Conflict and flooding drive Emergency outcomes, with risk of Famine in Nasir

• Food assistance needs remain extremely high in South Sudan at the start of the harvest in October, with 8.0-8.99 million people (55-60 percent of the population) in need of assistance. While 1.6 million people received food and cash assistance monthly in the lean season, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes persist in 67 counties, eight of which are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The key drivers are conflict, flood, and economic shocks, as well as a sustained, high returnee presence. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels among children under five are very high, exceeding a 15 percent prevalence in 39 counties. As the main harvest begins, needs are expected to decline to 7.0-7.99 million through January, before rising again prior to the lean season.
• Nasir (Upper Nile) and Fangak (Jonglei) are of highest concern, with some populations still experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in October. Concurrent conflict incidents and flooding have disrupted crop production and access to wild foods, while severely constraining humanitarian access. While food assistance distributions are ongoing and planned to continue, reaching the most acutely food insecure households in isolated areas remains challenging due to insecurity, which has driven humanitarians to rely on airdrops, particularly in southern Nasir. Some populations are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through at least May.
• From October to May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand to 27 counties. Levels of acute malnutrition are projected to surpass 15 percent GAM prevalence in 42 counties by May, with Extremely Critical levels expected in Nasir, Ulang, Baliet, Duk, Rubkona, and Abyei due to a combination of food and non-food factors. Food assistance is expected to prevent severe outcomes in eight areas, mapped in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!).
• A risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) will likely persist in Nasir through at least May. There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict escalates to levels similar to or worse than early 2025, obstructing food assistance and converging with floodwaters to isolate populations from local food sources. If this occurs, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be likely. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 23, 2025. 

South Sudan has endured a complex humanitarian crisis for over a decade, driven by recurrent, cyclical bouts of conflict, flooding, and displacement amid poor economic conditions. Following secession from Sudan in 2011, the country was mired in civil wars in 2013-2014 and again in 2016-2018 that led to the deaths of an estimated 400,000 people, displacement of 4.5 million people both internally and across borders, and the declaration of Famine in central Unity in 2017. The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) ended the civil wars and ushered in a transitional period, which has again been extended through December 2026 as the country remained unprepared to host planned elections in December 2024. Sub-national conflict has flared episodically since 2018, remaining a key driver of widespread acute food insecurity. In 2025, fighting has intensified periodically in parts of Upper Nile, northern Jonglei, and Warrap, as well as in parts of Greater Equatoria, and the security situation in these areas remains extremely volatile. 

Flooding has become a severe and recurring shock. Six consecutive years of severe-to-extreme flooding in 2019-2024 led to extensive displacement, asset loss, and, in conjunction with the impact of conflict in some areas, near-complete livelihoods collapse. Severe flooding is ongoing once again in 2025 as floodwaters increasingly fail to recede during the dry season, compounded by record-high upstream lake levels and episodic, high-intensity rainfall. Additionally, the impacts of conflict and livestock raids have driven shifts from pastoralism to agropastoralism in areas with marginal crop productivity, which has further raised household vulnerability to new shocks. In late 2020, the combination of conflict and flooding led to a second Famine classification in Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). Many areas of eastern and northern South Sudan have faced high and severe levels of acute food insecurity for the past five years or more. 

On top of the longstanding impacts of conflict and flooding, two and a half years of war in Sudan have resulted in the arrival of over 1.2 million returnees and refugees since April 2023. While evolving conflict dynamics in both countries in 2025 have led to some reverse flows back to Sudan, the scale of displacement in already acutely food-insecure areas with scarce resources and meager livelihood opportunities in South Sudan is placing high pressure on local communities. Many returnees are heavily dependent on relatives and host communities for their food needs, while others lack local knowledge and social networks to access support or establish sustainable livelihoods. 

Macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate, driving up the already high costs of living. The national economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports with little to no diversification, and it has been characterized by steadily deteriorating exchange rates and rising import inflation. Following years of poor maintenance and flooding of oil fields, already declining production was dramatically reduced in February 2024 by a rupture in one of the two main pipelines traversing Sudan to Port Sudan for export. Oil exports reportedly resumed in April 2025 but remain threatened by insecurity and drone attacks in Greater Kordofan Region, through which the pipeline passes. Prolonged non-payment of salaries, combined with elevated staple food prices, a cash liquidity crisis, and the high cost of living in general, continue to erode household purchasing power and drive low effective demand. As a result, poor households, particularly in the worst-affected areas, remain highly dependent on low levels of food assistance amid limited humanitarian funding.

