Famine (IPC Phase 5) expected to persist amid escalating conflict and tightening sieges

• In Greater Kordofan, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Kadugli, and possibly occurring in Dilling, amid intensifying sieges of both towns. Between February and May, it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will continue in both towns and expand to surrounding rural areas of the Western Nuba Mountains near Dilling. As fighting spreads, near-daily displacement, looting, and severe disruptions to livelihoods, trade, and humanitarian access are expected to persist, and drive extreme levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality.
• In Al-Fasher of North Darfur, the vast majority of civilians have fled or died since late October and the population is thus below the level required for classification of Famine (IPC Phase 5). However, the outflow of tens of thousands of starving, malnourished people to other parts of North Darfur that are concurrently experiencing waves of conflict has led to a surge of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and high global acute malnutrition (GAM) in these other areas. In Um Baru and Kernoi, for example, the GAM prevalence spiked to 54 and 34 percent, respectively, by mid-December. Many displaced from Al-Fasher and from ongoing conflict in nearby areas have already died from extreme, life-threatening hunger. Many more are at imminent risk of death without immediate access to food and nutrition assistance.
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to spread across parts of Greater Darfur – notably in North Darfur – and most of Greater Kordofan through May where clashes and displacement are most intense. Humanitarian access and trade flows are increasingly impeded by insecurity, bans on movement of goods, and rising fuel costs following attacks at Heglig oil field. Some populations, particularly among those repeatedly displaced across North and South Darfur, and in Greater Kordofan, are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
• A risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is assessed in rural Al-Fasher, Melit, Um Baru, Kernoi, and Tawila (North Darfur); areas with high concentrations of displaced people in South Darfur and South Kordofan; and in El-Obeid of North Kordofan. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected in the most likely scenario, but there is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict cuts off trade and humanitarian access, restricts population mobility, and isolates populations from food sources, causing Famine (IPC Phase 5). 

This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 31, 2025. 

The conflict continues to escalate in December in the Greater Kordofan region as the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and joint forces of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) vie for control of key towns and trade routes (Figure 1). In early December, RSF captured Babanusa (West Kordofan) and Heglig oil field (West Kordofan), effectively consolidating control of much of West Kordofan. Large troop mobilizations, increasing ground battles, and aerial strikes have been reported in and around El-Obeid (North Kordofan), Dilling, and Kadugli (South Kordofan) as RSF/SPLM-N intensify siege operations on these towns. Meanwhile, the road between Dilling and Kadugli, which was controlled by SAF since February, was recently severed by the RSF in December and remains contested, preventing trade flows between the towns (Figure 1). 

The RSF seized two key towns from the Joint Forces in Um Baru and Kernoi of North Darfur on December 24, reportedly killing over 200 civilians, and burning and looting villages around the area. Combined with an increase in displaced populations into the area, this is leading to expansion of extremely severe outcomes. SAF has also continued drone attacks on RSF strongholds and supply lines in Greater Darfur, including strikes at the Adré border crossing in Al-Geneina (West Darfur) and in Nyala (South Darfur). Greater Darfur is also experiencing rising intercommunal clashes and looting amid the proliferation of armed groups and breakdown in traditional systems of governance, with pastoralist attacks on farmers and traders underscoring intensifying ethnic resource competition.

