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Displacement due to inter-communal clashes, the below-average harvest of the main agricultural season, significantly above-average cereal and non-cereal food prices, and continued macroeconomic difficulties are contributing to higher-than-normal humanitarian food assistance needs in Sudan during the post-harvest period. Between February and May 2022, most of Sudan will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity outcomes due to low purchasing power, while the conflict-affected areas in Darfur and Kordofan, parts of Jebel Marra, South Kordofan, and areas of marginal agricultural production in the Red Sea, Kassala, North Kordofan, and North Darfur states will likely be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to the impact of conflict, poor purchasing power, above-average staple food prices, and below-average rangeland resources.
According to the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, the 2021/22 main agricultural season is expected to be significantly below average. Total cereal production is estimated at around 7.23 million metric tons, including a forecast of 725,000 metric tons of wheat to be harvested in March, approximately 19 percent below last year's harvest and similar to production in 2019/2020. The harvest is estimated to cover around 76 percent of the national total cereal requirement. As a result, cereal import needs for 2022 are likely to be at least 2.2 million tons.
Since the overthrow of the civilian government in October 2021, the macroeconomic situation in Sudan is continuing to worsen due to the suspension of international economic support. This is resulting in increased shortages of hard currency reserves and a rapid deterioration in economic conditions across Sudan. By February 28, 2022, the parallel market exchange rate is trading at 500-532 SDG/USD compared to 448-452 SDG/USD in October 2021. In comparison, the official exchange rate in February 2022 is set at around 443 SDG/USD, a slight increase from 439 SDG/USD in October 2021. The government is likely to continue with a managed floatation of the SDG, but the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates is expected to further widen with the increased need to import food and non-food essential items.
Staple food prices continued atypically increasing across most main markets in Sudan during the post-harvest period of February 2022. This is being driven by the below-average harvest of the 2021/22 main agricultural season, extremely high production and transportation costs, limited carryover stock from last year, above-average demand for local consumption-driven by low production at the household level in addition to shortages and high prices of imported wheat and wheat flour. Cereal prices in February 2022 remained on average 70-80 percent higher than prices in February 2021 and 390-425 percent higher than the five-year average.
Emergency food assistance needs will remain above normal throughout the scenario period, driven by the below-average harvest, increased inter-communal clashes and displacement, poor macroeconomic conditions, significantly above-average staple food prices, and reduced household purchasing power. In Darfur and Kordofan, increased frequencies of inter-communal conflicts have displaced around 85,000 people and resulted in more households losing access to livelihood assets (livestock, homes, tools, cash crops) and access to their staple crop harvest. The worst-affected areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), including areas of Darfur and Kordofan recently affected by inter-communal conflicts, poor households in Red Sea and Kassala states where high food prices and limited access to income are limiting household purchasing power, and areas hosting IDPs in parts of Jebel Marra in Darfur and SPLM-N areas of South Kordofan.
2021/22 season agricultural production
According to data from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, national cereal production for the 2021/22 main agricultural season is below average. Total cereal production is estimated at around 7.23 million metric tons, including 5 million tons of sorghum, 1.5 million tons of millet, and around 725,000 tons of wheat forecast to be harvested in March 2022. This is approximately 10 percent below production from the 2020/21 season (7.97 million metric tons) and similar to the five-year average.