These shocks have sustained high and severe levels of acute food insecurity during the main harvest and post-harvest periods (October-January), particularly in the unimodal north and east. Farming households in these areas typically begin land preparation ahead of the main rainy season (June-September), while livestock seasonally migrate to distant areas in search of pasture and water, reducing household access to livestock products. In bimodal areas in the south and west, crop production is notably higher and is supported by the March-May and June-September rains.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest South Sudan Food Security Outlook: October 2024 to May 2025
• Latest South Sudan Alert and Key Message Updates: August-September 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Conflict and insecurity remain key drivers of acute food insecurity, with several new or re-emerging hotspots in 2025. These locations are concentrated in Upper Nile (Laukpiny/Nasir [Nasir], Ulang, and Panyikang), northern Jonglei (Fangak and Canal/Pigi), parts of Greater Equatoria (Tambura and Nagero of Western Equatoria; Morobo of Central Equatoria), Warrap (Tonj East and North), and Abyei Administrative Area (Abyei). Over the course of this year, fighting has displaced tens of thousands of people, disrupted livelihood activities, placed constraints on humanitarian access, and undermined household access to food and income. 

Nasir remains of highest concern since conflict erupted in March 2025, particularly in the southern payams of Mandeng, Jikmir, Kurenge, and Burebiey. After a short lull, attacks between the South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO)/allied White Army elements have escalated again in recent months, further restricting humanitarian access (Figure 1). In nearby Canal/Pigi, Fangak, and Panyikang counties, SSPDF has similarly clashed with SPLA-IO White Army elements, resulting in additional displacements, disrupted assistance deliveries and trade along the Nile River, and looting of humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, conflict has declined in Ulang since the violence in March/April, remaining low through October.   

Other recent, notable escalations in conflict are occurring in Western Equatoria, Warrap, Unity, Abyei, and Wau. Armed clashes and road ambushes are rising in Western Equatoria, marked by fighting between the SSPDF and allied SPLA-IO/National Salvation Front (NAS) in Nagero, Tambura, and Mundri East. In late September, tensions between Azande and Balanda communities displaced 52,000 people from Tambura to Ezo and disrupted crop production, trade, and markets. In Greater Tonj of Warrap and neighboring Mayom of Unity, conditions remain volatile despite the easing of intercommunal violence between August and October. In Abyei, tensions are rising again following SSPDF-SPLA-IO clashes in Athony on October 7, which killed 14 (mostly soldiers) and disrupted livelihoods, trade flows, and delivery of humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, aerial bombardments in Jur River in October reportedly displaced some households to Wau town.  

Flooding and heavy rainfall have affected over 960,000 people and displaced 335,000 as of October 23, marking the sixth consecutive year of severe flooding. The majority of inundations this year occurred across Jonglei and Unity states, accounting for over 90 percent of the flood-affected population. Flooding in October alone affected an additional 368,000 people, mostly in Pibor, Fangak, Leer, and Koch. The floods have severely impacted trade flows, population mobility, livelihood activities, and access to food and income sources, with reports of destruction to homes and crops in 26 counties. With rainfall in October trending above average, floodwater levels are expected to remain high through early November, prolonging the adverse impacts on flood-affected populations. Standing water and exceedingly poor water, health, and sanitation (WASH) conditions, combined with the exposure of displaced populations to these conditions and limited access to health facilities, continue to drive disease outbreaks. As of October 23, over 78,000 cholera cases in 2025 have been confirmed, with a new outbreak reported in Aweil South. It is highly likely that cases are underreported elsewhere due to insecurity-related constraints on surveillance efforts.

Macroeconomic conditions remain poor, marked by a persistent liquidity crisis and substantial decline in the value of the local currency that are driving high commodity prices, a high cost of living, and low household purchasing power. According to the African Development Bank, South Sudan’s real GDP growth was projected to grow by about 4 percent during FY 2024/25. However, this follows a 27.6 percent contraction in 2023/24 due to the massive drop in oil production amid the Sudan war, mismanagement and corruption of oil and non-oil revenues, and limited economic diversification. High inflation and high demand for hard currency are expected to result in further SSP depreciation through the next fiscal year. By October, the SSP traded at 4,600 SSP/USD and 6,100 SSP/USD on official and parallel markets, respectively (a 54 and 33 percent decrease, respectively, compared to the same time last year). 

In the most conflict- and/or flood-affected areas of southern Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Unity, market functioning and trade flows remain significantly disrupted. These factors are compounding the effects of high import costs and poor market integration, driving up the costs of transporting food to import-dependent areas. Consequently, staple food prices remain exorbitantly high during the harvest and post-harvest period. Based on WFP’s price monitoring data, the price for imported white sorghum per malwa (3.5 kg) in September did not seasonally decline in Aweil Centre, Wau, and Juba, and prices were significantly higher than last year (25-117 percent) and the five-year average (120-190 percent).  

