Emergency and risk of Famine to persist through harvest in the worst-affected areas

• FEWS NET estimates that 22.0-22.99 million people will be in need of humanitarian food assistance through September. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to spread across North Darfur; parts of Central, South, and East Darfur; much of Greater Kordofan; and Blue Nile due to conflict-driven large-scale displacement, disrupted livelihoods, and impeded commercial and humanitarian access. Some households are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes in Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine of North Darfur; Dilling, Kadugli, and the surrounding western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan; El-Obeid and surrounding areas of North Kordofan; and among some internally displaced populations (IDPs) in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. 
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes will likely persist in areas along active frontlines during the October-January harvest period, as harvests are not expected to provide a meaningful source of food. In other areas of western Sudan, persistent conflict, expanding drone use, and El-Niño-linked below-average rains are expected to limit harvests and result in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In calmer eastern areas, access to harvests and income from agricultural labor will ease consumption gaps, supporting Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 
• There is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in seven areas of northwestern and central North Darfur as well as in Dilling and Kadugli towns and nearby rural areas of South Kordofan. Many already face large to extreme food consumption deficits, and acute malnutrition is near or above Extremely Critical (GAM ≥30 percent) thresholds in some areas. If conflict escalates or severe sieges resume and block population movement and trade for a prolonged time, then hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality levels would likely surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. While the risk will likely persist through January, harvests may ease the risk in parts of North Darfur. However, if rainfall deficits are more severe than currently forecast – particularly if combined with escalating conflict – then this risk would persist in affected areas.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 30, 2026.

The more than three-year war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no sign of abating despite recent shifts in conflict frontlines and tactics. In the first half of 2026, conflict frontlines intensified in parts of Greater Kordofan and northwest North Darfur and expanded to Blue Nile. Fighting remains focused on logistically and economically important towns and routes, including Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan and El-Obeid of North Kordofan; supply routes from Chad and Libya into North and West Darfur; and Kurmuk and Geisan of Blue Nile. At the same time, defections and intragroup tensions are increasing, driven by opportunism, ethnic grievances, and territorial ambitions, affecting cohesion, operational capacity, and localized control dynamics within armed factions. The proliferation of drones has expanded the geographic scope of fighting, exposing populations far from frontlines to aerial attacks and constraining humanitarian access. While no area is currently classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5), Famine (IPC Phase 5) was previously classified in IDP camp around Al Fasher in July 2024 and in parts of North Darfur and areas of South Kordofan in October 2024. Needs remain extremely high with a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in parts of North Darfur and South Kordofan, driven by the prolonged impacts of over three years of conflict-related disruption to livelihoods, market flows, and humanitarian access. 

The politicization of the war along ethnic and tribal lines remains a significant driver of conflict dynamics. The RSF draws strong support mainly from western Arab tribes and allied Arab militias, with an alliance formed in February 2025 with the predominantly Nuba SPLM-N Al-Hilu faction present in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The SAF is predominantly led by Arabs in riverine and eastern areas but also draws support from the Darfur Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movement (JSAMF) and the armed civilian resistance. The war has been characterized by widespread sexual-based violence, targeting and massacres of civilians, and pervasive looting of public and private assets. Several attacks (like in Ag-Geneina in 2024, Zamzam camp in April 2025, and Al-Fasher town in October 2025) are reminiscent of the genocide in Darfur 20 years ago. While relative calm in the east of Sudan since April 2025 has facilitated the return of over 4.4 million households to their homes, an estimated 8.8 million remain internally displaced. 

The conflict continues to profoundly impact all aspects of livelihoods in Sudan. The destruction of and disruption to critical infrastructure and industrial capacity; damage to major oil fields and fuel refineries; flight of the private sector; and disruption to import-export activities, supply chains, and finance sectors have led to severe economic contraction on top of years of macroeconomic decline. The healthcare system has been severely impacted amid the targeting of health facilities, and communicable diseases continue to surge. Extensive looting of private assets – another persistent characteristic of the conflict – combined with loss of jobs and income sources, has driven widespread impoverishment. Markets are recurrently looted and damaged, and trade routes remain heavily contested, disrupting commercial and humanitarian access. This has sustained high and volatile food prices throughout the conflict. 

In rainfed semi-mechanized and traditional agricultural areas, households are typically engaged in the main summer season agricultural production during the June-September rains. This period is the peak of the lean season when households are heavily dependent on markets for food purchases. The primary income-earning opportunities are typically closely tied to agricultural activity in these areas, with land cultivation and planting in June and July; weeding throughout the season; and harvesting opportunities beginning in October. The main harvests typically occur between November and January, mitigating the severity of food insecurity. However, variable levels of conflict and insecurity are expected to interfere with household access to farms and these key sources of food and income. In addition, consecutive years of lack of access to credit and critical inputs are expected to reduce the cultivation and yields of those who do manage to farm. 

In agropastoral and pastoral areas, livestock herds typically move from southern dry season grazing areas in parts of South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic (CAR) northward to Sudan’s wet season pastures beginning in June, increasing household access to milk and other animal products. Herding labor opportunities also typically improve for poorer households. Southward movement typically begins after November – during the harvesting time – which increases the risk of herder-farmer conflicts. Ongoing insecurity is expected to disrupt migration and constrain access to critical pasture and water resources. The conflict has also deeply eroded livestock ownership among poor households via looting and increased distress sales due to sustained high food and non-food prices, a trend that is expected to continue. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Sudan Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Sudan: April to September 2026
• Latest Sudan Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis
• Additional Famine (IPC Phase 5) and risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) resources: The IPC’s Famine (IPC Phase 5) Factsheet; FEWS NET’s approach to analyzing the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5); Explainer: The Famine Review Committee process 

In June, conflict frontlines remained concentrated in northwest North Darfur, northern West Darfur, Greater Kordofan – particularly around El-Obeid – and Blue Nile, with increasingly fragmented command structures and an ongoing shift toward drone‑intensive warfare. The continued defections and shifting alliances among RSF, SPLM‑N factions, and affiliated militias are further weakening cohesion and reshaping localized control dynamics. The increase in drone warfare has changed the conflict's reach and humanitarian impact, with both SAF and RSF areas far from active frontlines sustaining long-range drone strikes in recent months at unprecedented frequencies (Figure 1). Trade routes, markets, hospitals, energy infrastructure, and food production facilities have been repeatedly targeted by both parties, driving increased civilian casualties and significant disruptions to market functioning and humanitarian access (see Annex 5). 

