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Key Message Update January - May 2026 Famine remains possible despite siege breakthrough in South Kordofan Download the report
  • As of January, Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Kadugli town and is possibly ongoing in Dilling town of South Kordofan. The siege of Dilling broke at the end of January, and a break in the siege of Kadugli is imminent.[i] While this may bring temporary relief to residents, it remains possible that Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist through May in the absence of a ceasefire and sustained humanitarian access. It is expected that the towns will remain heavily contested, and the risk is high that renewed siege-like conditions will be re-established between February and May. Moreover, the arrival of high numbers of displaced persons into the surrounding rural areas of the Western Nuba Mountains near Dilling – combined with heavy troop presence and insecurity, marginal and depleting harvests, and disrupted trade flows – will possibly drive outcomes to surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds by May.
  • In parts of northwestern North Darfur, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes were already ongoing, the outflow of tens of thousands of starving, malnourished people from Al-Fasher town since its fall in late October – combined with recent conflict and displacement – has led to a surge in the share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), especially in Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) has surpassed the weight-for-height threshold (≥30 percent) for Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Um Baru (53 percent) and Kernoi (34 percent), and is critically high in At-Tine (19 percent). Recent food security and nutrition assessments in the area point to growing food consumption deficits as households increasingly skip meals and reduce portion sizes, placing heavy strain on community support mechanisms. Without immediate access to food and nutrition assistance, populations in these areas face an elevated risk of starvation, acute malnutrition, and death.
  • Widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist in January and are expected to spread across the rest of North Darfur and parts of Greater Darfur, as well as in other heavily contested parts of Greater Kordofan, between February and May. Some populations are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the recently displaced and re-displaced in North and South Kordofan and North and South Darfur. In these severely conflict-affected areas, own-produced food stocks are expected to deplete atypically early, and households will increasingly rely on markets and thinly stretched community support. Trade flows are expected to be impeded by insecurity, bans on movement of goods, and sustained high fuel costs, while income sources remain limited, further eroding household purchasing capacity.
  • FEWS NET assesses a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in parts of North Darfur (rural Al-Fasher, Melit, Um Baru, Kernoi, and Tawila); areas with high concentrations of displaced people in South Darfur and South Kordofan, particularly in areas receiving displaced populations fleeing Kadugli and Dilling towns; and in El-Obeid of North Kordofan. These areas already have high levels of hunger and acute malnutrition in the harvesting and post-harvest period and face severe disruptions in their ability to access food and income. Widespread sharing of already reduced harvests and limited resources is expected to accelerate the depletion of stocks and drive Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes in the most likely scenario. If escalating conflict further cuts off trade and humanitarian access, restricts population mobility, and isolates populations from local food sources, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.
  • The sieges of Kadugli and Dilling and the partial siege of El-Obeid intensified from December to late January. Coordinated operations by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) – including shelling, drone strikes, and road blockades – deepened the isolation of the towns, triggering mass displacement while leaving tens of thousands trapped tens of thousands trapped amid food shortages and restricted movement. In late January, a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) counter-offensive from the east succeeded in re-capturing Habila and broke the siege of Dilling, before continuing onward to Kadugli. The breakthrough is reportedly enabling the arrival of some commercial supplies. However, access is likely to be volatile as the area remains heavily contested, and joint RSF-SPLM-N forces are expected to seek to regain control. The RSF has already launched renewed ground attacks on Habila and drone strikes on Dilling. Meanwhile, clashes and drone strikes in and around El-Obeid (North Kordofan) has escalated as both sides seek to establish control over the critical logistics and supply corridors linking the city with towns to the east and south.
  • Fighting escalated in December and January in Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tine localities (North Darfur), a region northwest of Al-Fasher that has received many displaced from Al-Fasher town since its fall in October. The RSF continued to pursue SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces, engaging in direct clashes while also burning entire villages, looting livestock and property, and killing civilians. In one particularly brutal attack in Kernoi in late December, the Sudan Doctors Network reported that more than 200 people, including women and children, were killed. Active conflict and insecurity are hindering efforts to respond to high levels of hunger and acute malnutrition in the area.
  • In the Southeast, fresh clashes erupted between SAF and joint RSF-SPLM-N troops in the Malkan and Al-Sillik areas of Blue Nile for the first time since the RSF withdrawal from central Sudan in early 2025. With ongoing troop deployments near the South Sudan and Ethiopia borders, attacks are continuing and are expected to increase in Blue Nile through at least May. Meanwhile, on January 12, a RSF drone also struck the SAF 17th Division headquarters in Sinja (Sennar State), marking a continuation of their drone campaign in parts of eastern Sudan that began in late 2025. While people are returning to eastern Sudan (an estimated 3.3 million returnees, according to a January 2026 International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix report), the rising threat from drone attacks and insecurity in main towns, combined with slow recovery in their places of origin, will likely curb the pace of returns. An estimated 4.4 million refugees still remain outside Sudan.  
  • Amid the escalating conflict, displacement has continued on a near-daily basis, particularly in Greater Kordofan and North Darfur. In Greater Kordofan, over 88,000 people were displaced over the course of three months (October 25-January 15), and the figure is now likely approaching 100,000 people based on new reports of large-scale displacements in Al-Quoz, Habila, and Ar-Reif Ash Shargi (South Kordofan); continued near-daily displacement out of Kadugli and Dilling towns; and high levels of displacement in El-Obeid. In North Darfur, the figure exceeded 127,000 internally displaced persons from Al-Fasher alone within the same period, combined with the additional displacement of about 19,000 people in northwestern North Darfur. People continue to flee to neighboring Chad, with cross-border arrivals for the same period estimated at over 25,000 people. Displaced populations have often experienced grave physical abuse, lost assets and access to food and income sources, and are heavily dependent on community support and humanitarian assistance. In gathering sites and camps, conditions are dire, with overcrowding exacerbating disease exposure and spread.  
  • Sudan’s economy remains exceedingly poor, marked by persistent hyperinflation and continued local currency depreciation. Annual inflation in Sudan eased to 68 percent in December 2025, down from 74 percent in November 2025, but remains exorbitant. Staple grain markets are particularly stressed due to supply and trade flow disruptions, driving sorghum and millet prices well above the five-year average. At the same time, the SDG value has declined precipitously, from 560 SDG/USD in 2023 to over 3,700 SDG/USD in 2025, losing its role as a functional currency. The parallel market dominates, with over 65 percent of transactions priced in foreign currencies. Government measures, including tighter import controls and raising the official exchange rate from 1,700 to 2,827 SDG, have failed to close the gap with the parallel rate. Rather, these adjustments contributed to inflation, eroded incomes, and undermined confidence, despite limited International Monetary Fund technical engagement.
  • Sudan’s 2025/26 main agricultural season is marked by the weak performance of both the main summer and winter wheat seasons. A below-average harvest is forecast for the main summer season cereal crops – sorghum and millet – due to the continued conflict and insecurity that disrupted planting and harvesting in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile. In the most severely conflict-affected areas, farmers fully abandoned their fields. More broadly, cultivated area has also been adversely impacted by fuel shortages and high input costs. Wheat production – with harvests expected in March and April – is also forecast to be below average due to reduced irrigation capacity amid fuel shortages and damaged infrastructure, coupled with the high cost of imported inputs (seeds, fertilizers). Reduced production in key production areas is increasing Sudan’s reliance on imports at a time of sharp currency depreciation.
  • Active conflict and escalating drone strikes, insecurity, bureaucratic impediments, and insufficient funding for the scale of needs continue to constrain the humanitarian response in Sudan. In December 2025, WFP reached 1.9 million people with in-kind assistance and an additional 1.2 million people with cash-based transfers, concluding a year in which total assistance deliveries nearly doubled compared to 2024. Nevertheless, needs continue to far outstretch the scale of the response, with December distributions reaching less than 20 percent of the population in need. Humanitarian access to the besieged towns of Dilling and Kadugli has remained cut off since a one-off distribution in late October. Insecurity and drone strikes along the Chad-Sudan border are also disrupting humanitarians’ ability to respond to rising needs in North Darfur. Bureaucratic impediments – including checkpoints, informal costs, administrative procedures, permit delays, and onerous administrative procedures – continue to constrain operations. 
 Read the full analysis
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Food Security Classification data View all Sudan Food Security Classification data
Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification

Forward-looking analysis representing the most likely food security outcomes for the near term (December 2025 - January 2026) and medium term (February 2026 - May 2026) periods.

 Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification Shapefile December 2025 (.zip) Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification December 2025 (.geojson) Near Term Projection: December 2025 - January 2026 (.png) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.png) Near Term Projection: December 2025 - January 2026 (.kml) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.kml) Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification

Forward-looking analysis representing the most likely food security outcomes for the near term (November 2025 - January 2026) and medium term (February 2026 - May 2026) periods.

 Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification Shapefile November 2025 (.zip) Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification November 2025 (.geojson) Near Term Projection: November 2025 - January 2026 (.png) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.png) Near Term Projection: November 2025 - January 2026 (.kml) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.kml) Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification

Current (October 2025) food security outcomes and forward-looking analysis representing the most likely food security outcomes for the near term (October 2025 - January 2026) and medium term (February 2026 - May 2026) periods.

 Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification Shapefile October 2025 (.zip) Sudan Acute Food Insecurity Classification October 2025 (.geojson) Current Situation: October 2025 (.png) Near Term Projection: October 2025 - January 2026 (.png) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.png) Current Situation: October 2025 (.kml) Near Term Projection: October 2025 - January 2026 (.kml) Medium Term Projection: February 2026 - May 2026 (.kml)
Seasonal Calendar

The Seasonal Calendar shows the annual and cyclical patterns of key food and income sources in a country throughout the typical year.
Seasonal Calendar image showing harvest and rainy periods for Sudan
Production & Trade Flow Maps
FEWS NET captures the market networks for a product in a given country or region, including their catchments and trade flow patterns.
Sorghum, Normal Year Wheat, Normal Year Millet, Normal Year
Satellite-derived products map

USGS-provided data and imagery supports FEWS NET's monitoring efforts of weather and climate throughout the world.

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Livelihood Zone resources Sudan Livelihood Profiles 2014 Sudan Livelihood Profiles, North Kordofan, September 2013 Sudan Livelihoods Descriptions, August 2011 Sudan Livelihoods Zones Map
Sudan 2014 Livelihood Zones Map (.PNG)
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