Military escalation in Greater Kordofan and North Darfur is driving waves of displacement under severe risk to personal safety, while simultaneously restricting civilian movement and humanitarian access. Since October 25, nearly 65,000 people have been displaced across Greater Kordofan, with thousands fleeing near-daily attacks around Dilling, Kadugli, and in locations around El-Obeid. Most are moving to locations within the Kordofan region, as well as to Kosti of White Nile, Khartoum, and across the border into South Sudan. Meanwhile, North Darfur remains an epicenter of displacement in Greater Darfur. The recent attacks in Um Baru and Kernoi forced over 7,000 to flee, many of whom were likely previously displaced from Al-Fasher. Registration of all those who fled Al-Fasher continues, and is estimated at over 107,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and over 11,000 who have fled to Chad. Tawila (North Darfur) continues to hold one of the largest concentrations of IDPs, and while humanitarians are actively responding, the needs far exceed capacity amid the rising disease burden. In other areas of Greater Darfur, rising intercommunal conflict is causing additional displacement, as evidenced by the displacement of over 200 people in Kass (South Darfur). In addition, thousands seen as hostile to RSF and allied groups have reportedly been detained and are being held in dire conditions. Across the country, women and girls face exceedingly high protection risks with reports of assault and detainment by RSF in multiple areas. In addition, areas receiving IDPs face acute shortages of shelter, water, sanitation, and protection services, while communications blackouts and bureaucratic impediments hinder coordination and response.

The attacks at Heglig oil fields in early December pose another serious risk to an already collapsing economy. While the area is currently stabilized and oil is reportedly flowing, the risk of renewed conflict further disrupting operations remains high. Meanwhile, fuel shortages, soaring transport costs, and conflict dynamics continue to disrupt market functionality and economic opportunities in the area, driving high price volatility amid deteriorating purchasing capacity. In calmer areas, the price of sorghum and millet is expected to stabilize slightly in December with the arrival of harvests but remain far above average. In contrast, food prices remain exorbitantly high in heavily conflict-affected and besieged areas, exacerbated by conflict disruptions to production and trade flows, as well as a recent ban on the movement of goods from Northern State along informal routes. In the face of these shortages, high costs, displacement, and erosion of wage opportunities, household purchasing power continues to plummet, forcing families to ration consumption, substitute with lower‑quality foods, and liquidate assets. 

Household access to own production continues to be undermined by the conflict. Sudan’s main summer crop harvest (November-–January) is expected to be overall below average, and significantly below average in conflict hotspots due to displacement, restricted field access, livestock damage, theft, and abandonment under siege. Agricultural labor opportunities, typically an important source of income in December amid the main harvesting season, remain limited by reduced demand from below-average cultivation and insecurity. 

Humanitarian food assistance

While no data are available on humanitarian activities in December, WFP reported assisting 3 million people with general food assistance in November, compared to 3.3 million in October, though 70 percent higher than the same period in 2024. The number receiving in-kind food assistance decreased from 2.6 million in October to 1.8 million in November, with the concurrent increase in cash-based assistance, particularly in areas where access to markets and market functionality are more consistent. For IDPs still fleeing Al-Fasher, WFP increased in-kind assistance in their current location of displacement, particularly in parts of North Darfur, Northern, Khartoum, and River Nile states. Humanitarian access to parts of North Darfur remains limited by insecurity, with the largest response effort in Tawila amid high levels of displacement. Local assistance response efforts in surrounding areas, such as in Korma and at a growing displacement camp in rural Al-Fasher, are ongoing, though details on service and assistance provision are unknown. Key informants report initiation of some nutrition responses in Um Baru and Kernoi in reaction to the extremely high acute malnutrition prevalence, though this is also likely to be limited by ongoing insecurity and displacement. Access to the Kordofans also remains highly disrupted amid the escalating conflict (of those assisted in November, less than 10 percent were in the Greater Kordofan region). Moreover, an inter-agency convoy of 16 trucks scheduled for Dilling and Kadugli was postponed due to security concerns. Overall, humanitarian access continues to be undermined by insecurity, supply disruptions, bureaucratic impediments, and funding challenges, with the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) only 36 percent funded.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the Sudan Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• The central processing facility at Heglig oil fields is expected to remain largely functional through the projection period, given the mutual interest of all parties in sustaining the oil flow and associated revenues. However, there is an elevated risk that fighting may re-erupt around the oil fields and impede the processing and export of oil (Annex 1).
• Greater Kordofan is expected to remain the nexus of conflict activity at least through May 2026, with the SAF and the RSF concentrating manpower and weaponry on North and South Kordofan. While a decisive breakthrough that would significantly shift the frontline east or west is unlikely through January 2026, sieges on El-Obeid, Dilling, and Kadugli are expected to intensify in the coming months. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• The government extended the opening of the Adré border crossing between Chad and West Darfur through mid-February 2026. The crossing is a critical access point for humanitarian actors to transport food and nutrition supplies into Sudan. However, attacks such as the drone strikes in Al-Geneina town and at the border crossing on December 5 highlight ongoing concerns about the use of the border for military reinforcements and the likelihood of continued insecurity that will interfere with humanitarian operations. 

