Famine (IPC Phase 5) expands to areas in South Kordofan

• It is considered likely that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and in Al Fasher town of North Darfur, inclusive of Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps, pending concurrence from the IPC’s Famine Review Committee (FRC), which is required for classification of Famine. It is also assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in Dilling and Kadugli localities of South Kordofan and among those displaced from Kadugli who are sheltering in neighboring Al Buram, also pending FRC concurrence. The prolonged besiegement of these areas, which has severely affected the food supply and humanitarian access, has most likely driven levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. Based on minimal to no access to new harvests, expectations of a worse lean season in 2025 than that of 2024, and persistent impediments to the delivery of food assistance at scale, it is assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely continue in these areas through at least mid-2025.
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected during the typical harvest season (October-January) in the most severely conflict-affected areas of Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah. Populations in these areas face poor harvests, very high staple food prices, and the loss of income sources. Amid low levels of food assistance delivery, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected among IDPs, particularly in Greater Darfur, who lack access to farmland, have minimal to no purchasing capacity, and are unable to move elsewhere due to conflict and insecurity.
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to become increasingly widespread amid a very early start to the lean season by March, and food assistance needs are expected to rise sharply as the 2025 lean season gets underway. Moreover, there is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 28 localities in Greater Darfur, parts of Khartoum, and Al Jazirah. An immediate ceasefire and sustained scale-up of food and nutrition, and WASH assistance are urgently required to mitigate the scale of hunger-related deaths. 

The humanitarian situation remains dire across Sudan 18 months into the war. Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in Zamzam IDP camp and Al Fasher town of North Darfur, inclusive of Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps. It is also assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoingin Dilling and Kadugli localities of South Kordofan and among IDPs who fled Kadugli and are sheltering in Al Buram. An official classification for all of these areas of North Darfur and South Kordofan is pending concurrence from a plausibility review by the IPC’s Famine Review Committee. Furthermore, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist across much of Greater Darfur with some households expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly in North Darfur where direct clashes have been severe and in parts of Central and South Darfur with high concentrations of protracted and newly displaced populations. 

In addition to alarming acute food insecurity outcomes, many areas are experiencing an acute malnutrition crisis due to rising disease prevalence and insufficient access to health services. 16 SMART surveys conducted in parts of Greater Darfur between June and September show elevated Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates even in areas where food consumption deficits are less severe. In 13 localities, the GAM prevalence is in the high range of Critical (GAM weight-for-height z-scores [WHZ] of 15-29.9 percent) or has passed the Extremely Critical threshold (GAM-WHZ ≥30 percent).  

While crops harvested between November and January are expected to temporarily improve food availability and moderate prices slightly in many areas, national production will likely be below- to significantly below-average for the second year in a row, and harvests in the most heavily conflict-affected areas will likely be marginal. An atypically early start of the lean season is expected by March 2025. IDPs and beseiged populations are expected to benefit least from the harvest. The impacts of fighting and displacement have also sharply undermined other food and income sources, disrupted food supply flows within Sudan, and prevented the necessary scale-up of assistance. In Al Fasher town and nearby IDP camps; Dilling and Kadugli localities; and among displaced populations in Al Buram locality, it is expected that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will continue through at least mid-2025. Meanwhile, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will become increasingly widespread across Sudan from February to May.

In 28 localities in Greater Darfur and parts of Khartoum and Al Jazirah, there is a very credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), especially between February and May, when the temporary relief provided by the 2024 harvest on food availability and access dissipates. If conflict (1) further isolates or indirectly prevents households from migrating to safer areas in search of food or income, and/or (2) prevents humanitarian access to populations whose resilience has been deeply undermined by two consecutive years of poor harvests, the severe erosion of income sources and asset ownership, and depletion of both household and community coping capacity), then levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality would likely pass the thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5). The results of a recent mortality study by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine already point to a steady, observable increase in the proportion of deaths attributable to the indirect impacts of the conflict (starvation and disease) over time since the start of the war, compared to deaths due to direct conflict. This trend will only worsen as the 2025 lean season nears, as access to food and income in 2025 will be worse than in 2024 due to the compounding impacts of conflict. Government and humanitarian actors are urged to take immediate action to urgently scale up and sustain food and nutrition assistance at high levels in order to end Famine (IPC Phase 5), mitigate the scale of deaths that are also occurring in areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and prevent the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Sudan. 

There are no signs of conflict abating 18 months into Sudan’s devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The politicization of the war along ethnic and tribal lines remains a dominant undertone: the RSF draws strong support mainly from Arab tribes and allied Arab militias, while the SAF draws support from the Darfur Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movement (JSAMF), which is a coalition of former Darfur rebel groups (though predominantly from the Zaghawa tribe), and the armed civilian resistance. The war has been characterized by widespread, sexual-based violence and targeting, looting, and massacres of civilians, with attacks such as in West Darfur reminiscent of the genocide 20 years ago. The scale of the violence and insecurity has driven massive displacement which, when combined with protracted displacement, has rendered Sudan the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. 

The impact of the conflict is profoundly affecting all aspects of life across the country. The destruction of and disruption to Sudan’s critical infrastructure and industrial capacity; destruction of major oil fields and fuel refineries; flight of the private sector; and disruption to import/export activities, supply chains, commerce, finance sectors, and agricultural productivity across the country have all led to severe economic contraction on top of years of macroeconomic decline. The healthcare system has all but collapsed amid the targeting of hospitals in cities. Extensive looting of private property and residences – another persistent characteristic of the conflict – combined with the loss of jobs and income sources have driven the impoverishment of millions in a relatively short timeframe. Markets have similarly been periodically looted and damaged, and trade flows have been disrupted, which have sustained extremely high food prices through the 2024 lean season that will likely persist during the 2024/25 harvest. 

Across the rainfed traditional, rainfed semi-mechanized, and irrigated agricultural sectors, the harvesting of summer crops typically begins with limited green harvests in October and main harvests between November and January. Agricultural labor opportunities in the irrigated and semi-mechanized areas of the southeast typically provide important income during the harvest season from October to January. However, variable levels of conflict and insecurity are expected to interfere with household access to farms and key agricultural sources of food and income through the post-harvest period. Between February and May, which coincides with the end of the post-harvest period and pre-lean season period, household and market stocks typically decline; in turn, prices typically rise seasonally in the lead-up to the peak of the lean season (June-September). This year, the lean season is expected to start as early as March due to the ongoing conflict and impacts on household access to typical income opportunities, high and rising food and non-food prices, and continued deterioration in household purchasing capacity. In some areas, where direct fighting has completely prevented households from engaging in crop production, the lean season is expected to start even earlier. 

Key hazards

Conflict

Eighteen months into the conflict, active fighting, insecurity, and displacement continue across most of the country, particularly along key frontlines between SAF and RSF in Greater Darfur, parts of Greater Kordofan, Khartoum, Al Jazirah, and Sennar; as well as between SAF, RSF, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in parts of South and West Kordofan (Figure 1). The greatest share of direct clashes continue in Khartoum, North Darfur, and Al Jazirah. Sudan remains the world’s largest displacement crisis with 14 million people displaced from their homes. According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), internal displacement has reached 11 million people as of October 29, inclusive of protracted displacement prior to April 2023. Since April 2023, 8.3 million people have been internally displaced, many of them multiple times. The majority of IDPs are living in Greater Darfur (50 percent), with high populations in North Darfur (14 percent) and South Darfur (17 percent). Meanwhile, displacement across borders has surpassed 3 million people, with the majority crossing into Egypt (39 percent), followed by Chad (28 percent) and South Sudan (27 percent).

The RSF-led siege of Al Fasher in North Darfur continued in October for the sixth consecutive month. Trade and humanitarian access remain effectively cut off, with limited quantities of smuggled food and other essential goods selling at very high prices. Since April 2024, the IOM DTM reported 31 conflict-related incidents in Al Fasher that triggered the sudden displacement of an estimated 410,376 individuals. Over half of those displaced fled to locations within Al Fasher locality, while the remainder fled to 22 different localities across Greater Darfur, including Tawila (15 percent) and Dar As-Salam (14 percent) of North Darfur and Shamal Jabal Marrah (7 percent) of Central Darfur. Heightened attacks in and around Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps also triggered large movements associated with civilian displacement. Some populations likely headed south in the direction of Zamzam, as indicated in satellite imagery analyzed by Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) and triangulated with ground reports, though likely additional population dispersed to other neighborhoods and areas within the town, increasing pressure on any available community services within the town.

Direct fighting also escalated between the SAF-aligned JSAMF and the RSF in mid-October, starting in various locations of North Darfur (including in Mellit, Kutum, and Um Baru localities) and extending to parts of Kulbus, Selia, Jebel Moon, and Sirba localities in northern West Darfur, resulting in large-scale displacement from the affected areas. The clashes are aimed at pulling forces away from and disrupting any re-supply to forces in Al Fasher. The impact of the fighting has spilled over to the neighboring Geneina town, the capital of West Darfur state, resulting in displacement of approximately 290 households who sought shelter in locations across the border in Chad. Between June and October, SAF has intensified frequent airstrikes on key RSF targets in Al Koma, Mellit, Kutum, Kebkabiya, and Saraf Omra in North Darfur, as well as targets including the airports in Nyala in South Darfur. Checkpoints continue to proliferate with reports of high fees, looting, and violence against civilians moving along main routes within Greater Darfur and routes linking Darfur to other parts of the country.

In South Kordofan, Dilling and Kadugli towns have been contested for most of 2024, resulting in high levels of conflict, insecurity, and siege-like conditions in these areas and surrounding localities. As of October, the SPLM-N controls most rural areas around Dilling (Nuba Mountains area), particularly to the east and south, while the RSF controls the north and west, cutting off access and movement to and from the locality. The SAF garrisons remain besieged in the cities of Dilling and Kadugli, though SAF controls slightly more territory in the latter. Ethnic conflict has flared repeatedly due to the historical tensions between the local Nuba population and resident Arab tribesmen, which has interfered with population access to farms for cultivation across the region more broadly. In West Kordofan, direct clashes have declined since RSF consolidated control of much of the region between July and August. In North Kordofan, RSF has largely consolidated control across the state though sporadic clashes continue around El Obeid, including attacks on villages. 