• In late May, drone strikes in At-Tine and Kernoi (northwest North Darfur) hit markets, killing civilians and disrupting trade. In mid-June, an RSF attack on several villages in Um Baru destroyed market infrastructure and water resources, displaced residents, and looted livestock. The front expanded southward into northern West Darfur, with Joint Forces reportedly recapturing Kulbus town in West Darfur and displacing thousands. 
• Other significant June drone strikes disrupted commercial and humanitarian movement: one hit the Ardamata Bridge in El-Geneina (West Darfur), a key route for assistance into Greater Darfur and Kordofan, while another damaged two bridges between Dilling and Kadugli (South Kordofan). 
• El-Obeid (North Kordofan) reemerged as a conflict hotspot: since June 10, the RSF has conducted daily drone strikes, destroying at least eight fuel depots, damaging the main power station, cutting water supply, and halting operations at multiple hospitals. Both SAF and RSF have reinforced positions around the city from multiple directions. The massacre of Dar Hamid civilians in West Bara and subsequent tribal defections to SAF highlight growing fractures within RSF-aligned networks. In Kauda of Heiban (South Kordofan), tribal violence killed dozens of civilians and caused displacement, destruction of homes, and breakdown of intercommunal trust. 
• Retaliatory offensives continued in June in Blue Nile, with SAF most recently recapturing strategically located Sirkum and Mugaja villages in Kurmuk locality on June 29. Control of these towns is important for cross-border supply from Ethiopia.       

An estimated 8.8 million people remain displaced, a 24 percent decline following the return of over 4.4 million people since late 2024. Returnees are concentrated in relatively stable areas such as Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, and Northern states, though living conditions remain fragile. New displacement mirrors conflict frontlines and is concentrated in Greater Kordofan, Greater Darfur, and Blue Nile. Between October 2025 and June 2026, 219,319 people were displaced in Greater Kordofan. Between June 17 and 23, approximately 3,690 people were displaced from Um Baru due to insecurity, with expanded conflict into Kulbus (West Darfur) displacing over 6,000 more people. In South Darfur, 11,630 people were displaced June 4-6 due to intercommunal violence. In Blue Nile, nearly 60,000 people were displaced by the end of May.   

Continued violence in North and West Darfur drive increased cross-border displacement into Chad in June, while outflows to South Sudan also continued. More than 5,000 people crossed into Chad between June 1 and 29, up from around 2,000 in May, brining recorded arrivals since April to roughly 15,000. These figures likely undercount total movements, given informal crossings through the Dar Zaghawa area and recent displacements from Kulbus. More than two-thirds of June arrivals entered Chad’s northern provinces of Ennedi Est and Wadi Fira. Cross-border outflows to South Sudan have also continued, with nearly 35,000 fleeing between April and June, though at reduced rates compared to earlier in the war.

While the June to September 2026 rains started 10-20 days early in most southern and southeastern areas, the rains are 10-20 days late in southwestern Darfur and have yet to begin across much of center and north. Access to fields for land preparation and cultivation remains limited by insecurity – particularly in the most directly conflict-affected areas and among the displaced – and the constrained availability and high cost of inputs. Among farmers who are able to access land, including those in semi-mechanized rainfed and irrigated sectors in the east, limited access to financing, loss or destruction of assets, and shortages and high costs of fuel, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs are delaying land preparation and disrupting agricultural operations. Fuel prices surged in May, increasing by 20 to 69 percent month-on-month and more than doubling compared to May 2025. Fertilizer costs have seen more modest recent fluctuations but remain elevated (68-90 percent above last year). In irrigated schemes, the deterioration of canals and irrigation infrastructure is further limiting cultivation. 

The conflict is worsening livestock ownership disparities and undermining animal health and mobility. Armed actors' control of livestock trade, looting, distress sales, high costs, and disease are driving ownership declines, particularly among poor households. A late 2025/26 vaccination campaign reached under 10 percent of the national herd – equivalent to about 9.1 million animals – while owners report declining productivity and rising disease among their livestock due to disrupted veterinary services. Security conditions continue to dictate pastoral movements and access to pasture and water: pastoralists in northwest North Darfur have fled to Chad for safer grazing, livestock movement along the Sudan-Ethiopia border has dropped, and access to the Gedaref’s Butanah grazing area is increasingly restricted. Herders are confined to increasingly smaller areas, causing localized overgrazing and water depletion. Moreover, elevated temperatures and erratic May-June rainfall – despite early seasonal onset in the south – have left pasture conditions below average and many water points at Watch or Alert status by late June (Figure 2).

Trade and markets across Sudan remain fragile, with further deterioration likely as the rainy season progresses. In Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur, trade flows along main corridors are heavily disrupted by conflict and insecurity, checkpoint taxation, and movement restrictions, while routes across stable eastern areas have improved relatively (Figure 1). The main trade routes are a focal point of control, with attacks increasing as drone warfare expands, augmenting the risks to traders and humanitarian operations. The temporary easing of sieges in Dilling and Kadugli earlier in the year facilitated short-lived increases in commercial and humanitarian flows and brief price declines in February and March. Subsequently, humanitarian access was reportedly achieved again in June, but commercial flows remain constrained by insecurity and damage to critical road and bridge infrastructure, driving up market prices. Underlying structural constraints, such as SAF-imposed trade restrictions since December 2025 and the escalation in fuel prices since February, also continue to limit the movement of goods countrywide, sustaining erratic supply and elevated prices. 

Staple food prices remained exceptionally high despite mixed trends. Sorghum and millet rose 10-15 percent between April and May due to lean season pressures and transport costs, while wheat flour declined slightly given recent harvests but remained well above historical averages. Regional disparities persist: Darfur markets (Zalingei, El-Geneina, and Nyala) have comparatively lower sorghum prices than eastern markets due to localized supply conditions and reduced effective demand due to weak purchasing power. Kadugli (South Kordofan) has sustained the highest prices – triple the national average – due to disrupted trade flows. Nationally, sorghum and millet prices vary between 125 to 200 percent above the five-year average. Non-cereal food prices have also surged sharply since 2024, driving up overall food costs. Meat, milk, oil, and bean prices remain substantially above both last year (15-70 percent) and the five-year average (60-130 percent). 

Rising living costs, currency depreciation, and high inflation – amid widespread disruption to livelihoods – are further eroding purchasing power and food access countrywide. Wage labor rates are rising but not keeping pace with living costs. Households displaced by violence or emerging from prolonged sieges, especially in North Darfur and Greater Kordofan, lack productive assets and income sources and have extremely weak purchasing power. Livestock prices are rising, but poor households cannot meaningfully benefit amid livestock losses or shrinking herd sizes. Severe banking system disruptions and liquidity shortages further constrain finances.

