Famine thresholds no longer met, but credible risk of Famine persists in parts of Sudan

• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are ongoing in key hotspot areas, following shifts in conflict dynamics in early 2026 that have relatively reduced the likelihood of Famine (IPC Phase 5). The areas of highest concern include parts of South Kordofan (Dilling, Kadugli, and surrounding western Nuba Mountains), North Darfur (northwestern localities of Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tine), and North Kordofan (in El-Obeid town and surrounding rural areas). Conflict and high levels of displacement continue to drive severe hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality in the post-harvest period. At the peak of the lean season, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated to expand further across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, as well as in Blue Nile. FEWS NET estimates that up to 22.0-22.99 million people will need humanitarian food assistance.   
• In Kadugli and Dilling towns of South Kordofan, the shift from an assessment of Famine Possible (IPC Phase 5) to that of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) reflects that the technical thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are no longer being met or expected to be met in the most likely scenario, rather than a more substantive improvement in food security conditions. The change is driven by several factors: the scale of deaths that likely occurred under the extreme siege conditions between mid-2025 and January 2026; large-scale displacement out of the towns; the breaking of the sieges in late January and early February that facilitated the arrival of market and humanitarian supplies; and the expectation that the reestablishment of siege conditions will not escalate to the same intensity as in 2025.
• The scale of hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality is still expected to remain high in Kadugli, Dilling, and the surrounding western Nuba Mountains area, sustaining a credible risk of renewed Famine (IPC Phase 5). If the areas again become completely besieged such that remaining households are isolated from food including humanitarian assistance, then it is likely the thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) would again be crossed. There is also a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, At-Tine, rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila); and areas with high concentrations of displaced people in South Darfur and South Kordofan; and El-Obeid. If conflict frontlines cut off trade and humanitarian access, population mobility, and access to minimally available food, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 28, 2025. 

The nearly three-year war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no sign of abating despite recent shifts in conflict frontlines and tactics. Since early 2026, SAF has consolidated control over most of eastern and central Sudan, including Khartoum and Al-Jazirah, shifting the conflict frontlines west to Greater Kordofan. Fighting intensified over logistically and economically important towns and routes, including Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan, El-Obeid of North Kordofan, and Heglig oil fields in West Kordofan near the border with South Sudan. RSF, jointly with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), intensified the siege of Kadugli and Dilling towns, leading to confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in September 2025 in Kadugli, and possibly in Dilling. Meanwhile, the siege of Al-Fasher (North Darfur) culminated in the confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in September, the subsequent brutal RSF takeover, and the flight of tens of thousands of acutely food-insecure and malnourished people across parts of North Darfur and further to eastern Sudan and Chad. 

The politicization of the war along ethnic and tribal lines remains a dominant undertone. The RSF draws strong support mainly from Arab tribes and allied Arab militias, with an alliance formed in February 2025 with the SPLM-N Al-Hilu faction present in South Kordofan. The SAF draws support from the Darfur Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movement (JSAMF) and the armed civilian resistance. The war has been characterized by widespread sexual-based violence, targeting and massacres of civilians, and pervasive looting of public and private assets. Several attacks (like in West Darfur in 2024, Zamzam camp in April 2025, and Al-Fasher town in October 2025) are reminiscent of the genocide in Darfur 20 years ago. Increasingly, the use of drones has also become a defining feature, further constraining humanitarian access amid escalating risks. While relative calm in the east of Sudan has facilitated the return of over 3.7 million households to their homes, an estimated 9.1 million people remain internally displaced. 

Theconflict continues to profoundly impact all aspects of livelihoods in Sudan. The destruction of and disruption to critical infrastructure and industrial capacity; damage to major oil fields and fuel refineries; flight of the private sector; and disruption to import-export activities, supply chains, and finance sectors have all led to severe economic contraction on top of years of macroeconomic decline. Inflation exceeds 60 percent while the SDG continues to depreciate sharply to 3,575 SDG/USD, 34 and 495 percent weaker than 2025 and before the conflict, respectively. The healthcare system has all but collapsed amid the targeting of health facilities, and communicable diseases continue to surge. Extensive looting of private assets – another persistent characteristic of the conflict – combined with loss of jobs and income sources, has driven widespread impoverishment. Markets are recurrently looted and damaged, and trade routes remain heavily contested, disrupting commercial and humanitarian access. This is sustaining high and volatile food prices in 2026, expected to worsen in the approaching 2026 lean season (June-September).  

Between February and May, households in rain-fed semi-mechanized and traditional agricultural areas typically begin to see household food stocks decline and reliance on markets increase. This year, however, stocks will decline or be fully depleted atypically early, particularly in directly conflict-affected areas of Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur. Similarly, market stocks will also seasonally tighten, and prices will rise, peaking during the June-September lean season. In irrigated areas (Al-Jazirah, Kassala, River Nile, Northern), households are engaged in irrigated wheat cultivation, with harvesting expected in March/April. Between June and September, the upcoming main rainy season would typically involve land cultivation and planting in June and July; Agricultural labor opportunities in the irrigated and semi-mechanized areas of the southeast typically provide important income during the lean season. However, variable levels of conflict and insecurity are expected to interfere with household access to farms and these key sources of food and income. In addition, consecutive years of lack of access to credit and critical inputs are expected to reduce the cultivation and yields of those who do manage to farm. 

In agropastoral and pastoral areas, livestock are expected to be in southern dry season grazing areas through May, returning to wet season grazing areas with the start of the main rainy season from June to September. However, ongoing insecurity will continue to disrupt migration and constrain access to critical pasture and water resources. In addition, the conflict has led to a steep decline in livestock ownership among the poor and displaced, which has in turn reduced access to milk and income from livestock sales. Furthermore, high food and non-food prices have prompted herders to sell livestock at faster rates than average to earn the income needed to allow them to purchase food. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Levels of conflict remain high across Greater Kordofan and northwestern North Darfur, while conflict has emerged in Blue Nile. In South Kordofan, a SAF counter-offensive traveling along rural roads on light vehicles from the east succeeded in recapturing the town of Habila and broke the siege of Dilling on January 26, before continuing on to break the siege of Kadugli on February 3. The breakthroughs have reportedly enabled the arrival of commercial supplies and a humanitarian convoy on February 18, though it remains unclear how long access will be maintained. The supplies are arriving via smaller unpaved mountain roads as the main route from El-Obeid to Dilling remains heavily contested. Direct clashes have decreased in the area, with reports of reduced troop presence in February. However, drone attacks have escalated, hitting infrastructure including schools and UN facilities, causing dozens of civilian deaths and injuries (Figure 1). 