In September, fighting in Khartoum continued with the SAF pushing into western Omdurman’s Ombada and Fatehab areas, and the RSF displacing civilians from Bahri’s Darfoog and Hatta areas during attacks on the SAF-controlled Kadroo enclave. The SAF launched a major offensive in late September, in which the SAF captured three key bridges and advanced into central Khartoum’s Mogran district. Although the SAF advance stalled in October, armed clashes, attacks, heavy artillery fire, and drone strikes continued to destroy remaining infrastructure in Greater Khartoum and often killed civilians indiscriminately. In September, a SAF airstrike on a market in southern Khartoum killed 35 people, while in October an airstrike on a market in central Khartoum killed 25 people.

In the southeast, SAF made significant gains in September in Al Jazirah, advancing to within 12 kilometers of Wad Madani. Subsequently, in early October, SAF recaptured the villages and towns of Jebel Moya area in Sennar and re-opened the main road linking eastern Sudan with White Nile state. However, Sennar city remains contested and RSF still controls large parts of Sennar state (Suki, Dinder, and Sinja). In late October, RSF renewed its attacks on several areas in Al Jazirah state, attacking 30 villages and towns between October 20-30, 2024. The ferocity of these attacks was due in part to the defection of the RSF Gezira commander Abu Aqla Keikel to SAF, and resulted in deaths of at least 124 people, sexual assault of dozens of girls and women, displacement of over 135,000 people, and widespread looting and devastation of public and private infrastructure. Between June 24 and the end of October, over 374,000 people fled the southeast (Al Jazirah and Sennar states) to areas in Gedaref, Kassala, and Blue Nile states, bringing the total number of IDPs from the southeast to over 1,260,000 people since the start of the conflict. 

Macroeconomic conditions

Sudan’s economic conditions continue to deteriorate as the conflict rages on. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has projected that the economy could contract by an additional 5.9 percent in 2024, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates it could be as high as 18.3 percent. This is on top of an estimated contraction of 37.5 percent in 2023. The Sudanese pound (SDG) continues to rapidly lose value against the USD: between August and September, the SDG/USD exchange rate increased 50-60 percent on the official and parallel markets (trading at 2,950 and 3,750 SDG, respectively), and increased 390-525 percent compared to March 2023 (600 SDG on official and parallel markets) (Figure 2). In addition, the annual inflation rate increased from 193.9 percent in July, to 218.2 percent in August, before easing slightly to 215.5 percent in September. Despite the minor decrease in September, the current high inflation rate reflects the poor economic conditions amid continued conflict and instability.

Cereal prices (sorghum and millet) generally remained extremely high and above-average at the peak of the lean season (September), despite noticeable month-on-month decreases in some markets. The degree of price increases during the lean season has been exacerbated by the significantly below-average harvest from last year; widespread disruptions to market functionality, import volumes, and domestic trade flows; high production and transportation costs; and deteriorating economic conditions. Between August and September 2024, sorghum and millet prices increased on average by 15 and 24 percent, respectively, across the reporting markets (Figure 2). Several markets, including in Wad Madani, Kadugli, Kassala, Nyala, Sennar, and Ad-Damazin, recorded even steeper month-on-month increases of 15-50 percent for sorghum and 20-110 percent for millet. Kadugli (which maintained its position as the highest-priced market for staple foods for the ninth consecutive month) recorded a sorghum price of 3,900 SDG/kg, followed by Ad Daein (3,400 SDG/kg) and Madani (3,033 SDG/kg). In contrast, some markets, such as in Al Gedaref, El Obeid, Kosti, Zalingei, and Geneina, saw sorghum and/or millet prices stabilize or slightly decline between August and September 2024; this is attributed to grain traders releasing their stocks prior to the availability of new harvests, and as they seek to build up cash reserves to meet their harvest financial obligations. In addition, the decision by RSF to prohibit the export of agricultural and livestock commodities from areas under their control is contributing to a decline in the prices of exported goods, such as groundnuts and sesame, in parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan.     

In September, livestock prices in most markets were either stable or increased slightly compared to August, a noticeable change after months of steeply rising prices in some markets. Still, compared to July, livestock prices (cattle, goat, and sheep) were 21-34 percent higher on average. Compared to last year and the two-year average, livestock prices were 190-240 percent and 220-280 percent higher, respectively. Consumption markets in the east have seen the steepest increases over the last few months (including Madani, El Gedaref, Kassal, Dongola, and Omdurman), while production markets in the center and west of the country have seen greater stability or even slight declines in recent months (reflecting both reduced access to consumption and export markets and reduced demand for local consumption due to dwindling purchasing power). Rising prices – particularly in the east – are driven by declining supply due to (1) persistent disruptions to trade routes amid conflict and seasonal deterioration in roads; (2) favorable pasture and water conditions that are driving better livestock body conditions, supporting herders’ decision to sell less now in anticipation of higher prices in the coming months; and (3) economic factors, including underlying local currency depreciation, excessive inflation, and high production and transport costs.

Weather and flooding

The main June to September rainy season was characterized by mostly above-average rainfall, driven by the atypical northward migration of the inter-tropical front (ITF) (FIgure 3). As a result, areas that rarely see significant rainfall – such as parts of Red Sea, Kassala, and Northern states; most of North and West Darfur; and the northern parts of Central Darfur and North Kordofan – experienced the wettest year of the 40-year historical record.

The heavy rains led to flash floods that have compounded the adverse impacts of conflict in affected areas. Between June and October 2024, the IOM DTM reported 126 heavy rain and flood events that displaced an estimated 190,000 individuals across 15 of Sudan’s 18 states (Figure 3). The highest level of weather-related displacement corresponded directly to areas that experienced the wettest season on record: River Nile, North Darfur, Northern, Red Sea, and West Darfur (Figure 3). The rains also caused significant damage to public and private infrastructure, including bridges, roads, schools, and latrines, as well as damage to IDP settlements and private homes. In addition, livelihoods have been significantly affected as farms were submerged in water, crops damaged or lost, and a number of livestock washed away. The accumulation of water in low-lying areas also poses a serious health and environmental hazard, including the increased risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera. According to the Health Cluster for Sudan, over 19,200 cholera cases and 572 associated deaths were reported across 64 localities in 11 states between August and September 2024. The highest cholera case concentrations are in Kassala, Gedaref, River Nile, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum states.

Crop production

While a national-level assessment of seasonal progress is unavailable due to the conflict, the overall level of area planted for the 2024 agricultural cropping season was significantly reduced by the ongoing conflict and associated massive displacement; the impact of flooding; lack of access to, scarcity of, and high cost of inputs; and reduced access to finance from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) due to disruptions to the banking system. Conflict-driven reduction in access to farms was most significant in areas with heaviest direct fighting or attacks, including Al Fasher of North Darfur, Gezira scheme in Al Jazirah, and in semi-mechanized agricultural areas of Sennar. The risk of targeted atrocities against civilians based on ethnicity also prevented farmers from accessing fields in additional areas with less direct combat but persistent high levels of insecurity. Extensive flooding also reduced levels of cultivation, particularly across the southeast. According to a impact assessment conducted by FAO-DIEM, over 1.7 million hectares of cropland were affected. Sennar, Gedaref, Al Jazirah, White Nile, Blue Nile, River Nile, and Kassala were the worst impacted in terms of absolute area affected (Figure 4). In terms of the proportion of total cropland affected by state, River Nile was the most heavily impacted (with 50 percent of typical cropland flooded), followed by Al Jazirah (39 percent), Sennar (33 percent), Khartoum (32 percent), and Northern (29 percent).

Detailed analyses of satellite imagery (including time series assessing levels of human activity throughout the agricultural season conducted by USGS and NASA) suggest the likely presence of increased fallow fields and reduced cultivation compared to past years. While above-average rainfall has contributed to significantly above-average vegetative conditions based on satellite-derived imagery, this should not be interpreted as an increase in crop cultivation. The Normalized Vegetative Difference Index (NDVI) is unable to differentiate between natural vegetative growth and crop growth. In Gezira and Rahad irrigation schemes in Al Jazirah and parts of western Gedaref states, for example, the loss of distinctiveness in field patterns in September 2024 and more diffuse green hues are an indicator of uncultivated land and encroachment of weeds and grasses (Figure 5), suggesting potentially high levels of cropland abandonment in 2024 relative to 2020 (selected as a good production year in the irrigation schemes). Additionally, reports of burning fields and crops during the recent October attacks and terrorizing of many villages in Al Jazirah are expected to have reduced harvestable area even further, with very serious implications for local and national harvests.

Declines in cultivated area have also been particularly severe in parts of Al Jazirah and Sennar under semi-mechanized and rain-fed systems. Since these are typically highly productive areas, the losses have significant implications for national harvests: on average, the area planted under rainfed cereals (millet and sorghum) in these two states accounts for about 19 percent of the total area planted for the rainfed cultivation of those two crops. 

Some of the heaviest fighting during the agricultural season occurred in North Darfur, with significant consequences anticipated for production. In Al Fasher locality, analysis by NASA suggests severe reductions in cropped area: significantly above-average NDVI values suggest a proliferation of weeds and grasses amid a large increase in fallow fields. The initial signal of fallow areas was further substantiated through satellite imagery analysis that looked for the delineation of crop fields and monitoring of change in those fields over the cultivation period. The findings corroborated high levels of abandonment of previously farmed fields, particularly around razed villages to the west and north of Al Fasher. While relatively better cultivation was anticipated in other localities of North Darfur, recent increases in fighting in Al Malha, Al Saiha, parts of Mellit and Kutum, and neighboring Kulbus, Jebel Moon, and Sirba localities in northern West Darfur are expected to destroy farms and cause harvest losses. In addition, an increase in farmer-herder conflict exacerbated by ethnic tensions – such as that reported in some areas of Tawila locality of North Darfur – will likely affect harvesting activities and compromise crop production totals.

