Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes to persist through May 2025

• South Sudan’s acute food security situation remains severe at the start of the main harvesting period in October, with 12 counties in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and some households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Malakal of Upper Nile, Abyei, and among returnees in transit areas. The severity is due to the impact of another record year of flooding and sporadic conflict that have disrupted access to own production – often in areas that have faced years of asset erosion – in addition to high returnee and refugee burden, and severe deterioration in purchasing capacity amid worsening economic conditions. However, food assistance has contributed to mitigating the severity of food consumption gaps in 15 counties, a testament to the early warning system and mobilization of lean season and flood response mechanisms. 
• Through January 2025, the number of counties in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will remain the same but shift geographically depending on expected duration of own food stocks and access to additional food and income sources. Food assistance activated under the flood response system is expected to mitigate more severe outcomes in 10 counties. Some households are expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Malakal, Uror, and Pibor, as well as among returnee populations. FEWS NET projects that 7.00-7.99 million people, or 65-70 percent of the population, will require food aid by May 2025.
• FEWS NET assesses that there remains a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in South Sudan through January – particularly in low-lying and flood-prone counties in the Sudd wetland area and river basins – if severe flooding combined with conflict isolates households from accessing typical food and income sources or assistance deliveries for a prolonged period of time. Between February and May 2025, FEWS NET assesses that the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) will decline as flood waters recede and household, commercial, and humanitarian mobility improves. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 18, 2024.

South Sudan remains mired in shocks that are sustaining widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes and the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) during the typical harvest and post-harvest period. The country has experienced yet another record year of flooding that has affected over 1 million people,  with impacts most severely felt in areas that have faced years of asset erosion and the near-collapse of livelihoods; these same areas are ones grappling with the heavy and continuing burden of over 840,000 returnees and refugees fleeing war in Sudan and facing the further erosion of already low purchasing capacity amid deteriorating economic conditions. 

While the rainy season is coming to an end in October, severe flooding can and often does continue into November or even up until January, resulting in further population displacements, loss of household assets including food stocks and livestock, and reduced mobility and access to markets and humanitarian assistance. According to flood projections by NASA and USGS, the risk of elevated flood levels in South Sudan is expected to persist through November (Figure 1). 

Most of these areas are only just emerging from severe lean season conditions characterized by high levels of hunger and acute malnutrition, and the further shock of flood-related displacement and reduced mobility, potentially combined with insecurity and conflict dynamics, could result in levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality escalating to breach the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. As a result, FEWS NET maintains a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in low-lying and flood-prone counties in the Sudd wetland area and along major river basins, particularly in areas with a high burden of displaced persons and returnees who are unfamiliar with traditional coping strategies such as wild food gathering and consumption. These areas include parts of north-central Unity, Jonglei, and Upper Nile. 

In the second projection period between February and May 2025, flood waters are expected to recede under dry season conditions and mobility is expected to improve. While sporadic conflict is expected to persist and will likely continue to temporarily affect household access to typical sources of food and income, the manifestation of such insecurity is likely to remain in line with recent lower trends, particularly in light of the postponement of the elections to 2026 (Figure 2). Although it is possible that a scenario in which Famine (IPC Phase 5) occurs could materialize, the likelihood of conflict and flooding interacting to drive such a sharp deterioration in food insecurity outcomes is low enough that FEWS NET does not consider it a credible alternative scenario from February through the end of the projection period in May 2025. 

South Sudan has endured a complex humanitarian crisis for more than a decade, driven by recurrent, cyclical bouts of conflict, flooding, and displacement amid poor economic conditions. Following secession from Sudan in 2011, the country was mired in civil wars in 2013-2014 and again in 2016-2018 that led to the deaths of an estimated 400,000 people, displacement of 4.5 million people both internally and across borders, and to the declaration of Famine in central Unity in 2017. The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) ended the civil wars and ushered in a transitional period, which has again been extended through December 2026 as the country remained unprepared to host planned elections in December 2024. Episodic retaliatory intercommunal conflicts, deeply politicized over the years, continue to plague the country, though at relatively lower levels than past years.  