North Kordofan remains a major hotspot: since late 2025, both SAF and RSF have reinforced strategic positions in and around the capital El-Obeid. Key towns including Bara, Kazgeil, Um Dam Haj Ahmed, and parts of Ar-Rahad have repeatedly changed hands as both sides contest control of strategic corridors. RSF attempts to cut the Kosti-Ar-Rahad and Ar-Rahad-El-Obeid roads have involved drone strikes on military and civilian targets, including markets, mosques, commercial traffic, and humanitarian convoys. SAF has launched intermittent offensives toward Bara and Um Rawaba while expanding defensive works, reportedly digging ditches around El-Obeid, Ar-Rahad, Um Rawaba, Tendelit, and Kosti. Fears of siege tactics have prompted some residents to flee El-Obeid toward White Nile, even as thousands continue to arrive from surrounding areas of North and South Kordofan, seeking relative safety. Satellite analysis by the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) identified nearly 800 new temporary structures for internally displaced persons (IDPs) at a camp inside El-Obeid on January 2-14, 2026, underscoring mounting displacement pressures.

In North Darfur, conflict and insecurity have continued in Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine in the northwest. RSF is pursuing SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces, engaging in direct clashes, burning villages, looting property, and killing civilians. As part of its broader operations to pressure army-aligned forces, RSF carried out multiple recent drone strikes affecting areas including local markets, civilian areas, and commercial vehicles. Recent clashes at At-Tine crossed over into Chad, prompting the Chadian government to close several border crossings to commercial flows on February 22, though humanitarian movements via Adré are continuing. Meanwhile, in other parts of South Darfur and West Darfur, SAF has continued its drone campaign to disrupt RSF supply lines and logistical hubs, including Nyala airport and along the Chad border.   

In early 2026, the Blue Nile State emerged as a new active front in the war. The shift followed a late-January offensive by the RSF and SPLM-N in Bau and Al-Kurmuk localities, entering via South Sudan, though they were reportedly repelled by the SAF. Throughout February, sustained ground fighting, drone strikes, and troop buildups along the South Sudan and Ethiopian borders underscored the strategic importance of the frontier and growing use of aerial warfare. The violence has triggered new waves of internal displacement from rural conflict zones within Blue Nile to towns perceived as safer, including Ad-Damazine.  

Displacement remains extremely high, with over 9.1 million people internally displaced and 4.5 million displaced to neighboring countries. The return of 3.7 million people since November 2024 – primarily to parts of eastern Sudan – has driven a decline of 21 percent in the total IDP population from its wartime peak. Most returnees (83 percent) came from other parts of Sudan and are gradually resuming livelihoods. However, recovery is constrained by widespread asset loss, damage to public and private infrastructure, and weakened public services. Escalating conflict in Greater Kordofan and northwestern North Darfur, however, continues to cause new displacement. Between late October and early February, 115,223 people fled violence in Kordofan, primarily to North Kordofan, White Nile, and South Kordofan. In West Kordofan, some households are reportedly returning to Babanusa town after the prolonged siege, but face severe water shortages, a collapsed health system, and risk from unexploded ordnance. In North Darfur, continued insecurity is driving new displacements alongside re-displacement of many of the 127,162 people who were uprooted from Al-Fasher since October 2025, with many fleeing to Chad. Over 33,500 people have crossed into Chad since October, with 10,555 arriving since January. 

Sudan is facing simultaneous epidemics, driven by conflict, displacement, and systemic service breakdowns. In early 2026, WHO reported over 20 million people in need of health assistance, with cholera, malaria, and dengue outbreaks spreading across all 18 states amid collapsed health, water, and sanitation systems. The deterioration in health conditions, particularly in overcrowded camps, is driving increased morbidity and contributing to high levels of acute malnutrition among children, who are more vulnerable to the adverse physiological effects of hunger when sick. Most recently, suspected measles cases in Central Darfur surged, peaking at 317 in January and continuing into early February, with 303 cases reported in Golo and Um Dukhun localities.

Trade routes and market functionality in Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur continue to be disrupted by conflict and movement restrictions, while eastern Sudan has seen considerable improvement (Figure 1). In Greater Kordofan, the breaking of the Dilling and Kadugli sieges marked a significant, albeit likely temporary, improvement: prices dropped sharply in February for the first time in months. In Dilling, sorghum prices fell from highs of 800,000-900,000 SDG to 40,000 SDG per 90-kilogram (kg) sack, sugar fell from 16,000 to 3,000 SDG/kg, and flour dropped from 80,000 to 6,000 SDG/kg. Kadugli recorded similar declines in February following large-scale supply arrivals. However, these price declines do not necessarily signal substantial improvement in household food access, as many households lost income sources and productive assets during the prolonged sieges and exodus from the towns. While key informants reported fewer checkpoints along rural routes through South Kordofan, drone attacks present a continued threat to city access routes, as seen by the attack on the UN convoy in late February, and routes are expected to remain contested. In addition to conflict and insecurity, trade flows from eastern and northern Sudan into Greater Kordofan remain disrupted by the December 2025 SAF trade ban. The ban has contributed to increased prices in many West Kordofan markets, despite the relative calm at present. In Greater Darfur, markets are functioning relatively better than in parts of the Kordofans, though the market system overall remains highly fragile and volatile, undermined by insecurity, informal taxation at checkpoints, the functional collapse of the banking system and subsequent ongoing liquidity cash crisis, and movement restrictions. 

Unaffordability remains a critical barrier to food access, particularly in Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur. In January, millet and sorghum prices were 275-300 percent higher than the same time before the war (January 2023), although remaining relatively stable in recent months due to the harvest and slight improvements in production compared to last year. Wheat flour prices rose considerably in January compared to December due to declining supply and rising demand during Ramadan and were on average 400 percent higher than the same time pre-war. In the most conflict-affected areas, prices remain highly volatile month-on-month, reflecting continued access constraints and supply chain disruptions. The combination of fragile macroeconomic conditions, conflict-driven market disruptions, and uneven price corrections underscore the fragility of Sudan’s markets.

