Famine (IPC Phase 5) is underway in Al-Fasher and Kadugli, and possibly Dilling

• Protracted, extreme siege conditions have led to Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Al-Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan) towns, a classification the IPC’s Famine Review Committee finds plausibleFamine Review Committee. FEWS NET assesses it is possible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also ongoing in the besieged town of Dilling (South Kordofan), though direct, quantitative evidence is more limited. In the absence of a change in siege conditions, it is possible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will continue in Kadugli and Dilling through May. In Al-Fasher, the fall of the town in late October gave way to mass killings and the flight of tens of thousands of civilians. Many civilians are trapped in the area, however, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to persist in the near term. FEWS NET is not classifying Al-Fasher town in February-May as it is uncertain whether at least 10,000 people will still be in the area.   
• In rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are expected from October to January (harvest and post-harvest period) in the most likely scenario. However, there is a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) during this period. By February-May, FEWS NET assesses Famine (IPC Phase 5) is possible in this area. Marginal harvests will be exhausted by then, and the spillover effects of the sieges of Kadugli and Dilling – including severe trade and humanitarian access constraints, looting and destruction of assets, and high displacement – are expected to cut off households’ access to remaining sources of food.
• Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected among populations displaced by conflict across North and South Darfur, and among populations in Sheikan in North Kordofan (where El-Obeid town is located) through May. Levels of starvation and acute malnutrition are high, particularly in overcrowded displacement sites. In Sheikan, intensifying conflict and looting are sharply reducing access to food and income.
• A risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is assessed in rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila (North Darfur); areas with high concentrations of displaced people in South Darfur and South Kordofan; and El Obeid. While Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected in the most likely scenario, there is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict cuts off trade and humanitarian access, restricts population mobility, and isolates populations from food sources, causing Famine (IPC Phase 5). 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 31, 2025.

The two-and-a-half-year war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no signs of abating despite recent shifts in conflict frontlines. Most recently, Greater Kordofan and North Darfur have faced the highest intensity of fighting, including severe sieges imposed on the towns of Al-Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli and Dilling (South Kordofan). Khartoum and parts of eastern Sudan remain relatively calm following the SAF’s recapture of the area since March 2025. The politicization of the war along ethnic and tribal lines remains a dominant undertone. The RSF draws strong support mainly from Arab tribes and allied Arab militias, with an alliance formed in February 2025 with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Al-Hilu faction present in South Kordofan. The SAF draws support from the Darfur Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movement (JSAMF) and the armed civilian resistance. The war has been characterized by widespread sexual-based violence, targeting and massacres of civilians, and looting. Several attacks (like in West Darfur in 2024, Zamzam camp in April 2025, and Al-Fasher town in October 2025) are reminiscent of the genocide in Darfur 20 years ago. The scale of the conflict has also driven massive displacement: Sudan is currently the world’s largest internal displacement crisis, affecting an estimated 9.6 million people. 

The conflict continues to profoundly impact all aspects of lives and livelihoods in Sudan. The destruction of and disruption to critical infrastructure and industrial capacity; damage to major oil fields and fuel refineries; flight of the private sector; and disruption to import-export activities, supply chains, finance sectors, and agricultural productivity have all led to severe economic contraction on top of years of macroeconomic decline. The healthcare system has all but collapsed amid the targeting of health facilities, and communicable diseases continue to surge. Extensive looting of private assets – another persistent characteristic of the conflict – combined with loss of jobs and income sources, has driven widespread impoverishment. Markets are recurrently looted and damaged, and trade flows remain disrupted. This is sustaining extremely high food prices through the 2025 lean season, which are expected to persist through the 2025/26 harvest. 

Across the rainfed traditional, rainfed semi-mechanized, and irrigated agricultural sectors, the harvesting of summer crops typically begins with limited green harvests in October before progressing to the main harvests between November and January (Annex 3). Agricultural labor opportunities in the irrigated and semi-mechanized areas of the southeast typically provide important income during the harvest season from October to January. However, variable levels of conflict and insecurity are expected to interfere with household access to farms, harvests, and other key sources of food and income through the post-harvest period. Between February and May, which coincides with the end of the post-harvest period and pre-lean season period, household and market stocks typically decline; in turn, prices typically rise seasonally in the lead-up to the peak of the lean season (June-September). This year, the lean season is expected to start as early as March due to the ongoing impacts of conflict on agricultural production; household access to typical income-earning opportunities; high and rising food and non-food prices; and continued deterioration in household purchasing capacity. In areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan where direct fighting has prevented many households from engaging in crop production or accessing harvests, the lean season is expected to start even earlier. 

In agropastoral and pastoral areas, the performance of the main rainy season from June to September has historically dictated prospects for livestock production. At this time of year, recently replenished pasture and water resources would typically provide local households with access to milk through November. However, conflict and insecurity have led to a steep decline in livestock ownership, which has in turn reduced access to milk and income from livestock sales. As the dry season sets in, herders typically migrate livestock to southern grazing areas; however, the war will likely continue to interfere with migration and constrain access to critical pasture and water resources. Furthermore, high food and non-food prices have prompted herders to sell livestock at faster rates than average to earn the income needed to allow them to purchase food.  

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

As of mid-October 2025, the conflict has been defined by the continuation and intensification of the sieges on the towns of Al-Fasher, Kadugli, and Dilling, and the escalation of fighting across North Darfur and Greater Kordofan (Figure 1). On October 26, Al-Fasher town fell to the RSF, resulting in mass atrocities and the flight of at least 82,000 people from Al-Fasher town; reported numbers of deaths and displacements continue to rise. While direct clashes remain low in areas of Greater Darfur outside of North Darfur, insecurity is high and continues to affect population mobility and engagement in livelihoods, as well as commercial and humanitarian movements and access. Relative calm in the eastern parts of Sudan – particularly in Sennar, Al-Jazirah, and Khartoum – have enabled households to return to their homes and begin to re-engage in livelihoods. However, recovery is slow as many farmers missed critical windows for cultivation, and income-generating opportunities have been severely eroded.

In the besieged areas of Al-Fasher, Kadugli, and Dilling, the population’s mobility has become increasingly restricted. In Al-Fasher, the RSF’s 18-month siege – characterized in recent months by escalating aerial attacks and the construction of an extensive earthen perimeter that cut off virtually all food supply and access points – culminated in RSF’sbrutal takeover of the city brutal take-over of the city on October 26. The ensuing scale of violence against civilians has not yet been fully determined. Fleeing populations are still being accounted for in neighboring localities of North Darfur (Tawila, Melit, Kebkabiya, and rural areas of Al-Fasher), as well as in parts of Greater Darfur, West Kordofan, Northern, and White Nile states. In Kadugli and Dilling, siege conditions – which were present for much of 2024 – had eased slightly in late 2024 and into early 2025. However, following the alignment between the RSF and SPLM-N in February 2025, joint operations on SAF-held cities of Dilling and Kadugli have escalated and effectively cut off commercial and humanitarian access. As of October, RSF controls major transit routes north and west of Dilling, while SPLM-N controls routes from Kadugli to the South Sudan border and rural routes to the east of the two cities. Food shortages in Kadugli and Dilling are increasingly acute, prices have skyrocketed, and people are taking extraordinary risks to flee when possible, though many remain trapped. 