In South Kordofan, insecurity and reduced access to farms; the scarcity and high prices of agricultural inputs; and reduced access to credit are also resulting in below-average area planted. The impact of high prices and shortages of agricultural inputs further rippled through the agricultural season affecting production. The highest losses are expected in Dilling, Habila, and Kadugli; the western Nuba Mountains; Abu Kershola; and parts of Abassiya in the Eastern Nuba Mountains. 

Across the traditional rain-fed areas spreading from Greater Kordofan west to Greater Darfur, there is significant variability in production prospects. In some areas, particularly rural areas that are proximate to heavy fighting, reductions in area planted occurred for the second consecutive year. In other areas, fear and insecurity have interfered with regular weeding and maintenance, thus impacting crop growth and likely reducing harvestable areas and expected production. Moreover, heavy rains, intensive weed growth, and the high cost of labor are expected to impact weeding processes and reduce the area harvested. In relatively calm rural areas of West and South Darfur, area cultivated is expected to be slightly higher compared to last year, but nonetheless remain far below average due to insecurity-driven reductions in access to farms and high costs of agricultural inputs. By contrast, average to near-average area cultivated is expected in most rural areas of Central and East Darfur, due to relatively calmer conditions this cultivation season than the last. In North Kordofan, insecurity and fighting are expected to have reduced cultivation while recent attacks in August and September have likely further interfered with crop growth and production.

In Gedaref and parts of Blue Nile where there have been fewer direct clashes and relative stability, available field information from the end of October indicates better cultivation than in Sennar and Al Jazirah; nonetheless, the area planted in each of these two states is expected to be below-average due to reduced access to financing from the ABS amid input shortages and high production costs (e.g., fuel, machinery, labor).

Livestock production

Many of the most heavily conflict-affected populations, especially the millions of IDPs across the country, have drastically reduced livestock holdings due to either the loss of abandonment of livestock or the need to sell off their livestock assets for income to purchase food. As a result, large swathes of the rural population are not expected to benefit from improved access to livestock products. 

Among those who do own livestock, insecurity is limiting mobility and contributing to high concentrations of livestock in areas with relative calm, leading to faster depletion of and increased competition for available pasture and water resources, as well as an increased risk of livestock diseases. By October, above-average rainfall had significantly improved pasture and water availability, supporting seasonal improvement in livestock body conditions in most pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones in western, central, and eastern Sudan (Figure 6). However, access to these resources remains constrained by insecurity in many areas, and conflict is also interfering with access to seasonal migratory routes. Typically, pastoralists begin southward migration in October and November, but recent reports point to an increase in tribal clashes along these routes, such as between herders and farmers in the Darfur region, and near the borders with Ethiopia in eastern Sudan. 

At the same time, herders are unable to adequately address livestock diseases due to diminished access to inputs and veterinary services. Shortages of vaccines and medications have not recovered since the destruction of Sudan’s vaccine manufacturing capacity early on in the war. This is particularly important in the context of likely above-average disease incidence due to elevated exposure to flood waters over the course of the rainy season. According to FAO-DIEM, an estimated 4 million livestock are typically found in the flood-affected localities. 

Market supplies

As of October, the availability of market supplies remains insufficient but is gradually improving relative to the peak of the lean season, leading to stable to declining monthly price trends. Green harvests have begun in some areas of Sudan, and traders are releasing older stocks in anticipation of the main season harvests starting in November. However, stocks remain lowest in markets in besieged areas such as Al Fasher of North Darfur and parts of South Kordofan.

Conflict and insecurity along major transportation routes continue to impede the movement of food and goods between SAF-controlled and RSF-controlled areas, worsened by the recent RSF trade embargo on commercial activity across these conflict frontlines (Figure 7). The disruption of trade along the Ad Daein-Al Dabba road, for example, is adversely leading to a decrease in the prices of products that local farmers sell and export (such as groundnuts), while contributing to an increase in the prices of products that are typically sourced from or imported via the east and north. According to key informants, traders are reportedly forced to pay large exit fees per truck of up to 4 million SDG when crossing from RSF-held areas to SAF-held areas. However, some relative improvements have been seen in several southeast corridors following the end of the rains and SAF operations along Sennar White Nile roads. 

The RSF trade embargo is also affecting livestock trade from RSF-controlled to SAF-controlled territories and onward to Egypt, which is expected to significantly reduce livestock supplies in consumption markets in the east. At the same time, reported insecurity and direct attacks on livestock markets in parts of North Darfur, particularly in Al Fasher, are disrupting market access in livestock production areas. Despite the RSF trade ban, livestock exports are expected to remain elevated due to the importance of the livestock trade to the war efforts for both sides. While recent total livestock export figures are unavailable, the trend is expected to be similar to last year (2023), which saw a near doubling of exports compared to 2022. For SAF, reductions in livestock supply flows from RSF-controlled areas in the center and west have led to increased exports sourced from the east; for example, Kassala reported a 61 percent increase in sheep exports in August compared to July. Meanwhile, the ban does not affect livestock trade from RSF-controlled areas to Libya and Chad. 

Flooding and seasonal deterioration in roads across Sudan have also contributed to trade route disruptions, but modest improvements are expected in some areas in October. In West Darfur, seasonal wadis are drying up and roads are becoming increasingly passable. With the Adre border crossing officially open since August 15 and recently extended for three more months (until February 2025) to facilitate humanitarian operations, commercial traders are expected to increase trade flows across the border. Along the southern border, limited available data suggested sharp declines in trade during the rainy season, and this dynamic likely persist given that flooding in South Sudan continues to constrain cross-border trade flows. In the north, trade flows between Egypt and Sudan have likely remained relatively stable in 2024 compared to 2023; limited data available on trade volumes between the two countries in 2023 compared to 2022 point to declines in Sudanese exports to Egypt, but increases in Egyptian exports to Sudan, particularly for flour mill products. This has been corroborated by ground observations of wheat products from Egypt in markets across Greater Darfur. However, prices remain high due to steep transportation costs and security risks, as well as the impact of the RSF trade ban. In the east, the Al Galabat border closure with Ethiopia in early September likely also contributed to further slowdowns in cross-border flows, although the closure of this border is not infrequent. With its re-opening in mid-October, flows are likely to have improved slightly but remain below that of March and April before the onset of rains. 

Household purchasing capacity

18 months of war have severely eroded sources of income and cash liquidity while food and non-food prices remain extremely elevated, undermining household purchasing capacity for many, particularly those without any assets left to liquidate. The terms of trade for sorghum remain significantly below last year and the three-year average, despite showing slight improvement in favor of herders and agricultural workers in September following a significant drop between July and August (Figure 8). For example, the labor-to-sorghum terms of trade in El Gedaref fell 28 percent between July and August before increasing by 17 percent between August and September but was down by 38 and 51 percent compared to the same time last year (September 2023) and the three-year average, respectively. Similarly, the goat-to-sorghum terms of trade in El Obeid fell by 42 percent between July and August, recovered by 19 percent between August and September, but remained 68-69 percent below September 2023 and the three-year average. The high prices of other food and non-food items are also increasingly out of reach, with prices of sugar, edible oil, and meat increasing by 170-425 percent between September 2023 and September 2024 due to local currency depreciation, reduced supply, and high transportation costs.

Wild foods

The availability of wild foods has significantly improved with the favorable rains, but access to gather them continues to be restricted in many areas due to insecurity. This is particularly true in the besieged areas of Al Fasher of North Darfur, where accessing available wild foods requires traveling greater distances and circumventing hostilities. In parts of South Kordofan, where wild foods are historically more available than in other areas of Sudan, access is expected to be highly constrained compared to normal in the besieged areas of Kadugli and Dilling. Nonetheless, available information indicates that households in these areas, particularly IDPs, are atypically and heavily reliant on wild foods as a key source of food due to the lack of food or income. In relatively more secure areas, heightened demand for and reliance upon wild foods is also likely straining supply and forcing households to travel further to gather them. 

According to data provided by WFP, an average of 1.5 million people were reached monthly between July and September with food assistance meeting 50 percent of beneficiaries’ caloric needs. The largest share of those reached were in Khartoum, followed by Kassala, West Darfur, White Nile, Central Darfur, and Red Sea (Figure 9). The scale of deliveries achieved in West and Central Darfur is directly attributable to the re-opening of the Adre border on August 15. However, flooding and seasonal road deterioration, high levels of fighting and insecurity, and bureaucratic impediments imposed by both armed parties have continued to greatly limit humanitarian access and undermine the scale of urgently needed food and nutrition assistance, particularly in the areas facing Famine (IPC Phase 5) or a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Despite multiple attempts to reach Zamzam camp and parts of South Kordofan, most convoys were unable to reach the area during the lean season; only a small number of trucks reached Zamzam in September, providing food to an estimated 35,000 people (less than 10 percent of the estimated population). In South Kordofan, no official assistance associated with humanitarian agencies (e.g., WFP) was able to cross the frontlines, though there are reports that local NGOs provided some assistance at the beginning of the lean season. This was limited to small rations, and deliveries were cut off by the seasonal deterioration of roads towards the peak of the rainy season in September. Overall, food assistance in most of the areas facing Famine (IPC Phase 5) or a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains unpredictable, inconsistent, and unable to mitigate the scale and severity of food consumption deficits in October. 

In October, which typically marks the end of the lean season and the start of the green harvest, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes persist across the entirety of Sudan. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are most widespread across Greater Darfur and parts of South Kordofan, in addition to Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and Sennar states. Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in Zamzam and in Al Fasher town of North Darfur, inclusive of nearby Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps;it is also assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in Dilling and Kadugli localities and among IDPs in surrounding localities of South Kordofan. All Famine (IPC Phase 5) classifications are pending concurrence by the FRC. Household access to food remains significantly below normal in advance of the main harvesting period beginning in November. High levels of insecurity have constrained trade flows, driven high food prices, propelled unprecedented displacement, limited household mobility, and generally undermined access to traditional livelihoods, income, and food sources.