Amid the ever-tightening sieges, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to be ongoing in Kadugli, and possibly ongoing in Dilling through January; in both towns, Famine will possibly persist through May. Extreme outcomes are also likely accelerating rapidly in the surrounding areas of the western Nuba Mountains (parts of rural Dilling, Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut) amid the rapid, near-daily intensification of fighting and displacement. It is possible that these already high levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality will surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds in the western Nuba Mountains area between February and May.

In Al-Fasher town of North Darfur, a recent UN-led assessment confirmed that the vast majority of civilians have either fled or died since the fall of the town in late October; fewer than 10,000 civilians are understood to remain in the city, which is the threshold for classification of Famine (IPC Phase 5). However, the outflow of tens of thousands of the starving, malnourished people from Al-Fasher town into surrounding areas of North Darfur that are concurrently experiencing waves of conflict has led to a surge of people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in these other parts of the State. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) is extremely high – recent SMART surveys conducted in Um Baru and Kernoi (North Darfur) in mid-December found that the GAM prevalence among children under five had surged above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold, reaching 54 and 34 percent, respectively, based on weight-for-height z-score. Of these malnourished children, 18 percent had Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in Um Baru – associated with a higher likelihood of death. The SMART surveys also found crude mortality rates of 1.4 and 0.61 deaths per 10,000 people per day in Um Baru and Kernoi, respectively. While deaths are expected to escalate in this context of severe hunger and acute malnutrition, highly volatile displacement dynamics create uncertainty about whether the concentration of malnourished people in these locations is or will be sustained long enough to result in high levels of hunger-related mortality that exceed the threshold (≥2.0 deaths/10,000 people/day) for Famine (IPC Phase 5). What is clear is that, in multiple areas of North Darfur – including among IDPs who have fled Al-Fasher and those displaced by ongoing conflict in the state’s northwestern areas – many people have already died from extreme, life-threatening hunger, and many more are at imminent risk of death without immediate food and nutrition assistance. 

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be widespread across most of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan through May. Some populations are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among IDPs and in the areas experiencing the highest on-the-ground fighting. Additional SMART surveys conducted in November and December continue to show Critical (≥15 percent) levels of GAM persisting into the harvest period, including in Al Tine of North Darfur (19.7 percent) and Rahaid Albirdi of South Darfur (21.6 percent). Of highest concern are populations in Sheikan, Bara, Gharb Bara, and Um Dam Haj Ahmed of North Kordofan; northern and central South Kordofan; northern localities of West Kordofan through which the main route from Greater Darfur passes (Wad Banda, An-Nuhud, Al-Khiwai), and in areas receiving IDPs from Babanusa and around Heglig (such as Abyei/Al Muglad of West Kordofan). The severe disruption of harvesting, trade flows, and humanitarian access, combined with the scale of displacement, re-displacement, and associated loss of assets, will accelerate the seasonal depletion of households’ own-produced food stocks, while undermining market access amid rising prices and erosion of purchasing power.