Clashes across Greater Kordofan escalated through October 2025, involving RSF, SPLM-N, and SAF forces. Civilians face widespread displacement, disruption to cultivation, and looting of assets and agricultural inputs in frontline areas across North, South, and West Kordofan. In North Kordofan, between May and September 2025, SAF temporarily regained control over the Kosti-Rahad-Umm Ruwaba corridor and the Khartoum-Bara route. However, by late October, RSF forces advanced rapidly into Bara and neighboring Um Dam Haj Ahmed and Um Rawaba, amid reports of summary executions of civilians and displacement of thousands towards El-Obeid and White Nile. In the last week of October alone, International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM) estimates that nearly 37,000 people were newly displaced in North Kordofan. Further south from El-Obeid, at the intersection zone between North, South, and West Kordofan, high levels of insecurity and intermittent fighting by the armed groups (vying for control of key trade routes) are ongoing. This is affecting rural communities’ ability to engage in livelihood activities and blocking humanitarian access. Fighting has similarly continued around the borders of SPLM-N stronghold territory in South Kordofan; most recently, aerial strikes hit displacement shelters in Abassiya and Delami, causing 400 people to flee deeper into SPLM-N-controlled territory. 

Outside of some areas of North and Central Darfur, Greater Darfur remains broadly controlled by the RSF. SAF strategy has been focused on intensified airstrikes on RSF supply lines, particularly targeting RSF strongholds areas, such as Al-Koma (North Darfur) and in Nyala (South Darfur), to disrupt logistics and reinforcements. Nyala town has been declared as the administrative capital for the newly established parallel government (Tasis Alliance). The airport is a key logistics hub for RSF shipments, making it a frequent target of airstrikes. The RSF is also attacking the Joint Forces’ stronghold areas in western parts of North Darfur, including in As-Serief and Kernoi, displacing approximately 12,000 people. In West Darfur, the Adré corridor from Chad remains open tentatively through December 2025, but RSF-imposed fees, roadblocks, and looting continue to obstruct assistance and trade, sustaining high prices. 

While rainfall and cropping conditions were generally favorable this year, agricultural production remained deeply undermined by the impacts of both recent and long-term conflict. Localized heavy rains and rising river levels led to landslides and flooding that displaced over 23,000 people in August and September and disrupted cultivation. Notable events included the devastating landslides in the Jebel Marra mountains in South Darfur; and flooding along major river basins in Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, and River Nile that displaced people and disrupted agricultural production. While these flood events had severe impacts in localized areas, conflict drove reductions in cultivation and agricultural production on a much larger scale. Displacement, restricted access to farms, limited cultivated area, looting, and the low availability and high costs of inputs all affected production in and around besieged towns. However, even in calmer areas of eastern Sudan, including Al-Jazirah and Sennar (Sudan’s breadbasket), damaged irrigation systems, stolen machinery, lack of access to inputs and credit, and late planting are expected to result in below-average production. 

Sudan is experiencing its worst cholera outbreak in years. Transmission continued into October, particularly in hotspot areas of Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur with high internally displaced person (IDP) concentrations. Between January and the end of August 2025, over 59,000 suspected cases and more than 1,300 deaths were recorded. While cases have declined overall since the middle of the rainy season, the disease burden, exacerbated by ongoing armed conflict that has crippled health infrastructure and restricted humanitarian access, remains heavy. Additionally, heavy rainfall and flooding led to further deterioration of already poor water, sanitation, and health (WASH) conditions, while funding gaps and access constraints are hindering cholera response plans. The interaction between cholera and hunger is driving up acute malnutrition rates and increasing the risk of severe illness and death, particularly among children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, and other vulnerable populations. 

Sudan’s economy remains in deep crisis, driven by over two years of war that have caused institutional and market collapse, with the potential loss of an estimated 4.6 million jobs. GDP contracted sharply in 2024, and if conflict persists, a further decline of over 40 percent is projected by the end of 2025. Inflation remained above 83 percent between August and September. The SDG continued to depreciate sharply, trading at over 3,520 SDG/USD in the parallel market in October; this represents a 33 percent loss in value compared to the same time last year and a 485 percent loss in value compared to pre-conflict levels. The depreciation of the SDG is driven by rising demand for hard currency from both the government and the private sector to meet rising import requirements. SDG depreciation, combined with high fuel and transport costs and disruptions to supply chains, has also resulted in elevated staple food prices countrywide. Price increases have been particularly acute in besieged towns due to blockades and high demand for scarce goods. Overall, household purchasing capacity has been deeply eroded due to the continuous escalation in costs of living (for both food and non-food needs), reduction in incomes, and increased poverty levels, especially among heavily market-dependent urban populations.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian access remains critically limited by ongoing conflict and insecurity, logistical and bureaucratic obstacles, and persistent funding shortfalls. Food assistance levels rose in September (the peak of the lean season), providing 3.7 million people with food or cash assistance that met 50-100 of their minimum kilocalorie needs, up from 3.1 million in July and 2.5 million in August; however, this represents less than 20 percent of the estimated population in need (Figure 2). Of the assistance provided during the peak lean season months (July-September), approximately 55 percent was distributed in Greater Darfur (mostly North and South Darfur) and 50 percent in the eastern states of Sudan. On average, only 5 percent of assistance reached populations in Greater Kordofan. Overall, approximately half of those assisted in the lean season were IDPs or refugees, and the other half were residents.

As of October, the Famine Review Committee (FRC) has concurred that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in the besieged towns of Al-Fasher and Kadugli.¹ Areas in and around Al-Fasher have faced Famine (IPC Phase 5) since July 2024, starting with Zamzam IDP camp in July and spreading to Abu Shouk and Al-Salam IDP camps and the broader Al-Fasher locality between October-December 2024. In addition, FEWS NET assesses that it is possible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also ongoing in the besieged town of Dilling. This conclusion is based on an extrapolation of outcomes from besieged Kadugli given the similarity in intensity and length of the siege in Kadugli and Dilling towns and similarity of pre-war livelihoods.² Further details on these analyses are available in Annexes 5 and 6 of this report.

In nearby rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (parts of Dilling, Habila, and Al-Lagowa localities), the FRC found the classification of Famine (IPC Phase 5) not plausible. While FEWS NET concurs and assesses Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are most likely, this phase is still characterized by extreme hunger. Amid signs of severe acute malnutrition and reports of extreme hunger, as well as the reported severity of mobility constraints that prevent trade, humanitarian flows, and access to food and income, FEWS NET also assesses there are likely populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

Across most of the rest of the country, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes persist. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are present in areas that have experienced sustained, active conflict, insecurity, and high levels of displacement, particularly in parts Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile, as well as in parts of Sennar, Al-Jazirah, and Khartoum. In the latter areas, large numbers of returnees have missed the cultivation season and lack the income to purchase adequate food following months of heavy fighting, destruction, and looting. As a result, household access to food and income in these areas remains critically low in advance of the main harvesting period that typically begins in November. Acute malnutrition levels, exacerbated by ongoing disease outbreaks, are expected to remain high until the arrival of the main harvest. Of 52 SMART surveys conducted so far in 2025, 40 occurred between March (pre-lean season) and September (peak lean season) (Figure 3). Of these, over half (23) found a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence based on weight-for-height z-score (WHZ) exceeding the Critical threshold (>15 percent GAM WHZ).    