The continuation of targeted attacks on health, water, and limited basic services has exacerbated the seasonal rise of disease outbreaks (including measles and cholera) throughout the rainy season. These factors have led to very high acute malnutrition rates even in areas where hunger is relatively less dire, as confirmed by multiple recent SMART surveys conducted in Greater Darfur and one in Red Sea between June and September 2024 (Figure 10). Nine out of 17 localities recorded a statistically significant GAM increase when compared to 2018 baseline levels. In 13 localities, the GAM prevalence among children under five is already in the high range of Critical (GAM-WHZ 15-29.9 percent) or has passed above the Extremely Critical threshold (≥30 percent).

In areas with the highest need, humanitarian access has been sporadic and insufficient to mitigate the severity of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition. Community support, social support, and remittances are expected to continue to be among the few remaining sources of food and income, particularly in urban areas that have better access to community kitchens run by Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) and with better mobile network connectivity facilitating limited access to remittances from family members in safer areas of Sudan and overseas. While these resources have helped to mitigate more severe outcomes, they are severely strained and limited after 18 months of heavy reliance; the over-use amid low funding is severely degrading the current and future coping capacity of the population overall. 

Greater Darfur

Displaced and besieged populations in Al Fasher town and nearby IDP camps of Zamzam, Abu Shouk, and Al Salam camps of Al Fasher, North Darfur are of highest concern. Famine (IPC Phase 5) has persisted since June in at least Zamzam camp. At the same time, the increasing intensity of attacks in and around Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps has caused further displacement around the town, increasing the pressure on the urban population and community resources at the same time that the intensifying siege and cash liquidity crisis has likely reduced household and community access to critical remittances and resources. As a result, the besieged town are assessed together with the displaced from Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps as likely in Famine (IPC Phase 5) in October. 

While no new quantitative direct evidence is available on food consumption, livelihood change, or mortality in these areas, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) did collect new acute malnutrition data based on Middle Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measurements in Zamzam in September 2024 via a mass screening of 29,000 children. Based on the screening, MSF found GAM levels reached 34 percent – an increase of 5 percentage points above their last mass screening of nearly 47,000 children in March 2024 – and more than double the MUAC threshold (15 percent) that may be used to classify Famine (IPC Phase 5). Moreover, the proportion of severely acutely malnourished children rose from 8 percent in March to 10 percent in September. It is highly likely that mortality rates have remained above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold through October, given the severity of GAM and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) prevalence and given that siege-like conditions have severely restricted access to both humanitarian and commercial food supplies since April. Meanwhile, the town continues to be effectively cut off under worsening siege conditions, with trade and humanitarian access extremely limited and smuggling of limited food and essential goods increasingly difficult. Cash liquidity has reportedly worsened for town residents, critically affecting household access to remittances via mobile apps as well as shared community resources via ERRs and community kitchens. At the same time, populations are increasingly displaced between neighborhoods, putting additional pressure on remaining urban residents and limited community resources. With these limited survival options further undercut and needs escalating, it is expected that conditions have deteriorated and breached the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold for the urban besieged and displaced populations.     

In rural Al Fasher, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) area-level outcomes with households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are likely persisting. A SMART survey conducted in August among rural residents only indicated GAM-WHZ levels of 21.6 percent, in the range of Critical, with SAM at 7.9 percent. While minimal to no harvests are expected across most parts of the locality due to the continued conflict during the cultivation season, mobility is relatively easier, and access to regional harvests is expected to be slightly easier.    

In other areas of North Darfur, an August 2024 SMART survey suggest very high levels of acute malnutrition are occurring despite relatively lower levels of hunger, particularly in El Taweisha, Al Lait, and Um Keddada localities. In these areas, GAM-WHZ levels surpassed 30 percent and SAM-WHZ levels were between 5 and 10 percent. While observations from an OCHA-led Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) collected between June and August indicated very poor dietary diversity in these three localities, surveyed households reported relatively very low levels of severe hunger as measured by the Household Hunger Scale. In addition, data on infant and young child feeding practices suggest relatively better access to animal products in Al Lait and El Taweisha, with two-thirds of households reported feeding their children egg or flesh foods within the past 24 hours. In Um Kedadda, the proportion of households who had fed their children animal proteins was very low at only 20 percent; however, when converged with ground reports that direct clashes have been limited in these localities such that populations have retained the mobility to access food and income, it is more likely that high acute malnutrition is driven by non-food factors. It is assessed that these areas are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Other areas in North Darfur also reported high GAM-WHZ levels – including Mellit, Saraf Omra, Tawila and Kebkabiya – with 22 to 28 percent of children acutely malnourished. 

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes likely also persist in much of West, Central, and South Darfur, particularly in areas with high levels of protracted and newly displaced populations. Among resident populations, access to typical livelihoods remains constrained and purchasing capacity are already very low; conditions are significantly worse among IDPsdue to the lack of saleable assets and few coping strategies in an environment of elevated insecurity and fear of targeting. Of high concern are IDPs living in camps in and around the urban centers of Nyala in South Darfur, El Geneina in West Darfur, Zalingei in Central Darfur, and Ad Daein in East Darfur, where many displaced households likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes as of October. 

Greater Kordofan

In South Kordofan, it is assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing in Dilling and Kadugli localities, as well as among the displaced population who fled Kadugli and are sheltering in Al Buram, though this classification is pending concurrence from the FRC. Dilling and Kadugli towns, as well as the surrounding localities, have experienced high levels of conflict, insecurity, and siege-like conditions for most of 2024. According to survey data collected in August/mid-September and validated by the SMART initiative, displaced populations in rural SPLM-N controlled areas around Dilling face large to extreme food consumption gaps and an estimated 36.3 and 11.2 percent of children under five were acutely and severely acutely malnourished, respectively. Additionally, while sample sizes were small, similarly extreme outcomes were present among IDP households displaced from Kadugli to neighboring Al Buram within SPLM-N territorial control. While food consumption and acute malnutrition data are not available for the urban besieged populations, it is highly likely that levels of acute malnourishment in Dilling and Kadugli towns are similar to worse than that observed among nearby IDPs given that the town is among the main targets of besiegement; it is likely that very poor and poor households who remain behind in the town are worse off than those in rural areas given tighter restrictions on their ability to search for wild foods; levels of poverty and protracted displacement within Dilling were high prior to the onset of siege-like conditions in 2024, meaning poor households have low capacity to cope with prolonged food shortages and skyrocketing food prices; there is no evidence indicating local NGOs were able to deliver food and nutrition assistance to the town; and urban populations are not only the least likely to directly access own-produced harvests but are also less likely to benefit from communal sharing of harvests given their separation from rural communities. 

In the rural areas, to mitigate starvation, households heavily relied on wild foods and the limited quantities of food assistance provided by local NGOs throughout most of the lean season; however, impassable road conditions have cut off these populations from food assistance since September. While the SMART survey showed non-trauma death rates were below the threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5) as of August/mid-September, it is highly likely that hunger-related mortality escalated to pass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold in October, given that Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition were already present and access to food subsequently worsened. Indicatively, observations among the limited sample of IDPs in Al Burham – despite the methodological limitations of disaggregating SMART data -- suggested the non-trauma mortality rate among this population did already exceed 2 deaths per 10,000 per day back in August/mid-September. 

In North and West Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in areas that have faced higher levels of conflict and displacement, particularly in Babanusa, Al Fula, and Wad Banda in West Kordofan, and Sheikan, Um Rawaba, Al Rahad, and Gharb Bara in North Kordofan. The ongoing insecurity and sporadic clashes significantly constrained household engagement in traditional livelihood activities and reduced trade flows into the areas. Faced with persistently high food prices and limited income generating opportunities, household purchasing power remained low.   

Khartoum and the southeast

In Khartoum, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes have likely continued into October, and it is highly likely that there are households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the most heavily conflict-affected neighborhoods of Omdurman, Bahri, Sharg Al Neel, Khartoum, and Jebel Aulia following the escalation of fighting and recent SAF offensives. Access to income to purchase food remains severely limited following the flight of most businesses and dearth of private and public sector employment. While remittances, community safety nets, and support from relatives are likely playing an important role in mitigating the severity of hunger, access to money transfers is still intermittent due to conflict-induced disruptions to banking and telecommunications systems and hefty access costs (for example, 10-20 percent fees are being imposed by some cash vendors). The extensive destruction of basic infrastructure, dramatic reduction in trade flows to Khartoum, and widespread looting of markets and shops also continue to limit food availability and sustain extremely high food prices, further limiting household purchasing power and access to food from market purchases.

In other areas of the southeast, outcomes vary depending on the extent of direct conflict. Of high concern are parts eastern Al Jazirah state, particularly Sharg Al Jazirah locality, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes have spread due to the impacts of brutal retaliatory attacks by the RSF since mid-October. The RSF’s attacks and associated large-scale population displacement coincided with the beginning of the harvest, leading to large pre-harvest losses as most farmers fled the area before harvesting their crops and the RSF reportedly burned crops and farmland. Sennar is also of high concern, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Direct clashes have continued as the frontlines between SAF and RSF within the state shift, causing renewed displacement, disrupting trade flows and market supplies, and preventing significant agricultural engagement in many areas.  

Northeast

In Northern, River Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states, the scale of population displacement and severe flood-related destruction of productive assets continue to place strain on food availability and access to available income-generating opportunities in October. This has led to widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some areas of Red Sea where poor households have had historically low capacity to cope with shocks in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The flooding also contributed to the outbreak of cholera, dengue fever, and other waterborne diseases that has exacerbated acute malnutrition rates. According to OCHA, more than 28,000 cases of cholera and 836 deaths were reported between July 22 and October 28, mostly concentrated in Kassala, Gedaref, Al Jazirah, and Northern states. Many displaced and host households are heavily reliant on remittances (typically high in this area) and are increasingly turning to gold mining and other casual wage labor opportunities available in urban areas. While markets are benefiting from continued supply flows from Egypt and Port Sudan, importation and marketing costs are high and translate to high prices for consumers, which are contributing to the erosion of household purchasing power.

