The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in South Kordofan and North Darfur

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In March, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are ongoing in key hotspot areas. The areas of highest concern include parts of South Kordofan (Dilling, Kadugli, and surrounding western Nuba Mountains), North Darfur (northwestern localities of Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tine), and North Kordofan (in El-Obeid town and surrounding rural areas). Conflict, displacement, and the early start of the lean season are driving severe hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality in the typical post-harvest period. In Blue Nile, escalating fighting is causing displacement, straining host community resources, reducing household food access, and driving widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with pockets of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) among newly displaced populations. Overall, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated to expand further across Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile during the lean season. FEWS NET estimates that up to 22.0-22.99 million people will need humanitarian food aid.
A credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains in parts of South Kordofan, North Kordofan, North Darfur, and areas of Greater Darfur with large concentrations of displaced populations. Of particular concern are Kadugli, Dilling, and surrounding areas of the western Nuba Mountains; these areas were recently projected to remain in Famine due to severe siege conditions. While recent shifts in access and displacement have driven the change to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with populations in Catastrophe (Phase 5), the levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality could deteriorate rapidly and surpass Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds if populations are again isolated from food, including humanitarian assistance, for a prolonged period. In northwest North Darfur, there is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) given already high levels of acute malnutrition: if conflict frontlines cut off trade and humanitarian access, prevent population movement, and obstruct household access to minimally available food, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.
In March 2026, conflict escalated across several regions of Sudan, driving instability and undermining humanitarian operations. In South Kordofan, Rapid Support Forces launched coordinated attacks on Sudan Armed Forces positions around Dilling, cutting supply routes, seizing control of stretches of the Dilling-Kadugli and Dilling-Habila roads, and disrupting trade and humanitarian access again after a brief reprieve in February that had facilitated the arrival of market and humanitarian supplies. Along the Chad-Sudan border, armed ground offensives and drone strikes at both Adré and At-Tine prompted the Chad government to close the border to movement except for humanitarian operations, disrupted population displacement across the border, trade flows, and humanitarian operations. In Blue Nile, the capture of Kurmuk by joint RSF-SPLM-N forces altered control of a strategic transit hub on the Ethiopian border, threatening trade and humanitarian corridors and triggering new waves of displacement.
Conflict-driven displacement continues to disrupt livelihoods and household food access, particularly in Blue Nile and Greater Kordofan. Needs also remain acute among displaced populations amid loss of access to livelihoods, income, and basic services. According to the International Organization for Migration, one-third of IDPs report going a full day without food, and one-quarter lack access to healthcare. In March, the escalating conflict in Blue Nile has driven waves of displacement, reaching a cumulative figure of 28,000 people displaced between January and the end of March. Meanwhile, in Greater Kordofan, over 2,100 people were displaced in March in South Kordofan due to armed clashes in Dilling town and in some villages in Habila. In North Kordofan, localized insecurity displaced 585 people in Gharb Bara and Bara, while 120 people were displaced from Abu Zabad town in West Kordofan. In Kas of South Darfur, intercommunal conflict between two tribes uprooted about 250 individuals, highlighting ongoing ethnic tensions between pastoralists and farmers.
Humanitarian access in the frontline areas of the conflict remains exceedingly challenging in March. Road closures, heightened insecurity, and escalating drone strikes, on top of ongoing bureaucratic constraints, are restricting humanitarian deliveries in areas of active conflict. In Greater Darfur, attacks at At-Tine and Adré border crossings are disrupting humanitarian operations. Assistance in conflict-affected areas in the northwest of North Darfur are limited, with no food assistance reported to date; deliveries elsewhere in Greater Darfur remain volatile. Access to Dilling has deteriorated again amid ongoing fighting, while access to Kadugli and surrounding areas has remained relatively better since the breaking of the sieges. The escalation of clashes in Blue Nile has also disrupted humanitarian operations in the area. While the Nutrition Cluster confirmed sufficient nutrition supplies were available to last through June 2026, insecurity, administrative restrictions, and movement constraints are expected to disrupt operations and limit distribution to areas of greatest need.
Market flows also remain disrupted by the conflict and insecurity, driving high and volatile prices even in the post-harvest period. While prices declined in Dilling and Kadugli compared to the siege’s peak, they remain among the highest in the country and significantly above normal; it is expected that similarly high market prices prevail in nearby markets in South Kordofan. In Greater Darfur, disruptions at the Chad border have disrupted staple imports and livestock movements, affecting supply and driving up prices. Declining fuel supplies due to the conflict in the Middle East are causing surging transport costs. According to WFP market monitoring in February, fuel prices registered a 3-4 percent price increase on commercial markets, though black market prices rose more sharply (7-11 percent) compared to January; further increases were again reported in March.
In addition to escalating fuel shortages and rising transport costs that are translating into increasing retail food prices, the conflict in the Middle East is destabilizing the humanitarian supply pipeline and disrupting fertilizer access. Fertilizer imports are already depressed due to the Sudan conflict; however, further reductions in availability are expected to reduce yields, particularly for farmers preparing to plant in the semi-mechanized and irrigated eastern areas. The conflict is causing delays in humanitarian supply and increasing operational costs. Sustained conflict in the Middle East is expected to sharply worsen Sudan’s already fragile food security by further increasing fuel and import costs, disrupting logistics, and diverting international attention from Sudan’s conflict.

Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Sudan Key Message Update March - September 2026: The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in South Kordofan and North Darfur, 2026.

This Key Message Update provides a high-level analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography. Learn more here.