Greater Darfur 

Outside of Al-Fasher, widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes dominate across North Darfur, northern localities of South Darfur, and in parts of Central Darfur. These areas face persistently high levels of either direct conflict or insecurity that prevent consistent humanitarian access, constrain households’ mobility (including access to farms), and sustain high levels of displacement. As of the end of September, Greater Darfur accounted for the highest share of displaced populations (60 percent of total IDPs), with 38 percent residing in North and South Darfur. IDP numbers across the region have likely only increased in October, following the fall of Al-Fasher town and the ensuing massive scale
of displacement (estimated to be at least 82,000 people) to neighboring areas of North Darfur. Additional displacement in parts of western North Darfur is estimated at 12,000 people. The prevalence of acute malnutrition has been highest in many of these areas. Of the surveyed localities in Greater Darfur, 65 percent have had a GAM prevalence above 20 percent, with the highest prevalence in Melit and At-Tawisha (34 and 29 percent, respectively). In both Tulus of South Darfur and Yassin of East Darfur, GAM prevalence has reached 28 percent. While humanitarian actors have prioritized deliveries to Greater Darfur, access constraints and displacement have impeded the response. Based on the number of people reached and the amount of in-kind food or cash received, the scale of food assistance has likely been sufficient to only prevent more severe outcomes from materializing in five localities, where Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are mapped: As-Sunta and Buram of South Darfur; and El-Geneina, Kereniek, and Kulbus of West Darfur. In other localities of North Darfur and northern South Darfur where large assistance was delivered, the impact was expected to have been diluted by the very high presence of displaced population and high likelihood of sharing.

Areas hosting high numbers of IDPs are also of high concern in Greater Darfur, where some households face extreme food consumption deficits indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In North Darfur, areas in rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila have been heavily impacted by the fall of Al-Fasher town. In Tawila, in particular, the recent influx of newly displaced people is compounding an already extremely high burden of displacement, with over 650,000 people displaced – accounting for over one-third (37 percent) of all IDPs in North Darfur. In IDP and refugee camps around Nyala of South Darfur; parts of Jebel Marrah, Zalingei, and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur; and Abu Karinka, Adila, and Al-Firdous of East Darfur, displaced populations possess few assets, have low access to income sources, and are heavily dependent on markets to access food. Many of them lack the income to purchase sufficient food amid extremely high food prices. In addition, limited access to health care facilities and the exceedingly poor WASH conditions – aggravated during the rainy season – continue to fuel high disease transmission rates (such as cholera), particularly in overcrowded camps. High disease prevalence is likely driving a further increase in the already elevated levels of acute malnutrition recorded earlier in the lean season (e.g., 22 percent among IDP children in Tawila).  

Greater Kordofan

Outside of the besieged towns of Kadugli and Dilling, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes persist in rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (covering rural Dilling and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut); central areas of South Kordofan; and in heavily conflict-affected areas in North and West Kordofan. In the western Nuba Mountains area, data from multiple sources in accessible areas indicate a mixed severity of outcomes between households, with wide variation in the severity of food consumption deficits and acute malnutrition prevalence. Based on the body of evidence, including the severity of constraints on population mobility, the spillover effects of the siege on Dilling town, and reports of starvation and widespread acute malnutrition, it is assumed that a substantial share of the population in the inaccessible areas of the western Nuba Mountains are facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in October. 

In North Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes likely persist in October in Sheikan, Bara, Gharb Bara, and Um Dam Haj Ahmed. Violent and large-scale attacks in late October displaced nearly 37,000 people within a week, undermining their access to fields at a critical harvest time. Harvests, market supplies, and household assets were widely looted, further reducing purchasing capacity at a time when food prices remain high in advance of the main harvesting period (November-January). In parts of West Kordofan, earlier attacks in May in some areas such as Wad Banda, Abu Zabad, and Al-Khiwai displaced populations and resulted in widespread looting of inputs that are expected to have undermined the cultivation season, contributing to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. In Al-Idia, the high burden of displacement from the sustained siege on Babanusa is similarly driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.  

Khartoum 

In Khartoum, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are evident across most of the state, while Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are assessed in Jebel Awlia. In the localities of Um Bada, Omdurman, and Sharg An-Neel, some households are likely experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The livelihood and market systems in these areas are slowly recovering from the protracted impact of conflict, following the restoration of relative stability in March 2025. The pace of recovery has been hindered by the extent of infrastructure destruction, which continues to impede market and trade flows and, in turn, continues to sustain high food prices; slow the recovery of the labor market; and limit humanitarian access even as high number of people return to the area. As of the end of September, the number of returnees to Khartoum had surpassed 1 million. Levels of acute malnutrition stood just under 10 percent in September in Khartoum locality, and likely remain elevated due to reduced food intake, high disease prevalence (exacerbated by flash floods in October), and limited availability of basic health and WASH services. According to the Ministry of Health, over 3,000 dengue infections were reported in Khartoum in the week of September 20-26 alone.  

Southeast

In the southeast (Al-Jazirah, Sennar, Gedaref, White Nile, and Blue Nile states), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes endure in multiple locations in October; these areas were previously among the most heavily impacted by conflict, though relative calm has existed since March 2025. These areas include Sharg Al-Jazirah (Al-Jazirah); Sinja, Sennar, and Sharg Sennar (Sennar); and Al-Kurmuk and At-Tadamon (Blue Nile). By the end of September, a cumulative 55 percent of returnees (1.4 million of the total 2.6 million) were in the southeast: Al-Jazirah (37 percent), Sennar (7 percent), Blue Nile (7 percent), and White Nile (4 percent). However, many missed critical windows for crop cultivation or had limited access to inputs and agricultural finance given the scale of looted or destroyed assets, poor maintenance of irrigation systems, and slow recovery of services. In addition, the flash floods along river basins in August and September destroyed cropland in key agricultural areas, disrupting production and access to food and income. Similar to Khartoum, the combination of high population density, extremely poor WASH conditions, collapsed health services, and floodwaters have fueled disease outbreaks. The Ministry of Health has reported that a hepatitis outbreak is underway in Al-Jazirah. While recent data on acute malnutrition in Al-Jazirah is not available, results from a SMART survey conducted in nearby Sharg Sennar in June 2025 found a GAM (WHZ) prevalence of 22.5 percent. Continued poor health conditions and the spread of diseases have likely worsened levels of acute malnutrition since then. In a few localities – Baw of Blue Nile and Ad-Dinder of Sennar – enough food assistance was received that it has likely prevented more severe outcomes.

Northeast

In the northeast (Northern, River Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states), widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) (particularly among IDPs and remote areas of Red Sea with typically low coping capacity). The relative stability secured across most of eastern Sudan has facilitated the restoration of main trade routes, notably improving commercial trade flows to main production and marketing centers in the southeast, and increasing household access to available income-earning opportunities. However, the presence of high numbers of IDPs and increased influx of new IDPs in Northern State (following the deterioration of the situation in North Darfur and North Kordofan) is straining the limited availability of basic services. In addition, prices for basic food and essential non-food items remain very high compared to income levels. Moreover, flooding caused by elevated Nile River levels also inundated several riverside villages, displacing over 4,000 people and damaging infrastructure, homes, and croplands. Recurrent flooding along major Al-Gash River basins in Kassala further disrupted agricultural activities and livelihoods, forcing households to relocate or increasingly rely on social networks, remittances, and humanitarian assistance.