National assumptions

• At the national level, conflict between the SAF and RSF is expected to continue unabated despite regional and international attempts to revive negotiations. Peace efforts are likely to stall as the parties’ interest in pursuing bona fide talks has been diminished by recent territorial gains and the perception of weakness by both sides. Moreover, while some foreign actors will continue to push the parties to negotiations, they lack the leverage to compel or incentivize them to commit to a ceasefire. At the same time, other foreign actors are expected to continue to provide unofficial support to rival sides, which will prolong the conflict. Overt and significant foreign military intervention is unlikely and would significantly complicate the conflict's dynamics. In the absence of a national ceasefire, RSF will likely continue to establish governance structures in areas under their control, leading to a gradual de facto partition of the country.
• Displacement is expected to continue on a large scale, both internally and across international borders. Flows are expected to be especially large in heavily populated parts of the southeast due to RSF advances in Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile, and forays into Gedaref, as well as SAF and aligned Joint Forces advances in northern parts of North and West Darfur states. The precision of tracking population displacement will most likely become increasingly complicated as many of those who were originally displaced from Khartoum into the north, east, and southeast are being re-displaced multiple times, and it is challenging to account for returns to areas of relative calm.
• The ongoing economic contraction is expected to continue in the near term, though the degree of the contraction will likely be highly uncertain as it remains subject to large downside risks from prolonged conflict and tensions. The currency is expected to continue to depreciate to 2900-3700 SDG/USD through mid-2025, a decline of 380-515 percent compared to March 2023 (the pre-conflict period). This will contribute to further increases in the prices of imported and locally produced goods across the country and sustain extremely high inflation.
• Overall, national cereal production in 2024/25 (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is expected to be significantly below the five-year average due to both the direct and indirect impacts of conflict, such as large-scale population displacement; inconsistent and unsafe access to farmland; and constrained access to inputs amid shortages and high costs, in addition to flooding. As a result, a large crop production deficit is expected during the 2024/25 consumption year, likely worse than last year (2023/24). In the semi-mechanized and irrigated areas of the southeast, the largest shortfalls are expected in Sennar and Al Jazirah given the severity of direct attacks, looting, destruction of irrigation and mechanized infrastructure, and displacement. In the rain-fed sector, the largest production shortfalls are expected in traditional rainfed areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, especially in and around the besieged areas of Al Fasher, Kadugli, and Dilling. Significant, but less severe, losses are also expected in parts of the Northern, River Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states and in Gedaref due to the indirect impacts of conflict and heavy rain and flooding.
• Imported cereal requirements in 2024/25, particularly for wheat but also sorghum and millet, are expected to be higher than normal due to the scale of local wheat production shortfalls this year. This will be the third consecutive significantly below-average wheat harvest, which occurs in March/April (later than the sorghum and millet harvests). However, Sudan’s ability to import wheat via Port Sudan will continue to face challenges through the rest of 2024 and into 2025 due to local currency depreciation, diminishing foreign exchange reserves, damage to transport infrastructure, among the other persistent impacts of the compounding conflict and economic crisis.
• Seasonal southward livestock migration to grazing areas will likely be disrupted by widespread conflict, intercommunal clashes, and insecurity affecting most major livestock migration routes. Nomads from parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan who remained in parts of South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Chad throughout the rainy season are likely to extend their stay through the summer due to continued insecurity in Sudan. Among livestock who do congregate in accessible seasonal grazing areas within pastoral areas of Sudan, livestock disease prevalence is expected to be atypically high due to the lack of veterinary health services.
• In the absence of a meaningful ceasefire, trade flows and market functionality are expected to remain highly disrupted across the country (particularly in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan) and marked by high levels of insecurity, proliferation of checkpoints, and deterioration in road conditions following a very wet rainy season. The expansion of the conflict and direct fighting in central and southeastern Sudan; the continued clashes around Sennar and parts of Blue Nile; and limited movement across the main roads linking eastern and western Sudan will likely continue disrupting trade flows and market functionality from east to west. Additionally, the anticipated expansion of fighting deeper into the east and southeast will most likely further disrupt flows within the relatively calm areas of Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea in the east. The main routes linking Khartoum to the rest of the country will remain highly insecure, with periodic disruption along the last functional route of Dongola-Omdurman.
• Food prices are anticipated to remain significantly above average due to the expected scale of disruption to staple food production, trade flows, and market functionality. Prices are expected to moderate slightly during the harvest and post-harvest period between October and February, but speculation and below-average harvests will prevent any substantial decreases. Prices will likely resume rapid increases by March – as the lean season is anticipated to begin atypically early – with expected increases to 100-250 percent above last year and 800-1,500 percent above the five-year average. In areas with severe fighting and continued siege-like conditions, prices are not expected to decline seasonally.
• Livestock prices will remain above average, though significant variations will be observed between markets depending on the degree to which conflict is affecting market functionality and the livestock supply chain. Livestock prices are anticipated to increase in the main consumption markets of relatively calm urban areas, driven by reduced supply from the main production areas and high transportation costs. Meanwhile, prices are likely to decrease atypically across most of the rural and main supply markets due to continued livestock supply chain disruptions, reduced access to consumption markets due to insecurity, high informal fees along primary and secondary trade routes, reduced export activities, and the elevated need among pastoralists to sell more animals to purchase food at significantly above-average prices.
• Other sources of income are expected to remain below normal due to the scale of destruction to basic infrastructure, economic contraction, and the impact of insecurity on household mobility. In relatively secure rural areas, poor and very poor households will mainly rely on agricultural labor, remittances, and the sale of bush products during the October to January harvest season. During the post-harvest and start of the lean season from February to May, households will shift to migratory off-farm casual labor, alongside remittances and the sale of bush products. In the most heavily conflict-affected areas, people will likely increasingly rely on the collection and sale of wild foods, firewood, and charcoal, in addition to gifts and remittances throughout the projection period; however, conflict and insecurity will likely severely constrain their access to forest products and agricultural labor. In conflict- and displacement-affected urban centers and areas, cash availability and purchasing capacity will be limited by reduced income-earning opportunities, limited cash availability, and widespread looting and pillaging.
• Demand for agricultural labor will range from below to significantly below average during the harvest (October to January). However, labor wages are expected to remain 30-150 percent higher than last year and 170-800 percent above the five-year average, driven by high inflation and local currency depreciation.
• Migration to calmer areas to access non-agricultural and unskilled labor opportunities is expected to increase throughout the projection period, particularly among households in areas with limited access to agricultural labor and bush products. This trend is expected to intensify after the main harvest season concludes and agricultural labor demand seasonally declines. Conflict, insecurity, and increased checkpoints along major transportation routes are likely to continue to hinder the scale of population movements between SAF- and RSF-controlled areas.

Greater Darfur

• Al Fasher of North Darfur is the last major outpost in Greater Darfur that remains uncaptured by the RSF and is likely to remain the focal point of escalating conflict through the projection period. The RSF’s significant deployment of forces to the area and consolidation of control of routes in and out of Al Fasher indicate that the city is likely to remain under siege for several months. However, SAF and SAF-aligned forces likely have the capacity and strategic imperative to hold out through at least January; the division headquarters is large, well-supplied, and supported by the local population. Following early failures by the RSF to decisively capture or attack SAF targets, the RSF is likely to attack soft targets, therefore increasing risks to civilians, particularly in villages around Al Fasher.
• In the event that RSF manages to capture Al Fasher (a moderate-to-high likelihood through at least January), a significant increase in the targeting of non-Arab communities by the RSF can be expected given the recent alignment of previously neutral non-Arab militias with the SAF in a bid to defend Al Fasher. There is also a moderate likelihood that RSF will attempt to consolidate the civic administration of Greater Darfur and declare an independent state if they capture Al Fasher.
• In addition to clashes over Al Fasher town, Joint Forces offensives in West and North Darfur are likely to increase the number of conflict incidents in localized areas through at least January. While it is unlikely that they will recapture these states from RSF control, they will likely carry out an increased number of attacks on RSF supply lines and storehouses in towns such as Mellit and al-Zuruq. Successful attacks by the Joint Forces are expected to trigger retributive RSF attacks against villages occupied by non-Arab groups.
• Major organized battles between the RSF and SAF are unlikely to extend beyond North Darfur (Al Fasher and the so-called “desert war”) into Greater Darfur through the projection period, given that RSF already controls most of Greater Darfur and SAF is focused on retaking the territories in the East; however, an increase in intercommunal violence is likely in response to RSF targeting of non-Arab communities and communities perceived as having supported the SAF. This is likely to be exacerbated by the RSF’s expected inability to manage and control violence between communities over land disputes. 

Greater Kordofan

• Urban areas of West and South Kordofan are likely to see intense conflict in the near term. In highly contested areas of Dilling, Kadugli, and other urban areas of South Kordofan, as well as some rural areas at the edge of territory that are at least nominally controlled by a major armed actor, conflict is expected to continue between RSF, SAF, SPLM/A-N (Al Hilu), and other armed actors at least temporarily aligned with these larger actors. This will likely lead to continued siege-like conditions through May.
• In North Kordofan, conflict between RSF and SAF along major transportation corridors remains likely throughout the projection period. Further RSF advances on El Obeid are likely in November and December 2024, especially following the RSF’s likely capture of the SAF’s 22nd Infantry Division base.
• As the RSF pushes further into West and North Kordofan, and threatening South Kordofan, it is moderately likely that conflict between the SPLM-N and SAF will remain subdued, as both sides move forces to contain further RSF advances. Conversely, clashes pitting the SPLM-N against the RSF are expected to increase in West and South Kordofan – especially around Dilling – stoking further intercommunal violence. 

Khartoum

• The battle for Khartoum is likely to persist, with the SAF offensive expected to gradually retake Omdurman and Bahri while RSF forces concentrate on consolidating control of southern Sudan. In keeping with patterns observed thus far in 2024, the SAF will likely experience periodic breakthroughs but will generally move forward incrementally, capitalizing on the reallocation of RSF resources to other fronts. The RSF is anticipated to maintain its hold on significant pockets of Greater Khartoum through at least May. The RSF is likely to continue besieging or partially blocking bases and civilian neighborhoods deemed as vital to SAF logistics and supply lines (which enter the city from the north and northeast). 