National sorghum production is estimated at around 5 million tons, 3 percent lower than last year (5.2 million tons) and similar to the five-year average (4.9 million tons). However, field informants report that sorghum production was impacted by a lack of fertilizer due to high costs, dry spells during the vegetative and reproductive stages, and pest infestations. Additionally, the impact of conflict, and the shortage and high cost of labor significantly delayed the harvest process, contributing to above-average pre-harvest losses. The estimated 1.5 million tons of millet produced is almost 22 percent below last year and 7 percent below the five-year average. National millet production has been severely affected by intercommunal clashes in Darfur during the harvest period and dry spells in August and September 2021 in the Darfur and Kordofan regions. The dry spells occurred during the moisture-critical reproductive crop growth stages. The forecasted 725,000 tons of wheat is almost 19 percent lower than last year due to limited access to irrigation due to the high cost of electricity for the pump irrigation systems and poor maintenance of irrigation channels, in addition to the shortage and high cost of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. Groundnut production is estimated at 2.5 million tons, similar to last year. Sunflower production is estimated at 136,000 tons, around 30 percent above the five-year average, as farmers increased their acreage following high sale prices for sunflowers last year. Sesame production is estimated at 0.85 million tons, about 26 percent lower than 2020/2021 and 9 percent lower than the five-year average. Like other crops, sesame production was impacted by dry spells in addition to sesame gall midge infestations.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan is expected to face a significant cereal supply gap in 2022. The production estimates from USDA FAS suggest that the 7.23 million tons of cereal harvested in the 2021/2022 agricultural season will likely provide around 76 percent of the national cereal requirement of 9.4 million tons for January to December 2022.
Meanwhile, the total cereal import needs for 2022 are estimated at approximately 2.2 million tons. However, national imports in 2022 are likely to be hindered by reduced hard currency reserves in the official banking system and the continued devaluation of the SDG. This will likely be reflected in shortages and high wheat, wheat flour, and bread prices.
Given the recent conflict in Ukraine and subsequent sanctions on Russia, there is the potential for disruption to global cereal and fertilizer exports from both Ukraine and Russia. Around 46 percent of Sudan's wheat imports are from Russia. The likely magnitude of these disruptions is still being analyzed as events in Ukraine unfold. The potential impacts are further detailed in the Events that Could Change the Scenario.
Sudan's macroeconomic situation has continued to deteriorate since October 2021 following the suspension of economic support from the World Bank, the USA, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the suspension of the process of writing off Sudan’s debts in response to the overthrew of the transitional civilian government. As a result, Sudan is increasingly experiencing increased shortages of hard currency reserves and a rapid deterioration in its macroeconomic situation. This is reflected in the 2022 national budget, where there is around a 10 percent decline in total expenditures, pauses in implementing planned economic reforms, and a rise in the SDG to USD exchange rate in the parallel market.
As of February 25, the parallel market rate is trading at 500-532 SDG/USD compared to 448-452 SDG/USD in October 2021, while the official exchange rate increased to 444 SDG/USD from 439 SDG/USD in October 2021 (Figure 1). The devaluation of the local currency and the observed shortage of hard currency reserves is reducing the government and the private sector's ability to import goods. This is resulting in continued increases in the price of imported essential commodities and services, including fuel prices, cooking gas, and medicine. In early January 2022, the government announced an over 500 percent increase in electricity tariffs, followed by fuel price increases in early February, the third increase since June 2021. On February 6, gasoline prices increased from 362 SDG/liter to 415 SDG/liter, while diesel prices increased from 347 SDG/liter to 407 SDG/liter. Fuel prices are almost 43 percent above fuel prices in June 2021 and 170-200 percent above fuel prices in February 2021. The rise in fuel prices has led to a more than 25 percent increase in Khartoum transportation tariffs and is expected to lead to a steep increase in the price of food and non-food items. In December 2021, the inflation rate in Sudan is around 318 percent, around 49 percent higher than in December 2020. The continued high inflation rates indicate that the prices of food and goods remain very high and are likely impacting household purchasing power (Figure 2).
Prices and term-of-trade:
Sorghum and millet retail prices have continued to unseasonally increase between October 2021 and the February 2022 harvest period, when prices typically decline as new harvests reach markets. Sorghum and millet prices have increased by 15-30 percent between January and February 2022 in most of the main production and consumption markets and are 70-80 percent higher than in February 2021 and 390-425 percent higher than the five-year average. Continued increases in staple food prices are driven principally by tighter than usual market supplies and above-average demand. This is due to below-average cereal production, extremely above-average production and transportation costs, below-average carryover stocks, and the continued depreciation of the Sudanese Pound (Figure 3).