The conflict continues to drive poor macroeconomic conditions. Following large economic contractions of -37.5 percent in 2023 and -12.8 percent in 2024, the economy remained near‑stagnant in 2025 (around -0.6 percent), and only a modest and fragile recovery of about 1.3 percent is projected in 2026, reflecting continued conflict-related disruption. Inflation has moderated from its 2024 peak but remains elevated, while sharp currency depreciation reaching about 4,960 SDG/USD in June 2026 (a 70 and 724 percent increase compared to June 2025 and March 2023, respectively) is sustaining high import costs and driving fuel and food price inflation. 

Sudan is facing simultaneous epidemics at the start of the rainy season, driven by conflict, displacement, and systemic service disruptions. Cholera, malaria, dengue, and other communicable disease outbreaks are spreading across all 18 states amid major disruptions to health, water, and sanitation systems, most recently highlighted by rapid spread of measles in Central Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur between January and April, as well as a severe outbreak of suspected cholera in West Kordofan in late May. The deterioration in health conditions, particularly in overcrowded camps, is driving increased morbidity and contributing to high levels of acute malnutrition among children. Between December 2025 and June 2026, 13 of 25 SMART surveys found global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalences surpassing the Critical (15 percent) threshold, with the highest severity observed in North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Kordofan (Figure 3). In the two localities of Um Baru and Kernoi, the GAM prevalence was well above the Extremely Critical (30 percent) threshold.

Humanitarian food assistance

In May, food and cash assistance reached 3.2 million people, including 1.9 million people who received food and 1.3 million who received cash. This represents less than 20 percent of FEWS NET’s estimated population in need. Assistance coverage is highly uneven by region. Nearly half of all beneficiaries were in Greater Darfur, where most received in-kind rations covering 50 percent of daily kilocalorie needs, rising to 70 percent in areas assessed to face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). In areas assessed to face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), WFP reported reaching 680,000 of the targeted 771,000 people; this included in-kind deliveries in Kadugli, which have been sustained since February. In contrast, no food or cash assistance has reached Um Baru and Kernoi since March – when limited assistance was delivered – though nutrition supplies for over 2,000 children reached Um Baru in April. Greater Kordofan remains extremely difficult to reach, accounting for less than 15 percent of the total beneficiaries reached in May. Meanwhile, nearly 40 percent of beneficiaries were in eastern Sudan, where relatively better access and market functionality support the use of predominantly cash assistance. 

While distribution data are not yet available for June, available plans indicate a target of 4.9 million people, though this is unlikely to be fully achieved given ongoing conflict, insecurity, administrative and logistical barriers.  Based on FEWS NET’s analysis of available data, food and cash assistance is likely preventing worse outcomes in June in 14 localities: the three Jebel Marrahs, Mukjar, and Um Dukhun (Central Darfur); Tawila, At-Taweisha, Al-Lait, and Al-Koma (North Darfur); As-Sunta (South Darfur); Delami (South Kordofan); Baw (Blue Nile); Reifi Shamal ad-Delta (Kassala); and Al-Fashaga (Gedaref).

Areas of highest concern

Northwestern North Darfur

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing, with some populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Since the fall of Al-Fasher in October 2025, northwestern North Darfur has continued to experience high displacement as households flee violence, seek assistance from humanitarians and local Dar Zaghawa communities in Sudan and Chad, and utilize informal pastoral routes to avoid conflict. Violence and drone strikes are severely disrupting trade flows, markets, and water and pasture access amid extremely limited humanitarian assistance, constraining critical income and food sources.

SMART surveys conducted in November and December 2025 found GAM levels exceeding the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold for acute malnutrition in December 2025 in Um Baru (52 percent) and Kernoi (34 percent) and surpassing Critical (>15 percent) levels in At-Tine (19.7 percent), though food consumption indicators indicated moderate levels of hunger. At that time, FEWS NET did not assess Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Um Baru or Kernoi because the available evidence did not support convergence across all three Famine thresholds, despite the extremely high acute malnutrition levels. With no new surveys conducted since then, there is limited understanding of who is currently living in northwest North Darfur due to constant conflict-related population movement, the nature of pastoral livelihoods, and the survival strategies employed by communities living on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, also impacting interpretation of prior survey data. However, hunger and acute malnutrition are expected to remain severe across North Darfur. Several recent SMART surveys from neighboring localities indicate GAM rates are near or surpassing the Critical threshold: 24.3 percent in Kutum (neighboring Um Baru to the east); 21.7 percent in As-Serief, 14.6 in Kebkabiya, and 15.1 percent in Saraf Omra (to the south/southeast) as of May/June. 

Dilling and Kadugli towns and surrounding western Nuba Mountains areas of South Kordofan

Siege-like conditions persist in June, particularly in Dilling, marked by periodic drone strikes targeting critical infrastructure and clashes over control of main routes in the area, driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Commercial access remains difficult and risky, driving rising prices at a time of heightened market dependence amid limited income-earning opportunities. Access to agricultural labor opportunities is similarly expected to be constrained by insecurity. Without direct access to Dilling town and surrounding areas of the western Nuba Mountains, humanitarian food assistance has been limited to cash transfers, the impact of which is reduced by steeply rising prices. Populations in Kadugli have received in-kind distributions. The scale of distribution, regardless of modality, remains low relative to the scale and severity of need.

El-Obeid town and the surrounding area in North Kordofan

In El-Obeid town and surrounding areas, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing, and some populations likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the large population of IDPs residing in El-Obeid. The partial siege and recent escalation in violence, including drone strikes on critical infrastructure, are causing extreme fuel and water shortages, sharply reducing market supply, and increasing food prices. The escalating attacks are also driving widespread fear and mass displacement out of El-Obeid toward safer areas of central and eastern Sudan, though thousands remain in the town due to extremely high transportation costs or unwillingness to leave. For those who remain, the attacks are disrupting livelihood activities, reducing access to income from agricultural labor at the start of the season, as well as to informal income sources in the town. Households are forced to increasingly liquidate assets and rely on community support to access food.   

Other areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan

Across other areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in areas with active conflict (including direct clashes and drone strikes), increased intercommunal clashes, and other types of insecurity and access constraints, as well as in areas hosting large IDP populations. These include parts of South, North, and Central Darfur; parts of northern West Kordofan; SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan; and Bara, Gebrat el-Sheikh Gharb Bara, Um Dam Haj Ahmed, and parts of Ar-Rahad localities in North Kordofan. A recent assessment in Ghubayaish, for example, found evidence of severe food insecurity among IDPs and poor households who are largely dependent on a single communal kitchen and community support. Livelihood opportunities remain scarce, limited mainly to domestic work for women, while men have few viable income-generating options.

