Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes or worse expected as the lean season peaks in early 2026

• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to emerge in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces in early 2026. Severe drought, depleted food stocks, and the seasonal absence of agricultural and casual labor will likely drive limited access to food. Poor households are expected to engage in severe livelihood coping strategies, such as selling last female livestock, early marriage of daughters, and begging. Households will likely face large food consumption gaps, driving atypically high levels of acute malnutrition.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to remain widespread, primarily driven by prolonged drought, reduced remittances, and limited labor opportunities. The February to April lean season marks the period of greatest food and income constraints. Poor households will rely heavily on markets for food, but purchasing power will remain below average. In areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3), poor households will experience moderate food consumption gaps. Conditions are expected to improve countrywide in May as the wheat and barley harvest begins, improving household access to food.
• Winter wheat planting has largely concluded across the country, though late and below-average precipitation has limited engagement in planting activities. This has driven a below-average total area planted of winter wheat, notably in northern and northeastern areas, compared to both last year and the long-term average. Updated international forecast models have no clear indication of average, above-, or below-average rainfall. While average precipitation is most likely to support spring wheat production, below-average rainfall could lead to a fifth consecutive drought and poor wheat production in 2026.

• Since mid-October, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure has disrupted trade and slightly raised food prices associated with higher transportation costs. Between November and December, food prices increased marginally, as alternative trade routes and new trade partners offset negative impacts. Livelihood activities in bordering districts have also been disrupted as they are heavily linked to trade. The FEWS NET projection assumes that the border closure is indefinite, lasting through at least May, adding pressure to an already weak economy.

  This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 25, 2025. 

• Precipitation: Early October to late December 2025 precipitation marking the start of the October-May precipitation season was characterized by atypically dry conditions in northern, central, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan (Figure 1). In western and southwestern areas of the country, precipitation at the start of the season was favorable. Southwestern areas of the country are typically arid and do not receive significant total annual precipitation to support rainfed production. Precipitation at the start of the season in Afghanistan is typically light; as such, absolute precipitation anomalies range only from below 100 mm to above 50 mm of average. Precipitation that falls from February to May is when most of the season’s cumulative precipitation occurs. As of late December, snowpack is largely below-average; in some northern and eastern parts of the country the snowpack is modestly above average. Overall, snowpack as of late December is higher than the same time last year.
• Land preparation and planting: Winter wheat planting is nearly complete countrywide, with below-average area planted driven by below-average precipitation and poor soil moisture conditions. The northern and northeastern belt, which accounts for a significant proportion of total winter wheat planting and production, did not benefit from December precipitation, though some other areas benefited from rainfall that allowed for planting. Northern and northeastern areas received light precipitation, which was insufficient to improve soil moisture to a level that would allow for planting. As a result, many farmers in these areas missed the winter wheat planting season. In western and southern areas where December precipitation was moderately favorable, particularly in Herat, Badghis, Helmand, and Uruzgan provinces, the improvements in soil moisture supported winter wheat planting. In some areas of the south, notably Nimroz and Kandahar provinces which received favorable precipitation, limited rainfed planting occurred as these areas are predominantly arid with low annual rainfall totals.
• Returnee influx and migrants: The influx of Afghan returnees from Iran and Pakistan continues to strain limited resources and increase competition for already limited labor opportunities. While some deadlines for deportation set by the governments of Iran and Pakistan have passed, the influx of returnees continues at the same rate. Between early November and late December, around 640,000 people were forcibly returned from Iran and Pakistan. Compared to the same period last year, returnees have increased by nearly 40 percent. Typically, at this time of year, members of poor households migrate to Iran for labor opportunities to send remittances. From early November to late December, about 100,000 individuals left Afghanistan for Iran and Pakistan, likely seeking income-earning opportunities to send remittances to their families. Compared to the same period in 2025, the number of migrants to Iran has sharply decreased by around 70 percent.  
• Border closure: The eight official border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan have remained closed since mid-October. The key border points between Afghanistan and Pakistan are Torkham and Spin Boldak, where the movement of goods is large, and livelihoods are closely linked to the imports and cross-border activities. The closure has disrupted key trade routes and livelihood activities. Among the most impacted areas are Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, as both heavily rely on cross-border trade, transportation, and daily wage labor (despite ongoing deportation efforts by the Pakistani government). Key food imports such as rice and vegetable oil are no longer flowing from Pakistan. However, the government of Afghanistan has sought to fill the trade gaps by seeking alternative trade routes through Iran and new trade partners such as India. Traders have been marginally successful in offsetting the negative impacts of the border closure.
• Staple food prices: Staple food prices between October and November only marginally increased and have yet to be significantly impacted by the border closure between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wheat and high-quality rice prices increased nationally by around 7 percent between October and November. Key food commodities from Pakistan – including rice, vegetables, and oil - slightly increased from October to November, driven in part by trade disruptions from the border closure in eastern, southeastern, and southwestern regions. While alternative trade partners have been found, longer transportation routes are driving up costs and food prices. However, price increases have been marginal as these commodities continue to flow through alternative trade routes, and stocks from the November harvest are supporting market supply. Wheat, prices moderately increased from October to November, with declines in domestic wheat production associated with the drought and increased demand from the returnee influx contributing to the increase.
• Labor market: Agricultural wage work seasonally declined in December, as winter wheat planting neared completion. Drought-related reductions in agricultural production have driven farmers to atypically hire fewer laborers. Non-agricultural labor opportunities, particularly in construction, have also seasonally declined. The border closure between Afghanistan and Pakistan has significantly reduced cross-border daily wage labor, such as loading and unloading goods, despite ongoing deportation efforts by the Pakistani government. This decline has restricted household income and access to food in eastern and southern regions.

Humanitarian food assistance

National winterization programs from WFP have been completed, with distributions in October reaching around 1.3 million people with humanitarian food assistance to cover three months. Beneficiaries typically receive five months of food rations; however, this year recipients have received rations covering only three months. Distribution efforts in remote provinces, including Ghor, Bayman, Badakhshan, Daykundi, and Nuristan, ended prior to severe winter weather, which typically blocks road access due to heavy snowfall.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Afghanistan Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Average cumulative precipitation is expected between February and May 2026, due to the anticipated transition from La Niña to ENSO-neutral conditions between January and March, prior to the start of the spring wheat harvests. However, there remains some uncertainty in international forecast models that point to equal chances of average, below-average, or above-average precipitation
• Soil moisture conditions will likely remain below average through the winter planting season, resulting in below-average area planted between November and January. Conversely, spring wheat planting between February and April 2026 is expected to be average due to forecast average precipitation from February to May.
• The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is expected to remain closed through at least May 2026, disrupting cross-border trade and livelihood activities, particularly in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces.
• Most food prices are likely to marginally increase due to the border closure, driving up transportation costs as new trade partners are expected to drive longer routes. Specifically, wheat prices are forecast to marginally increase as increases in global wheat supply and an appreciating AFN will likely result in generally stable market supply; however, increasing market demand is expected to slightly strain markets.

In the northern rainfed belt and central highlands, particularly Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi, provinces, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to emerge in February 2026, continuing through March. Poor households will likely exhaust food stocks before the lean season is complete, following consecutive seasons of below-average own production, and are completely reliant on markets for access to food. Income from livestock remains below average due to poor rangeland conditions, reduced livestock productivity, and increased reliance on distress sales. Labor opportunities seasonally decline during the peak lean season, constraining income-generating opportunities for poor households, limiting household purchasing power, and decreasing access to food. Additionally, remittances have been sharply reduced due to the ongoing deportation efforts from Iran and Pakistan. Households will most likely adopt livelihood coping strategies such as selling land or homes, begging, illegal migration, or taking high-interest loans. Malnutrition rates are expected to increase during this period as households are expected to face large food consumption deficits.

Acute food security outcomes are expected to improve in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces starting in May as access to food and income from livestock and labor are expected to seasonally improve, resulting in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The forecast average precipitation between February and May will likely lead to improved pasture conditions, which will improve livestock body conditions, providing households with a key income source to mitigate food consumption gaps following the lean season. Additionally, land preparation activities with the spring wheat production will support household access to some income for food purchases.

In the rest of the northern, central, and western areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through April/May 2026. Poor households are expected to face moderate food consumption deficits as they are nearly completely market-reliant with below-average purchasing power. During the peak of the lean season, remittances (the main income source)  will likely be below average. In spring, agricultural and non-agricultural labor activities will begin supporting household income until households are able to harvest in May. In May, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes at a minimum are most likely as the lean season ends, and households access food and income from agricultural and non-agricultural labor.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected across the eastern region. Despite the drought, some poor households in these areas have access to food and income from the rice and maize harvests, supporting food and income access. However, rising food prices and lower remittance inflows are eroding purchasing power, leaving some poor households — especially in drought-affected areas — facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the peak lean season.

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through May 2026 in most southern and southeastern provinces, particularly Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Khost. Households are expected to consume food from their own production, which is expected to support food consumption through the early lean season. Households are also relying on other off-own-farm income sources, such as petty trade and the stable flow of remittances from Gulf countries, to access income and food. However, these stocks are likely to be depleted, and the ongoing border closure, which is expected to increase food prices, is likely to limit households' ability to meet their non-food needs. In localized areas most dependent on cross-border activities, particularly border districts in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, some poor households are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as the prolonged closure increasingly limits income and food access. While the border closures have not resulted in an area-level phase change, the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes is expected to increase.  

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan reopens

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan reopens, household access to food and income would improve in Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Khost provinces. In rural areas, if the border re-opens, a resumption of cross-border trade would likely stabilize staple food prices, leading to improved household access to food. Additionally, the border reopening would also enable cross-border trade and improve income-earning opportunities, resulting in improved household access to income for purchasing food. In urban centers in Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Khost, the border reopening would ease market strain and increase household purchasing power as prices decline and income from labor increases. While seasonal declines in labor demand during winter will continue to constrain income-earning opportunities, the return of cross-border trade would partially offset these typical seasonal challenges. However, because of weak economic conditions and other factors driving worsening food security, urban areas will likely remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through May 2026, while Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will persist at the area level through May 2026. Overall, there would be a decline in the population in need of food assistance. 

Below-average precipitation occurs from January to May 2026 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Updated El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) forecasts indicate a transition from La Niña to ENSO-neutral conditions in early 2026, which has driven uncertainty in the upcoming February to May precipitation season. International forecast models indicate no tilt in the odds toward average, above-average, or below-average precipitation from February through May 2026. FEWS NET’s most likely scenario is average precipitation; however, in a scenario where precipitation is below average from January to May 2026, a fifth consecutive year of drought could occur, constraining rainfed and snow-fed water resources. Below-average precipitation would also reduce annual groundwater recharge and drive increased demand for groundwater extraction. Furthermore, the poor precipitation would drive reduced engagement in spring wheat planting, poor crop development, and an overall below-average 2026 wheat harvest.

If the wheat harvest is below average, it would limit seasonal improvements in household access to food and income. Reduced crop production would limit household food stocks. Additionally, reduced agricultural labor opportunities during planting and harvesting could constrain income-earning opportunities. Under this scenario, the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would remain elevated.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.