• Conflict between the different actors (SAF, RSF, SPLM-N, and various allied armed groups) is expected to continue at similar scale and intensity, as the groups remain unwilling to negotiate amid perceptions of shifting military strengths and weaknesses. SAF will seek to build on recent gains in the east and southeast. RSF will continue to further consolidate their control in Greater Darfur following the fall of Al-Fasher, particularly targeting stronghold areas of the Joint Forces in North Darfur. SPLM-N will similarly likely continue to seek consolidated control over much of South Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile. Greater Kordofan is expected to become the primary conflict frontline, with fighting expected to involve all three major players (SAF, RSF, SPLM-N) and focus on control of trade routes and major cities, particularly El-Obeid, Dilling, and Kadugli. While the end of the rainy season in October will likely facilitate an intensification of kinetic conflict, neither side is likely to achieve a decisive breakthrough in Greater Kordofan. Intercommunal conflict in parts of Greater Darfur and in areas of newly transitioned control are expected to spike as frontlines move.
• New and repeated instances of displacement will continue, especially in parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Displacements will be driven by continued conflict, particularly following the fall of Al-Fasher, and by the advance of an anticipated early start to the lean season by March and April 2026. As SAF regains control in parts of the east and southeast (Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, Sennar, White Nile), populations are expected to increasingly return to their places of origin, but they will face difficulty re-establishing their livelihoods given the massive loss of assets and destruction of public and private property.
• Sudan’s economy will remain in deep crisis, driven by ongoing conflict and institutional collapse. GDP has contracted sharply during 2024, with projections indicating that, if conflict persists, GDP could decline by up to 42 percent by the end of 2025 under extreme scenarios. The value of the SDG is expected to depreciate further, fueling severe inflation (year-on-year rates exceeded 78 percent in July and 80 percent in August).
• Overall, national 2025/26 cereal production (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is expected to remain below the five-year average. However, main season harvests (November 2025-January 2026) are likely to vary locally depending on the extent of exposure to direct conflict. Significantly below-average harvests are expected in areas that experienced the heaviest fighting and/or besiegement during the current agricultural season (Al-Fasher, Dilling, Kadugli, and parts of North and West Kordofan). Even in areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan not directly affected by fighting, farmers have reduced area planted, face significant disruptions to the agricultural supply chain, and anticipate high post-harvest losses. In central and eastern areas less affected by direct clashes, and areas experiencing relative stability and increased IDP returns, harvests are nonetheless expected to be below average. This is due to vast areas left uncultivated due to widespread infrastructure damage, looting, displacement, and limited access to farms in the conflict-affected zones. In the central and eastern semi-mechanized and irrigated sectors, most irrigation systems remain broken and access to funding and inputs is scarce, stalling recovery efforts at a time when heavy rains and flooding also negatively impacted the cultivation process in many areas.
• The 2026 winter wheat harvest (March-April 2026) is expected to be below average due to expected disruptions in planting and production, particularly in the Gezira scheme. Shortages, high costs of agricultural inputs, and limited access to agricultural finance are likely to negatively impact production in the main wheat-producing centers in the River Nile and Northern states, as well as the main irrigated schemes across the country.
• Import requirements for the 2025/26 consumption year, particularly for wheat, are expected to be atypically high due to a third consecutive year of below-average production. However, Sudan’s ability to import wheat will continue to face challenges through 2026 due to conflict-related disruptions to trade, shortages of foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank of Sudan, and ongoing local currency depreciation.
• Seasonal livestock migration will likely continue to be disrupted by conflict and insecurity, lack of governance around timing and pathways for migration resulting in increased intercommunal (farmer-herder) clashes, and widespread insecurity across most of the major migratory routes. Atypical concentrations of livestock are expected in relatively calm areas, supported by late above-average rains that will improve pasture and water access, including in the Al-Butana grazing areas in Gedaref and Kassala states; Al-Baja grazing areas between White Nile and North Kordofan states; and parts of Blue Nile and South Kordofan states. Herders from parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are also likely to extend their stay in wet season grazing areas instead of moving to dry season grazing areas. Livestock diseases are expected in areas with high concentrations of livestock, particularly in the aftermath of the above-average rainy season, due to insufficient veterinary health services.
• Trade flows and market functionality are expected to remain highly disrupted in areas where armed parties are actively competing for control of key routes. Routes through Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, in particular, will face continued high levels of insecurity and a proliferation of checkpoints. Routes into besieged areas of Al-Fasher, Dilling, and Kadugli are expected to remain effectively blocked to main commercial flows, with limited potential for the smuggling of commodities in small volumes and at high costs on some rural routes. In eastern Sudan, trade flows and market functionality are expected to remain near normal.
  • Atypical reductions in market supply are expected during the harvest season, stemming from the below-average production; disrupted physical access to transport goods in conflict hotspots; and post-harvest losses.
  • Market functionality and participation are also inhibited by low liquidity, cash restrictions, high unofficial taxes, and high cash transfer costs.
  • Illegal/illicit cross-border flows are expected to continue. The illicit fuel trade supported by armed groups, which emerged before the war at the Sudan-Chad border, has likely expanded to other commodities, including food. These commodities originate from Libya and are not expected to meaningfully impact food prices due to the high transport, transaction, and protection costs involved. Despite the RSF-imposed trade embargo with Egypt, cross-border wheat inflows are still occurring unofficially. The ongoing discussions to resume cross-border trade between Sudan and South Sudan are not expected to impact staple food prices in the near term due to insecurity and currency challenges.
• Based on the above conflict, economic, production, and trade factors, food prices are anticipated to remain significantly above average throughout the projection period. In general, prices are expected to moderate slightly during the post-harvest period between January and February 2026, but speculation and below-average harvests will prevent any substantial decreases. In areas with severe fighting and continued siege-like conditions, prices are not expected to decline seasonally. Across Sudan, prices will likely resume rapid increases with the beginning of the anticipated atypically early lean season by April.
• Livestock prices are anticipated to vary locally depending on the severity of conflict impacts on market functionality and the livestock supply chain. Prices are anticipated to increase in the main consumption markets of the relatively calm urban areas due to reduced supply from main areas of production and high transportation costs. In rural areas and the main supply markets, prices are likely to decrease atypically due to supply chain disruptions, reduced access to consumption markets due to insecurity, high informal fees along primary and secondary trade routes, and reduced export activities. Pastoralists are also likely to seek to sell more animals than typical to cope with the high cost of living, contributing to price declines.
• Income sources are expected to remain atypically low given the scale of destruction, economic contraction, and security constraints on household mobility. In relatively secure rural areas, poor households are likely to increase their dependence on remittances, sale of bush products, and migration for unskilled labor opportunities, such as informal work in artisanal mining sites and in safer towns. This is particularly likely between March and May 2026 amid an anticipated early lean season start.
• Agricultural labor demand, which is mainly driven by the main harvest (October 2025-January 2026), is expected to remain below normal due to reduced production levels and insecurity. However, wages will likely remain higher than last year, driven by high inflation and local currency depreciation.
• Disease prevalence is expected to remain high through January 2026 following the above-average rainy season amid extremely poor WASH and health conditions, particularly in overcrowded areas and besieged towns. The spread of disease is expected to subsequently decline as conditions dry out, though remaining atypically high in areas with high numbers of IDPs and returnees. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• Despite funding shortfalls, WFP anticipates providing cash and food assistance to approximately 4 million people during the harvest and post-harvest period. Localities with a high share of displaced populations, particularly in Greater Darfur, will be prioritized. According to WFP’s plans, the majority of planned beneficiaries in November and December (over 2.3 million, or roughly 55 percent) will be in Greater Darfur. Approximately 1.3 million are expected to be assisted in eastern areas of Sudan, including in Khartoum (about 40 percent of planned beneficiaries), while fewer than 500,000 are slated to be assisted in Greater Kordofan (5 percent of planned beneficiaries).
• The Adré border crossing between Chad and West Darfur is approved to remain open through December 2025, a critical access point for humanitarian actors to transport food and nutrition supplies into Sudan. Beyond December, it is assumed that the border opening will be maintained given international attention to the severity of acute food insecurity across Greater Darfur and the difficulty of transporting assistance from Port Sudan. However, there is high uncertainty around the status of this border crossing beyond December given the RSF’s increasing consolidation over Greater Darfur and the Government’s preference to reduce the risk of diversion of supplies to the RSF.
• Humanitarian access to deliver assistance within Sudan will likely be dynamic. Constraints on access will be highest in and around besieged areas in Greater Kordofan and parts of North Darfur.
• In the near-term through January, levels of assistance are expected to be significant (reaching over 25 percent of the population with at least a 25 percent ration) in a few accessible localities in West Darfur, South Darfur, and Blue Nile. This is based on demonstrated consistency in assistance delivery throughout the lean season, alongside WFP’s tentative plans to maintain assistance at similar levels through December and an assessment of conflict-related access constraints.
• In the medium term from February to May, levels of assistance are not expected to be significant (i.e., reaching over 25 percent of the population with at least a 25 percent ration) in any locality. This assumption is underpinned by anticipated access constraints to areas of highest concern, the fluidity of displacement, inadequate funds compared to the high scale of need, and the likelihood that humanitarian actors will frequently adapt their operational plans as conditions change on the ground. 

