Famine (IPC Phase 5) possibly persists in besieged Kadugli and Dilling

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During the typical harvest and post-harvest period through January, the besieged towns of Al-Fasher and Kadugli are expected to remain in Famine (IPC Phase 5), and it is possible that Dilling town will also remain in Famine (IPC Phase 5). In late October, WFP was able to access and deliver in-kind food assistance in Kadugli and Dilling towns for the first time in over a year, temporarily alleviating the severity of food consumption deficits. While the exact quantities are not yet available, the impact per recipient is expected to have been diluted by widespread sharing within the community given the intensity of need. Humanitarian access is expected to worsen in the coming months as the Rapid Support Forces seek to fully blockade both towns. In the absence of consistent, sustained humanitarian access, it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist through May in both Kadugli and Dilling. In Al-Fasher, however, FEWS NET is not classifying the town between February and May given considerable uncertainty about whether 10,000 people will remain in the area amid ongoing deaths, starvation, and mass displacement.
In the rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains near the towns of Kadugli and Dilling (including rural Dilling and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut localities), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected from November to January in the most likely scenario. Household access to food is currently marginal due to the severe impacts of conflict on the 2025 harvests and local market functionality. However, there is a credible risk that Famine (IPC Phase 5) could emerge in these areas between now and January if conflict isolates rural populations from already-scarce food and income sources. Even if this risk does not materialize by January, it is likely that currently high levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality will rise further during the pre-lean season period, and this underpins FEWS NET’s concern that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is possible in the western Nuba Mountains between February and May.
Widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist across other areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Some populations are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the displaced. With active fighting escalating in Greater Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expanding in North Kordofan (Sheikan, Bara, Gharb Bara, and Um Dam Haj Ahmed); northern localities of West Kordofan through which the main route from Greater Darfur passes (Wad Banda, An-Nuhud, Al-Khiwai); and parts of northern and central South Kordofan. The conflict-driven deepening of acute food insecurity will be accelerated by the seasonal depletion of household food stocks through May and increased market dependence amid rising prices.
While Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected in the most likely scenario, FEWS NET assesses there is also a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in rural areas of Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila (North Darfur); areas with high concentrations of IDPs in South Darfur and South Kordofan; and in El-Obeid of North Kordofan through May. There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict cuts off trade and humanitarian access, restricts population mobility, and isolates populations from food sources. Given the presence of populations already in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and likely high prevalence of acute malnutrition amid ongoing disease outbreaks and disruptions to adequate food supply, the likely outcome of such prolonged isolation of populations in these areas would result in Famine (IPC Phase 5).
In the besieged towns of Al-Fasher, Dilling, and Kadugli, levels of conflict and displacement have deteriorated in November, and the spillover effects continue to affect surrounding areas. In Al-Fasher, the RSF takeover of the town is estimated to have displaced at least 106,387 individuals as of November 24. Civilians remain trapped in and around Al-Fasher, lacking the ability to safely flee either due to insecurity, risk of kidnapping, blocked access routes, or prohibitively high transport costs; protection risks are particularly high for women and children. Nearby Tawila locality now hosts over 655,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) following the fall of Al-Fasher, and populations face severe shelter, protection, and service provision gaps despite humanitarian efforts. In Dilling, the town itself experienced significantly intensified aerial bombardments in mid-November with more than 40 shells hitting civilian neighborhoods and hospitals in one week. Meanwhile, in rural areas surrounding Kadugli, fighting between the armed groups has resulted in increased displacement to nearby localities.