Elsewhere within these regions, the delivery of humanitarian food assistance in some insecure areas of North and Central Darfur (with large IDP populations) is mitigating food security outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). Meanwhile, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists in relatively calmer areas, poor households have relatively better access to in-kind and cash payments from agricultural labor and sustained access to functional markets. However, high and increasing prices are nevertheless limiting financial access to food, resulting in food consumption gaps. 

Eastern Sudan

In Blue Nile, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in Al-Kurmuk, Geisan, and Baw due to ongoing clashes between SAF and the joint forces of RSF-SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction) that have displaced tens of thousands, disrupted livelihoods, limited commercial and humanitarian access, and restricted population movements. The atypically early depletion of food stocks and heavy dependence on markets amid high food prices are deepening food consumption deficits. In other parts of the southeast, including Al-Jazirah, Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, and Khartoum, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists due to high food prices and reduced access to income-generating opportunities for both IDPs and host communities. Localized areas of Gedaref and Al-Jazirah, as well as parts of Northern and River Nile have improved to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) due to relatively better stocks from the 2025/26 season, including the recent wheat harvest which is a primary source of food and income. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in the areas hosting large numbers of IDPs, as these households have limited access to food and income.

• Conflict: Peace efforts are expected to continue to stall. The war’s increasing internationalization through competing Gulf, Egyptian, and Ethiopian involvement is prolonging the conflict and expanding its geographic scope. While the rainy season is likely to reduce ground attacks in active frontline areas, aerial warfare is expected to continue through the projection period (Figure 4). Intragroup fighting and defections are expected amid a broader security void and opportunistic economic and territorial power grabs, with local economies increasingly under the de facto control of warlords.   
  • Greater Kordofan will remain a critical frontline with multiple active armed groups (SAF, RSF, SPLM-N); no decisive territorial shifts are expected in the near term. El-Obeid, Dilling, and Kadugli are likely to remain partially besieged, with drone strikes constraining movement despite rainy season declines in ground attacks.
  • In Greater Darfur, RSF will likely retain control of most of Darfur and consolidate control over northwestern North Darfur (At-Tine, Kernoi, Um Baru) by January. Intragroup conflict, insecurity, and opportunistic criminality are expected to continue amid the weak security environment and volatile local dynamics.   
  • Blue Nile is expected to remain an active frontline; the rainy season will likely slow ground, but not drone, operations.  
  • Eastern Sudan is likely to remain relatively calm and under SAF control, though RSF is expected to increasingly target critical military and civilian infrastructure with drones. 
• Displacement and re-displacement are expected to continue, particularly in major frontline areas. In Greater Darfur, new displacement is expected to be highest in North Darfur, as populations flee offensives in the northwest (Dar Zaghawa) and seek increased access to food and income elsewhere. Populations are likely to continue fleeing to rural areas and Chad. In Greater Kordofan, displacement is expected to be highest in South and North Kordofan. As attacks mount on El-Obeid, populations are expected to continue fleeing to safer areas to the east. In South Kordofan, populations fleeing clashes in and around Dilling and Kadugli are likely to move deeper into SPLM-N (al-Hilu)-controlled areas in South Kordofan or to White Nile, Khartoum, or South Sudan. In Blue Nile, movement is likely to continue from rural conflict zones to main towns.
• IDP and refugee returns, predominantly to parts of eastern Sudan, are expected to continue to accelerate and are projected to reach more than 7 million over the next six months.

• With the emergence of a strengthening El Niño event in June, the June to September rainy season is likely to be below average, with increasing odds of more severe deficits in the southern areas (Figure 5). 
• Temperatures are expected to remain above average, increasing evaporation and moisture stress for crops and rangelands.
• The economy is expected to remain poor, marked by high inflation and currency depreciation. Annual inflation is expected to decline from last year but remain above 70 percent. The SDG is expected to further depreciate (an over 700 percent loss in value since pre-conflict levels). Extreme poverty worsened from 36 percent before the war to over 70 percent in 2025 and is expected to remain elevated given the slow and uneven economic recovery. 
• Trade flows are expected to remain disrupted, particularly in areas where armed groups are actively seeking to control main trade routes in efforts to expand territorial control. Most routes through Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan will likely face continued high levels of insecurity, proliferation of checkpoints, and increased drone strikes. Routes in and out of Dilling and Kadugli are expected to remain contested, limiting commercial and humanitarian assistance flows. Routes through Blue Nile will likely be disrupted by ongoing conflict. From June to September, the rainy season will impact road conditions, compounding conflict-driven disruptions.
• Markets are expected to remain largely functional but highly fragile due to financial system collapse, high transport costs, insecurity along key supply routes, and increasing reliance on smaller, alternative routes. Along frontline areas, particularly in northwest North Darfur, northern West Darfur, and major cities of Greater Kordofan, frequent drone strikes are expected to periodically force market closures and constrain supply.
• Food and fuel prices are expected to continue to rise and remain significantly above average through September due to seasonally declining market stocks; anticipated disruptions to production, trade flows, and markets; import constraints; and macroeconomic contraction. Persistent disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz are expected to exacerbate these trends by through fuel price volatility, driving elevated transport costs and widening regional disparities in market supply and retail prices. Between October and January, cereal prices are likely to stabilize with the harvest but remain significantly above average due to poor macroeconomic conditions, high transport costs, and disrupted flows from surplus- to deficit-producing areas. 
• The livestock sector is expected to face moderate to significant stress through January, driven by ongoing conflict, restricted herd movements, disrupted migration routes, and limited access to veterinary and marketing services. Below-average rainfall is also likely to reduce pasture and water availability. Between October and January, livestock prices are expected to remain elevated while cereal prices moderate with the harvest, driving improvement in livestock-to-cereal terms of trade. 
• Income-earning opportunities are expected to remain atypically low. In relatively secure rural areas, poor households are expected to rely heavily on agricultural labor opportunities; however, opportunities are expected to remain below average due to reduced cultivation and capacity to hire among better-off households. Herding labor opportunities will similarly seasonally increase but remain below average given reduced economic capacity, ownership rates, and herd sizes. Households are expected to increase their dependence on remittances, local community sharing, and migration for non-agricultural unskilled labor opportunities, such as informal labor in artisanal mining sites and in safer towns. 
• National-level cereal production (sorghum, millet, and wheat) in 2026/27 will likely be below last year and the five-year average due to forecast below-average rainfall and insecurity and conflict. Planting, which typically occurs between June and August, is expected to be below average nationally and significantly below average in areas facing persistent and high intensities of fighting, insecurity, and displacement, such as in North Darfur, parts of Greater Kordofan, and parts of Blue Nile. 
• Import requirements for the 2026/27 consumption year, particularly for wheat, are expected to be atypically high due to anticipated below-average production for the fourth consecutive season. However, Sudan’s ability to import wheat will continue to face challenges through January due to conflict, shortages of foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS), and ongoing local currency depreciation.
• Disease prevalence – particularly for contagious diseases – is expected to increase with the start of the rainy season amid extremely poor water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health conditions; the near collapse of the health system; and lack of facilities, medical supplies, and staff; particularly in areas that are highly insecure, overcrowded, and hosting large IDP populations. The lack of treatment, poor health outcomes, and high levels of hunger are expected to drive elevated acute malnutrition prevalence and hunger- and disease-related mortality through the peak lean and rainy season. Disease incidence is expected to moderate seasonally in the harvest period but remain elevated amid poor health and WASH conditions. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian access is expected to remain volatile and highly dynamic, inadequately funded, and constrained by high costs, unstable supply, administrative and logistical barriers, and seasonal deterioration. Rising fuel costs linked to the Middle East conflict will sustain high operation costs, particularly for the more remote areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Ongoing bureaucratic and administrative barriers are expected to impede program operations, while escalating aerial warfare will restrict ground transport. Damage to critical bridges and roads will likely exacerbate seasonal road deterioration. WFP is expected to continue targeting in-kind assistance to areas facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), as well as areas with high concentrations of displaced populations, particularly in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. 