In Al Gadaref market, the main sorghum production center in Sudan, sorghum prices increased around 5 percent from 131 SDG/kg in January 2022 to around 138 SDG/kg in February 2022, remaining 110 percent above respective prices last year and more than five times over the five-year average.
Similarly, the retail price of locally produced wheat increased 10-15 percent in most main wheat production and consumption markets across the country between January and February 2022 due to tightened market supplies from last year's harvest, along with increased demand due to shortages and high prices of imported wheat and wheat flour, and high production and transportation costs. In Dongola, Sudan's main wheat production and consumption market, locally produced wheat sells for 420 SDG/kg in February compared to 417.8 SDG/kg in January 2022. On average, wheat prices in February 2022 are 180 percent above respective prices last year and almost eight times above the five-year average.
Goat and sheep prices decreased 5-15 percent across most markets and remained relatively stable in other markets between January and February 2022 due to increased local supply as pastoralists and households sell livestock for cash due to insecurity, political instability, and repeated blockages of main roads due to protests against increases in the cost of electricity constraining market access and exports, particularly to Egypt. Below-average pasture conditions in most pastoral and agropastoral areas and the high cost of fodder and water, along with high staple food prices, have also contributed to above-average sales of animals by pastoral and agropastoral groups. Goat and sheep prices in February 2022 remain 150-160 percent above respective prices in 2021 and 500-600 percent above the five-year average for February. The high livestock prices are primarily driven by the high inflation, rapid depreciation of the SDG, high breeding and transportation costs, and the deterioration of the macroeconomic situation.
The Goat-to-sorghum terms-of-trade (TOT) continued to decline unseasonally between December 2021 and February 2022 as sorghum prices continue to increase at greater rates than livestock prices. The February 2022 goats-to-sorghum TOT in the El Obied market dropped by 11 percent compared to January due to a 13 percent increase in sorghum prices, while goat prices remained unchanged. In February, the sale of a goat can purchase 248 kg of sorghum compared to 279 kg of sorghum in January 2022. However, the TOT in February 2022 was 71 percent above respective prices in 2021 and 43 percent above the five-year average (Figure 4). The current goat-to-maize terms of trade would be sufficient to purchase 70 days of minimum (2100) kilocalories for a household of six, assuming the consumption of only sorghum during that time.
Wage-labor-to-sorghum TOT indicated a declining trend between November 2021 and February 2022 due to the continued increase in sorghum prices. In the Al Gadaref market, wage-labor-to-sorghum TOT dropped by 13 percent and remained at 21.8 kg of sorghum per daily wage in February 2022 compared to 24.9 kg in November 2021. This is almost 81 percent above respective prices last year (16.4 kg/daily wage) and 33 percent above the five-year average (21.8kg/daily wage). However, access to labor is not regular due to increased competition and reduced opportunity as the end of the harvest approaches. The current wage-labor-to-sorghum terms of trade would be sufficient to purchase six days of minimum (2100) kilocalories for a household of six, assuming the consumption of only sorghum during that time.
Although terms-of-trade ratios are currently high, the high prices of other need-based expenses such as housing, food, medical care, and utilities, along with the high cost of production and transport. According to the January 2022 WFP market monitor, the average cost of a local food basket was around 290 SDG, around 7 percent higher than December 2021 and 136 percent higher than January 2021. Overall, the rising cost of food and non-food needs and limited access to income due to reduced economic activity and increased competition for income-earning opportunities is constraining access to income and resulting in low purchasing power for pastoral and daily wage-dependent households.