Areas of greatest concern

In the typical harvest and post-harvest period from October to January, the besieged towns of Al-Fasher and Kadugli are expected to remain in Famine (IPC Phase 5), and it possible that Dilling town will also be in Famine (IPC Phase 5) (Figures 4 and 5). Extreme levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality are expected to persist in these besieged towns based on the likelihood that the RSF will target civilians in Al-Fasher town and intensify efforts to blockade Dilling and Kadugli towns. Notably, the RSF’s territorial gains in Al-Fasher will enable it to dedicate more resources towards frontline areas in Greater Kordofan. Within these besieged towns, coping strategies have been completely exhausted and food shortages are expected to persist or worsen. At least one-in-five households are expected to face extreme food consumption deficits (≥50 percent), going frequently without food and resorting to consuming weeds and livestock feed or begging. Acute malnutrition will remain widespread among children under five, in addition to adults. Without a significant easing or end to siege conditions, it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in Kadugli and Dilling towns through February-May as well. In Al-Fasher, however, there is considerable uncertainty around whether 10,000 people will still be in the area by then given ongoing mass killings, mass starvation, and mass displacement; as such, FEWS NET has not classified the town in February-May.

In the nearby rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (Dilling and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut localities), the intensity of conflict and insecurity is similarly expected to worsen. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected in the near-term. The availability of marginal harvests is expected to stabilize levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality in the near-term, but the severity of acute food insecurity is expected to deepen over the next three-to-seven months. The worst-off households are expected to heavily depend on family and community support and resort to more extreme livelihood coping strategies, including consumption of seeds, liquidation of assets (including livestock and productive assets), migration through insecure areas to search for food and income, and begging. Between February and May, however, it is possible that levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality will surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds.

Greater Darfur

From October to January, large parts of North Darfur, northern areas of South Darfur, and some areas of Central Darfur are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These areas will experience high levels of displacement (worsened by the fall of Al-Fasher), marginal harvests, market supply shortages and high staple food prices, shrinking labor demand, and severe erosion of household purchasing power. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across calmer areas of Greater Darfur (East Darfur, West Darfur, southern parts of South and Central Darfur), where access to food is expected to improve more substantially with the arrival of the main harvests starting in November. Households in these calmer areas have had relatively better access to their fields to cultivate their own crops and to in-kind payments from agricultural labor. In parts of West Darfur (Kereneik) and South Darfur (As-Sunta and Buram), Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected, meaning planned levels of food assistance will likely prevent more severe acute food insecurity.  

Between February and May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to spread across much of Greater Darfur, with Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes expected among displaced populations. This is typically the pre-lean season period, and households will increasingly exhaust their own-produced food stocks, driving increased market dependence amid rising prices. In order to earn income to purchase food, households will likely rely on the sale of natural resources and migration to urban areas for labor opportunities. However, insecurity and the threat of banditry and targeted violence will continue to limit households’ ability to migrate. Continued economic shocks will also limit the availability of income-earning opportunities, particularly among IDPs. Households are expected to increasingly rely on support from relatives and extended families while also engaging in severe livelihood-based coping strategies, including the sale of productive assets.

Greater Kordofan

In addition to the western Nuba Mountains area, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist through January in heavily conflict-affected areas of North Kordofan (Sheikan, Bara, Gharb Bara, and Um Dam Haj Ahmed); northern localities of West Kordofan through which the main route from Greater Darfur passes (Wad Banda, An-Nuhud, Al-Khiwai); and parts of central South Kordofan. Anticipated increases in conflict incidents along the main frontlines in Greater Kordofan are expected to lead to increased disruption to and looting of local harvests, which will in turn impact market supplies. In the relatively calmer areas, availability of stock from own-produced crops, access to livestock products among pastoral populations, and in-kind payments from agricultural labor are expected to drive relative improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during the harvest and post-harvest period. 

Between February and May, the severity of acute food insecurity is expected to deepen, and the share of the population experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes is expected to increase. The situation is likely to begin deteriorating with the atypically early start of the lean season in March, characterized by food shortages, the start of seasonal livestock migration to southern grazing areas, and soaring food prices.

Khartoum 

In Khartoum, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in all localities through May, though some households will likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in Jebel Awlia, Um-Bada, Omdurman, and Sharg An-Neel. Overall, the population experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes is expected to decline over the projection period as relative calm is expected to permit livelihoods to steadily recover. However, the pace of recovery will remain slow given the extent of reconstruction required to support the restoration of business activity and basic services. Food supply flows from surrounding rural areas to Khartoum are expected to remain disrupted by poor infrastructure, high transportation costs, and limited market functionality. This will likely restrict the degree to which households will benefit from seasonal harvest stocks in rural areas. The scarce income sources available within the city will also continue to heavily suppress households’ capacity to purchase food that is available in local markets. Communities will remain heavily dependent on remittances, community support such as Emergency Response Rooms, and fish for those with river access. 

Southeast

In the southeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely remain widespread through January, while Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) is expected in Baw of Blue Nile. Whilefood availability is expected to improve during this main harvesting and post-harvest period, the impact is expected to be uneven due to variability in household access to land, inputs, and services during the planting season. In particular, recently displaced populations arriving from North Kordofan, protracted IDPs, returnees who may have missed the cultivation season, and those impacted by the flash flooding are most likely to be acutely food insecure. These populations will have limited direct benefits from the harvest and will largely rely on market purchases, which will be limited by their low purchasing power. From February to May, the pre-lean season period, the population experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected to steadily increase as households exhaust food stocks and turn to market purchases. Some areas of Blue Nile are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), where the impact of conflict and displacement is higher.

Northeast

Across the Northeast, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated through May. In River Nile and Northern states, needs are expected to peak from January until the start of the winter wheat harvest in March/April. Locally produced wheat is the main staple in these areas, and households depend on the March/April wheat harvests for both food and income. The area is expected to remain relatively calm, with better access to cultivation during the upcoming production season and near-typical trade flows. The high number of IDPs, however, will continue to place pressure on available livelihood options and basic services. The peak of the lean season typically falls between November and February, when food stocks deplete and prices reach an annual high. 

In Kassala and Red Sea, access to new harvests from the ongoing 2025/26 season will likely support some improvement in access to own-produced food and income from agricultural labor. While physical access to land to cultivate has been better in these areas compared to heavily conflict-affected areas, harvest-related gains will likely be moderated by the effects of inadequate access to agricultural inputs and high production costs. Staple food prices are anticipated to rise unseasonably early, driven by the expected atypically early depletion of household and market food stocks. This will further reduce households’ access to food and drive acute food insecurity.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Escalation of fighting and expansion of direct clashes between armed groups into relatively calm areas

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Under the most likely scenario, direct clashes between armed groups are expected to intensify in Greater Kordofan. The parties to the conflict are fighting for control of the major towns of El-Obeid (North Kordofan), and Dilling and Kadugli (South Kordofan), as well as control of major trade routes throughout the region. In Greater Darfur, conflict is expected to remain high in North Darfur (particularly in stronghold areas for the Joint Forces). Insecurity and drone strikes are also likely to persist in additional areas of Greater Darfur.