The presence of returnee and refugee populations from Sudan is also contributing to high food assistance needs in the northern states bordering Sudan. Since the beginning of 2025, over 260,000 people have arrived, while a reported 300,000 fled from South Sudan to Sudan. While the trend of arrivals from Sudan has been declining in 2025, nearly 20,000 people arrived in August and September each, and another 15,000 in October. The high degree of volatility in conflict and repeated instances of displacement are severely undermining the population’s capacity to cope with recurrent shocks.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance remains a critical lifeline for acutely food insecure conflict- and flood-affected people, of whom returnees and refugees are most in need of food assistance. However, the scale of assistance remains limited by humanitarian access constraints and funding shortfalls. WFP’s main 2025 Lean Season Response concluded by mid-October, reaching 2.1 million per month, of whom 1.6 million received direct food or cash assistance. The number of people who received assistance represents less than 25 percent of the estimated population in need at the peak of the lean season in August/September (Figure 2). Since September, WFP has transitioned to a Famine Prevention Response, targeting 311,712 people in six counties (Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, Panyikang, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak) where assistance deliveries were heavily disrupted during the lean season by conflict and flooding. At the end of September, less than a quarter of those targeted had been reached, as some of the most severely affected areas of southern Nasir, Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Panyikang are physically inaccessible.

 At the start of the harvesting period in October, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes remain widespread, with 60 counties (out of a total 80) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and eight in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). More than half of South Sudan’s population faces Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes in October. Similarly, GAM levels among children under five remain very high, with prevalences surpassing 15 percent in 39 counties. The most severe malnutrition levels are occurring in Nasir, Ulang, Duk, Rubkona, and Baliet, where prevalences meet or exceed 30 percent GAM by Weight-for-Height (WHZ) or 15 percent GAM by Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) due to a combination of low food intake, low dietary diversity, high disease prevalence, and other non-food factors.  

Nasir and Fangak remain counties of highest concern, with populations likely still experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in October. Concurrent conflict and flooding have significantly disrupted household engagement in crop production, fishing, and wild food gathering; destroyed limited harvests; and severely constrained humanitarian access, particularly in southern payams (Jikmir, Kurenge, and Mandeng), Burebiey in eastern Nasir, and in Old Fangak of Fangak. Exceedingly poor WASH conditions, exacerbated by persistent floodwaters, are sustaining high levels of waterborne diseases such as cholera. Combined with the severity of food consumption deficits, the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition is assessed to be extremely high, particularly in the most isolated areas. While there is limited recent data for these inaccessible areas, a survey in June/July in Nasir suggested very high levels of acute malnutrition (25.4 percent GAM MUAC). In Fangak, acute malnutrition was found to low, at 14 percent GAM WHZ, in July but is expected to have deteriorated amid severe recent flooding. Assistance is ongoing to both of these counties under WFP’s Famine Prevention Response, which has reached an estimated 10-30 percent of the county populations via airdrops and river routes. However, the targeting of the most food insecure households in isolated areas is being hampered by conflict and severe flooding; in southern Nasir in particular, several distribution sites remain inaccessible and humanitarians continue to face obstacles to airdrops. The presence of armed forces are actively preventing humanitarian access or directing it to Nasir town only. 

Ulang, Longochuk, and Panyikang of Upper Nile; Canal/Pigi and Twic East of Jonglei; and Pibor County of GPAA likewise remain of high concern due to the persistence of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Recurrent conflict and severe flooding between August and mid-October have displaced populations, disrupted livelihood activities, reduced harvests, constrained access to other local food sources (livestock and wild foods), and interfered with humanitarian and commercial flows in these areas. Households are dependent on limited fishing and wild food gathering as security permits, while resorting to severe coping strategies, including liquidating their assets and begging. As of mid-October, assistance was being delivered to areas of Pibor and Ulang, but had not started in Longochuk, Panyikang, and Canal/Pigi due to flood- and security-related access constraints.   

In other parts of Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during the harvesting period are being driven by localized conflicts, flooding, and poor economic conditions, and compounded by high numbers of returnees who fled the war in Sudan (particularly in counties bordering the Sudan-South Sudan border). While the severity of acute food insecurity has been slightly moderated in some of these areas by relatively better access to crop and livestock production, wild foods, markets, and sustained humanitarian assistance during the lean season, there are pockets of populations experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. The highest concentration of populations experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are in counties along the Sobat River corridor of Upper Nile (Baliet, Akoka) and in Nyirol and Uror of Jonglei, where years of cattle-raiding have undermined livestock ownership and crop production is limited; in Tonj East and North of Warrap, where the security situation remains tense following severe intercommunal clashes that displaced populations and limited engagement in livelihood activities; and in Aweil East, North, and South of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, where the influx of returnees and refugees from the Sudan war remains high. Across Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, eight counties have received enough food assistance such that it is likely preventing more severe outcomes: Malakal (Upper Nile); Nyirol and Uror (Jonglei); Rubkona, Pariang, Leer, and Panyijiar (Unity); and Abyei. 

In Greater Equatoria, 17 of 24 counties are also assessed in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in October. In Tambura, Mvolo, Mundri East, and Nagero of Western Equatoria, these outcomes are primarily driven by the impacts of armed clashes, insecurity, and road ambushes on population displacement, crop production, trade flows, and market functioning. On the other hand, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in Kapoeta East and Kapoeta North, Ikotos, and Budi of Eastern Equatoria are primarily driven by economic hardships, high food prices, insecurity, rising returnee burdens from refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda, and dry spells that impacted crop production. In Central Equatoria, Morobo and Kajo-Keji are of concern, where Crisis (IPC 3) outcomes are driven by persistent armed clashes and insecurity that sporadically displace households and interfere with crop production and trade flows. 