Across the eastern states, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will remain widespread through the projection period. In the southeastern areas, food stocks are expected to begin depleting through the post-harvest and pre-lean periods through May, with some facing more rapid depletion given the wide variability in household access to land, inputs, and services during the most recent agricultural season. Recent SMART surveys in November and December confirm the malnutrition situation remains Serious (10-14.9 percent) to Critical (15-29.9 percent) in some eastern areas despite ongoing harvests, amid the destruction of healthcare systems, high levels of displacement, and slow pace of recovery despite relative calm. Across Northern and River Nile states of northern Sudan, needs will begin to decline with the arrival of the winter wheat harvest in March/April, a primary source of food and income in these areas. Newly displaced populations fleeing conflict in Greater Kordofan and North Darfur and arriving in White Nile, Northern, and Khartoum states are of high concern, with some expected to be facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Conflict erupts over the Heglig oil fields and leads to the prolonged disruption of oil flow and processing

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If conflict erupts again at the Heglig oil facilities, the impact of lost revenue for the government and SAF will further accelerate the collapse of the Sudan economy, depriving Sudan’s government of vital transit fees and direct income. This would likely also trigger further depreciation of the local currency, leading to extremely high food prices and a soaring cost of living across the entire country, including the SAF-held areas that have seen some stabilization in prices. Consequently, many households would face large to extreme food consumption gaps, deepening the severity of acute food insecurity countrywide such that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread.

El- Obeid town in Sheikan locality, North Kordofan 

Siege conditions in El-Obeid intensify at a faster pace than expected

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the siege of El-Obeid would intensify and tighten at a faster pace than currently expected, leading to more severe reductions in trade flows and humanitarian access, driving large-scale displacement, and increasingly cutting off some populations within the town from food and income sources. If this were to occur by February, then it is likely that levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds during the February-May pre-lean season period.

 Rural areas in South Kordofan

Intensification of the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli leads to spillover effects in surrounding rural areas of South and West Kordofan 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which Famine (IPC Phase 5) will occur more rapidly in areas of the rural western Nuba Mountains (rural Dilling, and parts of Habila, Al-Lagowa, and As-Sunut) than February-May. This would occur if the RSF focuses its attention on intensively tightening the sieges of Dilling and Kadugli, thereby increasing troop presence in the surrounding rural areas, particularly around Dilling. This increase in conflict and insecurity would result in severe restrictions on trader, humanitarian, and population mobility in rural areas; disruptions in access to food and income sources during the harvest and post-harvest period; and likely looting of already marginal harvest stocks and market supplies. In this scenario, levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality would escalate more rapidly than currently expected and would likely breach the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds in a matter of weeks, given the current share of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and high levels of acute malnutrition. 

In other neighboring areas of South Kordofan, the intensification of the two sieges would result in a rapid increase in displacement deeper into rural areas (rural Kadugli, Al-Buram, Heiban, Delami, Ar-Reif Ash Shargi), as well as a more rapid depletion of available harvests. These factors would likely contribute to an expansion of area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with an increase in populations experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the typical harvest and post-harvest period (October-January). The rapid exhaustion of harvests and increase in conflict-driven disruptions to trade flows, humanitarian access, and population mobility would lead to high levels of starvation between February and May. This would in turn drive levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality beyond the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds. 

Greater Darfur

Deepening of intercommunal clashes and RSF escalation in North Darfur beyond the expected level and scope around areas hosting a high number of IDPs in Greater Darfur

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which RSF’s targeted attacks on IDPs and/or escalation of intercommunal fighting is sustained at an intensity that obstructs humanitarian access, disrupts trade flows, population movements, and community support, and triggers displacement and re-displacement across Greater Darfur. Displacement into already overcrowded areas/IDP camps with extremely poor water, sanitation, and health services and already high disease incidence would fuel further outbreaks and exacerbate acute malnutrition. If this were to occur, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be the likely outcome. This risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is assessed in areas with high concentrations of IDPs, particularly those that are receiving the most recent waves of displacements from Al-Fasher town, including rural Al-Fasher, Melit, Um Baru, Kernoi, and Tawila. Many of those fleeing Al-Fasher are arriving in a state of starvation and acute malnourishment. The risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also present in crowded camps in parts of South Darfur (Nyala, Beliel, Buram, Gereida, and Tulus).

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.