While no comprehensive official data are yet available for Sudan’s 2025/26 agricultural production, available evidence suggests overall output from the main season (harvested between November 2025 and January 2026) remained below pre-war levels for the third year in a row. However, there are sharp regional variations in harvest outcomes. Areas that experienced the heaviest fighting during the current agricultural season – including parts of North Darfur and Greater Kordofan – are likely to have harvested substantially less than normal, with the worst-affected areas producing only marginal harvests and leaving households with little to no food stocks in February. In less directly affected areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, insecurity-related constraints such as restricted access to fields and abandonment of fields during the production and harvesting periods; crop damage due to livestock trampling amid weakened local governance structures; and the theft of assets and harvest stocks also resulted in below-average production. In the relatively calmer areas of eastern Sudan, including rainfed, semi-mechanized, and irrigated production areas, harvests are estimated to be better than last year but still below normal, driven by widespread damage to agricultural infrastructure, limited physical and financial access to agricultural inputs, and the loss of productive assets, and slow recovery of the agricultural sector. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian access remains limited by ongoing conflict and insecurity, logistical and bureaucratic obstacles, and persistent funding shortfalls. WFP reached 3.2 million people with food or cash assistance in January 2026 (less than 20 percent of the estimated population in need). While this represents an increase from the 3 million reached between November and December 2025, it is still lower than September (a peak of 3.7 million people reached). Roughly half of the beneficiaries reached were in Greater Darfur, 40 percent in eastern and central Sudan, and less than 10 percent in Greater Kordofan, highlighting the continued challenges in accessing these volatile areas. Assistance modality also differed by region, with 60-75 percent of beneficiaries in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan receiving in-kind rations meeting 70 percent of daily kilocalorie needs, while 60 percent of beneficiaries in eastern and central Sudan received cash. 

While comprehensive distribution data is not yet available for February, important breakthroughs were achieved in reaching the towns of Dilling and Kadugli. Reportedly, some limited distributions occurred in January and 700 metric tons for nearly 70,000 people arrived on February 20. However, no food assistance has reached the areas of northwest North Darfur, though humanitarians are scaling up the nutrition response plan to address the extremely high levels of acute malnutrition.  

Areas of highest concern

Widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are ongoing in February, the typical post-harvest period, in all of the areas of highest concern in Sudan: Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine (northwestern North Darfur); Dilling and Kadugli towns (South Kordofan); and in the surrounding rural areas of the western Nuba Mountains (South Kordofan).

In northwestern North Darfur, conflict and displacement continue to severely disrupt household access to food and income. The area represents a key corridor for displaced populations fleeing Al-Fasher as clashes continue in the area. SMART surveys conducted in Um Baru and Kernoi in December found extremely high acute malnutrition of 53 and 34 percent global acute malnutrition as measured by weight-for-heigh z-score (GAM-WHZ), respectively, while GAM as measured by mid-upper arm circumference (GAM-MUAC) were at 16.3 and 18.6 percent, respectively. These levels of acute malnutrition surpassed the Famine (IPC Phase 5 threshold quite substantially based on the WHZ indicator (≥30 percent), and more moderately based on the MUAC indicator (≥15 percent); however, levels of non-trauma mortality across the population were comparatively lower, ranging from 0.58 to 1.05 deaths per 10,000 people per day, while under-five mortality rates were 0.21 and 0.35 deaths per 10,000 children per day, respectively.¹ Subsequently, a food security and nutrition assessment was conducted among displaced populations in Um Baru and At-Tine and found 28-38 percent were experiencing moderate levels of hunger, with high engagement in food consumption coping strategies, such as reducing portion sizes and meals; at the time, these levels were indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3). A subsequent rapid assessment in Um Baru further corroborated reduction in meals with low dietary diversity and an increasing reliance on community support and foraging.

As of February, access to food in northwestern Darfur is expected to have deteriorated amid ongoing insecurity, likely resulting in deepening food consumption deficits, in line with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes area-level outcomes, with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Acute malnutrition likely remains exceedingly high due to a combination of an elevated disease burden, food consumption deficits, and inadequate health, nutrition, and sanitation services. However, available displacement data, corroborated by key informants and partners on the ground, indicate elevated population movement to other areas of Greater Darfur and Chad. Meanwhile, health and nutrition services are being scaled up – UNICEF reported that five new nutrition programs were opened as well as four new primary health facilities in Um Baru and Kernoi, though provision of supplies is constrained by the insecurity. The combination of highly volatile population movement and increasing services suggests the concentration of hunger-related mortality resulting from acute malnutrition remains below the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold.

In Dilling and Kadugli towns of South Kordofan, the shift from the assessment of Famine (IPC Phase 5) Possible to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in February reflects that the technical thresholds that define Famine (IPC Phase 5) are no longer met. Newly available data collected in January by an anonymous NGO among populations that had fled Kadugli and Dilling towns between November and January found levels of hunger have fallen far below the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. Thirty-two percent of households reported severe hunger (associated with Emergency [IPC Phase 4]) and 6 percent reported extreme hunger (associated with Catastrophe [IPC Phase 5]). Acute malnutrition among children under five had also fallen to 15 percent (GAM-WHZ), below the ≥30 percent WHZ threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5). However, this does not necessarily imply substantive recovery. Rather, it reflects the effects of prior widespread mortality, large-scale displacement out of the towns and ongoing fluidity of population movement, and short-term fluctuations in access to food, including community assistance and limited food assistance in areas of reception (Annex 5). 

In the context of the severe sieges of both towns since mid-2025 and the confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Kadugli in September 2025, it is highly likely that Famine, by definition, had already resulted in widespread death before January. When a large share of the population has died, observed mortality rates may subsequently decline. At the same time, large-scale displacement out of the towns has occurred over the course of the siege, altering the demographic composition of those remaining behind. Families reportedly split and men remained behind due to the threat of being killed or forcibly recruited into armed groups if caught fleeing the towns. Among the IDP households surveyed in January, the vast majority (80 percent) of households were comprised of women and children only. The relative reduction of ground troop presence following the break in the siege conditions in February also enabled additional displacement out of the towns, continuing the notable, ongoing demographic shift within the towns.

Access to assistance is likely also playing a role. According to the January survey, one-third of the households that had fled the town reported they had received food assistance, and 20 percent of children were enrolled in a nutrition program. Access to assistance as well as to community support among those who fled has likely contributed to mitigating the severity of outcomes among displaced populations near the towns. Within the towns, the breaking of the sieges has also facilitated the arrival of commercial and humanitarian supplies in February, providing relief to the towns’ residents.