• Conflict is expected to intensify in hotspot areas where tensions are highest between government and opposition and allied forces. This includes parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei, and areas of Western and Central Equatoria. Intercommunal violence and cattle raids are expected to seasonally increase with the advance of the dry season.   
• The number of South Sudanese returnees and refugees will likely remain exceptionally high amid projections of continued conflict in Sudan, with a disproportionate share expected to remain in the northern states. The daily rate of arrivals from Sudan will likely continue to decline slowly, though with periodic surges as conflict evolves in the Greater Kordofan Region and Blue Nile. Meanwhile, some Sudanese refugees are likely to return to relatively calm parts of Sudan. In the south, the flows of South Sudanese returnees from refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda are expected to continue amid cuts to food assistance in those countries.
• New and protracted displacement is expected to remain high. Conflict-induced internal displacements are anticipated to persist in conflict hotspots in the Upper Nile-northern Jonglei border region, parts of Warrap, Abyei, Lakes, and Greater Equatoria. Likewise, flood-induced displacements will likely continue into early November.
• Floodwaters are expected to partially recede after the anticipated peak of flood extent in October and the start of the dry season in November (Figure 3). However, the pace of flood recession is expected to be slow due to elevated river water levels. Floodwaters will continue to interfere with population mobility and humanitarian and commercial access, particularly in the areas that were most severely inundated this season and along the river basins.
• The 2025/26 harvest will likely be significantly below average in severely conflict- and flood-affected areas, including in Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, Longochuk (Upper Nile), and northern Jonglei (Fangak and Canal/Pigi). In contrast, the harvest is expected to be similar to or better than last year and the five-year average in relatively stable areas in the west and southwest.
• Consumption of livestock products is expected to be seasonally high through March/April; however, in severely conflict- and flood-affected areas such as Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, Longochuk, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak, access will likely be constrained. Overall, livestock holdings among poor households are expected to remain low.
• Although fish and wild foods will be at peak seasonal availability through March/April, fishing and wild foods gathering in deep floodwaters will be dangerous to households who lack appropriate equipment. Additionally, conflict and insecurity will interfere with household movement in search of these food sources, leading to below-average access in hotspot areas.
• Poor economic conditions are likely to persist based on limited hard currency supply, persistent local currency depreciation, the cash liquidity crisis, and a high cost of living. Oil production and export will face periodic disruptions, leading to insufficient revenue to service government debt and regularly pay civil servants. As such, GDP is projected to contract by more than 30 percent in 2025.
• Cross-border trade flows are expected to remain constrained along the northern border with Sudan, while flows from other neighboring countries are expected to remain relatively normal.  
• According to FEWS NET’s price projections, the retail price of a malwa (3.5 kg) of red sorghum in Wau and Juba is expected to remain above the five-year average from October through May 2026, due to persistently poor macroeconomic conditions and SSP depreciation. Seasonal increases in market and household supplies are expected to support a slight decline in prices through January, but prices are expected to rebound from February to May as stocks from the harvest become depleted. Overall, prices are expected to peak at 170 percent above average in Juba and 440 percent above average in Wau.
• Disease outbreaks (especially cholera cases) will increase through at least the end of the rainy season, though following a declining trajectory at the country level. The most severe outbreaks are expected to occur among flood- and conflict-displaced populations living in overcrowded settlements where WASH services are poor or lacking and response efforts are constrained. Underreporting of cases is expected to remain a challenge, likely obscuring the true burden of disease and deaths, particularly in inaccessible areas.   

Humanitarian food assistance

• Humanitarian food assistance will continue in the coming months under WFP’s Famine Prevention Response using a combination of airdrops, river, and road access as feasible, targeting over 300,000 people in six counties of Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, Panyikang, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak. However, conflict, insecurity, and severe flooding will continue to disrupt the delivery and distribution of this planned food assistance. Between February and May, WFP’s 2026 Lean Season Response will begin, prioritizing counties with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes.

In the harvest and post-harvest period (October-January), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in 13 counties (out of 80), before expanding to 27 counties between February and May (the pre-lean season period in most of South Sudan). Acute malnutrition levels are similarly expected to surpass 15 percent in 37 counties in the harvest and post-harvest period and then expand to 42 counties by May. The highest prevalence of acute malnutrition is expected in Nasir, Ulang, Baliet, Rubkona, and Duk counties, driven by low food intake, high disease prevalence, and non-food factors such as low access to health services. Overall, FEWS NET projects that 7.0 to 7.99 million people (50-55 percent of the total population) will be in need of humanitarian food assistance from November through May.¹

Some households in Nasir and Fangak are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during periods where conflict and floods obstruct access to food. While humanitarian efforts are expected to continue in the coming months under WFP’s Famine Prevention Response in six highest-priority counties – Nasir, Fangak, Ulang, Longochuk, Panyikang, and Canal/Pigi – the slow recession of floodwaters, combined with the presence of armed actors and continued fighting, are expected to prevent full commercial and humanitarian access. A share of the population will be heavily dependent on wild foods to survive, and access to this food source is also expected to be periodically disrupted by conflict. 