However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which the conflict expands to areas that are currently relatively calm – particularly back into parts of central and southeastern Sudan (White Nile, Sennar, Al-Jazirah) – and further into calmer parts of eastern South Kordofan. This expansion would lead to large-scale targeting of civilian populations, loss of lives and livelihoods, massive displacement and re-displacement of civilians, and disruption to the agricultural production in these critical breadbasket areas of the country. In central and southeastern Sudan, a re-emergence of conflict would also result in increased destruction of remaining critical infrastructure, flight of the remaining (or recently returned) private sector, and further decimation of industrial capacity. This would likely drive further job and income source losses among both IDPs and residents. Conflict would reduce humanitarian access and limit the ability of the international community and the government to support the conflict-affected people. Under such a scenario, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would expand and the population facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would increase, including in not only the areas directly affected by heightened conflict but also distant deficit-producing areas that rely on supply flows from the center and southeast.

The warring parties reach an agreement on a humanitarian ceasefire 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, peace efforts are expected to remain stalled through at least May, despite continued sporadic regional and international attempts to revive negotiations. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which a peace agreement is reached, bringing the fighting and aerial attacks between the major warring parties to a halt and paving the way for a permanent ceasefire. While ongoing fighting and instability – especially around ethnic and intercommunal lines – would likely continue in Greater Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan, humanitarian access would be restored to currently besieged and hard-to-reach areas. Trade flows and population movements would improve across the country, enabling displaced people to return to their places of origin in safer areas. However, no meaningful returns would be expected in the more insecure areas of Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur before reaching a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive peace agreement. 

Under this alternative scenario, households’ access to food and services would broadly improve relative to the most likely scenario; however, the devastating impact of over 30 months of conflict on public and private infrastructure, livelihoods, and the economy would continue to undermine the recovery process in the medium term. The level of improvement in food consumption, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality would likely be determined by the scale and consistency of humanitarian assistance. If humanitarian food and nutrition assistance occurs on a large-scale in currently besieged and hard-to-reach areas, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely be mitigated to Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!), and some areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would improve to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). In calmer areas, area-level outcomes would likely improve in many productive centers to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

El- Obeid town in Sheikan locality, North Kordofan 

Siege conditions in El-Obeid intensify at a faster pace than expected

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, following the fall of Al-Fasher in late October, the RSF is expected to focus its attention and troop mobilization towards major contested areas of Greater Kordofan. RSF priorities likely include ousting the SAF garrison from Babanusa (West Kordofan), vying for control of El-Obeid town within Sheikan locality of North Kordofan, and controlling the primary trade routes through Greater Kordofan. It is expected that the RSF will attempt to surround and besiege the city, but the topography and geography of El-Obeid make a full siege unlikely. Rather, partial siege conditions are expected to restrict trade flows and population movements in the most likely scenario. Nevertheless, there is a credible alternative scenario in which the siege of El-Obeid would intensify and tighten at a faster pace than currently expected, leading to a more severe reductions in trade flows and humanitarian access, driving large-scale displacement, and increasingly cutting off some populations within the town from food and income sources. If this were to occur by February, then it is likely that levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds during the February-May pre-lean season period. 

Rural areas in South Kordofan

Intensification of the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli leads to spillover effects in surrounding rural areas of South and West Kordofan 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario through January, Dilling and Kadugli towns are expected to remain besieged by joint RSF and SPLM-N forces. Spillover effects from the sieges are expected to drive a high share of populations experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the immediate surrounding rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling, and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut). The focus of the RSF on other areas of North and West Kordofan is expected to limit the scale of troop build-up in these areas, allowing some access to marginal harvests from October to January. Beyond January, FEWS NET assesses it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will emerge as harvest stocks will run out and the population has little to no access to other viable food sources. 

However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which Famine (IPC Phase 5) will occur more rapidly in areas of the rural western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling, and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut) than February-May. This would occur if the RSF focuses its attention on intensively tightening the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli, thereby increasing troop presence in the surrounding rural areas, particularly around Dilling. This increase in conflict and insecurity would result in severe restrictions on trader, humanitarian, and population mobility in rural areas; disruptions in access to food and income sources during the harvest and post-harvest period; and likely looting of already marginal harvest stocks and market supplies. In this scenario, levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would escalate more rapidly than currently expected and would likely breach the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds in a matter of weeks in, given the current share of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and high levels of acute malnutrition. 

In other neighboring areas of South Kordofan, the intensification of the two sieges would result in a rapid increase in displacement deeper into rural areas (rural Kadugli, Al-Buram, Heiban, Delami, Ar-Reif Ash Shargi), as well as a more rapid depletion of available harvests. These factors would likely contribute to an expansion of area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with an increase in populations experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the typical harvest and post-harvest period (October-January). The rapid exhaustion of harvests and increase in conflict-driven disruptions to trade flows, humanitarian access, and population mobility would lead to high levels of starvation between February and May, which would in turn drive levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality beyond the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. 

Greater Darfur

Deepening of intercommunal clashes and RSF escalation in North Darfur beyond the expected level and scope around areas hosting a high number of IDPs in Greater Darfur

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, RSF attacks on IDP camps and rural villages, particularly in North Darfur, are expected to continue forcing secondary and tertiary displacements. IDPs are largely fleeing deeper into RSF-held areas of North Darfur (Korma, Kutum, Mellit), into safe-haven areas under SLA Abdul Wahid Nur control (Jebel Marrah area mostly centered in Central Darfur but expanding into parts of South, West, and North Darfur, including Tawila), or crossing into Chad and Libya. However, the level of conflict and insecurity is not expected to fully prevent humanitarian access or completely cut off populations from accessing food and income. 

There is a credible alternative scenario in which RSF’s targeted attacks on IDPs and/or escalation of intercommunal fighting is sustained at an intensity that obstructs humanitarian access, disrupts trade flows, population movements and community support, and triggers displacement and re-displacement across Greater Darfur. Displacement into already overcrowded areas/IDP camps with extremely poor health and WASH services and already high disease incidence would fuel further outbreaks and exacerbate acute malnutrition. If this were to occur, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be the likely outcome. This risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is assessed in areas with high concentrations of IDPs, particularly those that are receiving the most recent waves of IDPs from Al-Fasher town, including rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila; many of those fleeing Al-Fasher are arriving in a state of starvation and acute malnourishment. The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also present in crowded camps in parts of South Darfur (around Nyala, Beliel, Buram, Gereida, and Tulus).

The 18-month RSF siege on Al-Fasher was defined by violent, targeted attacks on civilian residents and IDPs, large-scale displacement out of the area, extreme food shortages, and a near-complete lack of humanitarian access. The siege has led to Famine (IPC Phase 5) in multiple locations in the area since at least July 2024; as of September 2025, the latest available evidence indicates Famine (IPC Phase 5) is still ongoing within the town of Al-Fasher. While Al-Fasher fell to RSF on October 26, 2025, thousands of people are expected to remain trapped in the area in the near-term due to combatant activity, with few prospects for accessing lifesaving food. Therefore, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to persist in the area between October and January. 

By February, if not sooner, the combination of mass starvation, displacement, and massacres makes it highly uncertain whether at least 10,000 people will remain in the area, which is the minimum number required for IPC classification of a geographic unit of analysis. For those who remain, however, a persistent risk of death will endure, driven by the threat of starvation and other atrocities.