According to shared plans, an average of 4.7 million people per month will be targeted with food and cash assistance equivalent to 50 percent of kilocalorie needs between June and September, with 70 percent rations planned for areas where some populations are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Given anticipated seasonal deterioration and the rising scale of need, humanitarian food assistance is unlikely to be sufficient to mitigate area-level outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) from July to September. While detailed plans are not yet available for the period of October 2026 to January 2027, WFP currently anticipates that funding shortfalls will force further prioritization – narrowing assistance to the worst-affected areas and households – and reduce monthly targets to 3.4 million people in the last three months of 2026.

Areas of highest concern 

Between June and September, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and worse outcomes are expected to expand as household stocks are completely depleted and market reliance increases in the context of extremely high prices and sharply eroded purchasing capacity. IDP households, poor households, and conflict-affected households are expected to increasingly rely on community support, and to resort to severe or extreme coping strategies such as consumption of seeds, wild foods, and liquidation of assets. Acute malnutrition is expected to deteriorate further within Critical to Extremely Critical levels across much of western Sudan as disease outbreaks spread, fueled by rainy season conditions amid poor WASH conditions and limited access to healthcare. Some populations are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the areas of highest concern within northwestern North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tine); parts of Greater Darfur with high concentrations of IDPs; and parts of Greater Kordofan, including Dilling, Kadugli, and the surrounding western Nuba Mountains area; SPLM-N-controlled areas of South Kordofan receiving high numbers of IDPs; and areas in and around El-Obeid of North Kordofan. 

Northwestern North Darfur

While conflict is expected to decline slightly as the rainy season conditions set in, drone strikes will remain elevated and ground clashes are expected to continue in northwestern North Darfur’s volatile frontlines areas. Population displacement is expected to remain pervasive, with crossings into Chad to access community and humanitarian support or migrate livestock to more remote pastures to avoid conflict. With cultivation in these areas expected to be severely disrupted, access to agricultural labor (including herding labor) will be severely reduced, and poor households are expected to increasingly rely on extreme coping strategies such as consumption of wild foods and liquidation of assets, with many experiencing food consumption deficits indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Humanitarian assistance delivery is likely to be disrupted by insecurity and seasonal deterioration in access conditions during the rainy season. 

Greater Kordofan

Across the partially besieged towns of Dilling, Kadugli, and El Obeid, and in surrounding areas including the Western Nuba Mountains, conditions are expected to remain severe, driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with some populations (particularly IDPs) in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Ongoing fighting over access routes, exacerbated by seasonal deterioration, will continue to restrict both commercial and humanitarian supply, pushing market prices higher across all three locations. The impact is expected to remain most acute in Dilling, though rising encirclement of El-Obeid is expected to drive expanded Emergency (IPC Phae 4) with an increasing number of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the town. Populations are expected to continue to flee El-Obeid to safer areas in east Sudan, but high transport costs and severe insecurity will constrain the scale of movement. For those remaining, purchasing capacity will further erode in the face of rising market prices.   

Between October and January 2027, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected, with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Conflict and ground fighting are expected to intensify with the cessation of rain and improved road access. High levels of population displacement are expected to continue in northwestern North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine) and Greater Kordofan (El-Obeid, Dilling, and Kadugli and surrounding Nuba Mountains) due to the RSF’s effort to control main supply routes and reimpose siege conditions. More households are expected to flee the epicenters of conflict intensity in search of safer corridors and improved access to food and income. IDPs and poor households are expected to rely heavily on community support as nearby areas engage in the harvests in addition to limited humanitarian food assistance. Marginal (at best) harvests are expected in and around the most conflict-affected towns, and increased sharing of anticipated below-average harvests across the affected regions will drive more rapid depletion of stocks than usual. 

Other areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan 

Between June and September, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand to across all other areas of North Darfur, large parts of South and Central Darfur, and most of the rest of Greater Kordofan. In northern West Darfur (Kulbus), where Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes are expected, an increasing share of population are expected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) given the recent escalation and displacement. This deterioration reflects the compounding weight of ongoing conflict and displacement, high market reliance amid deteriorating purchasing capacity and high prices, and anticipated disruptions to humanitarian assistance. The populations of highest concern include the displaced, conflict-affected households, and poor households with negligible remaining assets, who will rely on income from agricultural labor but will face difficulty accessing food due to extremely high prices. These households will increasingly depend on distress sale of any residual assets, wild food consumption, and begging, while leaning heavily on already strained community support networks. Among the most severely affected, particularly those sheltering in large displacement camps across Greater Darfur, including in North and South Darfur, a subset of the population is expected to deteriorate into Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

From October to January, harvests are expected to drive improvements to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in some of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan’s relatively calmer areas; however, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to persist in most of North Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan. Poor households are expected to earn income or in-kind payment from agricultural labor during the harvesting period, while food prices in the relatively calmer areas will moderate with stock inflows. In areas expected to experience elevated drone strikes or increased intercommunal clashes (such as in South Darfur and parts of West Kordofan), poor households will continue to rely heavily on community support and resort to severe coping strategies, including the consumption of wild foods and begging.  