Elsewhere in Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected between October and January, while Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated to become more pervasive between February and May. Returnee and refugee households are of highest concern. In late 2025, household food consumption deficits are expected to be partially mitigated by the main harvest and seasonal access to livestock products, fish, and wild foods. However, in early 2026, food stocks will gradually deplete, livestock will migrate to dry-season grazing areas, and access to fish and wild foods will decline seasonally. Reliance on markets will rise but remain constrained by limited purchasing power and high food prices, leaving many households to face widening food consumption deficits. The scale and severity of acute food insecurity are expected to intensify across parts of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Lakes as the lean season approaches. 

The Lean Season Response is expected to begin early next year in the highest-priority counties, including those targeted under the Famine Prevention Response. Food assistance is expected to mitigate the size of household food consumption deficits, resulting in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes in nine counties: Rubkona, Leer, Mayendit, and Panyijiar of Unity; Malakal of Upper Nile; Uror and Nyirol of Jonglei; Pibor of GPAA; and Abyei. 

In Greater Equatoria, the number of counties with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes is expected to decline from 17 to 13 counties between October to January, primarily driven by increased food availability from harvests in the bimodal areas of Central and Western Equatoria. However, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in the more agropastoral and pastoral areas of Eastern Equatoria, where limited harvests will be quickly exhausted, access to livestock products will decline seasonally, and household purchasing power will remain very weak due to disrupted livelihood activities and high food prices. Between February and May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes will spread once again across most counties in Greater Equatoria as the main lean season approaches. 
 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.

How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

A complete collapse of the September 2018 peace deal. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Conflict incidents are currently widespread and expanding into new  areas of South Sudan, particularly in the hotspots of Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, and Panyikang of Upper Nile; Fangak and Canal/Pigi of northern Jonglei; Tambura, Nagero, and Mundri East of Western Equatoria; Morobo of Central Equatoria; Tonj East and North of Warrap; and Abyei Administrative Area. In the most likely scenario, conflict events in South Sudan are expected to remain concentrated in these areas with localized, episodic intensifications. This is expected to be combined with continued SPLM-IG efforts to remove SPLM-IO figures from transitional government structures, signaling a further breakdown of the September 2018 peace deal. In the most likely scenario, fragmentation in the opposition is likely to prevent a descent into full-scale civil war. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which the September peace deal completely collapses. If this occurs, a subsequent deterioration into widespread and sustained conflict and insecurity would be expected to cause large-scale population displacement and widespread, severe disruptions to livelihood activities and humanitarian access. The severity of acute food insecurity would likely increase at both the household and area levels, resulting in more widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) area-level outcomes in additional counties. 

A complete shutdown of oil production and export via Port Sudan due to the persistent war in Sudan. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the war in Sudan expands further south and causes another complete shutdown of the northern sector's crude oil production and export via Port Sudan. If this occurs, then South Sudan’s key source of revenue and hard currency would be cut off. This would likely trigger a severe shortage of USD, further depreciation of the local currency, and a sharp deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, leading to extremely high food prices and a soaring cost of living. The resulting economic crisis would likely further destabilize political patronage networks and fuel additional violence. Consequently, many households would face large to extreme food consumption gaps, deepening the severity of acute food insecurity countrywide such that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread. 

Flooding peaks in October and extends into early November, but the severity and scale exceed the projected impacts and result in an extremely high flood extent. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, the remainder of the main rainfall season is forecasted to conclude at average to below-average levels in November, with rains tapering off and flood extent beginning to reduce in November. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which the severity and scale of flooding are higher than forecasted, as observed in recent years, and marked by extremely high flood extent through early November. If this occurs, the further destruction of homes, crops, and livestock; a near collapse of the local livelihoods system; or significantly disrupted humanitarian assistance delivery would be expected longer into the first projection period. In affected areas, a higher share of the population would likely face deepening food consumption deficits indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Of particular concern are counties in Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Pibor County in GPAA, where flooding is already severe. 