Siege of Al-Fasher 

Famine (IPC Phase 5) first occurred in Zamzam IDP camp, before spreading to other areas. At the start of the siege in May 2024, Al-Fasher hosted an estimated 580,000 IDPs, inclusive of over 160,000 new IDPs. Many IDPs resided in Zamzam camp to the south of the city, as well as the smaller camps within the northern periphery of the town: Abu Shouk and Al-Salam camps. As the siege on the town persisted through 2024, deteriorating access to sources of food and income among IDPs led to the emergence of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in these three camps between July 2024 and October 2024. 

Given that there was little to no improvement in access to food or humanitarian access after Famine (IPC Phase 5) was confirmed, it is highly like that Famine (IPC Phase 5) persisted in areas of Al-Fasher into 2025. Throughout 2025, RSF forces tightened the siege on Al-Fasher town. RSF constructed earthen berms that completely encircled the city by October (Figure 6), and increased drone and artillery attacks that targeted civilian and displacement areas. The largest attack was the vicious April 2025 attack on Zamzam camp, in which camp residents were killed or fled en masse to nearby areas, primarily Tawila. Since April, the population remaining in and around Zamzam have been primarily combatants and their allies. Between May and August, RSF increasingly carried out attacks on Abu Shouk camp, killing civilians and resulting in increased displacement from the camp into Al-Fasher town. By September 2025, it is assumed that the town was composed of mostly people who had been displaced by armed fighting within the town and targeted attacks on near-by IDP camps and informal displacement sites. Hundreds of thousands of people had been able to flee the town to neighboring localities. 

The intensification of the siege since mid-2025 severely reduced mobility into and out of the city, cut off trade routes, and trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians inside, preventing access to livelihood activities. As of August and September 2025, food availability had deteriorated catastrophically in the town, driving extreme surges in the prices of staple food. For example, sorghum and millet cost five to nine times more in Al-Fasher town than in nearest town of Tawila. Monthly food costs were estimated to exceed 700 USD per household, far beyond affordability amid the loss of main livelihood activities, including farming, trade, seasonal labor migration, and depletion of assets. Purchasing power has further collapsed due to hyperinflation and the breakdown of informal support systems via digital platforms such as Bankak amid telecommunications outages and infrastructure damage. 

Humanitarian access has remained non-existent due to the level of insecurity, with no direct food or nutrition assistance having reached the city in over a year. WFP reportedly provided cash assistance to about 260,000 people, but it is unlikely to have meaningfully benefitted the intended recipients given the fluidity of displacement, and difficulties that households face in accessing and using digital transfers in the context of extreme cash and food shortages and price surges. Community kitchens were also forced to shut down due to the insecurity and food shortages, cutting off a critical lifeline for residents. Households were increasingly employing more desperate coping strategies, including consumption of animal feed, oilseed cake (umbaz), wild foods, and other famine foods.¹ It is this convergence of evidence that underpins the conclusion that levels of starvation in Al-Fasher town still exceeded the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold as of September.  

The body of evidence also supports the conclusion that levels of acute malnutrition and mortality remain extreme. The 18-month siege had also all but decimated health facilities and health care services in the town, contributing to high levels of acute malnutrition and mortality. The fighting and construction of the earthen berms had severely restricted access to the Golo Reservoir, severely disrupting water delivery to the town. Only a few water pumps and tanks have been operational during the siege, and the continued high insecurity and danger in accessing these limited pumps are further interfering with access to safe water and hygiene facilities. While there has been limited information on disease outbreaks within the town, it has likely been high based on the reports of IDPs who were able to flee Al-Fasher to Tawila and Melit. High morbidity levels likely aggravated already-high acute malnutrition levels. The last round of data collected within Al-Fasher town occurred in March 2025, when an inter-cluster Rapid Needs Assessment found a GAM by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) prevalence of 38 percent. Since then, the body of evidence from Al-Fasher town, coupled with the high rates of acute malnutrition among IDPs arriving from Al-Fasher in Chad and in Tawila, indicate that the prevalence of acute malnutrition was still above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold as of September. While mortality data is unavailable, it is inferred based on the severity of starvation and acute malnutrition outcomes that mortality from hunger and the interaction of hunger and disease was also still above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold as of September.

Fall of Al-Fasher

Levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality are expected to remain above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds following the fall of the city. On October 26, 2025, the RSF seized control of Al-Fasher town following the fall of the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division, engaging in indiscriminate attacks and slaughtering of civilians. Approximately 82,000 individuals have been reportedly displaced since then, mostly to parts of North Darfur (Tawila, rural Al-Fasher, and Melit localities) as well as to other parts of Greater Darfur Region and Northern State. While ground conditions are highly volatile, reports have emerged that civilians remain trapped with severely limited access to food, healthcare, or safe passage under the threat of kidnappings and continued extrajudicial killings. Reports are emerging of a system of extortion, high ransoms, and levies, in which civilians are forced to pay to access water, food, or medicine. The only remaining operational Saudi Hospital was attacked and likely looted, exacerbating already extremely poor access to health services. 

The situation in surrounding areas such as rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila (the main receiving area for IDPs since the start of the Al-Fasher siege) has meanwhile become increasingly dire. In Tawila, the total number of IDPs is now likely to be near to or possibly in excess of 700,000 people following the fall of Al-Fasher, having already tripled between March and the end of September (an estimated 652,079 people as of September 30). While humanitarians have access to these areas, and local and international organizations are working hard to provide services and assistance, the scale of the influx and extremely high needs are overwhelming their capacity. The camps and informal sites are severely overcrowded, straining local infrastructure and resulting in severe shortages of shelter, clean water, and medical care. These factors are likely exacerbating disease outbreaks that have plagued the locality since late June. Amid the large influx, women and children remain at highest risk of extreme outcomes in addition to gender-based violence. Further movement of IDPs is expected toward rural Al-Fasher and Melit, with key informants reporting high insecurity along displacement routes. However, these rural areas lack services or capacity to support large groups of IDPs, and are likely to serve as transition points as populations flee further to areas of Greater Darfur, Chad, or to eastern Sudan.

Kadugli and Dilling towns

Kadugli and Dilling towns are major urban centers located in the western side of South Kordofan. Kadugli, the state capital, lies on the southern edge of the Nuba Mountains and has historically served as a strategic administrative and military hub. Dilling, located to the north of Kadugli and within the Nuba Mountains, is known for its educational significance, particularly as the home of Dilling University, and for its commercial activities. Both towns are ethnically diverse, with significant populations of Nuba and Arab Baggara communities, and their strategic locations have made them focal points in the ongoing war.

The conflict in South Kordofan is one of several long-running conflicts in the country that pre-date April 2023, which the war has exacerbated. The conflict is rooted in ethnic tensions between the Nuba and Arab Baggara communities over land and water resources. The Nuba, aligned with SPLM-N, have long faced political marginalization, land dispossession, and historical targeting, including campaigns of ethnic cleansing. The Arab Baggara, particularly the Hawazma and Misseriya tribes, are aligned with the RSF, driven by resource competition and identity politics. These tensions have been militarized over decades, and the current war has exacerbated them, leading to intercommunal violence and further destabilization. 