Southeast

• In response to the advances of SAF and aligned forces in parts of Al Jazirah state during July and August, RSF will likely launch a counteroffensive by the end of the rainy season (between October and January).
• It is likely that the RSF will continue to consolidate control over much of Sennar, but RSF is unlikely to capture Sennar City before January. There is a moderate likelihood of RSF taking Sennar City by May, though the likelihood hinges on the outcome of the siege of Al Fasher and other RSF offensives. With SAF forces in White Nile and Blue Nile at risk of being cut off from overland resupply routes, there is a moderate-to-high likelihood that the RSF will attempt to besiege and capture the White Nile state following the conclusion of the rainy season in October, linking its forces in Darfur and Kordofan to those in Al Jazirah and Sennar. RSF is expected to attempt pushing south into Blue Nile; however, Blue Nile is less vulnerable to RSF takeover than White Nile and is comparatively less likely to be overrun. While RSF is less likely to be targeted in the near term, clashes are expected by May between RSF and SAF along the Dinder-Hawata road and in the plain between Sennar and Al Fao, bringing fighting to the western areas of Gedaref. 

Humanitarian food assistance

National

• According to available information from WFP, the agency plans to provide food assistance to 5.4 million people monthly between October and December. In January and February, the agency expects to scale down assistance amid the harvest to 3.6 million people each month. Assistance plans beyond February are currently unknown. Between October and December, this level of planned assistance (if achieved) would reach less than one-third of the population in need.
• While conditions are improving with the cessation of the rains, seasonal barriers will continue to restrict the movement of food assistance supplies in some parts of the country, exacerbated by conflict dynamics. Moreover, the provision of food assistance will continue to face considerable challenges amid precarious security conditions; administrative hurdles including closed borders, delayed travel permits, and denial of visas for humanitarian staff; significant looting and loss of humanitarian assets; exorbitant fees and informal taxation; and destruction of facilities. As a result, assistance is not expected to consistently reach the IPC 3.1 threshold for significance – at least 25 percent of a population receiving at least 25 percent of kilocalorie needs from humanitarian food assistance – in any locality during the projection period. 

Greater Darfur

• Humanitarian access across Greater Darfur is expected to remain intermittent and volatile. While the extension of the Adre border crossing opening for an additional three months through February 2025 will facilitate assistance delivery in Greater Darfur, it is also likely to drive an increase in banditry in West, North, and Central Darfur as criminals seek to loot the trucks and increase informal road checkpoints to charge illegal fees. Meanwhile, insecurity in North Darfur will continue to prevent or severely limit humanitarian access from Chad or Port Sudan.
• In Al Fasher of North Darfur, so long as the city remains under siege (expected through at least January 2025) and/or RSF heavily targets non-Arab communities (in a scenario in which Al Fasher is captured), food assistance deliveries are anticipated to be, at best, sporadic and limited in volume relative to the scale of need. Cash assistance, which has been scaled up in many areas of the country, will be undermined particularly in Al Fasher by the severe liquidity and access challenges.
• In other areas of Greater Darfur, sustained access will be limited by insecurity, banditry, involvement of increasing armed actors, unnecessary bureaucratic and administrative requirements imposed by both the Government of Sudan/SAF and RSF, and other systemic failures. 

Greater Kordofan

• In Dilling and Kadugli of South Kordofan, WFP has indicated there are plans to scale up food assistance in November to a total of over nearly 15,000 beneficiaries in Dilling (<10 percent of total population) and 73,000 in Kadugli (30 percent of total population) with 50-70 percent rations, distributed via overland convoys. However, negotiations for such convoy access have not yet been approved, and WFP has not previously accessed the area in 2024. In addition, other groups indicate there are plans for assistance deliveries in November and December consisting of one-month rations meeting 50 percent of caloric needs to over 500,000 beneficiaries in areas of Kadugli, Dilling, and immediately adjacent areas of neighboring localities (Habila, Al Sunut, Lagauwa) via airdrops and an airbridge from Juba to Kadugli airport. However, the success of any food assistance delivery plan relies heavily on cooperation and facilitation by the armed parties with respect to their territorial control, with likely limitations on the number of successful flights to facilitate airdrops and road access permissions. Ultimately, even if successful, the scale of one-off deliveries is likely insufficient to meaningfully alleviate acute food insecurity outcomes over the medium-term.
• Starting in December, plans are underway for a larger scale-up of multisectoral assistance via ground transport, though approvals have not yet been obtained. Overall, based on previous experience and uncertainty as to the intentions of either side to fully cooperate, the unhindered and undisrupted roll out of the plan is not expected to occur. In the absence of an end to heavy fighting and sustained and demonstrated actions to ensure access by SAF and SPLM-N, it is expected that levels of food assistance to this area will remain low and inconsistent.

Greater Darfur

Without a significant and consistently maintained scale-up of assistance, it is expected that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will remain the most likely outcome among the displaced and besieged urban populations in Al Fasher, North Darfur from October through at least May (encompassing the typical harvest, post-harvest, and pre-lean season periods). This conclusion is pending concurrence by the FRC. The high levels of conflict and continuation of siege-like conditions – which have already persisted for over seven months – are expected to result in marginal harvests, and displaced and besieged urban populations are the least likely to benefit given a lack of own-produced crops and very little access to income to purchase any stocks that may be available for sale. Despite plans for scaling up assistance, insecurity is expected to prevent sufficient or consistent assistance from reaching the camps or the town. In the absence of an end to the conflict or other drastic measures to either enable large-scale flows of humanitarian and commercial food supplies to reach the population or facilitate weakened civilians to leave the area, any marginal improvement associated with the harvest will rapidly dissipate. Under such conditions, food consumption gaps will remain extreme, acute malnutrition rates will remain very high, and hunger-related mortality is expected to remain above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold as additional people succumb to starvation and/or disease.

Across the rest of Greater Darfur, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist during the October to January harvest period in areas that incurred large-scale of harvest losses in prior bouts of heavy conflict in 2023/24 and the associated loss of agricultural labor income. Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are likely among IDPs with little access to farmland and depleted purchasing capacity, which will greatly constrain their financial access to food despite the relative increase in market supply during and following the harvest. In some of the region’s relatively calmer rural areas, outcomes are expected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as own-produced stocks from the harvest and in-kind payments from agricultural labor will relatively improve food availability and access. However, relief provided by the harvest will be short-lived amid expectations of below- to significantly below-average production in most areas.

The 2025 lean season is expected to start even earlier in 2025 than observed in 2024 (by March instead of April/May). From February to May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to become increasingly widespread across the rest of Greater Darfur region. Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to spread among the displaced population (particularly in camps in and around large urban areas), who are most vulnerable to insecurity and targeting by armed groups that restrict their ability to move to safer areas or access food and income sources (including collection and sale of bush products, petty trade, and labor migration). As food prices rise even more steeply and access to income deteriorates during the lean season, displaced, conflict-affected, and very poor households who have very few assets will increasingly employ extreme coping strategies – including consumption of wild foods, liquidation of any remaining assets, and begging – and will rely heavily on community support and sharing of extremely limited resources. The persistent inadequate availability of basic services will most likely compound the physiological effects of poor food consumption and contribute to worsening levels of acute malnutrition. 

Greater Kordofan

In the absence of an end to siege-like conditions and large-scale humanitarian response, it is expected that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in Dilling and Kadugli localities and among the displaced who fled Kadugli and are sheltering in neighboring Al Buram. While some stocks from marginal harvests are expected to become available in rural areas of these localities, urban and displaced populations are unlikely to see a sustained alleviation of food consumption deficits due to very limited to no engagement in cultivation; considerable challenges of transporting stocks from rural areas to the besieged urban areas; and scarcity of income to purchase stocks that are available for sale. The scale of anticipated humanitarian food assistance deliveries will only partially mitigate hunger for likely up to a month, which is insufficient to significantly change the trajectory of Famine (IPC Phase 5). Even among rural households, a recent Household Economy Analysis (HEA) approach for Southeast Semi-mechanized Rainfed Agriculture South Kordofan livelihood zone (SD10) suggests that rural very poor and poor host/resident households will see only a short 2-month reprieve in the immediate harvest period before facing extreme food consumption deficits (≥50 percent of daily kilocaloric needs) as early as January. The insufficient harvest will deplete even more rapidly if rural host/resident populations share their stocks with those displaced to the rural areas, as has been observed elsewhere in Sudan. In other words, even if there is some reprieve in November/December associated with air drops and the harvest, the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds are expected to be surpassed for the majority of the post-harvest and lean season periods.

In West and North Kordofan, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected from October to January, before Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes become increasingly widespread from February to May. In the most heavily affected areas where people are unable to cultivate due to the conflict and displacement, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected during the harvest and post-harvest period. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in calmer areas where households have been able to engage in agricultural production, as food availability, in-kind payments for agricultural labor, and the availability of wild foods and animal products will relatively improve compared to the preceding lean season. However, once food stocks become depleted by March, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand even to relatively calm areas. Some households will likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly in the most heavily conflict-affected areas and areas with high levels of displacement, where direct clashes and insecurity are restricting population movement and commercial and humanitarian food supplies. 

Khartoum and the Southeast

In Khartoum, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist, and some households will likely continue to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), mainly in the heavily contested parts of Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri, and parts of Omdurman. Food supply flows from surrounding rural areas to Khartoum are expected to remain heavily disrupted, restricting the degree to which populations remaining in Khartoum will benefit from seasonal harvest stocks grown in rural areas. The scarcity of income sources available within the city will also continue to heavily suppress households’ capacity to purchase food that is available in local markets. Communities will remain heavily co-reliant and dependent on remittances, community support such as ERRs, and fish for those who can access the rivers. 