Eastern Sudan

In Blue Nile State, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist between June and September in Al-Kurmuk, Geisan, Baw, At-Tadamon, Ed-Damazine, and Ar-Rusayris. Continued military offensives and counteroffensives are likely to drive further displacement, disrupt livelihoods, and constrain access to markets, agricultural activities, and basic services. Recurrent insecurity will limit the availability of and access to income-generating opportunities, forcing asset sales amid rising market prices, with the largest food consumption deficits expected among IDPs and poor households. Between October and January, Al-Kurmuk and Geisan localities in Blue Nile are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) as agricultural engagement is expected to have been considerably constrained by active conflict and increasing displacement, reducing harvest expectations. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected elsewhere in Blue Nile during the harvest period, where conflict will limit the degree of improvement in access to food and income.

In the eastern pastoral and agropastoral areas of Red Sea, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected to emerge between June and September due to long-term erosion of pastoral livelihoods linked to repeated droughts and livestock diseases and high market dependence in a remote pastoral context, driving large food consumption gaps during the lean season. From October to January, Outcomes are expected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as prices moderate with the harvest.

In the southeastern states of Al-Jazirah, Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, and Khartoum, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through September, driven by the lingering effects of clashes in 2023 and 2024, from which markets and household livelihoods have not yet fully recovered. Limited livelihood opportunities and persistently high food prices are expected to continue eroding purchasing power. While the recent winter wheat harvest in parts of Al-Jazirah likely provided temporary improvements in food availability and incomes through June, these gains are not expected to extend through the lean season as market dependence increases and seasonal food prices rise. Between October and January, outcomes are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in much of Gedaref, parts of Kassala, and some areas of Al-Jazirah and Sennar with the arrival of the 2026/27 harvest, which provides both food from own production and in-kind payments, as well as income from sales and labor opportunities. Even if the harvests are below average due to the forecasted below-average rainfall, the reduction in household food stocks will likely not be felt until later in 2027. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in the rest of these states and much of Khartoum due to slow rebuilding and recovery of livelihoods following the massive destruction of public and private infrastructure in areas that experienced direct clashes in 2023/24, as well as the impact of below-average harvests on households.

Across much of Northern and River Nile states, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September following the winter wheat and legume harvests, which provide important sources of food, income, and agricultural labor opportunities. The date palm harvest beginning in July is also expected to further support household incomes. However, IDPs from Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, including those who fled to Northern State following the fall of Al-Fasher in October 2025, will likely continue to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Most of Northern and River Nile states will also deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) between October and January as household food stocks from the wheat harvest decline and reliance on markets increases.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

The warring parties reach an agreement on a humanitarian ceasefire 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which a sustained, humanitarian-focused ceasefire – likely consisting of periodic pauses to permit food assistance deliveries – is reached, enabling relief operations and expanded commercial movement. Under this alternative scenario, changes across Sudan would likely be significant but uneven, with variations driven by geography; conflict-related impacts on public and private infrastructure; field-level compliance by subordinate armed actors given fragmented command and control structures; and duration of the pauses. In Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile, humanitarian access via the Chad, South Sudan, and Port Sudan corridors would likely improve, though both humanitarian and commercial movement would remain constrained by seasonal factors. Trade flows, market functionality, and livelihoods would be more likely to normalize gradually in the relatively stable areas of eastern and northern Sudan before more severely conflict-affected areas of Darfur, Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile, with a likely slow decline in staple food prices and gradual rebuilding of livelihoods and assets. 

Improvements in food consumption, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality would likely be determined by the scale and consistency of humanitarian assistance, which will be linked to required funding and improvement in the operational environment. If large-scale and sustained food and nutrition assistance consistently reaches the most severely conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas for a minimum of three months, then areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) would likely see improvement to area-level Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes from October to January. In calmer areas, outcomes would likely improve in many productive centers to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

Rainfall is severely below average, resulting in drought-related agricultural losses

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which projected rainfall deficits are more severe than anticipated and drought emerges. Under this alternative scenario, the overall performance of the 2026/27 agricultural season would be severely impacted across much of the rainfed agricultural systems and rangelands. Combined with the impacts of conflict on access to farms for cultivation, severely below-average rains or drought would further reduce planting, limit agricultural activities, reduce access to agricultural labor, reduce household incomes, and increase food prices, particularly among poor rainfed farming, conflict-affected, and IDP households. In pastoral and agropastoral areas, severely below-average rainfall or drought would reduce pasture regeneration and worsen livestock conditions; pasture and water availability would deteriorate even more rapidly once the rainy season ends and drives atypically early livestock migration (usually begins in November), potentially raising the risk of localized conflict over grazing land and water. Within the projection period, this scenario would reduce harvest-related improvements between October and January, driving more widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes than currently projected. However, the most severe ramifications would likely materialize later from February to May 2027, when own-produced food stocks would deplete atypically early.

Areas facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5)

North Darfur, inclusive of areas with high IDP concentrations: Escalation of conflict, intensified drone strikes and worsening of intercommunal clashes beyond the expected levels 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which severe fighting expands and is sustained in parts of North Darfur, particularly in northwest North Darfur, in a manner that prevents population movement, cuts off trade routes, and undermines support systems. Targeted attacks on civilians – particularly in areas with a high IDP population – would trigger additional displacement and further isolate populations from food, services, and livelihood activities, including cultivation. Overcrowding in areas with poor health and WASH conditions would likely worsen disease outbreaks and acute malnutrition, particularly during the rainy season. Under this scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur in northwestern North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tine) and/or in areas hosting high numbers of IDPs in central North Darfur (including rural Al-Fasher, Melit, Kutum, and Tawila). In central North Darfur, the likelihood that this scenario would materialize is relatively higher during the June to September lean season compared to the harvest period between October and January; while IDPs are less likely to directly benefit from harvests, they would indirectly benefit from increased agricultural labor income, seasonal price declines as market supply increases, and community support. However, if severe rainfall deficits cause agricultural losses, then the combination of both severe conflict and weather shocks would likely prevent the level of risk from easing during the harvest.

Dilling and Kadugli towns; Surrounding rural areas in Greater Kordofan, including the western Nuba Mountains area; and parts of central South Kordofan: resumption of the Dilling and Kadugli sieges leads to the return of severe mobility restraints in towns and the surrounding rural areas 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the sieges on Dilling and Kadugli towns would intensify and tighten more than currently expected, leading to a more severe reduction in access to farms for cultivation, reduced trade flows and humanitarian access, driving large-scale displacement, and increasingly cutting off some populations within the town from food and income sources during the peak lean season. The reinstatement of a severe siege on Dilling town would also result in spillover effects in the surrounding areas of the rural western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling, and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut). This would occur if the RSF and SPLM-N jointly intensify the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli, resulting in increased troop presence in the surrounding rural areas, particularly around Dilling and the main supply routes. This increase in conflict and insecurity would result in severe restrictions on trader, humanitarian, and population mobility in rural areas; disruptions in access to food and income sources; and likely looting of harvest, food stocks and market supplies. In this scenario, levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would escalate and likely breach the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds.