The current ongoing conflict in South Kordofan is uniquely three-sided, involving the SAF, the RSF, and the SPLM-N al-Hilu faction. While SAF currently controls both Kadugli and Dilling, the towns are under siege, encircled by RSF and SPLM-N forces. Civilian movement is heavily restricted, and both towns are subject to frequent shelling. While siege conditions eased in late 2024 and into early 2025, they then intensified following a rapprochement between the RSF and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) in February 2025. Fighting has increased since then as RSF/SPLM-N work together to tighten the siege on the SAF-held cities of Dilling and Kadugli. Meanwhile, SAF is mounting its offensive from the North Kordofan side, trying to break through and reconnect the towns to the main road through North Kordofan. The SAF is also applying pressure along the SPLM-N's eastern territory, and clashes have displaced civilians into central areas of South Kordofan under SPLM-N control. In late June, SPLM-N and SAF vied for control over Al-Dashoul station located between Dilling and Kadugli, disrupting movement between the two towns. In August, SPLM-N captured Umm Adara, cutting off Kadugli from markets on the South Sudanese border.

Information on the severity of impacts on local populations is very limited, especially in and around Dilling, given the nature of the siege and prevailing constraints on humanitarian access. Evidence from Kadugli is more widely documented. According to IOM DTM, an estimated 3,000 people fled Kadugli between August 6-10 alone, reportedly due to the severe food shortages and deteriorating conditions in the town.  However, local estimates of displacement place the number fleeing the town much higher. It is expected that conditions are worse for those who remain trapped in the city. It is assumed that displacement flows have also increased within and outside Dilling town.

Severe siege-related movement restrictions in Kadugli and Dilling towns have devastated market supply systems and public services, leading to extreme food shortages, exorbitant food prices, and the near-collapse of basic infrastructure. For example, in Kadugli town, key informants reported that the average price of sorghum had increased by over 400 percent between May and August 2025. Community kitchens, which have been a lifeline throughout the war, have had to reduce services with many reportedly closing. Health services have collapsed, with hospitals lacking essential medicines and operating at minimal capacity. 

Humanitarian access challenges are severe. There has been no direct, in-kind food assistance to either town in 2025. Cash assistance was provided to just under 7,000 people in September in Dilling locality (though it is unclear to FEWS NET if they were located in the town or in rural areas), down from nearly 21,000 in August. In Kadugli locality, the last delivery of cash assistance was in July to 3,000 people, down from over 35,000 in May. The decrease in cash assistance was reportedly due to the known, limited impact of cash assistance amid food shortages and extreme price surges. One convoy carrying nutrition supplies did arrive in Dilling and Kadugli in mid-August and early September, intended to provide nutrition assistance to an estimated 120,000 beneficiaries. However, the amount of nutritional assistance is too low to meaningfully curb the pace of increase in acute malnutrition levels. According to the Nutrition Cluster, stockouts of nutrition supplies had already been reported in both Dilling and Kadugli in July and August. This is supported by a drop in admissions trends to outpatient treatment and stabilization centers in Kadugli, which peaked in July and then dropped steeply in August, reflecting reduced capacity to treat patients. The death rate among admissions soared to 67 percent of admitted patients in August. 

Based on the body of evidence from Kadugli, the FRC concurs that Famine (IPC Phase 5) has likely been ongoing in Kadugli since September 2025. According to an August 2025 rapid assessment conducted among households who had fled Kadugli town to surrounding rural areas, 27 percent of households had very severe hunger (measured by the Household Hunger Score [HHS]) and 67 percent had engaged in severe consumption coping strategies. The same assessment found a GAM WHZ prevalence of 34.7 percent among the assessed households. While evidence of mortality is limited, the startling death rates among children admitted for treatment of acute malnutrition in August (67 percent) converges with other contextual evidence and strongly supports that mortality has likely surpassed the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. 

There is no data available on hunger, acute malnutrition, or mortality from Dilling town. While the FRC concluded that the body of evidence was not sufficient to establish whether the IPC thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) have been crossed in Dilling town, FEWS NET assesses that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is possible in Dilling based on the similarities in the length and characteristics of the dual sieges of Kadugli and Dilling. Given that the sieges are expected to continue and intensify following the fall of Al-Fasher, it is further possible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist through May in both towns.

Rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains

The immediate surrounding rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut) have experienced severe spillover effects from the sieges since early 2024. Although detailed information is unavailable due to humanitarian access constraints, conflict and insecurity have again escalated in the area since May 2025 and are likely causing additional displacements. Movement restrictions are reportedly very high amid security-related concerns, fear of mines, and targeted violence against civilians. Conflict is also expected to have disrupted cultivation and limited access to farms. In particular, Habila, which is typically a main production center supplying harvests to the immediate surrounding areas, experienced attacks at the start of the cultivation season. These high levels of insecurity are expected to have severely reduced production this year. Access to markets is reportedly very challenging in accessible areas, and is therefore likely even worse in inaccessible areas. Food prices are expected to be very high. 

Humanitarian assistance is very limited in these areas due to insecurity. According to the Food Security Cluster, no direct food assistance has been provided in 2025. Some local NGOs who typically provide assistance in these areas acknowledged serious access constraints in the western Nuba Mountains areas, particularly since the deterioration in security since July. IDPs had reportedly left camps in the area since no assistance was arriving and are likely relying heavily on community support. Reliance on wild foods is also expected to have increased among both residents and IDPs. According to one survey in accessible areas, over half of the households were relying on wild foods, and this is likely to be even higher among households in inaccessible areas.

While evidence is limited, food consumption data identified recent, rapid increases in hunger and signs that the population is exhausting available coping strategies. Due to access challenges in these areas, available data on household food consumption and livelihoods coping only reflects conditions in accessible areas, and outcomes are expected to be generally much worse in inaccessible areas. According to a SMART survey conducted in July among resident populations (excludes IDPs) of the rural western Nuba Mountains, only 4 percent reported severe hunger (a HHS score of 4, 5, or 6). However, in August, another survey found that 47 percent of surveyed households (mostly residents) in Habila had severe hunger, though only 3 percent reported severe hunger in rural Dilling. Meanwhile, the same August survey found evidence of high levels of livelihood coping in both Dilling and Habila, with 39 and 61 percent of surveyed households, respectively, reporting that they had sold their last female animal, while 14 and 21 percent, respectively, reported resorting to begging.

Data on acute malnutrition also pointed to alarming outcomes during the lean season, though the signals were mixed. In June, a MUAC screening conducted in three villages in the western Nuba Mountains area found a GAM prevalence of 33 percent, more than double the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold for MUAC. A follow-up SMART survey in July found a 6.7 percent GAM WHZ prevalence, though some clusters approached 20 percent within this sample. It should be noted, however, that the July survey collected data only among the resident population; the demographic makeup of the villages surveyed in June is unconfirmed and may include IDPs. In September, the Nutrition Cluster conducted another SMART survey in As-Sunut which found a GAM WHZ prevalence of 20 percent. As with all assessments conducted in this insecure area, the survey’s coverage was limited by access constraints, with challenges reaching inaccessible areas closest to the West-South Kordofan border. It is generally assumed that acute malnutrition levels are worse in inaccessible areas. 

Based on the convergence of available evidence, FEWS NET assesses there are likely populations experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the western Nuba Mountains area as of October, and the severity of acute food insecurity is expected to deepen across the broader population over the coming months. Data on mortality has not been collected in this area, but hunger-related deaths are likely occurring. In the coming months, the siege of Dilling town is expected to continue and intensify, and insecurity in the surrounding rural areas is expected to deteriorate. Commercial and humanitarian access is expected to remain obstructed. Agricultural production in the immediate areas of the western Nuba Mountains is expected to be very limited and will provide only limited relief in the immediate harvest and post-harvest period (October-January). Households are expected to heavily depend on family and community support and engage in more extreme livelihood coping strategies, including consumption of seeds, liquidation of assets (including livestock and productive assets), risky migration in search of food and income sources, and begging. As a result, the share of the population in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to remain elevated during the harvest and post-harvest period. Between February and May, it is possible that the levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality will rise and cross the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds (Figure 7).