Upper Nile-northern Jonglei border region

Localized conflict escalates to levels similar to or higher than March/April 2025.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, conflict and insecurity are expected to persist at current levels through at least May 2026 (particularly in Nasir of Upper Nile, given continued attacks and aerial bombardment in October, and relatively lower levels in Ulang of Upper Nile, and Fangak and Canal/Pigi of northern Jonglei). Insecure conditions are expected to lead to new or secondary population displacements and severe access constraints that impede assistance delivery, trade flows, fishing, and gathering of wild foods. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict intensifies to levels similar to or higher than those observed in March/April 2025 and converges with slow recession of high floodwaters. In Ulang, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi, an increase in conflict in a credible alternative scenario would likely result in renewed displacement, severe disruptions to livelihood systems, a surge in cholera cases, and more prolonged disruptions to humanitarian access. In this scenario, the share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would like increase substantially, with an increase in population experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Fangak. In Nasir,  it is credible that an increase in conflict would fully obstruct humanitarian access and isolation of households from access to remaining sources of food. If that situation is prolonged, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would most likely occur with highest concern for southern Nasir, given that there are already populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and acute malnutrition levels likely already surpass the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. 

Tonj East and Tonj North of Warrap and Abyei Administrative Area

Escalation in intercommunal conflict to levels similar to or higher than late 2024 and May/June 2025.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Although the incidence of intercommunal violence in Greater Tonj of Warrap has subsided between August and October, the situation remains tense and volatile. These conditions are expected to persist through the projection period in the most likely scenario, with likely sporadic communal violence and cattle raiding increasing during the dry season. Likewise, in Abyei, tensions are rising again following clashes between SSPDF-SPLA-IO in Athony and are expected to increase during the upcoming dry season in the most likely scenario (albeit not to levels seen previously). However, there is a credible alternative scenario that conflict escalates to more severe levels than anticipated. This would result in significant population displacement and disruptions to livelihoods, trade flows, and humanitarian assistance delivery. If this occurs, then the share of the population in these areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely increase more substantially. 

Tambura, Nagero, and Mundri East of Western Equatoria state

Armed clashes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO intensify and expand to additional areas in Western Equatoria.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Armed clashes have risen in Tambura, Nagero, and Mundri East of Western Equatoria, with over 50,000 people displaced from Tambura to Ezo in recent months. In the most likely scenario through May 2026, opposition armed groups are expected to continue conducting attacks and road ambushes at an elevated frequency relative to the past two years. Additionally, the SPLA-IO and NAS alliance will likely trigger the SSPDF to deploy more forces to Tambura, Yei, Lainya, and Morobo, resulting in an intensification of fighting. The dry season, beginning in October, will also facilitate an intensification relative to the period from May to September. There is a credible alternative scenario in which armed clashes rise to even higher levels than currently anticipated, resulting in further population displacements, loss of harvest stocks, and disrupted trade flows. If this occurs, then the share of the population in these areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely rise more substantially. 

Persistent armed conflict, insecurity, and severe flooding in Fangak and Canal/Pigi counties have severely disrupted livelihood activities (Figure 4).  Populations have low access to key sources of food, inclusive of fishing and wild foods. Humanitarian assistance, trade flows, and market functionality are also highly disrupted. As a result, severe acute food insecurity outcomes are expected.

Conflict and displacement: Armed clashes and aerial bombardments in April and early May 2025 resulted in the destruction of the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital, humanitarian compounds, and markets in Old and New Fangak, in addition to the displacement of over 84,000 people to Paguir and Toch. In Canal/Pigi, renewed White Army activities under the leadership of Makuach Tut triggered SSPDF airstrikes in Belewach and Kurwai and displaced over 40,000 people from Atar, Alela, Wunlit, and Khorfolus to Ayod, Panyikang, and Malakal in September and early October. More broadly, conflict and insecurity have severely disrupted trade flows from Juba and Malakal and significantly restricted humanitarian access. From May to September, little to no humanitarian assistance reached Fangak or Canal/Pigi, with limited assistance intended for Fangak looted en route in early September. Likewise, the conflict has restricted livelihood activities such as fishing and wild food gathering, further worsening acute food insecurity conditions. 

Flooding: Consecutive years of flooding from 2019 to 2025 – including recent, severe flooding between August and October 2025 linked to the overflowing Nile and Sobat rivers – have repeatedly displaced people, damaged homes and health facilities, submerged crop fields, and restricted both household movement and humanitarian access. As of October 30, 2025, at least 145,315 people had been affected and 89,106 displaced in Old Fangak, Paguir, Kuernyang, Manajang, Juaibor, Pulita, Toch, Mareng, and Bei payams of Fangak county. A FEWS NET field monitor reported in mid-October that at least 121,218 people had already been affected, with villages such as Chortbora and Kuernyang fully submerged. Displacement is expected to rise further as Nile River water levels continue to rise. In Canal/Pigi, flooding displaced over 25,500 people from Wunlem, Atar, Alelo, and Wunlit payams to Ashabnil, Dolep, Panam in Panyikang County and Malakal town. Additional households were displaced within Canal/Pigi, particularly in Korwach, Wunlem, Alela, and Canal payams. All health facilities in Khorwach have been submerged, severely limiting access to medical and nutrition services and contributing to high malnutrition rates among children.