As a result of the reduced ground troop presence, easing of mobility restrictions, and increase in flow of goods, households are also experiencing relatively improved access to food and income sources in the surrounding western Nuba Mountains area (to which many residents of Dilling and Kadugli have fled), though some populations are expected to remain in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Preliminary data collected in the area suggest little to no extreme hunger ongoing in accessible areas, though data collection likely did not reach the most insecure and remote areas.

Other areas of Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expanding in the surrounding areas of SPLM-N-controlled South Kordofan. These areas have received large numbers of IDPs, some of whom are experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). These displaced populations are relying heavily on limited humanitarian assistance and community support during the post-harvest period amid likely early depletion of food stocks following below-average production. In North Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing, with pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) due to the partial besiegement of El-Obeid, the continuation of clashes and drone strikes in surrounding areas, and high levels of displacement. Humanitarian and commercial access remains disrupted, and food prices are very high, limiting food access. 

Across the rest of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, including parts of West Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and elevated levels of acute malnutrition persist in conflict-affected or insecure areas – particularly in parts of South, North, and Central Darfur; the northern parts of West Kordofan; and Bara, Gebrat el-Sheikh Gharb Bara, Um Dam Haj Ahmed, and parts of Ar-Rahad localities in North Kordofan – due to continued displacement, limited access to own-produced food stocks, and disruption to humanitarian assistance. Two recent SMART surveys from West Kordofan conducted in December 2025 found global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above the Critical threshold (15 percent): Meriam (20.6 percent) and Muglad (21.2 percent). 

In the relatively calm areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, outcomes have likely improved to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during the post-harvest period. Households have own-produced food stocks and access to limited in-kind and cash payments from agricultural labor, while the relative, seasonal improvement in market supplies has stabilized cereal prices, though prices remain significantly above the five-year average. In addition, humanitarian food assistance in parts of South Darfur (As-Sunta and Buram localities and in IDP camps in Beliel) is sufficiently at scale such that is likely preventing worse acute food insecurity outcomes. 

Eastern Sudan

The return of relative calm since March 2025 to much of the southeast, northeast, and Khartoum is likely sustaining Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in most of eastern Sudan. Localized Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely ongoing in the more productive and less directly conflict-affected areas of Gedaref. While livelihood, market, and trade systems are recovering amid the return of over 3 million people to their places of origin, the scale of conflict, looting, destruction, and displacement that occurred in Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, White Nile, and Sennar will continue to temper the pace of recovery. Most poor households continue to face constrained access to income and food amid limited income-earning opportunities, high food and non-food prices, and low purchasing power. In parts of Northern State, the high IDP presence and increased influx of new IDPs following the deterioration of the situation in North Darfur and North Kordofan are straining already limited basic service availability. 

• Despite ongoing regional and international attempts at peace talks, conflict between the different actors (SAF, RSF, SPLM-N, and various allied armed groups) is expected to continue as the groups remain unwilling to negotiate amid perceptions of shifting military strengths and weaknesses. SAF will continue to build on gains in the east and southeast, while seeking to repel the Blue Nile offensive; RSF will seek to further consolidate control in Greater Darfur, focusing on northwestern areas of North Darfur. All main parties (SAF, RSF, SPLM-N) will continue to fight for control of critical towns, routes and supply corridors in Greater Kordofan, which will remain the dominant conflict frontline in 2026. Heightened drone warfare is expected to remain a key characteristic of the war in 2026.
  • Greater Darfur: Fighting is expected to continue in northwest North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine) in the near term, with RSF gradually consolidating control in the medium term (by September 2026). In West and South Darfur, intercommunal conflict and targeting minorities is expected to continue, as well as an increase in criminality as traditional communal governance structures fray and break down.   
  • Greater Kordofan: Greater Kordofan is expected to remain the epicenter of conflict activity through the projection period, with the SAF and the RSF concentrating manpower and weaponry on North and South Kordofan. Contestation of the main towns (Dilling, Kadugli, and El-Obeid) is expected to persist through September, given their strategic importance, with increased reliance on aerial bombardments. RSF is expected to reimpose the sieges on Dilling and Kadugli, though the intensity of the sieges is not expected to reach the same severity as before, based on expectations of reduced participation from SPLM-N forces and increased presence of SAF. El-Obeid is also expected to remain partially besieged throughout the projection period, with intermittent blockades restricting trade and movement.
  • Blue Nile: Blue Nile is expected to remain an active front, with RSF/SPLM-N expected to launch further attacks. The RSF will likely try to seize control of the Al-Kurmuk border crossing to facilitate supply lines from the bases in Ethiopia.
• Displacement and re-displacements are expected to continue, particularly in North Darfur and Greater Kordofan, driven by continued conflict and by the advance of an anticipated early start to the lean season in April 2026. In Greater Darfur, displacement is expected to be highest in North Darfur as populations continue to flee from the fall of Al-Fasher in late October, combined with RSF offensives in northwestern North Darfur (Dar Zaghawa). Populations are likely to flee to rural areas and across the border to Chad. In Greater Kordofan, displacement is expected to be highest in South and North Kordofan. Those fleeing attacks in rural areas around El-Obeid are likely to continue fleeing into El-Obeid city or to White Nile, Khartoum, and Northern states. In South Kordofan, populations fleeing clashes in and around Dilling and Kadugli are likely to flee deeper into SPLM-N (al-Hilu) controlled areas in South Kordofan or outward to White Nile, Khartoum, or South Sudan. In Blue Nile, the population is likely to continue fleeing from rural conflict zones to main towns.
• Returns to parts of eastern Sudan are expected to continue to accelerate, as the SAF is expected to maintain control in parts of the east and southeast (Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, Sennar, White Nile). The International Organization for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM) projects that returnees could reach over 6 million in 2026.
• Sudan’s economy will remain in deep crisis, driven by ongoing conflict, institutional collapse, and severe market disruptions. Conflict, economic fragmentation, and poor policies are expected to limit the potential of export earnings. GDP is expected to further decline, though the projected increase in global gold price is expected to slightly improve foreign reserves in Sudan after record earnings of 1.8 billion USD from exports in 2025 (equivalent to 8 percent of all external debt). Consumer price index is expected to be below last year but remain high at over 60 percent, and the SDG is expected to further depreciate (more than 500 percent above pre-conflict levels).
• Overall, the national cereal production in the 2025/26 season (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is expected to remain below the five-year average. The main season harvests (November 2025-January 2026) are likely to see localized variations depending on the extent of exposure to direct conflict. This year’s wheat harvest (March-April 2026) is expected to be below average but substantially higher than that of last year due to the large number of returnees and sustained relative calm (Figure 2). However, shortages and high costs of agricultural inputs and limited access to agricultural finance are likely to negatively affect yields in the main wheat-producing centers in Al-Jazirah, Kassala, River Nile, and Northern states.

• Domestic cereal supply: Given the below-average production estimates for the ongoing 2025/26 main agricultural season, combined with the widespread looting and destruction of markets, shops and storage facilities in in key producing areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan recently affected by direct clashes, the domestic cereal supply is expected to be below average during the immediate post-harvest period (February-March 2026) and significantly below-average during the lean season (April-September 2026). Continued siege-like conditions and recurrent attacks on major urban centers – including El-Obeid, Al-Nuhood, Kadugli, Dilling, and Habila, which host key crop auctions, cereal markets, and storage facilities – are expected to increase post-harvest losses and further reduce households and market-level cereal availability. Elevated insecurity and heightened risk of looting across different parts of the country are likely to prompt traders and large-scale farmers to sell stock atypically early. In parallel, the continued local currency depreciation is expected to incentivize atypically high informal cross-border flows to South Sudan, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, further reducing national-level stocks and constraining local supply.
• Import requirements for the 2025/26 consumption year, particularly for wheat, are expected to be higher than typical due to the anticipated below-average production for the third consecutive season. However, Sudan’s ability to import wheat will continue to face challenges through 2026 due to the conflict, shortages of foreign exchange reserves at the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS), and ongoing local currency depreciation, which is limiting the government and private sector’s ability to import.
• Trade flows and market functionality are expected to remain disrupted, particularly in areas of active conflict where armed groups are actively seeking to control main trade routes in their bid to expand their territorial control. Most routes through Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan will likely face continued high levels of insecurity and proliferation of checkpoints. Routes in and out of Dilling and Kadugli are expected to remain contested, limiting commercial and humanitarian assistance flows. Routes linking North Kordofan to White Nile State will remain highly disrupted due to the active conflict and continued siege-like conditions.
• Food prices are anticipated to remain significantly above average throughout the projection period due to the expected scale of disruption to overall production, trade flows, markets, import constraints, as well as the macroeconomic contraction. Prices are expected to remain at atypically high levels during the post-harvest period between February and March as the projected below-average harvests will likely prevent any substantial seasonal decreases. Prices will likely resume rapid increases with the beginning of the anticipated atypically early lean season by April, with prices expected to remain significantly above last year and the five-year average. In areas with severe fighting and continued siege-like conditions, prices are not expected to decline seasonally and will remain highly volatile.
• Seasonal livestock migration is likely to continue to be disrupted by conflict and insecurity, informal taxation by armed groups, increased intercommunal clashes, and widespread insecurity across most of the major animal migratory routes. Many herders are forced to change their traditional migration patterns due to the blockage of major migration routes. Atypical concentrations of livestock will likely congregate in the relatively calm areas of Al-Butana grazing areas in Gedaref and Kassala states, Al-Baja grazing areas between White Nile and North Kordofan states, and some relatively calm areas in Blue Nile states. Instead of the typical north-south seasonal movements, most herds from Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan will change their movement direction east-west, continuing to cross the border into South Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR).
  • In the more pastoral areas of northwestern Darfur where conflict and insecurity have intensified, livestock owners are likely to have taken their herds far from towns into rural mountainous areas and/or across borders into Chad, where access to adequate grazing and water and veterinary services is likely limited.
  • Absence of adequate routine vaccination coverage will likely continue in the conflict-affected areas of Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile due to the severely disrupted animal health care and collapse of the disease surveillance and vaccination system. Livestock diseases are expected in areas with high animal concentrations, particularly during the rainy season, due to the lack of sufficient veterinary health services
• Livestock prices are anticipated to experience extreme volatility and significant variations across different markets, depending on conflict impacts on market functionality and the livestock supply chain. Livestock prices are likely to atypically decrease across severely conflict-affected areas: pastoralists are likely to engage in distress sales amid elevated need for purchased food at significantly above-average prices, reduced access to grazing areas, continued livestock supply chain disruptions, and reduced access to consumption markets. Prices are anticipated to increase and remain relatively high in the main consumption markets of the relatively calm urban areas due to reduced supply from the main producing areas, high transportation costs, and high informal fees along primary and secondary trade routes.
• Other key household income sources are expected to remain atypically low amid the scale of destruction, economic contraction, and persistent insecurity limiting household mobility. In relatively secure rural areas, poor households are likely to increase their dependence on remittances, bush product sales, and migration for non-agricultural unskilled labor opportunities, such as informal labor in artisanal mining sites and in safer towns, particularly between March and May, amid an anticipated early start to the lean season in April.
• The June to September 2026 main rainy season is expected to be average.
• Disease prevalence is expected to increase with the start of the rainy season (June-September) amid extremely poor water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health conditions, particularly in overcrowded areas and besieged towns. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• Updated distribution plans for humanitarian food assistance deliveries are unavailable to FEWS NET. However, WFP is expected to continue providing in-kind assistance to some displaced populations in severely conflict-affected areas despite worsening funding constraints, prioritizing areas that were either classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5) or facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Greater Kordofan and Greater Darfur, as well as localities with a high share of IDPs. In areas of east Sudan that are receiving high numbers of IDPs, such as in Northern and White Nile states, some limited in-kind assistance is expected to continue, while cash assistance is likely to be scaled up. In select areas where WFP has been able to consistently provide assistance in recent months and where conflict dynamics are not expected to shift (As Sunta, Buram, and Al Radoum localities, as well as in Beliel camp of South Darfur), FEWS NET assumes that levels of food assistance will be sustained in the near-term before the rainy season and reach at least 25 percent of the population with at least a 25 percent ration.
• In the medium term from June to September, levels of assistance are not expected to be significant (i.e., reaching over 25 percent of the population with at least a 25 percent ration) in any locality. This assumption is underpinned by anticipated seasonal and conflict-driven access constraints to areas of highest concern, the fluidity of displacement, and inadequate funds compared to the high scale of need.
• Humanitarian access is expected to remain volatile and highly dynamic. Active fighting and intermittent blockades of major trade routes will restrict deliveries in the most severely affected parts of Greater Kordofan and North Darfur. In Blue Nile, clashes and cross-border tensions will continue to impede operations. In the medium term (June-September), the rainy season deterioration will further exacerbate conflict-driven constraints, particularly in the more remote and rural areas with few if any tarmac or gravel roads.
• The Adré border crossing between Chad and West Darfur, a critical corridor for assistance to Greater Darfur and parts of Greater Kordofan, is approved to remain open through March 31, 2026. The border opening is likely to be maintained beyond March 31 given international attention to the severity of acute food insecurity across Greater Darfur and the difficulty of transporting assistance from Port Sudan. However, there remains some uncertainty, given the RSF’s increasing consolidation over Greater Darfur, the Chadian government’s restriction on the use of the borders, and the Sudanese government’s targeting of RSF cross-border supply lines. 