Pasture and Livestock situation:
Below normal natural pasture conditions have been reported in most of the pastoral and agropastoral zones of Sudan because of rain shortages and dry spells in July and August during the rainy season, and flooding and waterlogging in central and southern parts of the country. Poor pasture conditions are being reported in the main grazing areas of North Darfur, North Kordofan, Kassala, Red Sea, northern Gazeira states in addition to the grazing areas of Al Butana in Al Gadaref state where pastoral households from different parts of central and eastern Sudan typically spend the rainy season and part of the summer season (Figure 5). Seasonal migrations of nomadic pastoralists with their animals into the southern dry season grazing areas in February and March have been reportedly constrained by blockages to livestock migratory routes by farmers across most pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones in western, central, and eastern Sudan. Additionally, the increased intercommunal clashes between pastoralists and farmers in Darfur, Kordofan, and parts of White Nile states have also constrained pastoral migration to the southern dry season grazing areas. According to the Range and Pasture Department of the Ministry of Animal Resources, the below-average pasture conditions have resulted in fodder gaps, which is resulting in 'medium' to 'poor' livestock body conditions and lower sale values in most pastoral and agropastoral areas.
Inter-communal conflicts and new displacement:
Between November 2021 and January 2022, intercommunal violence significantly increased in the states of Darfur, Kordofan, and parts of White Nile as a result of increasing disputes between nomadic pastoralists and farmers as the nomadic pastoralist travel from the wet season grazing areas in northern Sudan to the southern grazing areas, coinciding with the main harvest season in many farming areas. The main affected states are West Darfur, North Darfur, West Kordofan, South Kordofan, and White Nile states. Based on the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), around 85,000 people (approximately 17,000 households) have been displaced between November 2021 and January 2022, with around 90 percent of displacements occurring in West Darfur state (Kereneik and Jebel Moon localities). The recent inter-communal clashes have resulted in fatalities, the burning of villages, and the loss of livelihood assets, including livestock and crops.
According to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), there were cumulatively 99 recorded violence against civilians (VAC) events in Darfur and Kordofan states between November 1, 2022, and February 17, 2022, with 38 VAC events taking place in December 2021 (Figure 6). The number of VAC events is similar to the same period last year (October 2020-February 2021), where 97 VAC events occurred; however, the increase in attacks last year occurred in January following the withdrawal of UNAMID. In January and February 2022, VAC events have declined as the government has deployed joint armed forces, including the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Force (RSF), and representatives from the rebel groups that signed the Juba peace agreement to control the situation. However, the clashes across Darfur have resulted in the loss of lives and livelihood assets, including livestock, market, and household stocks, and widely disrupted the 2021/2022 agricultural season, markets and trade flows, household market access, livelihood activities, and labor opportunities across the affected areas.
COVID-19 related information:
As of February 15, 2022, around 5.13 million people have received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, around 11 percent of the population. International airports remain open, and there is free movement of goods through seaports and land crossings points; however, population movements across most borders remain controlled. Current restrictions are not having a major impact on food security; however, income-earning opportunities for poor households engaged in domestic labor, primarily in urban areas, remain below-average as better-off households limit hiring to reduce their risk of exposure.
Conflict and Ethiopian refugees:
According to UNHCR and the government's Commission for Refugees (COR), as of mid-February 2022, over 59,500 Ethiopian refugees have arrived in Sudan since November 2020, with around 51,200 refugees in Kassala and Gadaref and around 8,300 refugees in Blue Nile state. The number of new arrivals has significantly declined compared to previous months. UNHCR teams at the border get consistent reports from refugees that the border is sealed on the Ethiopian side and that crossing is very difficult. In January 2022, around 126 Ethiopians arrived in Sudan compared to 600 in January 2021.
In January 2022, WFP and implementing partners provided approximately 1.96 million beneficiaries with 6,985 MT in-kind assistance of food commodities and 3.7 USD in cash vouchers, around 36 percent of the planned quantity and 65 percent of the planned cash voucher equivalent value. Most beneficiaries reached by humanitarian assistance include IDPs and conflict-affected people in Greater Darfur, government-controlled areas of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile state, refugees from South Sudan and Ethiopia, people affected by the recent inter-communal clashes in addition to chronically food-insecure areas of eastern and western Sudan. WFP plans to distribute over 228,900 MT and around 87.3 USD million in cash vouchers to 8.5 million beneficiaries between February and September 2022. According to WFP, around 32,000 people in SPLM-N controlled areas received humanitarian food assistance in January 2022, along with around 41,270 IDPs, 34,600 refugees, and 61,900 residents in government-controlled areas of South Kordofan. However, additional information on ration sizes is currently not available.
