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Source: FEWS NET
In August, the intensification of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)-led siege of Al Fasher, North Darfur, and occurrence of flash floods are likely exacerbating extreme levels of acute food insecurity in Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), where Famine (IPC Phase 5)1 is ongoing, and in nearby Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps, where it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5)2 is ongoing. Populations who are facing increasingly dire shortages of food, medicine, and other essential supplies under protracted siege conditions are now also facing the wettest rainy season of the 40-year historical record, leading to flash floods that are further endangering household access to food and driving disease outbreaks. Unless immediate action is taken to end the fighting and meaningfully reduce bureaucratic impediments that hinder humanitarian access and the flow of food and nutrition assistance across conflict frontlines, the impact of these shocks will continue to result in alarmingly high levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality, now and in the coming months.
Outside of the IDP camps in Al Fasher, there are multiple additional areas that face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), including the rest of Al Fasher locality in North Darfur, parts of West Darfur and Khartoum, and areas with high concentrations of IDPs across Greater Darfur and in Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan. Many host and IDP households in these areas already face large to extreme food consumption gaps indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Acute malnutrition is visibly widespread among children and adults, and deaths are occurring due to hunger, disease, or the interaction of the two: recent data collected by clinics in parts of Central and South Darfur where Mercy Corps is providing cash assistance indicate extremely high acute malnutrition levels among children of families who sought medical services. While there are limitations on the data’s representativeness, it converges with ground reports that starvation is pervasive. The record-setting rainfall season, which has led to widespread flooding in many of these same areas, is compounding the impacts of protracted conflict by causing additional displacement; destroying crops, property, and infrastructure; disrupting remaining livelihood activities; escalating disease outbreaks that are likely worsening malnutrition; and constraining already very low flows of commercial food and humanitarian food aid. Given that data collection is increasingly difficult amid these shocks and bureaucratic and logistical constraints, humanitarian and government actors should not wait for confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in other areas of Sudan before taking immediate action to facilitate large-scale, sustained delivery of assistance that saves lives.
- The RSF-led siege on the town continued through August, with escalating fighting and heavy civilian casualties, including in Abu Shouk camp on August 25. The intensity of fighting is continuing to cut off trade flows and humanitarian access, prevent population movements, and limit engagement in livelihood activities (including cultivation and agricultural labor). According to satellite imagery analysis by Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), by late August, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)-controlled territory had shrunk to its lowest levels since the siege began, with reports of RSF mobilization for a new attack, likely even on Zamzam camp itself in the coming months. RSF has reportedly established additional checkpoints on the B26 road between Al Fasher and Zamzam camp, further limiting mobility. The fighting also expanded to Al Koma, Kebkabiya, and Kutum in August, as each side sought to disrupt the other’s supply lines.
- Heavy rains between July 23 and 25 and again between August 12 and 17 caused massive flooding that affected both Zamzam and Abu Shouk camps. In total, nearly 2,000 households were re-displaced and their homes destroyed. Additionally, hundreds of latrines in the camps were destroyed and thousands were damaged, further worsening sanitation conditions. According to satellite imagery analysis conducted by Yale HRL, the flooding in late July affected nine out of 13 identified water points in Zamzam and flooded multiple latrines, likely contaminating the primary water sources in the camp and increasing the risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera.
- Humanitarian access to the area remains extremely limited, obstructed by insecurity, active conflict, flooding, and bureaucratic and administrative impediments. On August 15, SAF agreed to reopen the Adré border crossing between Chad and West Darfur for three months; however, aid flows remain impeded by burdensome administrative processes and rainy season conditions. The collapse of four critical bridges in West Darfur due to flooding in August – three in El Geneina town and one along the main road connecting West Darfur to the rest of Greater Darfur – is hindering convoy movement. Heavy rains have also severely limited flows through the Al Tine border crossing from Chad to North Darfur, stranding more than 30 WFP trucks in early August. Fighting and heavy rains have cut off east-to-west routes from Port Sudan through Al Deba to North Darfur. Partners on the ground in Zamzam report that nutrition supplies have dwindled, requiring prioritization of treatment of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) cases at the expense of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM). Lack of optimal MAM treatment is likely to drive increased cases of SAM, as well as SAM relapses, associated with a heightened risk that acutely malnourished children will either die or endure longer-term developmental problems.