Flooding continues to be a severe and recurring shock. Four consecutive years of severe flooding in 2019-2022 led to extensive displacement, asset loss, and, in conjunction with the impact of conflict in some areas, near-complete livelihood collapse. With flood waters no longer receding as is typical in the dry season and record high upstream lake levels, severe flooding is ongoing again in 2024. Additionally, shifts from pastoralism to greater agropastoralism in some marginally productive areas of the country have occurred. These shifts have cemented vulnerability, given declines in household livestock assets and coping capacity, and high variability in agricultural production. In late 2020 through mid-2021, the combination of conflict and flooding led to a second Famine Likely classification that occurred in Pibor, and many areas continue to face high levels of acute food insecurity to-date. 

On top of the longstanding impacts of conflict and flooding, one year of war in Sudan has resulted in an influx of over 840,000 returnees and refugees and is aggravating already poor food security conditions. Most of these returnees and refugees are arriving into acutely food insecure areas, with already scarce resources and are heavily dependent on relatives and host communities for their food needs. Moreover, many of these populations have limited to no assets to re-start their lives and livelihoods. 

Macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate with high cost of living and bleak livelihood opportunities in the urban and much of the rural areas. The national economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports with little to no diversification and has been characterized by steadily deteriorating exchange rates and rising import inflation. Following years of poor maintenance and flooding of oil fields, already declining production was dramatically reduced in February 2024 by a rupture in one of the two main pipelines traversing Sudan to Port Sudan for export. Among other strategies, the government initiated multiple customs and border fees in an effort to raise non-oil revenues that have resulted in highly volatile and even higher prices of food, fuel, and basic commodities. This contributed to further deterioration in household purchasing power, sustaining high dependence on humanitarian assistance amid the inability of households to rebuild livelihoods in the worst-affected areas.

The combination of sporadic violent conflict, persistent flooding, returnee/refugee flows, and deteriorating economic conditions have contributed to sustained high levels of food insecurity during typical harvest and post-harvest periods (October-January), particularly in the northern and eastern areas (Figure 3). Looking forward, farming households in these unimodal areas typically begin land preparation in anticipation of the main rainy season (June-September), while livestock undergo season migration to more distant areas in search of pasture and water, reducing household access to livestock products. In bimodal areas, the first rainy season begins in March and extends through May.  

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Prior South Sudan Food Security Outlook: June 2024 to January 2025
• Latest South Sudan Key Message Update: September 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Weather and flooding: 

The 2024 rainfall performance was generally mixed, with below-average cumulative rainfall for the March to May first season rains in Equatoria bimodal zone, and largely average cumulative rainfall during the June to September main rainy season. Exceptions included some pockets in the southcentral and northeastern regions that experienced cumulatively above-average rainfall, and localized areas of Western Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and eastern Upper Nile that received cumulatively below-average rainfall. 

The main season rains (June to September) had irregular spatiotemporal distribution with stretches of heavier rainfall, particularly between mid-July and mid-August. This combined with already high flood conditions at the start of the rainy season, sustained record-high discharge of water from lakes upstream, plus high discharge from Bahr el Jebel rivers through October, has resulted in the expansion of the 30-day cumulative flood extent from 17,000 km² in July, to 45,000 km² in August, to over 72,000 km² in September. While flood extents have declined slightly, it remains high into mid-October, estimated at 57,500 km² for the period October 1-15 (Figure 4). As of October 18, the flooding is estimated to have affected 1 million people across 42 counties, comparable to that of the most severe flood years of 2020 and 2022. It has displaced over 271,000 people; caused damage to crop fields, pastures, and critical infrastructure; disrupted livelihoods, trade flows, and humanitarian deliveries; and heightened risk of disease outbreaks including cholera (such as the outbreak reported in Renk of Upper Nile as of October 28) and measles (such as the outbreak declared in Tonj East of Warrap on October 23). 