Summary of Food Security Outcomes:
In February 2022, household food security has slightly improved compared to the peak of the lean season period in September 2021, driven by the relatively increased availability of own production from the recently concluded harvest of the 2020/21 agricultural season. However, the below-average harvest, the significantly above-average prices of cereal and non-cereal food items, and the persistent poor macroeconomic conditions continue to drive worse food security outcomes than is typically observed during harvest and post-harvest periods. As a result, many areas in North, West, and East Darfur states, parts of North and West Kordofan, and northern parts of Kassala and Red Sea states where poor households are typically highly dependent on markets to access food remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2). However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely in areas of North and West Darfur and North Kordofan recently affected by inter-communal conflicts and areas with protracted IDPs such as Jebel Marra and SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan where humanitarian assistance is not able to be distributed. The inter-communal clashes have limited household access to their farms and resulted in high losses of assets such as crops and livestock and reduced access to markets due to insecurity. Additionally, in the marginal production areas of northern North Darfur, parts of North Kordofan, northern Kassala, and Red Sea State, poor households with high dependency on market purchases for food are being impacted by high food prices and limited access to income-earning opportunities.
The most likely scenario for February to September 2021 is based on the following national-level assumptions:
- The below-average harvest of staple food and cash crops from the 2020/21 main agricultural season is expected to result in an increased national cereal deficit and reduced availability at households and markets due to the below-average market supply throughout the scenario period. Demand for local consumption is likely to remain above average across the country due to the below-average food stocks at the household’s level. Restocking the national grain reserve at the Strategic Reserve Corporation (SRC) is likely to continue to be limited by the low production this year and the continued importation difficulties due to limited hard currency reserves.
- Sudan's macroeconomic situation continues to deteriorate following the overthrow of the civilian-led transitional government in October 2021 and the resignation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in January 2022. The implementation of the economic reforms that started earlier last year remains on hold due to the international community's suspension of major economic support. Since December 2021, the Sudanese Pound has depreciated from 450 SDG/USD to 490 SDG/USD by the end-January 2021. The persistent lack of a sustainable hard currency stream will likely drive further currency depreciation. Continued increases in the prices of food and transportation and the local food basket are expected to continue impacting the purchasing power of poor households and likely drive an increase in the inflation rate.
- The transmission of COVID-19 is expected to be high in Sudan due to the increased gatherings and demonstrations, low compliance with control measures, and low vaccination rates. Current control measures are expected to remain in place. A rise in confirmed cases will likely reduce income-earning opportunities for poor households engaged in casual labor as better-off households seek to reduce their risk of exposure.
- Retail prices for sorghum and millet are anticipated to continue to unseasonably increase through the post-harvest period and remain above average before peaking in the lean season (June to September). Based on FEWS NET's integrated price projections, sorghum and millet prices are expected to be over 40-50 percent higher than last year and three to four times above the five-year average during the scenario period. Locally produced wheat prices are likely to continue increasing until the winter season harvest in March 2022. However, prices are likely to remain more than double compared to respective prices in 2021 and more than 400-500 percent above the five-year average.
- Livestock prices are expected to follow seasonal trends but at relatively high prices compared to average due to the anticipated high inflation and local currency depreciation. Prices are expected to slightly increase or remain stable in most markets due to seasonally reduced supplies during the post-harvest period. However, prices will begin to seasonally decrease at the beginning of the lean season as households sell additional livestock for staple food purchases and build household food stocks with the anticipated high cereal prices. Overall, livestock prices are expected to remain almost double compared to last year and 400-500 percent above the five-year average through September 2022.