- In August, direct fighting continued in multiple areas that face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), including in Dilling and Kadugli of South Kordofan and in Khartoum. In Dilling, clashes escalated as SAF attempted to break the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)’s siege on their supply lines. Kadugli similarly remains besieged as RSF obstructs key routes. With commercial flows from South Sudan into South Kordofan increasingly restricted due to flooding, market supplies are severely limited and food prices in markets such as Kadugli are among the highest in Sudan. Food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition are likely worsening in and around Dilling, Kadugli, and parts of SPLM-N controlled areas, driven by very low household purchasing power, high levels of displacement, and conflict-induced restrictions on the population’s ability to search for food, access services, or move to safer areas. Meanwhile, in Khartoum, fighting persists in downtown Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri. RSF continues to besiege SAF areas, impacting mobility and trade flows in adjacent civilian neighborhoods. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) remains widespread in Khartoum, with some households likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
- With the exception of Al Fasher locality in North Darfur, direct violent clashes currently remain low in Greater Darfur. However, the protracted impacts of the conflict on food production and trade flows – combined with severe flooding that is further displacing and re-displacing populations, disrupting cultivation, and cutting off already low flows of trade and humanitarian assistance – are likely driving worsening acute food insecurity as the lean season peaks in August/ September. Data on food security, nutrition, and mortality is (and will likely remain) limited, given increased government restrictions on data collection. However, indicative data collected in July by Mercy Corps-supported clinics in Un Dukhun, Bendasi, Mukjar, Wadi Salih, and Zalingei of Central Darfur, as well as in Al Radoum, East Jabel Marrah, and Nyala of South Darfur, illustrate the severity of hunger in multiple areas. While the children screened were brought by families who actively visited the clinics seeking services (and are thus not representative of the broader communities), the data indicate exceedingly high acute malnutrition rates. In some clinics, nearly a quarter of screened children had SAM, and clinic staff reported estimates of four to five children dying each day from malnutrition-related causes. This converges with Reuters investigative reporting in June of atypically rapid cemetery growth near five IDP camps in Greater Darfur – two of which were in South Darfur – where community leaders attributed additional deaths to malnutrition and disease.
- Since June, cumulative rainfall has ranged from average to significantly above average across the country. Most of North and West Darfur, some northern areas of Central Darfur, and areas along the northern band stretching across North Kordofan, Northern, River Nile, Red Sea, and Kassala are experiencing the wettest rainy season on the 40-year historical record. Severe floods have ensued, and the UN estimates 434,624 people have been affected, nearly half of whom (about 205,000) are located in Greater Darfur.
- The heavy rains and flooding are exacerbating already significant trade flow disruptions and market supply (Figure 2). In Greater Darfur, the flood-related collapse of critical infrastructure is leading to further reductions in commercial food supply and humanitarian access. In South Kordofan, routes to Dilling and Kadugli remain severely impacted by the continued fighting and siege-like conditions, while heavy rains and flooding have cut off roads, limiting access to cross-border trade flows from South Sudan. The reduction in flow of food and goods is driving prices upward, with month-on-month increases of 35-65 percent in the Darfur capital cities, 200-300 percent above just six months ago. This is likely exacerbating severe to extreme food consumption gaps among households in these areas.
- Crop cultivation in most of the traditional rainfed sector – particularly across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan – is limited by widespread insecurity and displacement that has reduced access to farms. Cropping conditions analysis by FEWS NET partners at NASA and USGS in July suggests an increase in fallow uncultivated areas compared to pre-war conditions, though farmers are engaging in land preparation to the extent possible. Key informants corroborate cultivation is below normal. In areas affected by direct confrontations between RSF and SAF (particularly in North Darfur) and between SAF, RSF, and SPLM-N in areas of South Kordofan, key informants report widespread reductions in area planted. Overall, area planted in rainfed areas is expected to be significantly below average while crop performance is likely to be negatively impacted by heavy rains, flooding, intensive grass growth, and shortages of/high cost of labor, limiting farmers capacity to weed or manage pest infestations.
- With the opening of the Adré border, 38 humanitarian trucks carrying 1,250 metric tons of supplies crossed between August 19 and 26, targeting nearly 119,000 people located mostly in West Darfur and some localities in Central Darfur. Eight WFP trucks were destined for Sirba and Kereneik of West Darfur, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are currently expected and there is a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). According to the UN, 131 trucks have been approved to cross the border, with WFP reporting in late August that enough food and nutrition supplies for around 500,000 people are ready to be transported. However, new bureaucratic impediments imposed by the government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, coupled with insecurity and damage to critical road infrastructure by heavy rainfall, highlight the persistent challenges affecting the delivery of consistent and adequate aid.
Note: The flooded area is aggregated from VIIRS 5-day composite flood products where pixels contained at least 25 percent inundation. However, due to persistent cloud cover in some areas, particularly over the western Darfur region, the flooded area may miss flash flooding events and may be an underestimation of the true extent of inundation.
Source: Source: FEWS NET using data from NOAA VIIRS and ACLED
- As of the end August, active fighting has expanded along key frontlines across the country, resulting in further displacement and disruption to trade flows and livelihood activities. Total population displacement has risen to 10.7 million IDPs and 2.3 million people forced to flee across borders. In the southeast, clashes have escalated considerably, with new fronts opening in Sennar, White Nile state, and parts of Blue Nile state. SAF has intensified operations to retake Jebel Moya and surrounding villages in Sennar; the RSF has launched attacks on Bayda village of Ad Dinder locality in Sennar and in several villages in Al Gitaina locality of White Nile state, resulting in additional displacement and tensions around Kosti (White Nile). In Blue Nile state, RSF reportedly attacked Gulli village of At Tadamon locality as clashes renewed between the SPLA (Joseph Tagu faction) and SAF in Dindiro town of Al Kurmuk locality, resulting in new displacements.