Conflict: 

In September and October, sporadic armed conflicts, intercommunal violence, revenge killings, and road ambushes were reported in several conflict hotspot areas, notably in Greater Tonj area of Warrap, Luakpiny/Nasir of Upper Nile, and in parts of Jonglei, Lakes, and Central and Western Equatoria. In Tonj East of Warrap, intracommunal fighting on September 13-14 and again on October 2 between Ngabakok and Malualchum payams led to at least 40 deaths and the suspension of humanitarian operations. Between September 27-28 and on October 6, clashes erupted in Tonj North and resulted in over 20 deaths and 37 injuries. In addition, WFP reported that one of its warehouses in Tonj East was vandalized and commodities were stolen, further disrupting humanitarian assistance in the area. In Laukpiny/Nasir, clashes between South Sudan’s People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the White Army re-erupted on October 16, causing 17 deaths and disrupting humanitarian access.  

In Lakes State, a road ambush on October 6 in Rumbek East killed a passenger, and intercommunal violence on September 28 in Rumbek North resulted in five dead and four wounded. In Unity State, a clash between the National Security service and the unified forces on September 23 led to the death of one police officer and three injuries. Meanwhile, in Jonglei and Pibor county of Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA), cattle raiding and child abductions were also reported, including incidents in Muruou village where a herdsman and a 10-year-old boy were killed and 500 cattle were stolen. On September 22 in Nyirol County of Jonglei, three students were killed and a 10-year-old child was abducted. 

In Central Equatoria, unknown gunmen ambushed a bus on the Juba-Nimule Road, killing one Ugandan and wounding eight others. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) suspended activities in Yei County after staff were looted and kidnapped on September 20. Similarly, on October 1, a vehicle traveling from Juba to Bor was robbed near Mogiri on the Juba-Bor Road. The next day, 50 cattle were stolen from traders near Mogiri. In addition, increased clashes between SSPDF and the National Salvation Front (NAS) were reported on October 9-10 in Lainya, Yei, and Kajo-Keji. The volatile conditions, sporadic conflict incidents, escalating road ambushes, and increased criminality continue to cause additional displacements and disrupt trade flow, livelihoods, and assistance delivery.

Refugees and returnees: 

South Sudan continues to face a heavy burden of displacement, including about 271,000 people who have been displaced by flooding this rainy season alone. In addition to the 2 million people internally displaced by prior conflict and flood events, a total of over 840,000 refugees and returnees have fled the war in Sudan. 

The number of arrivals from Sudan continues to decline relative to prior peaks, but has remained between 20,000-30,000 per month over the last several months (Figure 5). The onward movements of refugees and returnees within South Sudan are known for approximately 378,000 people (45 percent of those who have arrived in South Sudan): 7 percent (59,000) have remained in Renk, nearly 20 percent (69,000) are in other parts of Upper Nile State, 16 percent (60,000) are in Unity, and 13 percent (47,000) are in parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state. The precise destination/location of the other 55 percent is not known but is expected to be highest in northern counties close to the border. The large presence of returnees and refugees and steady stream of new arrivals is continuing to drive high competition for available resources (e.g., wild foods, pastures) as well as for nutrition and health services. For those heavily dependent on local communities and relatives, the sharing of green harvests (available August-September) and stocks from the main harvest (beginning in October) is likely sustaining food consumption gaps across a large population. In addition, the overcrowding conditions for returnees and refugees combined with peak flooding are contributing to the spread of diseases that will likely elevate acute malnutrition levels. 

Macroeconomic conditions: 

Amid ongoing preparation to export South Sudan’s crude oil via Port Sudan, macroeconomic conditions remain severe even with continued donor financing and support from the IMF and World Bank. According to an October IMF analysis, the economy is estimated to have contracted by six percent during the June 2023-June 2024 fiscal year. The worsening macroeconomic conditions are primarily driven by sharp losses in oil revenue linked to the damaged pipeline in Sudan that has been inoperable since February 2024 and limited diversification in the economic sector.

As a result of the limited hard currency supply and high demand for USD for importation, the South Sudanese Pound (SSP) has continued to lose its value against the USD, exchanging at 3,042 and 5,000 SSP/USD in October on the official and parallel markets, respectively, a 200-320 percent depreciation compared to the same time in 2023. 

The government continues to rely heavily on relatively new non-oil revenue such as customs and border fees, which have increased in valuation due to the high exchange rate; however, these measures cannot mitigate the losses in oil revenue.

Staple food and fuel prices: 

The significant SSP depreciation and high import and supply costs continue to drive high food and fuel prices.