Areas of highest concern 

In the area of highest concern – northwestern North Darfur; Dilling and Kadugli towns, the surrounding Western Nuba Mountains area, and SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan that are receiving high numbers of IDPs; and in and around El-Obeid of North Kordofan – Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are expected to deepen through September, the peak of the lean season. Based on the anticipated trajectory of conflict and displacement dynamics, levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality are expected to remain very high; however, the three technical thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are not currently expected to be crossed. While this assessment represents the most likely scenario at this time, the risk of reentry into Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains a very credible alternative scenario (see Annex 4).

Between February and May, before the start of the rainy season, high levels of population displacement are expected to continue in northwestern North Darfur and South Kordofan due to escalating conflict, rising use of drone strikes, and – in Dilling and Kadugli – the RSF’s effort to reimpose siege conditions. Thousands (particularly the most vulnerable, including women and children) of households remaining in the areas of greatest concern are expected to flee the epicenters of conflict intensity in search of improved access to food and income, including humanitarian assistance. IDPs arriving in surrounding locations are expected to rely heavily on community support and limited humanitarian food assistance. In northwestern North Darfur, households that remain behind are likely to hold livestock and can therefore benefit from the rainy season onset between June and September with access to animal products.  

Between June and September, which coincides with the typical lean and rainy seasons, food stocks are expected to become completely depleted, income-earning opportunities are likely to decrease more than is seasonally typical, market stocks are anticipated to reach seasonal lows atypically early, and food prices will likely rise even higher. While the rainy season onset is expected to reduce kinetic conflict activity, it will drive seasonal deterioration in road access for commercial and humanitarian use, further reducing market and humanitarian supplies and driving large to extreme food consumption gaps. Morbidity levels are expected to increase as exposure to waterborne diseases (such as cholera) increases, driving up already high acute malnutrition levels. Poor, conflict-affected, and displaced households are expected to increasingly resort to severe to extreme coping strategies, including consumption of seeds, wild foods, liquidation of assets, and heavy reliance on thinly stretched community support and limited humanitarian assistance. Continued distressed migration away from the worst conflict-affected areas is expected. Of particular concern are IDPs fleeing Kadugli, Dilling, and the western Nuba Mountains, as well as the rural areas of the northwestern part of North Darfur, as the onset of rains is expected to reduce access to these areas. 

Other areas of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan 

Across the rest of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to expand to most of North Darfur, large parts of South and Central Darfur states, as well as much of Greater Kordofan, by September (the peak of the lean season). This deterioration is driven by active conflict and insecurity, increased displacement, depletion of food stocks, and disruptions to humanitarian assistance. Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to spread among poor groups and IDPs (particularly in camps in and around large urban areas). Food prices and income access are anticipated to rise and decrease, respectively, in line with lean season trends. Displaced, conflict-affected, and very poor households who have very few assets will increasingly employ extreme coping strategies – including consumption of wild foods, liquidation of any remaining assets, and begging – and will rely heavily on community support and sharing of extremely limited resources.

Eastern Sudan

In the Eastern Sudan, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across Khartoum, Al-Jazirah, Gedaref, Sennar, White Nile, and Blue Nile due to reduced access to income-earning opportunities for both IDPs and the host community, resulting from the severity of the overall impact of the conflict and displacement, massive destruction of public and private infrastructure in areas experienced direct clashes in 2023/24, below-average stocks, and relatively high food prices. In some areas of Al-Jazirah with relatively better summer season harvests and expected relative improvement in 2026 winter wheat production, outcomes are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) between February and May. At the same time, Al-Kurmuk and Geisan localities in Blue Nile are likely to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4), driven by active conflict and increasing displacement. 

Across Northern and River Nile states of northern Sudan, needs will begin to decline with the arrival of the winter wheat harvest in March/April, a primary source of food and income in these areas, and outcomes in most areas will improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) between February and May. Between June and September, the typical peak lean season in Sudan, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to be widespread across the area. Access to food is expected to further deteriorate as own stocks deplete, income-earning opportunities decrease, and food prices seasonally increase. Income-earning opportunities will continue to be limited, further reducing household purchasing power. Concern remains high for the newly displaced populations in the area who fled Al-Fasher after its fall in October 2025. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

The warring parties reach an agreement on a humanitarian ceasefire 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which a temporary and humanitarian-focused ceasefire – especially short pauses allowing assistance deliveries – is reached, enabling relief operations, reducing violence, and paving the way for a longer-lasting ceasefire process. Under this alternative scenario, the changes across Sudan would likely be significant but uneven, with variations driven by geography, the impact of the three-year conflict on the public and private infrastructure, and the duration of the truce. In heavily affected regions like Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile, humanitarian access via the Chad, South Sudan, and Port Sudan corridors would likely expand quickly, provided cross-border guarantees are respected. Trade flow, market functionality, and livelihoods would normalize first in the relatively stable areas of eastern and northern Sudan. In the severe conflict-affected areas of Darfur and Kordofan, the recovery would be much more gradual, with a likely slow decline in staple food prices and gradual rebuilding of livelihoods and assets. The level of improvement in food consumption, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality would likely be determined by the scale and consistency of humanitarian assistance. If large-scale humanitarian food and nutrition assistance occurs in the currently severely affected and hard-to-reach areas, then areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) would improve to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) if that assistance is sustained for at least three months. In calmer areas, area-level outcomes would likely improve in many productive centers to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

Escalation of fighting, direct clashes, and intensification of drone attacks in relatively calm areas 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the conflict and drone attacks expand to areas that are currently relatively calm – particularly back into parts of central and southeastern Sudan (White Nile, Sennar, Khartoum) – and further into calmer parts of eastern South Kordofan. This expansion would lead to large-scale targeting of civilian populations, looting of assets, massive displacement and re-displacement of civilians, and disruption to livelihoods, trade flows, and market functionality. In central, northern, and southeastern Sudan, a reemergence of conflict or intensification of drone attacks would also result in increased destruction of remaining critical infrastructure and slow down the recovery process and return of previously displaced persons. Conflict would reduce humanitarian access and limit the ability of the international community and the government to support the conflict-affected people. Under such a scenario, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would expand, and the population facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would increase, not only in areas directly affected by heightened conflict, but also in distant deficit-producing areas that rely on supply flows from the center and southeast.

Southeast 

Increased troop buildup and escalation of conflict, ground fighting, and attacks on civilians across major areas in the Blue Nile region 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which RSF forces and SPLM-N will advance and intensify ground fighting and drone attacks in Blue Nile State, capturing major urban centers such as Geissan and Al-Kurmuk. If this scenario emerges, its implications for civilians would likely be severe and multi-dimensional. Large-scale displacement and re-displacement would likely increase dramatically, and residents would flee towns toward rural areas or forests, resulting in overcrowding in safer towns and villages. Ground fighting would likely disrupt key infrastructure, cause the collapse of services, hinder humanitarian access, increase food insecurity, and pose significant protection risks. Under such a scenario, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with some populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would expand.

Areas facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5)

Northwestern North Darfur: Escalation of fighting and direct clashes beyond the expected level 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which RSF advances further into northwestern North Darfur (Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine), gaining greater control of formal and informal cross-border points with Chad. This development would likely obstruct humanitarian access, disrupt trade flows, and limit access to grazing areas and water sources. The advances would likely be accompanied by targeted assaults on civilians, particularly in areas with high concentrations of IDPs from Al-Fasher town and other affected areas. This will trigger more displacement and re-displacement of people, isolating them from sources of food, humanitarian assistance, and basic services. In this scenario, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.

Areas in Greater Darfur hosting a high number of IDPs: Deepening of intercommunal clashes and RSF escalation beyond the expected level and scope

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which RSF’s targeted attacks on IDPs and/or escalation of intercommunal fighting is sustained at an intensity that obstructs humanitarian access and disrupts trade flows, population movement, and community support mechanism, while triggering waves of displacement and re-displacement across Greater Darfur. Displacement into already overcrowded areas/IDP camps with extremely poor health and WASH services and already high disease incidence would fuel further outbreaks and exacerbate acute malnutrition. If this were to occur, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be the likely outcome. This risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is assessed in areas with high concentrations of IDPs in additional parts of North Darfur (including rural Al-Fasher, Melit, and Tawila) as well as in crowded camps in parts of South Darfur (around Nyala, Beliel, Buram, Gereida, and Tulus). 

Dilling, Kadugli, and El-Obeid towns: The intensity of siege conditions escalates more than anticipated

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In El-Obeid, there is a credible alternative scenario in which the siege would intensify and tighten more than currently expected, leading to a more severe reduction in trade flows and humanitarian access, driving large-scale displacement, and increasingly cutting off some populations within the town from food and income sources. In Dilling and Kadugli, there is similarly a credible alternative scenario in which sieges are reinstated with the same severity and intensity as previously seen (March 2025-January 2026). This would entail the resumption of close collaboration between the RSF and SPLM-N, such that all routes into Kadugli and Dilling were again effectively blockaded for a prolonged period of time, and populations were prevented from fleeing. If these conditions were to unfold, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.

Surrounding rural areas in Greater Kordofan, including the western Nuba Mountains area and parts of central South Kordofan: resumption of the Dilling and Kadugli sieges leads to return of severe mobility restraints in the surrounding rural areas 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the reinstatement of a severe siege on Dilling town results in spillover effects in these surrounding areas of the rural western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling, and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut). This would occur if the RSF and SPLM-N jointly intensify the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli, thereby resulting in increased troop presence in the surrounding rural areas, particularly around Dilling. This increase in conflict and insecurity would result in severe restrictions on trader, humanitarian, and population mobility in rural areas; disruptions in access to food and income sources; and likely looting of any remaining harvest stocks and market supplies. In this scenario, levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would escalate and likely breach the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds.

In other neighboring areas of South Kordofan, the intensification of the two sieges on Dilling and Kadugli towns and accompanying escalation in conflict and drone strikes in neighboring areas would result in additional displacement deeper into rural areas (rural Kadugli, Al-Buram, Heiban, Delami, Ar-Reif Ash Shargi), increase in mobility restrictions, and more rapid depletion of any remaining available harvests. The rapid exhaustion of harvests and increase in conflict-driven disruptions to trade flows, humanitarian access, and population mobility would lead to high levels of starvation, which would in turn drive levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality beyond the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds.

The conflict in South Kordofan is uniquely complex, with origins that long pre-date the current war across Sudan. Deep grievances over political representation, security, and land rights underscore the conflict between SAF and SPLM-N, while ethnic tensions between the Nuba community (aligned with SPLM-N) and Arab Baggara community (typically aligned with RSF) are rooted in disputes over land and water resources. These tensions have been militarized over decades, and the current war has exacerbated them, engaging all three main actors: SAF, the RSF, and the SPLM-N (al-Hilu faction). 

SAF maintains a major presence in Kadugli and Dilling, the main two towns in South Kordofan, with the 14^th Infantry Division based in Kadugli and the 54^th Infantry Brigade (under the command of the 14^th Division) in Dilling. Both towns are major commercial hubs in the area, with Dilling serving as a key through-point between El-Obeid (North Kordofan), Al-Fula (West Kordofan), and Kadugli (South Kordofan), and onward trade routes into South Sudan. RSF and SPLM-N have besieged the towns to varying extents since the early stages of the April 2023 war. After a temporary easing of these siege-like pressures in late 2024 and early 2025 (at which point the first major humanitarian operation was feasible), the sieges again intensified from February 2025 on, following a rapprochement between the RSF and SPLM-N. This key development in the relationship between RSF and SPLM-N led to strengthening of blockades, including cutting off the main road linking Dilling and Kadugli, that drove extreme food shortages, soaring prices, and rapidly rising hunger, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality. By September 2025, Famine (IPC Phase 5) was classified in Kadugli. While data was lacking to definitively conclude, it was assumed that Famine (IPC Phase 5) was possibly ongoing in Dilling as well, on the basis of similarly severe impacts on access to food under siege conditions. 

Late 2025 into early 2026 saw sustained siege conditions with heightened shelling, drone strikes, and a troop buildup outside Dilling, signaling preparations for a ground offensive. Those developments, coupled with the dearth of new data on hunger, acute malnutrition, or mortality, underpinned prior assessments that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would remain possible through at least May 2026 in both Kadugli and Dilling. Furthermore, the spillover effects underpinned the assessment that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would possibly expand to surrounding areas of the Western Nuba Mountains as well. In these rural areas, it was evident that increased limitations on population movement, marginal to no harvests, the erosion of purchasing capacity and escalating food shortages, and the near-daily arrivals of IDPs from the towns indicated that the surrounding areas had diminishing capacity to cope with intensifying strain on available resources. 

Why the classification has shifted 

A shift from Famine (IPC Phase 5) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) reflects that the technical thresholds that define Famine (IPC Phase 5) are no longer met under the current evidence, and conditions do not decisively indicate that a return to Famine (IPC Phase 5) is the most likely outcome. However, it is important to note that this shift does not necessarily imply substantive recovery. Rather, it reflects the effects of prior widespread mortality, large-scale displacement out of besieged areas and the subsequent fluidity of population movement, as well as substantive shifts in conflict dynamics. The likelihood of a complete blockade that isolates these areas from food – as observed between mid-2025 and January 2026 – has declined, based on expectations of reduced coordination between RSF and SPLM-N forces and the increased presence of SAF troops. Under partial siege conditions, the most likely scenario is that the population will experience short-term fluctuations in access to food that relatively mitigate the severity of outcomes. Nevertheless, the underlying drivers of acute food insecurity remain severe, and the risk of reentry into Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains plausible.

• The effects of widespread mortality. A Famine, by definition, results in widespread death. These deaths ultimately impact future mortality rates once a large share of the most-at-risk population has died. This tragic dynamic does not indicate recovery; it reflects irreversible loss of life and changes in the composition of the surviving population. 

  While mortality data have not been available for either Kadugli or Dilling, admissions data from the Nutrition Cluster in Kadugli showed a dramatic increase in child deaths in the stabilization center for severe acute malnutrition in August 2025 after treatment supplies had been routinely prevented from entering. 

• Population displacement. Large-scale displacement can substantially influence measured outcomes. Households may flee from one area to another, altering the relative concentration of people who are malnourished or at heightened risk of mortality in specific geographic areas over time. For example, an area classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5) may experience changes in conflict dynamics that prompt widespread displacement. While the total number of people at risk of death may remain unchanged, their departure from the area can mean that Famine (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are no longer observed in the original area. Whether Famine (IPC Phase 5) emerges in the new, receiving area depends on the size of the incoming population relative to the host community and on whether, now combined, levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality meet the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. 

  In Dilling and Kadugli, displacement out of the towns occurred at high levels between September 2025 and January 2026. While figures are difficult to confirm, at least 5,000 fled Dilling, and about 10,000 fled Kadugli, in December and January alone. These populations were reportedly mostly women and children as families split and left men behind out of fear the men were at risk of being killed or forcibly recruited if caught fleeing the area, indicative of the shifting demographics of those who likely remained in the besieged towns. Meanwhile, those who fled were able to access support from local communities and limited food and nutrition assistance, helping to mitigate the severity of outcomes in surrounding rural areas, though levels of hunger and acute malnutrition remain substantially elevated. 

• Short-term fluctuations. Some factors that impact food security may change periodically, such as infrequent injections of humanitarian assistance, seasonal improvements to food availability, and short-lived market inflows. These factors may slightly improve some indicators without resolving the deeper causes that put the population at repeated risk of hunger-related mortality, namely market collapse, livelihood destruction, asset depletion, and repeated displacement. Certain factors may lead to short-term improvements, especially when combined with the impact of earlier mortality on the makeup of the surviving population, yet the risk remains that the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds could be reached again in the future. 

  On January 26 and February 3, a month-long SAF campaign advancing westward through rugged terrain in the eastern Nuba Mountains resulted in the breaking of the sieges on Dilling, and subsequently on Kadugli. The relatively rapid recapture of the towns – reportedly involving primarily motorcycle units – suggests a possible prior understanding with SPLM-N, at the same time as a RSF troop pullback. Conflict data from ACLED show a sharp decline in armed clashes and violence against civilians in February compared to December and January, although airstrikes and explosions remained elevated (Figure 3). Shelling and missile attacks also dropped after December, consistent with reduced ground proximity by RSF-SPLM-N forces. Key informant reporting further corroborated the reduction in troop presence, pointing to the removal of checkpoints along eastern access roads through Habila and Dilling and onward toward Kadugli following the SAF advance, reinforcing indications of at least a temporary RSF withdrawal. Meanwhile, conflict dynamics shifted, making reimposition of sieges to the same intensity and severity less likely in the coming months. The relationship between SPLM-N forces and RSF forces, informed by strained on-the-ground intercommunal dynamics, is likely to affect the durability of any RSF–SPLM-N (al-Hilu) alliance. While both groups may find short-term tactical convergence in opposing SAF, the underlying ethnic and resource-based tensions make a long-term partnership inherently fragile. While siege-like conditions are expected to be renewed, and drone strikes will pose considerable risks to access and population mobility, limited participation by SPLM-N and greater SAF presence is likely to prevent the establishment of a complete blockade as seen in 2025, likely enabling intermittent food inflows in the projection period.  

Critically, the shift from projecting Famine (IPC Phase 5) to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) does not indicate sustained recovery or improvement. Populations in an area where outcomes sit just below the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds are still facing widespread hunger-related malnutrition and mortality. Small deteriorations in access, displacement, or food assistance levels can be sufficient to again push outcomes across the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. The underlying drivers remain severe, and the risk of reentry into Famine (IPC Phase 5) remains plausible.