import around 2 to 2.5 million metric tons of wheat flour from Kazakhstan to meet market demand. 
• Imported wheat flour prices are expected to remain lower than the three-year average mainly due to the stability of the Afghani (AFH) against the USD, availability of wheat flour in the main market, HFA distribution, and stable supply from source markets. Prices will likely seasonally decline from June to September as the June to July wheat harvest reaches markets across the country. 
• Casual labor opportunities in urban areas are expected to remain significantly below average due to high competition for already limited labor opportunities in main urban markets through the end of the scenario period. Labor opportunities will remain lower than normal due to general economic constraints and the increasing number of forced returnees from Pakistan and Iran returning to urban areas for labor opportunities. 
• In rural areas, agricultural labor opportunities are expected to follow seasonal patterns through the scenario period, with seasonally low agricultural labor opportunities during the winter and then increasing labor opportunities through the spring and summer. However, low liquidity among better-off households is likely to keep labor opportunities low until the start of the spring wheat harvest in June. 
• Economic growth is expected to remain weak through the outlook period. Persistently high poverty levels, depressed aggregate demand for locally produced goods, and high unemployment rates are expected to reinforce deflationary pressures. The tight domestic money supply will moderate the continuously high trade deficit, inflows of US dollars through remittances and aid, and the central bank auctions of US dollars will lead to the stability or slight appreciation of the AFN during the outlook period. 
• Seasonal labor migration to Iran and Pakistan is expected to decline significantly due to unstable political tension between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries. Deportations from Iran and Pakistan are likely to continue till the end of the scenario period but with less intensity than the September -December 2023 period. 
• Remittances from Iran are expected to remain significantly below average due to forced deportations and seasonally below-normal labor opportunities in Iran for Afghan migrants. Remittances from Gulf countries are expected to remain near average levels due to stable labor opportunities. 
• Insecurity/conflict is anticipated to increase typically with the coming of spring months. Based on current trends, levels of conflict are expected to be higher than last year and significantly higher than over the past two years. 

Most Likely Acute Food Security Outcomes

From February to May, the conclusion of the winter wet season, the start of the spring wet season, and the peak of the lean season. This year, an abnormally dry El Niño winter precipitation season has negatively impacted the production of rainfed winter wheat. The decline in agricultural labor opportunities due to below-normal planted areas is impacting household access to income. However, declining food prices are slowly improving household purchasing power. The areas most affected by the below-average winter precipitation include Samangan, Faryab, and Badghis. Poor households are likely engaging in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to meet their food needs and rely on humanitarian assistance. However, from March to May, average rainfall during the spring will support planting for the spring season along with the rejuvenation of pastures. Poor households will likely see seasonal improvements in labor opportunities, supporting their access to income and household purchasing power amid declining food prices. However, in urban areas, limited income-earning opportunities and the influx of returnees from Pakistan and Iran are likely to keep competition for casual labor opportunities high, limiting household access to income for market purchases despite the decline in food prices. In particular, the urban areas of Nangarhar, Kandahar, Herat, and the central highlands provinces are likely to host most of the returnees. However, the start of the winter wheat harvest in May will improve household food access as wheat prices seasonally decline, allowing more households to meet their food needs. Overall, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to remain widespread in highland areas of Afghanistan from February to May, while lowland areas in northern and western areas will likely shift to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) as household food access improves due to a rise in labor opportunities for income, seasonally declining food prices, and the incoming winter wheat harvest. 

From May to September, the ongoing wheat harvest, seasonally declining food prices, and increased access to labor are likely to keep supporting household food access, with area-level Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes emerging in Herat, Jawzjan, Sar-e-pul, Balkh, and Panjsher as an increasing number of households can meet their food needs. However, in the northern, western, and central highlands, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to continue as poor households slowly recover from the multi-year drought that impacted the crop and livestock sectors. Additionally, lower than normal income from remittances, especially from Iran, and the increase of returnees will hinder household purchasing power in the northern highlands through the projection period due to increased competition for casual labor opportunities. 

Despite seasonal improvements in food and income access, high unemployment rates will continue to impact poor urban households' access to income, keeping market access low. High competition for labor opportunities, a limited number of working days a week, and low wages will continue limiting household food access despite declining food prices. During the May to September period, anticipated higher compulsory taxation of the government on medium-sized businesses and petty trades will limit the income-generating activities in the private sector and suppress a critical source of income for many households. Additionally, the influx of returnees from Pakistan will increase competition for an already limited number of labor opportunities in the labor markets, especially in Nangarhar and Kandahar, driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in urban areas. 

Events that Might Change the Outlook

Current Situation

Faryab province is located along the border with Turkmenistan but does not have an official border crossing to facilitate trade and imports. Rather, goods often come from the Mazar market. Around 70 percent of the arable land in the province for wheat production is rainfed. Faryab province annually yields around 150,000 metric tons of wheat, around 3 percent of national wheat production. Poor households in the hilly lowlands of Faryab typically engage in rainfed agriculture, cultivating wheat, barley, and sesame on small plots. Grains are sown before the winter and mature through the March to May rainy season before being harvested in the summer. Sheep, goats, and cattle ownership is common, but herd sizes vary by wealth group.

Access to arable land is limited, particularly for poor households with small landholdings ranging from 0 to 0.5 hectares and almost no access to irrigated lands. However, around 30 percent of the province's population and 60 percent of the lowland rainfed agricultural area participate in sharecropping, known as dekhani. Crop sales are an important source of income for all wealth groups, even though the yields poor households produce are insufficient to meet their food needs. Poor households are often reliant on market purchases for six to seven months of the year to meet their food needs. Even in good years, poor households will sell a small portion of their higher value crops or grain earned through in-kind payment to purchase cheaper grains and buy other essentials. Many poor households also rely on remittances from labor opportunities in Iran. In a poor production year, multiple male household members will often migrate to Iran for employment and send remittances home in order for family members to meet their food and non-food needs. However, Iran's tightening of border controls is increasingly limiting opportunities for migrant labor. Remittances from Iran constitute a major source of income for over 50 percent of the poor households in the province.

Over the past three years, Faryab province has been impacted by below-average precipitation, drought, and a decline in remittances. In the 2022/23 wet season, the province recorded a significant decline in rainfed wheat yields due to a lack of precipitation and untimely rainfall, leading to harvest estimates of around 50 percent of normal. The poor harvest and drought impacted household food access, leading to above-average reliance on market purchases and led to a decline in livestock body conditions and reduced dairy production. To cope with the poor harvest last year, poor households largely increased their reliance on remittances from Iran to get income for food purchases while also engaging in other livelihood coping strategies to meet their food needs.

The November 2023 to June 2024 wet season has been cumulatively below-average following below-average precipitation from December 2023 to February 2024 (Figure 8). The below-average rainfall resulted in many farmers being unable to prepare and plant their fields due to a lack of soil moisture, and those who planted with insufficient moisture risked losing their seeds before the start of the March to May spring rainfall. Cumulative precipitation during the 2023/24 wet season is also still notably below average as winter ends, with around 125 mm of precipitation recorded as of February 28, around 66 percent of the 2000-2018 mean, and lower than last year (Figure 9). The below-average precipitation is likely impacting rainfed wheat production as farmers in this area could not complete winter wheat planting before the closure of the planting window. Although there have been improvements in precipitation in February, concerns still exist for a below-average harvest in June amid the potential losses of planted seeds at the start of the season.

The poor households in the province heavily rely on purchasing food from the market. Still, the negative impacts of drought over the last three years, the decline in agricultural production, and limited labor opportunities are impacting household purchasing power despite declining food prices. The below-average precipitation at the start of the season limited agricultural labor opportunities, while most non-agricultural labor opportunities are located in urban areas, making it difficult for poor households in most rural areas to access employment.

The wheat grain-to-sheep terms-of-trade (TOT) for wheat and livestock (primarily sheep) in the urban market of Faryab province has fluctuated over the years. There has been a decrease in wheat and wheat flour prices, while sheep prices have been declining since March 2023. The rapid decline in wheat and wheat flour prices has led to a general improvement in the Livestock TOT (Figure 10). In January, the sale of a sheep can purchase around 245 kg of wheat grain, enough kilocalories to last a household of seven for around 60 days if they only ate wheat grain. However, these improvements have not substantially benefited the poor households in the rainfed wheat-producing areas, as livestock prices have declined and wheat prices in rural markets are typically higher than in the urban markets. In January 2024, livestock in Faryab urban markets was being sold for 6850 AFN (~95 USD), compared to 8500 AFN (~117 USD) in January 2023. This price is also the lowest livestock price since June 2020. The decline in livestock prices is likely driven by poor livestock body conditions due to the high cost and lack of available fodder that makes it challenging to sustain livestock during the winter months and increased market supply as households seek to maximize earnings. Relatedly, while there has been a general seasonal decline in labor opportunities, the decline in wheat grain prices is improving household access to food despite stagnant wages and labor opportunities. In January 2024, the wheat grain to casual labor terms-of-trade indicates that, on average, households can purchase around 25 kg of wheat grain each week, around six days of kilocalories for a household of seven if they only ate wheat grain (Figure 11). 

However, one of the more pronounced shocks has been the decline in remittances from Iran, limiting household access to an important source of income for food purchases. The decline in remittances is largely being driven by the Iranian government's decision to forcefully deport undocumented Afghanis, citing national security concerns, leading to more stringent border controls. The tightening of border controls has made illegal border crossing to Iran very difficult and created challenges for documented and undocumented labor migrants working in Iran.  

According to WFP, humanitarian food assistance is planned to be provided to approximately 30 percent of Faryab province's population through March, with rations equivalent to around 50 percent of monthly calorie needs. However, much of the assistance is often redistributed among community members.

With reduced remittances and limited income-earning opportunities, poor households are increasingly engaging in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to meet their food needs despite declining wheat prices.

Assumptions

In addition to the national-level assumptions, the following assumptions apply to this area of concern:

• The start of the wheat and barley harvest is likely to be lower than normal, but the forecast average precipitation during the March to May period is likely to improve crop conditions for later planted crops, with the harvest improving in June and July. 
• Food prices are expected to follow seasonal trends. Cereal prices will likely continue to decline with the start of the wheat harvest.
• Precipitation for the 2023/24 winter wet season, from October 2023 to March 2024, is most likely to be cumulatively near average in this area. Average precipitation from March to May is expected to improve pasture regeneration and access, supporting improvements in livestock body conditions in the area.
• Pasture regeneration in March and April will likely support improvements in livestock body conditions and milk production.
• The Iranian policy of forcefully deporting undocumented Afghan refugees, coupled with the pressure on wage working for Afghan labor migrants in Iran, is anticipated to decrease the inflow of remittances from Iran significantly. 

Most Likely Food Security Outcomes

From February to May 2024, poor households will likely increase their reliance on coping strategies to meet their food needs as limited access to agricultural and casual labor opportunities and a decline in remittances from Iran keep household purchasing power low despite the decline in wheat grain prices. As the lean season peaks, many poor households will likely continue buying cheaper and less preferred food, reducing meal sizes and frequency and compromising their diet quality and diversity to meet their food needs. To earn income for market purchases, poor households will likely try to sell more livestock than usual, but increased market supply and low demand will lead to lower-than-normal market prices. However, the worst-affected households are likely to engage in more severe coping strategies such as early marriage of daughters, consuming seed stock, and selling livelihood assets to earn income. From March to May, average rainfall will support crop production and the recovery of pasture, which will likely improve livestock body conditions. Additionally, milk production is likely to improve as lambs and kids begin to be born in the spring, supported by improvements in pasture and water access. However, limited access to income and a decline in remittances from Iran are likely to increase households' reliance on coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes to meet their food needs. 

From June to September 2024, most households will likely begin harvesting wheat, barley, sesame, and cumin, improving their access to food and income. However, the lower-than-normal wheat harvest, due to the delayed start of the wet season, will keep household reliance on market purchases higher than normal through the summer. However, the decline in remittances from Iran will keep household purchasing power low despite the seasonal decline in food prices. Many poor households are also likely to begin repaying past debt obligations accumulated during the drought, limiting access to their non-food needs. In general, although most poor households are likely to meet their food needs during the harvest period, at least one in five households are likely to continue engaging in coping strategies indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) to meet their food needs due to limited access to income for food purchases.