While October price data are not yet available, analysis of limited market price monitoring data in September 2024 revealed generally stable white sorghum prices relative to August 2024 in the reference markets of Juba, Rumbek Centre, and Pibor, though prices have remained 100 to 175 percent higher than the same period last year (September 2023), 190 percent higher than the five-year average in Pibor, and 320 to 410 percent above the five-year average in Juba and Rumbek Centre (Figure 6). Additional rural market price data for red sorghum collected by FEWS NET in September 2024 indicated similar stability between August and September in Mayendit, Leer, and Duk markets in Unity and Jonglei, while a decline of 11 percent was recorded in Maiwut of Upper Nile due to reduced household demand as households’ engaged in harvesting and have access to food aid. By contrast, in Fashoda and Fangak, the retail price of sorghum in September was 7-32 percent higher than observed in August due to continued high market dependence and flood-related disruptions to trade flows.

Similarly, fuel prices per liter have also remained elevated at pump stations across state capital markets. While analysis of available fuel price data in September 2024 showed some variability in price changes between August and September – stable prices in Juba, while increasing in Rumbek Centre (16 percent) and decreasing in Torit and Aweil Center (29-31 percent) – all remained significantly above the same time last year (300-435 percent) and the five-year average (530-770 percent) (Figure 6). 

Crop Production: 

Despite largely average rainfall performance and indications of increased cultivation, overall harvests are expected to be similar to or lower than last year and the five-year average due to the combined impact of flooding, pests, and limited access to agricultural inputs for production and harvesting. 

• Given the lull in conflict events and absence of major new flooding across many parts of the country at the time of cultivation (May-July), available information from a recent survey conducted by WFP/FAO suggested that households’ who planted or intended to plant in 2024 increased when compared to last year and the five-year average. This was particularly true in much of Upper Nile, Unity, Lakes, Greater Equatoria, and in parts of Jonglei and GPAA. On the other hand, planting was reportedly lower in Melut of Upper Nile; Mvolo and Tambura of Western Equatoria; and Rubkona of Unity, mostly due to conflict and floods. However, it is important to note that the information reflects planting as well as intentions to plant in 2024, and is not able to capture if planting occurred nor to what extent shocks such as flooding, conflict, dry spells, or pests may have affected production over the course of the agricultural season. 
• Based on FAO’s preliminary assessment of the impact of floods on crop production, about 75,000 hectares of cropland have been affected, with crop losses estimated at over 72,000 MT thus far. While the greatest area affected was in Warrap (over 25,000 hectares flood-affected) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (over 15,000 hectares), proportionately the largest impact was in Unity (39 percent of the average cropped area over the last five years has been affected by flooding this year), Jonglei (17 percent affected), and Warrap (13 percent affected) (Figure 7). While these losses are likely to contribute to lower harvests in flood-affected counties, many of these areas were nonetheless able to harvest some crops given the timing of the floods.

Wild foods:

Natural food sources including wild foods, fish, leafy green vegetables, wild roots, and tubers are key sources of food and income for poor households in rural settings, particularly during the rainy season. 

• According to survey data collected by WFP/FAO, a majority of households nationally were heavily reliant on wild foods at the peak of the lean season, reiterating the significant  seasonal importance of this food source when other sources of food are unavailable. In a handful of counties, however, even higher-than-normal dependence on wild foods was observed (Uror, Akobo, Awerial, Fangak, and Tonj North); for the latter three counties, this represented a significant increase when compared to household dependence reported in 2023, indicative of the key role increasingly played by wilds food in filling household food consumption gaps caused by the loss of access to other food and income sources from crops and livestock.  
• In September and October, FEWS NET field information indicated that wild foods continued to be seasonally available, particularly in non-flooded areas, but that access to some of these foods was limited due to conflict, insecurity and dense vegetation cover. In severely flooded areas, access to wild gathering is limited by high floodwater and in some areas by intercommunal conflict. 

Market supplies: 

While local harvests are improving supplies at most markets, imports remain significantly below average due to the ongoing macroeonomic deterioration marked by significant SSP depreciation and high import inflation related to the imposition of border fees and taxes. 

• Although main markets at state capitals and county headquarters are functional, supplies are moderate to low, particularly in flood and insecure areas due to high supply costs linked to import inflation, illicit taxes at numerous checkpoints, and poor road conditions (Figure 8). In severely flooded states and counties in Sudd regions, floods are continuing to affect movement of trade: according to OCHA on October 18, many routes remained blocked due to the floods, particularly in Unity, Jonglei, Upper Nile, parts of Lakes, and Kapoeta East. Outside non-flooded areas, market supply are reportedly moderate due to local supply from main season harvest, which began in October.  
• Analysis of FEWS NET’s cross-border trade flow data shows that imports of maize grain, maize flour, and sorghum into South Sudan in September through Nimule have decreased by 36, 56, and 75 percent, respectively, between August and September 2024. Compared to the same period in 2023, the import of maize flour, sorghum, and maize grain declined by 64, 67, and 70 percent, respectively. South Sudan  depends on imports to mitigate the typical national cereal deficit, and this reduction in supply is leading to declining availability in urban or major markets and increasing prices. In addition, the supply from Sudan to South Sudan remains disrupted due to ongoing conflict in Sudan, resulting in low supply in the most northern states neighboring Sudan. 

Household purchasing capacity: 

Household purchasing capacity continues to deteriorate amid low economic opportunity, worsening economic conditions, and persistently rising prices.Many households are unable to earn a consistent income while faced with atypically high and rising prices. According to survey data collected by WFP/FAO, over two-thirds of households are unable to afford their basic needs as measured against the minimum expenditure basket (MEB) and the survival MEB (SMEB), and a majority is spending more than 75 percent of household income on food. These combined indicators point to very limited capacity to access highly priced staple food from markets, contributing to the persistence of household food consumption gaps.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

Despite severe flooding and persistent insecurity, humanitarian food assistance reached 72 percent of planned beneficiaries in the 39 targeted counties, contributing to mitigation of large food consumption gaps in 15 counties in October. These include counties in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, and parts of Lakes and Eastern Equatoria. In July and August, WFP reached 1.5-1.6 million people with general food distribution and asset creation and livelihood assistance. While the lean season response ended on September 15, WFP has continued to provide assistance under the flood response, aiming to assist approximately 1.2 million flood-affected people from the end of September through November in 42 flood-affected counties in Jonglei, GPAA, Unity, Warrap, Abyei, Upper Nile, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. However, the agency continues to face insecurity and increased logistical challenges linked to heavy rains and floods that are delaying the arrival and delivery of food assistance. For instance, in late September, WFP suspended delivery of assistance in Tonj East County due to the fighting on September 13 and 14 between Ngabakok and Malualchum areas, which led to the deaths of 40 people and widespread looting; and in October, WFP reported that rising flood waters in Uror, Duk, Twic East, Koch, Mayendit and Maiwut counties was disrupting air drops, while flood waters had cut off roads in Aweil East and were hindering deliveries in southern Abyei. 

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

National

The acute food security situation in South Sudan remains severe during the main season harvest in October, though food assistance has helped to mitigate some of the anticipated severity despite the extremely challenging context of floods and conflict. The main drivers of continued widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes across the country are the ongoing flood and conflict-related impacts on local production; rising returnee and refugee burdens; and severe macroeconomic deterioration characterized by high staple food prices, SSP depreciation, and extremely low household purchasing power amid years of asset erosion.

Greater Upper Nile region

In the Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity), widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are ongoing, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in seven counties (Malakal, Panyikang, Renk, and Luakpiny/Nasir of Upper Nile; Rubkona of Unity; Fangak of Jonglei; and Pibor of GPAA). These counties are facing severe flooding and/or conflict that is interfering with household access to typical harvests and humanitarian assistance, compounded by prior years of flood/conflict impacts on local production and livelihoods, asset erosion, and disruption to markets and trade. Some returnee households (particularly in transit areas) and severely flood-affected households are facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes due to extremely limited food and income access and depleted household coping capacity. Acute malnutrition is high across much of Greater Upper Nile. Over half of the counties (19 of 31) were assessed during the May to August lean season to have Critical acute malnutrition (15-29.9 percent); of these, three (Panyijiar, Pibor, Baliet) were approaching the upper limit. Nonetheless, the humanitarian assistance response has helped to mitigate the extent of the previously projected food consumption gaps, resulting in Crisis! (Phase 3!) outcomes in 13 counties (Maiwut, Ulang, and Longochuk of Upper Nile; Akobo, Uror, Nyirol, Ayod, Canal/Pigi, and Duk of Jonglei; and Guit, Panyijiar, Koch and Leer of Unity).  

Greater Bahr el Ghazal

In Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Abyei, Warrap, and Lakes), persistent intercommunal conflicts and insecurity, as well as flood-related disruptions to production, trade flow, and assistance deliveries, are driving widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes present in Tonj East of Warrap; Aweil East, Aweil North, and Aweil South of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Abyei. The areas of highest concern in this region include Abyei and Aweil East which host large numbers of South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees, and where conflict and flooding are interfering with livelihoods, trade, and market functionality. Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is present among returnee households in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, as well as conflict-displaced households in Abyei who lost their livestock and missed the cultivation period due to persistent intercommunal conflict between Dinka of Warrap and Ngok Dinka of Abyei. All counties of Northern Bahr el Ghazal; Abyei; Twic, Gogrial East, and Tonj East of Warrap; and Awerial and Rumbek Centre of Lakes, have elevated rates of acute malnutrition, falling in the Critical range (15-29.9 percent).

Greater Equatoria

In Greater Equatoria, the persistence of insecurity, road banditry, armed cattle herders, and some localized armed conflict are disrupting trade flows, farming activities, and access to wild foods. When combined with severe macroeconomic deterioration and limited household purchasing power, these factors are driving widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes across the region during the peak of the main harvesting season in October. Exceptions include Nzara, Ibba, Maridi, Ezo, and Yambio of Western Equatoria, where surplus production is alleviating food consumption and driving Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.  