In other neighboring areas of South Kordofan, including rural Kadugli, Al-Buram, Heiban, Delami, Ar-Reif Ash Shargi, intensified sieges of Dilling and Kadugli towns and expanded drone strikes would likely drive additional displacement from the towns into rural areas, tighter movement restrictions, and more rapid depletion of food stocks and any newly available harvests. The rapid exhaustion of stocks, combined with increased conflict-driven disruptions to trade flows, humanitarian access, and population mobility, would likely lead to a high level of starvation, which would in turn drive levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality beyond the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. 

Sudan's civil war has undergone a fundamental tactical transformation since late 2025, shifting from ground-based territorial confrontations toward increasingly drone-intensive warfare. The shift is driven in part by heavy casualties from ground fighting, erosion of fighter morale, and frontline entrenchment, as well as by the increasing availability of drone technology. The incidence of ground battles declined steadily from peaks in 2023 and late 2024, while the use of drones increased to become the dominant mode of fighting in 2026 (Figure 6). From January through May 2026, Sudan recorded 522 air and drone strike incidents, a 38 percent increase compared to the same period in 2025, and the highest levels recorded since the conflict began. 

While drones are primarily used to strike supply lines and logistics nodes, they have also been deployed in tandem with ground forces to target and degrade defensive lines before major offensives, such as in Al-Fasher. ACLED recorded 27 drone strike incidents around El-Obeid in June 2026 alone – the highest monthly total since the war began – amid a major RSF force buildup around El-Obeid, indicative of the impending offensive involving coordinated air and ground capabilities.

Drone warfare has fundamentally changed the conflict's reach and humanitarian impact, with both the SAF and RSF now relying on unmanned systems to sustain pressure across vast distances where supply lines stretch for hundreds of kilometers. As frontlines have become more static, both the SAF and RSF have increasingly employed drones to project force beyond active battlefields. The May attacks on Khartoum International Airport and the Kenana industrial complex in White Nile illustrate a broader shift toward targeting infrastructure, logistics networks, and military facilities far from frontline areas. At the same time, the SAF has intensified strikes on RSF supply corridors and strongholds, while the RSF has concentrated resources on high-impact attacks against strategic targets. 

Some of the key drone attacks in May and June include: 

• Greater Darfur: Nyala of South Darfur, the headquarters of the Tasis (RSF-backed administration in Greater Darfur), remained the primary focus of SAF's aerial campaign, with strikes targeting Nyala airport, the city center, northern neighborhoods, and industrial areas in an attempt to disrupt RSF command/leadership, logistics, and storage facilities. Drone strikes targeting RSF supply lines hit the Ardamata Bridge in El-Geneina (West Darfur), an essential bridge for commercial and humanitarian flows, and Melit town (North Darfur) in an attempt to disrupt military supplies arriving from Libya and RSF preparations for a northern Sudan operation. 
• Greater Kordofan: Drone warfare intensified across North Kordofan in June, with both the RSF and SAF conducting strikes that hit civilian areas, markets, transport routes, and fuel infrastructure. From June 12-17, RSF conducted drone strikes on El-Obeid, primarily targeting fuel stations and storage facilities. Meanwhile, in South Kordofan, RSF and SPLM-N drones destroyed two bridges along the Dilling-Kadugli road, including a key crossing at Khor al-Dilib, disrupting passenger and commercial traffic and increasing access concerns ahead of the rainy season. In West Kordofan, a SAF drone strike on Ghubaysh market killed approximately 35 civilians and provoked a violent RSF response against civilians accused of providing SAF with coordinates. RSF drone strikes also targeted civilian vehicles on the Al-Fula-Abu Zabad road, increasing threats to civilian transport and supply routes linking key towns across the region.
• Blue Nile: Both RSF and SAF have employed drones amid offensives and counteroffensives aimed at securing territory ahead of the rainy season. For example, the RSF deployed drones during its late March offensive to capture Kurmuk, which displaced an estimated 73,000 people. 
• Eastern Sudan and Khartoum: RSF drone strikes in early May targeted multiple locations in Khartoum – the International Airport, Abu Alama Military Base in Um Bada, the SAF Signal Corps in Bahri, and police headquarters in Burri – as well as civilian infrastructure in White Nile, including Kenana sugar factory, Kosti fuel depots, and Rabak medical infrastructure. The coordinated attacks demonstrate RSF’s capacity to conduct long-range strikes on military, government, and civilian targets. 

Impact on food insecurity 

Increased drone use is seriously impacting household access to food and income in areas beyond the conflict frontlines. Drone strikes have repeatedly targeted markets – including those in At-Tine, Kernoi, Ghubaysh, Abu Zaima, and Nyala – killing civilians at peak trading periods and suppressing market activity. Attacks on fuel stations, storage depots, and transport infrastructure across El-Obeid, Tendalti, Kosti, and the White Nile corridor have driven fuel shortages that impact food transport, water pumping, and basic service functions. The destruction of the Ardamata Bridge in El-Geneina and two bridges along the Dilling-Kadugli road, alongside the persistent targeting of movement along main trade routes, is severely disrupting commercial and humanitarian supplies as traders and humanitarian actors face a worsening risk calculus for transport. These pressures along main trade routes are affecting food assistance delivery, reducing commodity availability, and increasing prices in already fragile markets. This comes at a time of heightened market reliance, thus contributing to driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes in affected areas. The targeting of civilian infrastructure deeper in eastern areas farther from frontlines also indicates that drone warfare is now a deliberate instrument for targeting civilian economic and humanitarian systems, rather than purely military assets.

External support and the increasing availability of drone technology is expected to proliferate the use of drones by both parties, driving a self-reinforcing dynamic: as drone capabilities expand, both parties increase their reliance on aerial strikes to compensate for the limits of ground operations and the attrition of frontline forces, while air defense investments on both sides struggle to keep pace. As both sides continue to adapt their tactics and supply networks, drone warfare is likely to remain a key feature of the conflict through the remainder of 2026, particularly during the rainy season when ground operations are typically more constrained. 

Sudan’s agricultural production has been deeply disrupted by over three years of war, and the country is likely to face a fourth year of severe conflict-related production constraints exacerbated by below-average rainfall in 2026/27. According to trend analysis, Sudan’s 2025/26 cereal production was 22 percent below last year’s, 27 percent lower than 2022/23 (pre-war), and 25 percent lower than the pre-war five-year average (2018/19-2022/23). Declines in production were sustained for both sorghum and millet in rainfed systems, underscoring the combined impact of conflict, reduced access to fields, input shortages, lack of access to agricultural financing, disruptions to harvesting, and inflation. Key cash crop production of sesame and groundnuts also declined sharply (48 and 55 percent below the pre-war five-year average, respectively), resulting in further income losses for many agricultural households. The conflict has been the overarching driver behind declining production, with impacts on:

• Access to farms: Conflict, insecurity, and displacement continue to significantly constrain farmers' access to fields, affecting their ability to prepare land, plant, and engage in cultivation, particularly in North Darfur; in parts of South Darfur where intercommunal clashes are occurring; along major conflict frontlines in North and South Kordofan; in insecure areas of West Kordofan such as Al-Khiwai and Al-Nuhud; and in conflict-affected areas of Blue Nile. In the southeastern states of Al-Jazirah, Sennar, and Gedaref, improved security relative to the last two years has allowed some farmers to return to previously abandoned areas in semi-mechanized and irrigated schemes. 
• Agricultural finance and credit: Credit from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) remains severely constrained. In 2025, no loans were provided in Darfur, Kordofan, Al-Jazirah, or the Northern states. The total USD value of ABS agricultural finance in 2025 was reportedly only 21 percent of pre-conflict (2022) levels. Most smallholder farmers, who rely on self-financing, are especially disadvantaged, particularly amid soaring input and fuel costs in the absence of financing and during a continuing cash liquidity crisis. While ABS has initiated talks with regional and international finance institutions in a bid to secure more funding for the 2026/27 summer season, access to credit is likely to still be far below needs. 
• Agricultural inputs: Availability of agricultural inputs remains highly constrained and uneven due to conflict, macroeconomic instability, and market disruption, with persistently high costs worsened by shortages and high fuel prices. Major irrigation schemes – historically key to cereal production – suffer from aging infrastructure worsened by war, including damaged canals, pump failures, and pest infestations. In semi-mechanized areas, machinery is scarce or unavailable due to damage, looting, and high fuel costs. While agricultural labor supply is broadly adequate nationally – partly due to IDP-driven workforce growth – declining cultivation and rising labor costs are constraining hiring. Labor shortages during peak-demand periods are still expected where conflict restricts seasonal migration and where youth are increasingly drawn to alternatives like gold mining over farm labor.

Amid these constraints, historical patterns of deficit versus surplus production have become more deeply pronounced. FEWS NET analyzed the gap in estimated cereal availability in kilocalories, representing the difference between net production¹ and estimated population consumption needs for the 2025/26 agricultural season.² The purpose of this trend analysis is to illustrate the potential scale of the gap; however, it is important to note that it does not take into account informal cross-border flows, shifts in consumption patterns, or adjustments in other uses, such as increased seed consumption (with significant implications for the next agricultural season) and reductions in animal feed (to increase available cereals for human consumption). This analysis is also not a direct measure of household access to food or acute food insecurity outcomes, as it does not account for market access, purchasing power, commercial imports, carryover stocks, or the ability of trade flows to move cereals from surplus- to deficit-producing areas. 

To identify states that typically have a cereal surplus or cereal deficit, FEWS NET calculated and compared average state-level cereal production from 2018-2022 CFSAM reports with estimated cereal requirements (Figure 7). The same comparison using 2025/26 CFSAM production estimates show a sharp deterioration last year: many central and western states that were previously typically surplus-producing are facing large domestic cereal deficits in advance of the 2026/27 harvests (Figure 8). The analysis confirms the scale of disruption to production and early exhaustion of stocks in early 2026, leading to escalating dependence on fragile markets amid limited purchasing capacity.

Weather shocks were notably not a major contributor to the below-average production in 2025/26 but are likely to compound production challenges this year (2026/27). Reasonably well-distributed (if below-average) rainfall and limited pest damage likely prevented an even steeper decline in production in 2025/26 when compared to previous years. However, this year, expected below-average rainfall associated with El Niño conditions is expected to further reduce production potential this year, even though the historical relationship between El Niño and crop yield losses has been less consistent. Anticipated above-average temperatures will likely compound yield losses by increasing evaporation and moisture stress for crops and rangelands for livestock.

Each El Niño weather pattern varies, and the current rainfall pattern is showing similarities to the 1997 and 2023 El Niño years. While those years were associated with rainfall deficits in several parts of the Greater Horn of Africa, the pattern is not clear for Sudan, highlighting the low teleconnection³ between El Niño and rainfall performance in Sudan. For example, in 1997, rainfall was broadly above average over Sudan’s agricultural areas with localized areas of below average rainfall; in contrast, 2023 showed broader areas of modest deficits in the southeast, ranging from 70 to 95 percent of normal, yet rainfall was average to above average across the west. While forecast ensemble models for 2026 rainfall do not align (Figures 9 and 10), the most likely scenario this year is below-average rainfall accumulation, with a higher probability of below-average rainfall in southern and western regions of Kordofan, White Nile, Blue Nile, and southern parts of Greater Darfur. Parts of northern Sudan may still receive near-normal or locally above-normal rainfall.

Impact on food insecurity 

Below-average rainfall is likely to compound conflict-driven declines in production and reductions in access to pasture and water, with the most pronounced impacts expected in western Sudan. In the most heavily conflict-affected areas of North Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan, agricultural production is already expected to be severely disrupted by conflict and displacement, with many households unable to engage in cultivation. As a result, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected even during the harvesting period. In addition to local losses, reduced production in neighboring areas will accelerate the exhaustion of household stocks as harvests are shared with displaced households and relatives. At the same time, below-average production is also likely to sustain extremely high market prices when they would otherwise typically decline or at least stabilize. Meanwhile, pasture and water resources are expected to deteriorate atypically quickly, leading to poorer livestock body conditions, decreased birth rates and milk productivity, increased feed costs, and atypically early migration. This will reduce household access to livestock products and herding income atypically early. 

Areas experiencing relative calm are expected to see less severe agricultural losses. While harvests will still be below average due to weather and other factors, there will be a lag in the impact on acute food insecurity outcomes, with an atypically early depletion of household stocks expected to occur between February and May 2027. The availability of harvests during the main harvest period (November-January) is expected to improve acute food insecurity outcomes to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in many of the more productive areas of Gedaref, Al-Jazirah, and Sennar.