- As of January 2021, below-average pasture conditions are being reported in most of the summer season grazing areas, as well as in agropastoral areas in western and eastern Sudan, due to high land surface temperatures following irregular rainfall during the rainy season that resulted in dry spells in some areas in western and eastern Sudan and flooding and waterlogging in central and southern parts of the country. Below-average rangeland resources are expected to increase competition for grazing resources between pastoralists groups and increase conflict between pastoralists and farmers. Livestock body conditions are likely to be negatively impacted by the expected shortage of pasture and water during the summer season (March-June). However, livestock body conditions will improve through the June-September rainy season as pasture and water resources recover.
- Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to decrease seasonally following the end of the 2021/2022 harvest, with labor wages dropping by 10-25 percent and remaining at 1500-1800 SDG per day between February and May 2022. Wages are expected to begin seasonally increasing in June with the start of the 2022/2023 agricultural season and remain around 2000-2500 SDG/day through September 2022. Labor wages are anticipated to be 40-50 percent above last year and 300-400 percent above the five-year average.
- Political violence will likely remain high through at least May 2022 following the overthrow of the civilian-led transitional government on October 25, 2021, and the resignation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok on January 2, 2022. The frequency and magnitude of civil unrest events – already at historically high levels not seen since 2018 – will likely remain elevated in Khartoum, and other major cities nationwide as pro-democracy and anti-government groups hold frequent demonstrations demanding the removal of military elements from the ruling council and the establishment of a civilian government. The security forces will continue to use forceful measures to disperse protesters, resulting in multiple civilian fatalities at each major demonstration. Casualty counts will likely increase as the government continues to withhold meaningful political concessions, and both security forces and demonstrators become quicker to escalate violence during significant protests. While not the most likely scenario, it is possible that fractures emerge between elements of the state security forces – the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Sudan Police Force, the Rapid Support Forces, and the General Intelligence Service – which could manifest in armed attacks occurring in urban centers.
- Intercommunal violence, which significantly increased in Darfur and Kordofan in December 2021 and January 2022 due to the continued seasonal movement of nomadic groups into southern grazing areas, is likely to relatively subside from February to April 2022 as the main harvesting season concludes. Nonetheless, violence is expected to escalate again during the May-July 2022 planting season and is likely to remain higher through the entire outlook period (through September 2022, and inclusive of the relative decline from February-April 2022) compared to 2021 due to increasing disputes over access to farming lands and competition for scarce natural resources between pastoralists and farmers. Government efforts to reduce violence are likely to be stymied due to the presence of multiple armed groups in Darfur's main urban centers, including several which are signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). The lack of progress in the implementation of the agreement will likely spur further incidents of sporadic violence.
- Despite the government's temporary suspension of the eastern Sudan track of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) protocol pending a consensus between the eastern Sudanese High Native Administration Council and the Higher Beja Council (HBC), tension and the possibility of civil unrest will remain high in Port Sudan and Red Sea state. Any future blockades of ports will impact key supply chains nationwide, including wheat and oil, resulting in price increases and an increased likelihood of civil unrest in urban centers. A cancellation of the eastern track of the JPA is likely to result in increased inter-communal conflict between the eastern tribal groups over political differences.
- Regional political tensions and military posturing will spur occasional outbreaks of violent skirmishes between Sudanese military forces and Ethiopia-based armed groups around the disputed al-Fashqa triangle along the Sudan-Ethiopia border. A heightened military presence along the contested border and bellicose rhetoric will periodically provoke localized skirmishes between the Sudanese military and Ethiopia-based armed groups; however, it is unlikely to escalate into a full-scale military conflict, given both governments' competing priorities.
- Al Gadaref, Kassala, Sennar, and Blue Nile states are expected to continue receiving Ethiopian refugees from Tigray through the forecast period. New arrivals in December 2021 have remained at a relatively low level of around 50 individuals per week; however, the influx is likely to increase tensions between refugees, asylum seekers, and host communities; however, significant violent disputes over land rights and civil unrest in areas along the Sudan/Ethiopia border remain possible but unlikely during the outlook period.
