Widespread Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes as high inflation constrains food access

• Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist countrywide through September 2026, driven by local currency volatility, high inflation rates, and elevated food prices in local currency, resulting in substantial reductions in purchasing power. Pockets of poor households with limited to no access to social safety net programs and/or income in USD are expected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The population of concern is concentrated in urban and peri-urban areas – particularly informal settlements around major urban areas such as Caracas – and in Zulia state.
• Currently, between 1.5 and 1.99 million people are in need of humanitarian food assistance; however, gradual improvements in macroeconomic conditions are expected to increase food access and progressively decrease the population in need through September 2026.
• Increases in oil production and exports are likely to facilitate foreign currency inflows – bolstering government revenues and ensuring the financing of social safety net monthly cash transfers. Although the VED/USD exchange rate is expected to remain near 2025 levels, its volatility is likely to decline as the Central Bank of Venezuela increases its intervention in the foreign exchange market, reducing the gap between the official and parallel market rates. Monthly and yearly inflation rates are anticipated to remain elevated and close to 10 and 500 percent, respectively, reflecting a reduced rate of increase compared to 2025.
• Monthly social safety net cash transfers are expected to continue. The Income Contra la Guerra Económica (ICGE) cash transfer is expected to increase in its indexed value from 120 USD to 180 USD around May, while a new cash transfer to replace the CLAP (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción) in-kind food deliveries is expected around July. Imports and domestic production are expected to keep markets well-supplied, and food prices in USD are likely to remain stable, while prices in VED are expected to persist above last year’s levels and the average.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 20, 2026.

For more than a decade, Venezuela has experienced a macroeconomic crisis characterized by the accelerated loss of purchasing power due to local currency depreciation, high inflation rates, and the deterioration of productive and industrial capacity, especially agricultural and oil production. Macroeconomic deterioration is strongly influenced by the country’s dependence on oil revenues: oil accounts for almost all export earnings and serves as the primary source of revenue for the government. Fluctuations in oil production, exports, and revenues – related to international sanctions and global oil prices – determine the government’s capacity to stabilize the exchange rate and finance public spending – including a robust social safety net. In this context, the volatility of the local currency drove the progressive, informal dollarization of the economy as a strategy to preserve purchasing power and facilitate commercial transactions. However, amid a substantial reduction in both income-generating activities and purchasing power, the economic crisis resulted in a significant flow of millions of Venezuelan migrants to other countries, mainly within South America, with Colombia being the primary recipient, followed by Peru and Brazil. Between 2021 and 2024, the country experienced gradual economic stabilization, with lower inflation rates, greater exchange rate stability, the partial recovery of productive agricultural infrastructure, as well as oil exports with the granting of a restricted license to Chevron to operate joint ventures in oil production with Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), in 2022. During this period, monthly and annual inflation rates slowed considerably and remained below 5 and 100 percent, respectively. However, in 2025, inflation increased once again, spiking to over 600 percent year-on-year, driven by the depreciation of the local currency, reduced foreign currency supply, and sociopolitical tensions. 

Nearly 90 percent of the population lives in urban areas (Figure 1) and household incomes typically include multiple sources (wages, remittances, and social safety net programs). Most employees in the formal or informal private sector receive salaries in a combination of VED and USD, while the public sector pays in VED, creating disparities between private and public incomes. However, a significant portion of transactions are conducted in USD across the country, with the level of dollarization varying across regions. In effect, Venezuela operates under a dual exchange rate, with an official rate set by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) and a parallel market rate established through informal transactions. The official exchange rate serves as a reference for taxes, salaries, and official transactions, while most households and businesses rely on the parallel exchange rate. Households receiving salaries in VED are therefore more vulnerable to experiencing losses in their purchasing power due to VED fluctuations and the conversion to USD at parallel market rates for daily transactions. Informal economic activities, such as informal wage labor, self-employment and petty trade, comprise an important income source for very poor households in urban areas while agricultural activities support incomes in rural areas, especially in Guárico, Cojedes, Portuguesa, and Barinas. Remittances are another important source of income, although they can be irregular, with their amount and frequency varying. In 2024, 21 percent of households reported receiving remittances, bringing in 3.0 billion USD, or around 3 percent of GDP. 

The social safety net system in Venezuela assists in covering food needs, with a variety of government-paid incomes such as the Ingreso Contra la Guerra Económica, (previously referred to as bonos, these monthly payments are indexed in USD at the official exchange rate and paid in VED through digital bank transfers via the Sistema la Patria digital platform), CLAP (Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción, subsidized food boxes regularly delivered to households based on their composition), and the Cestaticket (an electronic food voucher provided to public and private sector employees). Public workers and pensioners, who receive their income in VED, are the main beneficiaries of most bonuses; however, a significant percentage of the population has historically received the Cestaticket, Bono Contra la Guerra Economica, and/or CLAP deliveries. 

Due to macroeconomic conditions, the prices of staple products in VED often vary significantly over short periods. A staple diet for most households includes rice, flour, bread, pasta, oil or margarine, and substitutes such as plantain, pumpkin, and cassava, while chicken and eggs are the main sources of animal protein. However, households adjust their purchasing preferences depending on prices and seasonal availability. 

National production is organized into two annual harvest cycles: summer between February and May, and winter between August and November, harvesting maize, rice, beans, cassava, plantain, and vegetables. Since 2021, a combination of government interventions and improvements in macroeconomic conditions has halted the decline in agricultural production, although it remains below levels reported prior to the macroeconomic crisis (reference year 2013). Despite improvements, Venezuela requires cereal imports to meet domestic food needs; imports typically account for 60 percent of the domestic supply. Food availability has improved since the peak of the macroeconomic crisis and markets are typically supplied with both national and imported products. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Venezuela Adapted Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

• The issuance of two new general licenses by the U.S. Treasury in late January and early February eased sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry by broadening the scope of authorized activities. Following a substantial decline in late 2025 when inventories accumulated in onshore tanks and vessels, oil exports nearly doubled from 498,000 barrels per day (bpd) in December to 800,000 bpd in January as the U.S. granted licenses to traders Trafigura and Vitol to begin exporting the 40 million barrels of oil and fuel that had accumulated. Crude oil production fell in January to 830,000 bpd, 9 percent below December’s output levels; however, this was in response to the backlog of inventories and is not indicative of a trend of declining production. In accordance with bilateral agreements, 500 million USD has been transferred into Venezuela for the U.S.-brokered sale of around 50 million barrels of crude oil in January. This influx of foreign currency is both ensuring the continued distribution of social safety net programs and supporting the resumption of dollar auctions by mid-January, where the government sells USD at the official exchange rates to private banks in an effort to contain depreciation in the parallel market.
• In January 2026, while the official exchange rate was 341.60 VED/USD, the parallel market exchange rate reached 595.93 VED/USD, according to local partner data and FEWS NET calculations. The parallel market rate represents a 29 percent increase over December, reflective of reduced USD availability and high uncertainty around oil exports in late 2025 and in early 2026. Although the rate of increase for monthly inflation declined from 20 to 13 percent, annual inflation remained high at 587 percent, the highest reported since December 2021. In accordance with these exchange rate and inflation dynamics, food prices continue to rise in VED, above last year and the five-year average, but remain stable in USD. In January, the cost of a minimum survival ration (composed of maize flour, rice, pasta, and oil, representing the least-cost to meet monthly caloric requirements for an average household of four people, based on the average energy requirement of 2100 kilocalories/day) reached 47,897.94 VED, the highest reported within the last year, representing a month-on-month increase of 27.5 percent, similar to the rate of increase the month prior, and year-on-year increase of 793.3 percent (Figure 2). Pasta registered the most substantial monthly increase of 44 percent, driven by the depreciation of the VED and elevated import tariffs on finished wheat products aimed to strengthen domestic milling production.

• The social safety net system is currently transitioning from a combination of in-kind food distribution and cash transfers to cash-only transfers. CLAP distributions are now limited to Caracas, have become less frequent, and contain fewer products. According to key informants, beneficiaries in Caracas received their monthly box, containing only chicken and mortadella sausage, valued at 1,170 VED (less than 2 USD at the parallel market exchange rate). In comparison, CLAP boxes contained maize flour, rice, vegetable oil, pasta, sugar, sardines, and beans as of February 2025. Monthly cash transfers are continuing at regular intervals, with amounts paid in VED, but indexed to USD. However, as they are indexed at the official exchange rate – when households typically exchange using the parallel rate – their purchasing power has eroded over time as the gap between the two exchange rates has grown (Table 1). For example, the Ingreso Contra la Guerra Económica (ICGE) is indexed at 120 USD using the official exchange rate for the day the bonus is received; however, as of January, the parallel rate value for the cash transfer was just below 70 USD.

• Although February is outside the main rainy season, rainfall distribution has continued to be erratic with central and eastern Venezuela experiencing above-average rainfall and western and southwestern areas experiencing below-average rainfall. While below-average soil moisture conditions persist across most of the country, recent improvements in rainfall in eastern Venezuela have helped reduce deficits.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian actors continue to implement food assistance via general food distributions, but overall coverage remains low and geographically uneven. Through February 2026, WFP has provided targeted, localized support to approximately 16,000 people in communities in Zulia, Sucre, and Guárico. However, this support does not reach a sufficient number of people to change food security classifications. 

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are currently widespread across Venezuela. Despite increased macroeconomic instability, the combination of income streams, including multiple forms of formal or informal employment paid in both VED and USD, indexed social safety net programs, and remittances in USD suggests most households in Venezuela can cover minimum caloric needs. However, they are unlikely to be able to cover essential non-food needs and have limited capacity to absorb additional price increases without employing coping strategies, such as drawing down savings, purchasing food on credit, relying on less-preferred foods, and reducing meal portions.

A portion of poor households – particularly those without – or with very limited – access to social safety net programs or sources of income in USD are likely in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). However, they are likely spread throughout the country – in urban and peri-urban areas as well as in remote areas where limited access to banking services inhibits access to social safety net programs – and are not sufficiently concentrated to change the state-level area classification. Elevated numbers of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are located in major urban areas, particularly in informal settlements in Caracas, where incomes are extremely limited as poor households are more likely to depend on irregular, informal wages in VED and Zulia, where poor households remain highly vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and their capacity to cope has been diminished over the years of prolonged high inflation and reduced income-generating activities.

Venezuela has experienced a substantial deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in 2025, particularly during the last quarter of the year. Throughout 2025, the VED depreciated sharply from 66.65 VED/USD in January 2025 to 595.93 VED/USD by January 2026. While domestic production, which is supported by irrigation systems, and international imports remained stable, ensuring adequate market supply and keeping USD food prices steady, prices in VED have risen significantly. In this context, the purchasing power of formal and informal wages paid in VED has dropped precipitously. According to ENCOVI, nearly 60 percent of the population earned less than the equivalent of 100 USD per month in June 2024 – with poor households earning far less. However, since then, the VED has lost 93.3 percent in value. Although incomes have risen in response to inflationary pressures across the private formal and informal sectors, they have not kept pace with actual inflation rates. Most households rely on multiple income streams, including from multiple jobs to cope; however, incomes in the informal sector remain irregular and more frequently paid in VED, resulting in heightened vulnerability to continuously high inflation rates and a reduction in purchasing power over time.

The social safety net therefore constitutes a key source of income, particularly given its indexation to USD, albeit at the official exchange rate. For example, public sector workers, pensioners, and retirees, who earn only in VED unless they take on additional jobs, rely heavily on the Ingreso Mínimo Integral Indexado (III) – the combination of Cestaticket and ICGE cash transfers designed for this subgroup of the population – to cover their essential needs. Between January 2025 and January 2026, the parallel market value of the III fluctuated between 92.36 USD and 128.68 USD. Considering price fluctuations in USD over this time, purchasing a minimum survival ration utilized between 59 and 96 percent of the value of the III during this time (Figure 3), leaving very little to cover other aspects of the household budget. For private sector workers and those employed in the informal sector, there is a wide range of smaller cash transfers available, and reports indicate that overall coverage from these benefits is high; however, the total value of cash transfers that a poor household receives can vary greatly. Not all households receive all possible benefits as households must subscribe to receive each one and may not be aware of, or able to apply to, all cash transfers for which they are eligible. Remittances also remain an important source of income and foreign currency for households: with 21 percent of household reporting receiving an average of 123 USD per month as of late 2024. 

According to a survey funded by international donors in late 2024, prior to the recent spike in inflation rates, 97.7 percent of Venezuelans had an acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS), 92.6 percent reported little to no hunger in the Household Hunger Scale (HHS), and 95.2 percent were categorized between Phases 1 and 2 by the Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI). Although regional differences pointed to an increased use of coping strategies and relatively higher levels of hunger in Zulia, where long-standing structural problems such as high poverty rates and chronic malnutrition have heightened households’ vulnerability to shocks, these results broadly demonstrated adequate food consumption at the time. In addition, prior years’ surveys show slight improvements in outcomes over time, in line with the period of relative macroeconomic stability observed through early 2025. However, the increased volatility of the local currency and high inflation observed since then have substantially eroded purchasing power and limited the mitigating effects of social safety net programs. 

• Crude oil production and exports are expected to gradually increase to 1.3 million bpd and between 1.02-1.27 million bpd, respectively, in 2026; further expansion of production is likely to be constrained by the continued drawdown of accumulated inventory and by deteriorated infrastructure. Although international crude oil prices are likely to continue falling, the easing of sanctions and associated increase in Venezuela’s access to global markets is expected to reduce reliance on sub-market rate sales via shadow fleets and improve government revenues.
• The VED/USD exchange rate is expected to remain close to 2025 levels, but recent volatility is likely to ease through the outlook period, supported by improved foreign currency availability from oil exports and increased intervention by the BCV in the foreign currency market to contain the depreciation of the VED. Monthly and yearly inflation rates are anticipated to remain elevated and close to 10 and 500 percent, respectively.
• Markets are expected to remain functioning and well supplied with formal and informal imports and domestic production throughout the outlook period. Below-average and erratic rainfall and above-average temperatures are most likely from March through September. These conditions are expected to reduce soil moisture and increase the risk of crop pests and diseases, especially for small producers without access to pesticides or fertilizers and limited access to irrigation on their parcels of land (conucos), but without significantly affecting national production totals. Expanded cropped area and improved yields for domestic maize and rice are expected to result in national production slightly below last year in the case of maize and similar to last year in the case of wheat. However, wheat and maize imports are expected to be above average, driven by higher consumption and industrial demand and easing international prices. Meanwhile, rice imports are likely to remain below average due to increased domestic production.
• Food price increases in VED are likely to moderate as stable foreign currency inflows are expected to slow the depreciation of the VED; however, VED prices are expected to remain significantly above average while prices in USD are anticipated to remain stable.
• Monthly cash transfers via the Sistema de la Patria platform, such as the ICGE, Bono Unico Familiar, and Bono Hogares de la Patria, are expected to continue uninterrupted and remain indexed to USD. Reduced volatility in the exchange rate and an anticipated reduction in the gap between the official and parallel exchange rate are expected to slow the erosion of the value of these benefits. An increase to the ICGE is likely around May, from an indexed equivalent of 120 USD to 180 USD. CLAP distributions are expected to end completely; however, a new cash transfer is likely to replace the CLAP around July 2026 and be incorporated into Sistema de la Patria cash transfers. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• Although humanitarian actors’ official plans for the delivery of humanitarian food assistance are not yet public, deliveries are expected to remain targeted at levels near 2025/26 for the rest of the analysis period, without changing the phase classification in any state.

Between February and May, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely throughout the country, with pockets of poor households, those with limited to no access to social safety net cash transfers and sources of income in USD, likely to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Constraints on financial access to food are expected to remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity. Overall, food security conditions are likely to remain consistent as oil production, exports, and associated government revenues stabilize, and as exchange rate fluctuations, inflation, and food prices in local currency moderate, easing pressures on household budgets. In most urban and rural areas, income streams are expected to fluctuate based on household exposure to local currency depreciation. The value of income earned in VED, as well as cash transfers indexed at the official exchange rate, will erode over time, albeit at a slower pace than in 2025 as inflation begins to moderate and the gap between the official and parallel exchange rate reduces. Meanwhile, remittances and other income in USD are expected to remain steady; for households that receive at least some income streams in foreign currency, inflation-related reductions in purchasing power are expected to be limited. Small producers without access to pesticides or fertilizers and limited access to irrigation are likely to see reductions in their income from summer harvest crop sales; however, food stocks from rice and maize harvests are likely to last through at least July, ensuring access to food through own production. Despite early signs of stabilization, macroeconomic volatility is still expected to limit household purchasing power as inflation outpaces local currency earnings, forcing most households to rely on coping strategies to access food, including drawing down savings, purchasing food on credit, relying on less preferred foods, and reducing meal portions. 

Between June to September, the number of households facing slight to moderate food consumption deficits or relying on negative coping strategies to preserve food intake is likely to decrease; however, widespread Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes with pockets of poor households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) – especially in major urban areas, such as Caracas, and in Zulia – are expected to persist. Increased access to food is likely to be supported by several factors. A new cash transfer to replace the CLAP food boxes is likely to be introduced around July, and a seasonal increase in the demand for self-employed labor in September with the beginning of the school year is also anticipated, raising income levels even as fluctuations persist. Separately, although deteriorated oil infrastructure is likely to limit a rapid increase in crude oil production, some improvements are anticipated, facilitated by the easing of international sanctions. Crude oil production zones in Zulia, Anzoátegui, and Monagas are expected to see increased economic activity in both the formal and informal sectors; however, this is unlikely to meaningfully increase incomes for poor households in these areas in the short term. Increased BCV interventions in the foreign currency market and improvements in foreign currency availability are likely to reduce the gap between the official and parallel market exchange rate more markedly over time, easing inflationary pressures and progressively providing relief to household budgets. Rainfall and soil moisture deficits are expected to negatively impact small producers’ winter harvest, but without implications for national production totals and market supply. However, most small producers are likely to be atypically dependent on markets between winter and summer harvests and are expected to rely on sustainable coping strategies to access adequate food.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.