Across Greater Kordofan, some of the heaviest fighting of the year occurred in November as all major armed groups increased troop presence and vied for territorial gains. The fighting is constraining humanitarian and trade flows, displacing thousands, interfering with harvesting, and causing additional looting and violence against civilians. Clashes are most intense in North Kordofan, where strategic areas around El-Obeid town are increasingly contested in anticipation of RSF efforts to besiege the town. At the same time, many people fleeing attacks in smaller towns and rural areas are arriving in El-Obeid (estimated at 175,000 IDPs in one month, as of November 10), severely straining local resources. In South Kordofan, clashes, troop build-up, and forced recruitments have been reported in Abassiya, Abu Kershola, and Habila, resulting in mass displacement of more than 3,000 people and likely looting and disruptions to livelihood activities. Fighting was also reported in November in parts of West Kordofan, particularly as RSF tightened the siege on SAF’s 22^nd Infantry Division in Babanusa town, which reportedly fell to RSF in early December. While the majority of civilians in Babanusa were displaced earlier at the start of the siege last year, the current escalation of violence around the area has continued to cause repeated displacement spikes.
Disease outbreaks, including cholera, continue to spread amid the ongoing conflict and large-scale displacement; exceedingly poor health, water, and sanitation conditions in displacement sites; and limited access to health care. While cholera incidence is declining following the end of the rainy season, over 1,000 new cases were reported between October 27 and November 22, with sub-national increases documented in Greater Kordofan. Between January 1 and November 22, the cumulative total is over 72,000 cases, compared to just over 35,000 cases for the same period in 2024. Ongoing transmission in areas with severe food consumption deficits, particularly in the besieged areas, is expected to be underreported and likely contributing to the sustained high prevalence of acute malnutrition and deaths from the interaction of hunger and disease.
Sudan’s economy remains exceedingly poor, marked by a steep contraction, localized hyperinflation, a collapse in government revenue and service provision, and rising poverty. Economists and former officials have estimated hundreds of billions of dollars in infrastructure damage and major urban losses, particularly in Khartoum. The year-on-year inflation rate has been steadily declining over the last few months but remained high at 77 percent in October. The currency has also continued to depreciate, losing 22 and 43 percent of its value in the official and parallel markets, respectively, compared to last year. In November, the SDG was trading at approximately 2,400 SDG/USD on the official market and much higher on the parallel market (3,700–3,800 SDG/USD) amid high daily volatility.
Staple food prices in Sudan remain significantly above average despite the ongoing harvests, driven by ongoing currency depreciation, supply disruptions, and high transport costs. In the more severely conflict-affected areas, the impact of sustained border closures, route insecurity, threats of looting and attacks on traders, and a persistent liquidity crisis have systematically undermined market functionality, contributing to immediate local price spikes and market recessions. The breakdown in market and trade systems and the emergence of survival conflict economies continue to deeply erode household purchasing power. While food prices may moderate slightly in the harvest period through February in calm areas, they will nonetheless remain elevated and rise again in the post-harvest periods. Improvements are not expected in conflict-affected across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, or within besieged areas, particularly amid ongoing risk to harvesting, livestock movements, looting, and insecurity.
Humanitarian access remains severely constrained by the expanding conflict – particularly in Greater Kordofan amid the recent escalation – and bureaucratic access requirements imposed by various political and armed elements on the ground. Amid these challenges, WFP reported several operational breakthroughs and reached 2.6 million people countrywide with in-kind food assistance in October. These gains included first time access to Dilling and Kadugli in over a year with in‑kind general food assistance; emergency in‑kind food assistance to over 2,000 IDPs in Al-Muglad (West Kordofan), an area hosting IDPs from the prolonged siege of the SAF garrison in Babanusa (West Kordofan); and delivery of lifesaving nutrition support to 12,000 children and women in previously inaccessible areas of South Kordofan. In besieged Dilling and Kadugli, the assistance likely eased consumption deficits temporarily; however, quantities are not expected to be sufficient to curb rising starvation and deaths in the context of high and rising needs and widespread sharing, particularly if access is not sustained amid increasing conflict. In North Darfur, the Logistics Cluster reported deploying 10 mobile storage units to Tawila (North Darfur), with an additional 10 units planned in Farchana (Chad) to support cross‑border operations into Darfur.

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Sudan Key Message Update November 2025: Famine (IPC Phase 5) possibly persists in besieged Kadugli and Dilling, 2025.

This Key Message Update provides a high-level analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography. Learn more here.