Between February to May, the typical post-harvest period (February to March) and the start of the lean season (April to May) occur. During the post-harvest period of February to March, food security outcomes typically stabilize with the availability of the new harvest and will begin to deteriorate seasonally in April as household food stocks begin to diminish. In-kind payments from agricultural labor, cash crops, and livestock are also typically at seasonal lows in April and May. However, this year, below-average production from the 2021/22 agricultural season, along with above-average cereal and non-cereal food item prices are anticipated to persist through the post-harvest period, negatively impacting household purchasing power, along with below-average income from cash crop sales, high inflation, and local currency depreciation. These drivers are likely to continue to result in higher than typical needs. Household dependence on market food purchases and the seasonal increase in staple food prices are likely to start earlier than usual. Due to these drivers, many areas, including areas where the harvest was relatively better, will continue to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2). However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to emerge around April among IDPs and conflict-affected poor households in the Darfur and Kordofan regions as limited food stocks from the harvest decline along with limited access to income-earning opportunities following the loss of livelihood assets and markets due to insecurity. Additionally, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also likely to emerge among poor households in Darfur, Kordofan, northern Kassala, and Red Sea states where the below-average harvest, high food and non-food prices, and limited access to income-earning opportunities from livestock and crop sales will further decline household purchasing power and limit households’ food access at markets.
Between June and September 2022, the peak of the lean season, households will increasingly rely on markets to purchase staple foods at a time staple food prices will further increase, and food prices will likely outpace earnings in cash income from agricultural labor and livestock sales. As the rainy season progresses between June and September, livestock productivity and gifts from better-off households, access to in-kind and cash income from agricultural labor are expected to increase, providing some improvement to household food access. However, staple food prices are expected to continue seasonally increasing through the peak lean season in September 2022, further reducing household purchasing power. Overall, poor households' food access is expected to continue to deteriorate. The number of people expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected to increase among poor households in parts of North Darfur, North Kordofan, Red Sea, and Kassala states. Poor households are likely to seek labor opportunities to earn income in urban centres and areas with irrigated cultivation and traditional gold mining. Households from these areas are typically highly dependent on market purchases, but market prices are expected to remain very high due to high transportation costs from central Sudan. Households are likely to increase migration, reduce non-food expenditures, borrow food and cash, beg, and increase livestock sales to reduce food consumption gaps. In the areas recently affected by inter-communal conflicts in Darfur and Kordofan, areas hosting IDPs in parts of Jebel Marra and SPLM-N-controlled areas of South Kordofan, food consumption gaps are expected to widen further, and an increasing number of people will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in the absence of humanitarian food assistance.
Events that Might Change the Outlook
Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most-likely scenario.
|Area||Event||Impact on food security outcomes|
|National||Escalation and spread of inter-communal clashes; increased political tension and instability situation||Additional displacement and destruction of livelihoods in rural areas will increase the number of IDPs and disrupt the 2022/2023 agricultural season, resulting in a second consecutive year of poor harvests. Increased political instability will likely result in further deterioration in the macroeconomic situation and reduce household food availability and access. Households already facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).|
|National||Reintegration of the Sudanese economy into the international economy; increased support from the international community||Improved macroeconomic conditions would improve the availability of essential food and non-food items, reduce prices, and improve household purchasing power. This is likely to significantly reduce the number of people facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) acute food insecurity outcomes.|
A rise in global wheat and fuel prices
|Around 46 percent of Sudan's wheat imports are from Russia. The current macroeconomic difficulties and shortages of hard currency reserves are already limiting Sudan's ability to meet import requirements before the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and its potential impact on global wheat and fuel prices. Further wheat shortages will increase bread prices, likely further contributing to political instability and continued demonstrations against the government.|
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Source: FEWS NET
SEASONAL CALENDAR FOR A TYPICAL YEAR
Source: FEWS NET
Source: FEWS NET
Source: Central Bank of Sudan
Source: FEWS NET
Source: FEWS NET
Source: FEWS NET/USGS
To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.