Cholera: Cholera cases have been elevated in both counties this year due to overcrowding in displacement sites, high flood extent, poor WASH conditions, and limited access to health services. As of October 20, 2025, over 1,071 cholera cases and 32 deaths had been confirmed in Fangak, and 316 cases and 18 deaths in Canal/Pigi. However, a FEWS NET field assessment in Fangak in July 2025 found that, by June, South Sudan Medical Relief had already recorded 99 confirmed cases and two deaths, suggesting that the true caseload is likely underreported given the surveillance challenges posed by insecurity and flooding. 

Market access: Poor macroeconomic conditions, conflict-related disruptions to trade flows, and persistently high food prices amid very low purchasing power are severely constraining household access to food in both countries. Numerous checkpoints along the main routes from Juba to Fangak and onward to Canal/Pigi via the Nile River have reduced market supplies to low levels in key markets, driving up food prices. According to WFP’s South Sudan Weekly Market Price Bulletin for mid-October, Old Fangak recorded the highest food basket cost in the country despite a 21 percent decrease compared to mid-September, further constraining households’ ability to purchase food. 

Crop and livestock production: In July, the Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS) Round 31 survey found that most households had planted or intended to plant crops this year, but severe flooding between August and October subsequently destroyed much of local production. This has reportedly resulted in limited to no harvests at the household level. Livestock ownership also remains very low after years of recurrent shocks and the near collapse of livelihoods, limiting household access to livestock products. According to the FSNMS survey, fewer than 15 percent of households in these localities own livestock. 

Wild foods: Many households are heavily reliant on fish and wild foods, such as water lilies, following severe flood-related crop losses and loss of livestock. However, ongoing conflict, insecurity, and high floodwaters, combined with a lack of fishing gear (including canoes), have significantly disrupted access to these traditional food sources in most payams. The high level of dependence on wild foods among both displaced and resident households alike is also depleting local availability, particularly of water lilies near settlement sites. As a result, households are resorting to traveling in groups to further afield through swampy areas to gather water lilies for survival. 

Impacts on food security: The convergence of severe conflict, flooding, and economic shocks are driving protracted Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in both Fangak and Canal/Pigi. Pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected in Fangak through May. In the near term, conflict is expected to escalate due to command disputes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO over areas of territorial control  in Fangak and Canal/Pigi, as well as tensions linked to the ongoing trial of the First Vice President. These dynamics will likely further restrict trade flows from Malakal and Juba. Although WFP is currently scaling up the Famine Prevention Response in both counties – targeting 22 and 43 percent of the population in Canal/Pigi and Fangak, respectively – distributions are expected to be periodically disrupted due to insecurity. Rising Nile and Sobat river water levels are also likely to trigger additional displacement amid continued economic deterioration, further limiting household access to markets. 

In the medium term, households will increasingly depend on wild foods such as water lilies, though availability and access to this source of food will remain constrained by high demand and insecurity. While water levels are expected to at least partially recede during the dry season and may improve freedom of movement, conflict, insecurity, and residual floodwaters will continue to limit access to farmland and impede cultivation. These constraints are especially likely in areas hosting displaced populations in Paguir, Juai-bor, Toch, and Manajang payams in Fangak and in Wunlem, Atar, Alelo, and Wunlit payams in Canal/Pigi. As a result, little to no engagement in crop production is expected. Insecurity, including likely airstrikes, will concurrently continue to significantly constrain the delivery of humanitarian and health assistance.  The population is expected to face deepening food shortages and widening food consumption gaps, particularly in displacement sites in Fangak and Canal/Pigi. Given the extreme vulnerability of households in both counties to conflict and flooding, close monitoring of conflict dynamics, cholera trends, changes to humanitarian access and assistance deliveries, and population mobility remains critical. 

Severe conflict and insecurity have displaced tens of thousands, prevented household access to livelihoods, and obstructed humanitarian access through the main lean season response (Figure 5). As a result, severe acute food insecurity outcomes are likely across Ulang and Nasir, with extreme outcomes persisting in the more isolated areas of southern Nasir. 

Conflict and displacement: Nasir and Ulang of Upper Nile experienced severe conflict and heightened tensions during a critical time for both the agricultural season and the humanitarian lean season response. In March/April, escalated conflict involving the White Army militia and government forces displaced over 80,000 people in both counties into displacement sites along the Sobat River, with nearly 23,000 people fleeing into Gambella Region of Ethiopia. According to a UN High Commissioner for Refugees press release, 50,000 people (about 16 percent of county population) were displaced within Nasir and 34,000 (22.4 percent of county population) within Ulang. While conflict has significantly declined in Ulang since May (only one incident recorded in August and September), ground clashes and airstrikes intensified and persisted in Nasir from July through September. These violent events and related insecurity have significantly disrupted local agricultural production, fishing, market functionality, and access to health care, humanitarian assistance, and other typical food sources. 