In the southeast, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Al Jazirah from October to January, while Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be widespread across Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, and Blue Nile. While these are typically among the most productive areas for the harvest, recent and anticipated levels of fighting and displacement are expected to result in below- to significantly below-average crop production, especially with the expectations that conflict will expand further into parts of Sennar and Blue Nile states. As harvest stocks become depleted from February to May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will most likely expand across most of the heavily conflict-affected areas of Sennar, with some localities in White Nile and Blue Nile also expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In the relatively calmer areas of Gedaref and parts of Blue Nile, most areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in the February to May period, but with increasing numbers of IDPs in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Northeast

In the relatively calm areas of the north and northeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist with an increased number of people facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from October to January. Despite the lack of direct fighting and relatively better levels of cultivation, trade flows, and humanitarian access, the severity of flooding in mid-2024, massive destruction of public and private infrastructure, and the increase in IDPs – particularly after the recent attacks on Al Jazirah – will continue to place pressure available food and income sources. Available resources among host communities are inadequate to meet the needs of the IDP influx amid rising prices and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. In Northern and River Nile, the heavy dependence on wheat harvests in March/April mean that peak lean season typically falls between November and February, when the prior year’s stocks are depleted and the next main wheat harvest has yet to occur. Households are expected to increase dependency on small-scale irrigated production, which will partially mitigate their food consumption deficits from the limited availability of horticulture and irrigated vegetables during the winter season. Households will also rely on wage labor income (including in artisanal mines) and remittances, which are typically higher in this region. The wheat harvest between March and April is expected to partially mitigate the severity of food consumption deficits but will be insufficient to change area-level outcomes; most areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

In Kassala and Red Sea, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected between October and January. Below-average stocks from the 2024 harvest in the Halfa Al Gadeeda irrigated scheme and the Delta Al Gash flood retreat scheme in Kassala state, in addition to the winter season cultivation in the flood retreat areas of Red Sea state, are expected to partially mitigate food consumption deficits in this area. However, the food supply is insufficient to meet demand given the scale of flood-induced crop losses and influx of IDPs. Many localities are expected to face early deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between February and May. 

Greater Darfur, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah

Conflict isolates or indirectly prevents households from migrating to safer areas in search of food or income, and/or prevents humanitarian access to populations who are now facing two consecutive years of below- to significantly-below average harvests, near-depletion of purchasing capacity, and severe erosion of both household and community coping capacity

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario that would result in Famine (IPC Phase 5) in parts of North Darfur (Al Lait, El Taweisha, Um Kedadda, Melit); areas with high concentrations of displaced persons across Greater Darfur; and in parts of Khartoum and Al Jazirah. These areas have faced some of the highest and most intense levels of conflict; related disruptions to trade flows, market supplies, and livelihood activities; and massive displacement and/or re-displacement. Access to farmland is most limited among these populations and thus likely to result in minimal to no own production and continued dependence on humanitarian assistance where accessible, wild foods, social support, and meager market supplies. Living conditions are poor and access to health and water services is minimal due to widespread destruction of infrastructure and facilities; this is expected to continue driving high levels of morbidity and acute malnutrition. Humanitarian access continues to be severely limited by conflict, insecurity, and administrative obstacles imposed by SAF and RSF, and food assistance is either very low or absent. It is assessed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur in these areas if households are further cut off from markets, community support, and remittances (either through tactics of deliberate and prolonged isolation) or as a byproduct of severe insecurity and conflict that prevents households from migrating, whether due to threat to personal safety, inability to afford transport or physically travel long distances, or other family-driven reasons. IDPs are of particularly high concern as they are often from the most marginalized and targeted ethnic and tribal groups and have experienced long-term erosion of livelihoods and assets that greatly increase their vulnerability to shocks. 

National

The parties to the conflict reach an agreement on and commit to abide by a ceasefire with support from international actors, ensuring humanitarian access is sufficient to permit a large-scale food assistance response

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: This will likely bring the fighting to a stop, restore security in some of the conflict-affected areas, begin to facilitate trade flows across the country and across borders, and begin to enable the return of some IDPs to their homes. However, intercommunal conflict will likely continue in the short term in some areas and the devastation wrought by 18+ months of conflict will undermine any significant, large-scale recovery in the medium term. Given the erosion of Sudan’s food system and economy, a ceasefire agreement alone will be inadequate to halt Famine (IPC Phase 5) among the displaced and besieged urban populations in Al Fasher and South Kordofan; a ceasefire must be accompanied by actions to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches populations in need at large-scale, sustained levels. Should this occur, there is a credible alternative scenario in which Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) outcomes emerge among displaced and urban besieged in Al Fasher (including in Zamzam) of North Darfur and in Dilling, Kadugli and Al Buram of South Kordofan, though the timeframe for that improvement depends on the timeline, quantity, and frequency of food and nutrition assistance delivery. Similarly, large-scale humanitarian food assistance would still be required in other severely conflict-affected areas and those with high levels of displacement to prevent Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes; if significant levels of food assistance are delivered quickly and consistently, then this would likely mitigate area-level outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!). In the least conflict-affected areas of the east and northeast, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes would likely return.

RSF expands into Gedaref and challenges SAF stronghold areas to the north and northeast 

This would likely result in massive disruption to wheat cultivation (as the harvest occurs later, in March/April), a significant reduction in harvest and other food stocks, and further widening of the expected food gap nationally; additional looting of public and private property; increased displacement and concentration of IDPs in the limited remaining calm areas in the north and northeast; and higher numbers of people seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Moreover, this would likely result in the central government’s loss of control in most of the country and the complete collapse of the economy. The ability of the government, international community, and local community to provide support to the affected people would be significantly limited. Intercommunal clashes and ethnic tensions would likely increase, resulting in further destruction of infrastructure and basic services, displacement, and loss of lives and livelihoods. Area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would become more widespread in the north and northeast and Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely emerge in additional areas in the center and west. 

Dilling and Kadugli localities, South Kordofan state, Southeast Semi-Mechanized Rainfed Agriculture(SD10) livelihood zone (Figure 11)

Reason for selecting this area: Dilling and Kadugli localities have been selected based on evidence that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is likely ongoing and will most likely persist from October to May. The availability of direct evidence is strongest among rural displaced populations in Dilling and the immediate surroundings, but it is reasonable to extrapolate these findings to Dilling town and Kadugli locality given the similarity of livelihoods prior to the war and the conditions of besiegement. This featured area of concern will focus predominantly on the evidence for Dilling locality and conclude briefly with evidence supporting the extrapolation to additional areas. While Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also ongoing in Zamzam camp and possibly ongoing in nearby Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps of Al Fasher, North Darfur, the basis for this analysis has been extensively documented in the June 2024 Food Security Outlook with updates included in the national analysis provided above. The conclusions presented here are pending a plausibility assessment by the Famine Review Committee. 

Conflict and displacement

• Dilling and Kadugli localities have been contested for most of 2024. The cities, as well as the surrounding rural area, have experienced high levels of conflict, insecurity, and siege-like conditions. As of October 2024, the SPLM-N controls much of the rural areas around Dilling, particularly to the east and south, while the RSF controls areas to the north and west, cutting off access and movement to and from the locality. Ethnic conflict has flared repeatedly due to the historical tensions between the local Nuba population and resident Arab tribes. As seen not only with Zamzam IDP camp but also in past Famines (IPC Phase 5) – such as in Leer and Mayendit of South Sudan in 2017 or Al-Shabaab controlled areas in Somalia in 2010/11 – the besiegement or isolation of populations that seriously curtails their ability to move in search of food and income for a sustained period of time is closely associated with a descent into extreme hunger and acute malnutrition, eventually leading to an increase in mortality that meets the IPC definition of Famine (IPC Phase 5).
• Thousands of people that fled fighting in nearby areas are sheltering in Dilling locality. According to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in Dilling, there are an estimated 90,884 IDPs in Dilling locality, including those who arrived after April 2023 and those displaced due to prior conflicts. The IPC analysis update in October 2024 estimated the total population of Dilling at roughly 220,000; the inclusion of HAC displacement figures brings the total estimate to 265,000 people (35 percent IDPs). These populations increasingly lack basic necessities and are heavily reliant on wild foods, community support, and limited quantities of food assistance provided by local NGOs. In Kadugli, IPC and IOM DTM estimates suggest a total population of 130,000-202,000 people, of which an estimated 85,000 people are displaced. There are no available estimates of displaced populations in Al Burham locality, but it is assumed to exceed 10,000 people in the absence of a counterfactual.
• The IDP population is characterized by an extreme loss of productive assets and limited access to income-earning opportunities, including farming. According to recent assessments, only one-third of the population in and around Dilling locality reported engaging in crop production in the 2023 agricultural season, mostly due to the timing of their displacement, but also due to a lack of farmland or access to inputs such as seeds. Any food stocks they may have obtained are long since depleted. Additionally, survey data indicate only 3 percent of IDP households own livestock, compared to 36 percent of host households.  

Crop production

• Assessing the level of cultivation and the agricultural season progress without the Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) is extremely difficult amid the ongoing conflict. However, it is highly likely that the IDP population, in particular, has very limited access to farmland or inputs for cultivation, further worsened by insecurity that restricts their access to fields. Similarly, it is unlikely that urban populations are able to engage in cultivation, given their location in the town and different livelihood patterns prior to the conflict, coupled with the ongoing siege-like conditions. According to available information, below-average harvests are expected as farmers in the area’s main semi-mechanized production areas in neighboring Habila locality missed the season due to insecurity, a lack of access to inputs, and high costs. Typically, Dilling relies heavily on production in Habila and thus food availability will be significantly impacted. Due to lack of engagement in cultivation this year, IDPs and urban populations are not expected to significantly benefit from the green harvests (in October) or main season harvests (November to January).

Market supplies

• Local food supplies have sharply declined amid siege-like conditions and severe conflict-related disruptions to trade routes, as evidenced by months of steeply climbing food prices that are among the highest in Sudan. Market food purchases are not feasible for the majority of poor and displaced households who do not have own-produced food stocks or access to meaningful income-generating opportunities. Locally produced food stocks were depleted months ago following the relatively poor 2023 harvest, and 95 percent of IDP households in Dilling reported they did not have food stocks as of August/mid-September. SPLM-N has blocked the route between Dilling and Kadugli for months; the route from El Obeid to Dilling is effectively cut off by RSF presence and fighting between SAF and RSF in many areas of North Kordofan; and transport along routes from West Kordofan to Dilling and Kadugli have also become increasingly insecure and difficult to traverse. Kadugli market is recording some of the highest prices in the country: in September, sorghum prices were 500 percent higher than the same time last year and over 900 percent above the pre-war period (March 2023). Prices in Dilling market are likely even higher, though recent data is unavailable, given all three routes (Kadugli-Dilling, El Obeid-Dilling, and West Kordofan-Dilling) have been cut-off or are very challenging to pass.

Household purchasing capacity

• In September and October, income sources are particularly low even in a normal year due to the lull in agricultural labor opportunities between land preparation and planting (April-July) and the harvest (November). Typically, households rely on labor migration (to urban areas and gold mining sites) and wild food sales during the lull; however, mobility is currently severely restricted by insecurity. For those who are able to access casual labor, the amount of sorghum that can be purchased with a day’s wage declined by 72 percent in September compared to March 2023 and 76 percent compared to September 2023 and the five-year average, driven by the surges in sorghum prices. 

Humanitarian food assistance 

• Prior to September, humanitarian food assistance was limited to small rations provided by local NGOs in rural SPLM-N-controlled areas; however, even this assistance was cut off by rainy season conditions in September and October. WFP has been unable to access South Kordofan in 2024, and the little food assistance provided by local NGOs is not delivered in the besieged SAF-controlled towns due to insecurity and access constraints. According to local sources, beneficiaries that were reached prior to September received a one-month half-ration for a typical household, regardless of household size. Sharing outside of the household is also widespread. Thus, even if a household received assistance for two of the last six months, it only marginally mitigated their food consumption deficit as the quantity provided was likely diluted as they shared this food with other community members. Assistance combined with wild foods may, however, have had a limited effect in slowing hunger-related mortality among IDPs.

October 2024 Acute Food Insecurity 

SMART survey data was collected in August and mid-September among host and IDP populations in rural areas of Dilling and the immediate neighboring areas of Habila, As Sunut, and Lagauwa localities, as well as in limited areas of rural western Kadugli and neighboring Al Buram locality. The outcome data was most robust and representative for Dilling locality (using national administrative boundaries) and is presented here, followed by a brief explanation of the available evidence for Kadugli and extrapolation to both Dilling and Kadugli towns. In Dilling, 11 percent of displaced households reported extreme hunger indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) using the Household Hunger Score (HHS). While lower than the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold of 20 percent, two observations suggest that the proportion facing hunger gaps indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) exceeded 20 percent in October: (1) it is expected that extremely limited food and nutrition assistance, and wild foods with little to no nutrition or caloric value, were moderating the frequency of responses to “sometimes” experiencing extreme hunger instead of “often,” and (2) according to local informants, seasonal barriers have hindered access to this area since September, thus rapidly cutting off access to additional food sources for at least four to six weeks. 

Among IDPs in Dilling, specifically, nutrition outcomes were very severe: 37.6 percent of children under five were acutely malnourished (GAM-WHZ) and 11.8 percent were severely acutely malnourished (SAM-WHZ). According to GAM-MUAC, for which the acute malnutrition threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5) is around 15 percent, 22.3 percent of children under five were acutely malnourished, and 7.9 percent were severely acutely malnourished. In August 2018, the GAM-WHZ prevalence was just 6.75 percent (according to the Simple Spatial Sampling survey); this illustrates a staggering deterioration to well over the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds whether measured by GAM-WHZ or GAM-MUAC. While there have been no ground reports of major disease outbreaks, the SMART survey found an elevated prevalence of illness among children, which is likely interacting with acute malnutrition and further worsening their nutritional status. Of all children surveyed among IDP households, 70 percent were ill in the last two weeks. Of those who were ill, 47 percent reported fever, 42 percent reported diarrhea, and 39 percent reported cough. The prevalence of illness was the same between those who were acutely malnourished and those who were not (both 70 percent). 

At the same time, the all-cause Crude Death Rate (CDR) among all surveyed rural areas was 0.86 deaths per 10,000 people per day among host populations and 1.07 among IDP populations; when analyzed separately, the non-trauma CDR among the IDP population was markedly higher (1.4 deaths per 10,000 people per day). While the CDRs were below the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold (2 people per 10,000 per day) at the time the survey was conducted, hunger-related mortality has likely accelerated rapidly since then given the already Extremely Critical (≥30 percent) prevalence of acute malnutrition (GAM-WHZ) coupled with worsening access to food over 4-6 weeks.

The SMART survey was only conducted in rural SPLM-N-controlled areas. Nonetheless, based on an understanding of conflict and displacement dynamics, along with prolonged besiegement of Dilling town, it is assessed that food consumption, acute malnutrition, and mortality outcomes are likely even worse in Dilling town. The town’s population faces extremely restricted access to wild foods, rural harvests, and food and nutrition assistance. Kadugli town has been besieged at a similar intensity for a prolonged period and is likely facing equivalent conditions to Dilling town, and IDPs who have fled Kadugli to Al Burham likely also face extreme outcomes. Indicatively, when analyzing the sub-set of IDPs surveyed in Al Buram, 42.2 percent of children under five were acutely malnourished, with a SAM prevalence of 7.8 percent. The non-trauma CDR among the displaced population in Al Buram were already above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold at 2.03. 

Assumptions

• Conflict between RSF, SAF, and SPLM-N will likely continue in Dilling town and some rural areas at the edge of territory at least nominally controlled by a major armed actor. Conflict between RSF and SAF along major transportation corridors in South Kordofan remains likely throughout the projection period and will continue to limit entry of humanitarian and commercial traffic into Dilling. Siege-like conditions are expected to persist around Dilling and Kadugli towns.
• The 2024 harvest in Dilling and Kadugli localities is expected to be significantly below average for the second consecutive year due to the year-long besiegement and high levels of insecurity in surrounding areas. Neither locality is a main production center, and both typically benefit from production in neighboring localities (specifically Habila for Dilling). As insecurity continues to cut off trade routes, it is unlikely that Dilling or Kadugli will benefit from the flow of harvests from other parts of the state or country.
• While below-average supplies from 2024 harvests will likely reach rural markets and moderate cereal prices for a short period, the entry of supplies to the besieged town will most likely be minimal to none, and cereal prices are not expected to seasonally decline. Prices are expected to resume upward trajectories atypically early in both rural and urban areas with the anticipated early start to the 2025 lean season.
• Availability and access to in-kind payments from agricultural labor in the relatively secure areas of rural Dilling will likely improve seasonally to some degree with the main harvest. However, labor opportunities will remain significantly limited by the ongoing conflict and displacement during the harvest season from November to January. Demand for and access to migratory casual labor opportunities are expected to be below normal due to insecurity.
• WFP has indicated there are plans to scale up food assistance in November to a total of over nearly 15,000 beneficiaries in Dilling (<10 percent of total population) and 73,000 in Kadugli (30 percent of total population) with 50-70 percent rations, distributed via overland convoys. However, negotiations for such convoy access have not yet been approved, and WFP has not previously accessed the area in 2024. In addition, other groups indicate there are plans for assistance deliveries in November and December consisting of one-month rations meeting 50 percent of caloric needs to over 500,000 beneficiaries in areas of Kadugli, Dilling, and immediately adjacent areas of neighboring localities (Habila, Al Sunut, Lagauwa) via airdrops and an airbridge from Juba to Kadugli airport. However, the success of any food assistance delivery plan relies heavily on cooperation and facilitation by the armed parties with respect to their territorial control, with likely limitations on the number of successful flights to facilitate airdrops and road access permissions. Ultimately, even if successful, the scale of one-off deliveries is likely insufficient to meaningfully alleviate acute food insecurity outcomes over the medium-term.
• Starting in December, plans are underway for a larger scale-up of multisectoral assistance via ground transport, though approvals have not yet been obtained. Overall, based on previous experience and uncertainty as to the intentions of either side to fully cooperate, the unhindered and undisrupted roll out of the plan is not expected to occur. In the absence of an end to heavy fighting and sustained and demonstrated actions to ensure access by SAF and SPLM-N, it is expected that levels of food assistance to this area will remain low and inconsistent.

Acute food insecurity through May 2025

In Dilling and Kadugli localities, and among the displaced in Al Buram, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to persist through mid-2025, under the most likely assumptions detailed above. However, this classification is pending concurrence from the FRC. Population movement will remain heavily restricted and access to new harvests is expected to be marginal given trade barriers and limited planting. Food assistance (one-month rations distributed between November and December) is not expected to be successfully sustained at the necessary scale. While harvest stocks from rural areas are expected to be widely shared within the community, the scale of deficits coupled with constraints in access the besieged towns suggest the harvest would only temporarily mitigate acute food insecurity outcomes, likely for no more than 1-2 months (November-December). Household Economy Analysis (HEA) outcome analysis for Southeast Semi-mechanized Rainfed Agriculture South Kordofan Livelihood Zone (SD10)  indicates that rural very poor and poor host/resident households will see only a short reprieve in the immediate harvest period before experiencing very high food consumption deficits (>50 percent) beginning as early as January. Previous experience and precedent suggest a strong likelihood that available food from harvests and assistance will be widely shared and thus more rapidly depleted. In other words, even if there is some reprieve in November/December associated with air drops and the harvest, the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds are expected to be surpassed for the majority of the post-harvest and lean season periods.

The only way in which Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be expected to ‘end’ is through significant population loss; it is also plausible that such loss of life could lead to a period where the populations’ level of starvation, acute malnutrition, and deaths falls below the thresholds temporarily as those most vulnerable to malnutrition and mortality succumb but could re-escalate if the situation remains unresolved and claims the lives of once previously healthy adults. Thus, Famine (IPC Phase 5) will continue (even if intermittent declines in levels of acute malnutrition and mortality were to be observed) until such time as the conflict is mediated, population mobility and access restored, and/or humanitarian access is ensured for a consistent and prolonged period of time.