- Between June 1 and August 26, IOM DTM reported 77 incidents of heavy rains and flooding that displaced nearly 137,000 people across 14 states, approximately half of whom were previously displaced due to conflict. The states with the most displacement due to flooding were in River Nile (57,560), North Darfur (20,575), West Darfur (20,025), Northern (12,245), and Red Sea (11,425). The collapse of the Arba’at Dam on August 25 has likely been the deadliest incident with some estimating over 130 people killed. The record levels of flooding have destroyed or partially damaged thousands of homes; washed away critical infrastructure including bridges, dams, and roads; disrupted farming and livelihood activities; and contaminated drinking water sources for thousands, facilitating the rapid spread of waterborne diseases including cholera, malaria, dengue fever, and others. According to WHO, the July 22 outbreak of cholera has spread to five eastern states of Kassala, Gedaref, River Nile, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum and led to 2,895 cases and 112 deaths as of September 1.
- Across the country, crop cultivation has been significantly disrupted by the ongoing conflict and associated massive displacement; lack of access to, scarcity of, and high cost of inputs; and the impact of the heavy rains and flooding. As a result, moderate to very large crop production deficits are expected. In the semi-mechanized and irrigated sector of central and eastern Sudan (the historical agricultural breadbaskets), cultivation is significantly disrupted by ongoing fighting and insecurity in most of Al Jazirah and Sennar states, as well as in parts of Blue Nile. In Al Jazirah, the expected scale of decline in cultivation has significant implications for the national harvest. While relatively better cultivation is ongoing in Gedaref and calmer parts of Blue Nile, area cultivated in these areas is nonetheless expected to be below average. In Kassala state, near normal cultivation has been reported in Halfa Al Gaddeda irrigated scheme, as well as in the rainfed areas of rural Kassala; however, available field information indicated that farmers have cultivated more cash crops than cereal. According to the State Ministry of Agriculture, farmers are being encouraged to maximize cultivation in Delat Algash flood retreat irrigated scheme, where cultivation normally starts in September after flood waters recede.
- Macroeconomic conditions continue to deteriorate, driven by the impacts of conflict on the economy. From June to August, the Sudanese pound (SDG) depreciated further from 1,647 SDG/USD to 1,855 SDG/USD on the official market and from 1,904 SDG/USD to 2,500 SDG/USD on the parallel market. According to the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), inflation has risen from a pre-war rate of 48 percent in March 2023 to 194 percent in July.
- Unprecedented increases in cereal prices were observed in August across nearly all reporting markets. On average, sorghum and millet prices in main markets increased by 65 percent compared to last month, 180-210 percent compared to just six months ago (March 2024), and 310-365 percent compared to the same time last year (August 2023). Locally produced wheat prices increased on average by 60, 135, and 245 percent for the same reference periods. When combined with high inflation, reductions in income-earning opportunities and poor wage rates, purchasing capacity steeply declined in August: the labor-to-sorghum and goat-to-sorghum terms of trade declined on average 34 and 31 percent compared to last month, and 71 and 56 percent compared to last year, respectively.
- Countrywide, the humanitarian food and nutrition assistance response remains woefully inadequate relative to the scale of need, despite the determination of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in part of North Darfur and multiple warnings of a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in numerous additional areas. In June, WFP reached a total of 2.6 million people with food (2.3 million people) and cash (about 350,000 people), but just 1.3 million people in July (810,000 people receiving food and nearly 500,000 receiving cash). Humanitarian access is limited by ongoing bureaucratic and administrative barriers, conflict and insecurity, and heavy rains and flooding. Beneficiaries reached in July represent less than 10 percent of the estimated population in need. Moreover, funding remains insufficient, with the Humanitarian Response Plan still just 41 percent funded as of August.
Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Sudan Alert September 5, 2024: Famine (IPC Phase 5) continues in part of Al Fasher amid conflict and flooding, 2024.
The classification of “Famine (IPC Phase 5) with reasonable evidence” as assigned to Zamzam camp is used if there is clear evidence that two of the three thresholds for Famine have been reached and analysts reasonably assess from the broader body of evidence that the threshold for the third outcome has likely been reached. In addition, the IPC Famine Review Committee has determined the analysis and classification are plausible.
The reference to “possible” Famine is not an IPC classification. FEWS NET uses this description when direct evidence is unavailable or insufficient to conclude if the technical definition of Famine (IPC Phase 5) has been met, but the broader body of evidence suggests it is possible Famine is occurring.
FEWS NET will publish an Alert to highlight a current or anticipated shock expected to drive a sharp deterioration in food security, such that a humanitarian food assistance response is imminently needed.