Flooding and cholera: Floodwater inundated several lowland areas along the Sobat River and in swampland areas this year. Combined with extremely poor WASH and health service access, cholera cases surged in July. The cumulative cholera case fatality rate was 7.8 percent in Nasir and 2.6 percent in Ulang, exceeding the 1.0 percent threshold for effective outbreak control. Amid the ongoing conflict and insecurity, disease surveillance has been severely hampered and is likely leading to underreporting of cholera cases to date.

Crop production: In Nasir, crop production was critically undermined by the conflict and displacement which occurred during planting and was further impacted by the late rainfall start and prolonged dry spells early in the season. According to an assessment conducted by REACH in June/July (limited to accessible areas of Nyangore, Thulup, Torkiel, Wathjak, and Wecnyang payams in Ulang and Bukteng, Lipnuer, Makak, and Torkech payams in Nasir), less than one-third of households (32 percent) in Nasir reported that they expect to harvest this year, compared to over two-thirds in Ulang (71 percent). However, yields are expected to be reduced due to the poor rainfall performance. Additionally, these data were collected in Nasir prior to additional conflict that occurred in August and September, which is expected to have further affected access to any minimal harvests. Conflict has not re-emerged in Ulang. 

Livestock production: Livestock production is typically one of the key food and income sources for households in Nasir and Ulang. However, the relative contribution of this food source has been negatively impacted by conflict. Households have low livestock holdings, as well as constrained access to pastures, water sources, and veterinary services, particularly in Nasir. The REACH assessment found that ownership of livestock was less impacted in Ulang, with 71 percent reporting they owned livestock (relatively stable compared to ownership rates of past years). In Nasir, however, only 19 percent of households reported owning livestock, a sharp decline from previous years. However, two-thirds of households in Nasir reported that they could access livestock (even if they did not own the animals), indicative of sharing among the community. According to the limited data available for Nasir and Ulang in the FSNMS survey (conducted in September in accessible areas), households in both counties were consuming dairy products on average twice per week (sourced from own production). Roughly two-thirds of households reported consumption of dairy products in the last 24 hours, which is also indicative of some sustained access. However, given the FSNMS was limited to accessible areas of Nasir, it is expected that access to livestock products is lower in the inaccessible, southern areas. 

Access to fish and wild foods: Typically, poor households in Nasir and Ulang complement their household food stocks from crop and livestock production with fish and wild foods. According to the recent FSNMS, over one-quarter of households in Ulang reported consumption of fish in the last 24 hours, compared to less than 15 percent in accessible areas of Nasir. While recent data on wild food consumption is unavailable for these two counties, it is anticipated that consumption of wild foods is high in both; however, reliance is expected to be higher in Nasir given the disruption to crop and livestock production. However, access to fishing and wild foods is also expected to be more constrained in Nasir amid the heightened insecurity. 

Humanitarian response capacity: The deteriorating insecurity in both counties severely limited WFP’s ability to deliver food assistance under the 2025 Lean Season Response between May and September. In both counties, WFP resumed food distributions in July through airdrops in Nasir, as well as a combination of airdrops (in inland areas of Doma payam) and deliveries via river from Malakal to as far as Wathjak in Ulang. These efforts targeted roughly 40,000 people in remote areas in both counties. However, the assistance reached just 1-3 percent of population on average between June and September. Airdrops are exceptionally costly, and effective targeting of the most acutely food insecure households is difficult, due to challenges in identifying and targeting recipients via air and minimizing the associated risk of divergences. 

In October, WFP has transitioned to assistance deliveries under the Famine Prevention Response, reaching 10-22 percent of both counties’ populations via airdrops and river routes. However, the targeting of the most vulnerable in isolated areas is expected to be hampered by conflict and severe flooding. In southern Nasir in particular, several distribution sites remain inaccessible, and humanitarians continue to face restrictions on airdrops. The presence of armed forces presents another challenge, as they are actively preventing humanitarian access or directing it to Nasir town only.  

Impacts on food security: The conflict-driven disruptions to livelihood activities and the impact of persistent security restrictions on humanitarian assistance delivery and household mobility are driving protracted Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in both counties. In southern Nasir, the severity of these disruptions to livelihoods, household mobility, and humanitarian access is expected to result in pockets of households experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through May. Conflict is expected to continue in Nasir while remaining low in Ulang through the medium term. In Nasir, the conflict is expected to cause additional displacement, impede household access to markets and wild foods, and periodically disrupt the ongoing humanitarian distributions under the Famine Prevention Response. 

There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict intensifies to levels similar to or higher than that observed in March/April 2025 and converges with slow recession of high floodwaters. In Ulang, an increase in conflict under this scenario would likely result in renewed displacement, severe disruption to livelihood systems, a surge in cholera cases, and more prolonged disruptions to humanitarian access. The share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would likely increase substantially. In Nasir, it is credible that an increase in conflict intensity would fully obstruct humanitarian access and isolate households from access to remaining sources of food. If that situation is prolonged, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would most likely occur – with greatest concern for southern Nasir – given that there are already populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and acute malnutrition assessments have concluded that levels of malnourishment have already surpassed the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold.