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Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) likely to persist in Upper Nile through at least October

Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) likely to persist in Upper Nile through at least October

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  • Key Messages
  • Key Messages
    • South Sudan faces widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and worse outcomes characterized by extremely high levels of hunger and acute malnutrition. The areas of highest concern are in the Greater Upper Nile Region (comprising Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity states, as well as Greater Pibor Administrative Area), with particular concern for counties hosting large numbers of refugee and returnee populations. In the absence of improved humanitarian access and a significant scale-up of multisectoral assistance, it is expected that atypically high levels of hunger-related mortality will occur in areas with a high share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), especially within the Upper Nile-Jonglei border region. Food security conditions are expected to deteriorate through at least October, when the rainy season begins to subside and the harvest starts to become available.
    • risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Nasir and Ulang counties of Upper Nile State. In the most likely scenario, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are expected through January, driven by the impacts of conflict, insecurity, and interannual floods, and compounded by a cholera outbreak and a delay in the green harvest typically available in August. By mid-August, WFP had delivered food assistance intended for nearly 30 percent of the population of Nasir and Ulang, but the reliance on airdrops in Nasir necessitated by ongoing insecurity remains difficult and costly. If seasonal floods and conflict converge to further isolate the population from accessing food sources and worsen disease prevalence, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely be the credible alternative outcome.
    • Close monitoring of the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also warranted in Baliet, Fashoda, Malakal, and Panyikang counties of Upper Nile; Canal/Pigi and Fangak counties of Jonglei; and Greater Pibor Administrative Area (Pibor) as well as in counties bordering Sudan that are hosting a large share of the returnee/refugee households. Conflict and insecurity, anticipated flooding, poor economic conditions, and the ongoing cholera outbreak are continuing to drive very high levels of hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality; furthermore, delays in green harvests and significant funding shortfalls are limiting the degree of amelioration from seasonal and humanitarian sources of food. While Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are currently expected, there is a credible scenario in which floods and conflict converge to further isolate populations from life-saving food, nutrition, and health assistance and result in Famine (IPC Phase 5).
    • Between January and July 2025, a rising incidence of violent events contributed to the internal displacement of an estimated 355,000 people countrywide (up 25 and 40 percent compared to the same period last year, respectively). Total internal displacements are up to nearly 2 million, in addition to the 1.2 million returnees and refugees who have fled the Sudan war. Insecurity also continues to disrupt humanitarian operations. In August, clashes in Nasir have continued to limit the scale-up of humanitarian operations, and insecurity along key river routes caused a 30-day delay in the arrival of a WFP convoy carrying 3,500 metric tons of food to parts of northern Jonglei and Upper Nile. In Tonj East (Warrap State) and Rumbek Center (Lakes State), intercommunal clashes and cattle raids have flared up again, causing deaths, disruption to livelihood activities, and interfering with assistance delivery in Tonj East. Localized conflict in Greater Equatoria Region (Morobo, Kajo-Keji, Yei, and Tambura) also displaced households and affected humanitarian access.  
    • While rainfall performance generally improved in August, early-season delays and poor rainfall in July caused crop water deficits. Reductions in harvest potential are expected in eastern and north-central areas, with particularly deep production deficits in parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei. At the same time, forecasted above-average rainfall for the remainder of the rainy season through September, on top of already elevated water extents in South Sudan and persistently high lake levels in Uganda, are driving projections of severe flooding (similar to or worse than 2024) peaking between September and October. As of July 31, OCHA estimated at least 122,000 people have already been affected by floods in Mayendit and Panyijiar (Unity) and Bor South (Jonglei). The number of affected has likely risen since then based on reports of flooding in early August in Twic East (Jonglei) and reports of dangerously high water levels in Rubkona (Unity), Panyijiar, Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Panyikang. Severe flooding is expected to negatively impact crop and livestock production, displace additional households, and raise the risk that people will become isolated from food sources.
    • Access to other sources of food, including livestock products, wild foods, and fish, is expected to remain seasonally high through January in areas where security permits. However, in conflict- and flood-affected areas of highest concern, such as Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, Malakal, Fashoda, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak, access is severely constrained. Livestock ownership – already greatly reduced by years of conflict, looting, and flooding – remains low, and productivity is further limited by the inadequate availability of veterinary services and insecurity-driven constraints on access to pasture. Key informants also report that insecurity is limiting household engagement in fishing and gathering wild foods in Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak, while a lack of gear and canoes is limiting fishing activity in Malakal, Baliet, and Fashoda.
    • Anticipated severe flooding threatens to worsen an already ongoing and accelerating cholera outbreak. Between the official onset of the outbreak in September 2024 and late August 2025, WHO reports more than 89,000 cholera cases and 1,500 deaths, with a case fatality rate of 1.7 percent. From August 10 to 24, 2025, over 1,000 cases and 22 deaths were reported, with the highest burden recorded in Unity, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Warrap. Displaced populations living in overcrowded sites and with poor water, health, and sanitation conditions are most at risk of illness, as well as those in areas where the risk of flooding is high. Unfortunately, disease surveillance and response efforts are expected to remain limited in the most heavily conflict-affected areas due to ongoing insecurity, funding cuts, and rainy season conditions.
    • Macroeconomic conditions remain poor amid the deepening cash liquidity crisis, despite the limited resumption of crude oil production and export via Port Sudan since April 2025. Lower global oil prices and poor oil revenue management are leading to limited hard currency supply, persistent currency depreciation, and a high cost of living. The exchange rate is 20 and 80 percent higher than the same time last year on the parallel and official markets, respectively. Although South Sudan is currently producing 100,000 barrels per day from the Paloich oil fields, the revenue is insufficient to service government debt and regularly pay civil servants. GDP is projected to contract by more than 30 percent in 2025, likely to further limit financial access to food for many poor households.
    • While market prices for staple grains are relatively stable, they remain significantly above normal and beyond the purchasing capacity of poor households. Based on available price monitoring data, the price of red sorghum per malwa (3.5 kg) in mid-August is similar to July prices in Juba and Aweil Centre due to supply from the first season harvest from Magwi and Yei counties and imports from Uganda. However, prices were 65-120 percent higher in Aweil Centre and 430-520 percent higher in Juba compared to the same time last year and the five-year average, respectively. An additional rapid market assessment conducted in two main markets in Juba in mid-August found that sorghum prices per malwa had dropped slightly, by 10-16 percent, compared to last month. While the availability of local harvests are likely the primary driver of the slight decline in prices, the persistently high prices are forcing poor households with poor purchasing capacity to rely on cheaper substitutes, contributing to lower demand for sorghum.
    • While WFP plans to reach 3.1 million people with food and cash assistance in August as part of the lean season response, ongoing insecurity is likely to limit the scale of delivery. In particular, ongoing insecurity in the Upper Nile-northern Jonglei area and the 30-day delay in moving of assistance destined for parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei have constrained delivery to-date into the areas of highest concern. By mid-August, the agency reportedly only 16 percent of targeted population was reached in the highest priority counties (about 10 percent of the total population in these counties), though distributions were yet to start in Malakal and Uror. In Nasir and Ulang, WFP anticipates continuing airdrops in Nasir and resuming limited river deliveries to parts of Ulang, as feasible. However, the known difficulties of targeting deliveries using airdrops, combined with persistent insecurity challenges, are likely to sustain below-target reach in the coming months. 

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. South Sudan Key Message Update August 2025: Risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) likely to persist in Upper Nile through at least October, 2025.

    This Key Message Update provides a high-level analysis of current acute food insecurity conditions and any changes to FEWS NET's latest projection of acute food insecurity outcomes in the specified geography. Learn more here.

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