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• The remainder of the main rainy season in unimodal areas and July-November 2024 second season rains in bimodal areas are likely to be above average. The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is expected to transition from neutral conditions to La Niña in October 2024. La Niña is expected to be weak to moderate in intensity and remain the dominant ENSO event through March 2025 before transitioning back to ENSO neutral. 
• The March to May 2025 first season rains are expected to be average to below average based on analog years, though there is some uncertainty given the long-term forecast.
• Flooding is expected to be similar to or worse than that of 2020 and 2022 and is expected to peak in October/November, with flood extents remaining high into early 2025. This is based on current flood extents that expanded under heavy rainfall in August and early September; above-normal river water levels due to elevated lake and river levels upstream in Uganda; continued significant water release from the Jinja Dam (at a rate of 2,200 cubic meters per second); and the emergence of La Niña in October. Based on FEWS NET/USGS and NASA flood projections made using initial conditions in August, the flooding is expected to extend at least 72,000 km² through November. The inundated area in 2024 is forecast to be greater than in 2020/2022 and is projected to affect 1.0-3.3 million people and over 10,000 hectares of cropland. Due to limitations of forecasting spatiotemporal distribution of rainfall with high geographic resolution, uncertainty remains in predicting which geographic areas are most likely to be inundated.   
• 2024 main season crop harvests are expected to be below last year but similar to the five-year average in both bimodal and unimodal areas based on anticipated negative flooding impacts on crop production and atypically high post-harvest losses. Crop production in some of the most severely flood-affected counties (e.g., Aweil East, Mayendit, Fangak, Nasir, and Rubkona) is expected to be impacted as large populations are displaced, croplands are submerged, and/or fewer households plant due to fears of flooding, leading to localized reductions in area planted and harvests. Continued sporadic clashes and insecurity will also impact household crop production.
• Overall livestock body conditions are expected to be favorable for the remainder of the rainy season (October to mid-November). Good body conditions are likely to atypically persist into the dry season (through March/April) in some areas given the high likelihood of increased water and pasture availability due to forecasted above-average rainfall. However, in severely flood-affected areas, pastures are likely to be damaged or submerged by flood waters. Additionally, flood-induced livestock disease outbreaks and continued conflict and livestock raids are expected to result in above-average livestock losses in flood- and conflict-affected areas. 
• The availability of fish and wild foods is expected to be normal and seasonally high through January 2025; however, access will be atypically low due to dangerously high water levels during peak rainy periods combined with continued insecurity in October and November. Household access will be confined to nearby, shallow flooded areas or rivers/streams. As flood waters begin to recede and river levels decline through May 2025, household access is expected to improve moderately, though insecurity-related impacts to access will persist in some areas.
• With the country’s first general elections delayed to 2026, the previously expected surge in political violence is unlikely to materialize within the observation period, although politically driven tensions are expected to persist and drive sporadic conflict. Economic fallout from the pipeline rupture is likely to continue driving increased rates of banditry, criminality, and intercommunal violence through May 2025. Through at least November, displacements triggered by expected heavy flooding are likely to increase the potential for intercommunal conflict in the short term, while seasonal increases in intercommunal conflict between pastoral groups (driven by competition over scarce water and pasture resources) are expected during the November to April dry season. 
• Displacement is expected to increase through January 2025 and then moderate through May 2025. 
  • Refugee flows from Sudan are expected to continue through May 2025 but follow an overall declining trend. Returnee flows from Ethiopia and the spontaneous return of South Sudanese refugees from Uganda and the DRC are also expected to continue, but likely at lower levels given anticipation of election-related violence and further deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions in South Sudan. 
  • In the near term through January 2025, internal displacement is expected to increase due to the anticipation of further flood-induced displacements, sporadic conflict due to the delayed election, and declining economic conditions. Between January and May 2025, internal displacements will likely moderate as the flood waters begin receding.   
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain very severe through May 2025 despite donor financing, non-oil revenue collection, and government plans to restart oil export via Port Sudan. The reliability of oil exports will remain uncertain give persisting risks to pipelines from the conflict in Sudan. The local currency is expected to continue depreciating and is likely to remain volatile and above 4,000 SSP/USD on the parallel market. 
• Fuel prices at pump stations in key reference markets are expected to remain high or fluctuate at higher trends due to SSP depreciation driving high transportation costs. Fuel prices are likely to remain over 4,000 SSP/liter in Juba and over 7,000 SSP/liter in pump stations outside of Juba (e.g., Rumbek Centre and Gogrial East). 
• Food prices are expected to remain elevated during the harvest and post-harvest period due to flood-induced crop losses, illicit taxes along trade routes, flood- and insecurity-related disruptions to supply movement, poor economic conditions, and depreciation. Based on FEWS NETs integrated price projection analyses, overall retail prices of a malwa (3.5 kg) of white sorghum (feterita) are likely to trend 109 to 350 percent higher than last year in Juba, Aweil, Wau, and Bor, and 200 to 600 percent above the five-year average. In key reference markets of Juba, Wau, Aweil, and Bor South, sorghum prices are generally expected to decline seasonally with the arrival of the harvests and increased import supply, ranging from 7,600 to 12,000 SSP per malwa between October 2024 and January 2025. Prices are expected to rise with atypical household stock depletion and increased market dependency during the February to May 2025 post-harvest period and start of the 2025 lean season, ranging from 8,000 SSP to 14,900 SSP per malwa, with highest prices (11,000-14,900 SSP) likely in Bor South and lowest (7,000-8,000 SSP) in Juba.
• Trade flows from Sudan are expected to remain significantly disrupted in Q4 of 2024 into Q1 of 2025. As conflict and insecurity persist, harvests in Sudan are expected to be significantly below average, leading to very high domestic demand within Sudan and a likely early start to the 2025 lean season. As a result, limited cereal supplies are expected to flow from Sudan to South Sudan via Gok-Machar border crossing during Sudan’s typical harvest and post-harvest periods, driving low market supply and high commodity prices in northern counties. Re-export of essential commodities to Sudan – including fuel and high-energy foods – is expected to continue, driven by potential for high profits (albeit limited by South Sudan’s high import inflation).
• Trade flow volumes from Uganda are expected to increase month-on-month through February 2025 as Ugandan traders offload stocks in anticipation of an above-average first season harvest. Import levels are still likely to remain below last year’s, tempered by South Sudan’s high customs and border fees. Imports from Uganda will decline from March through May as stock levels decline in source markets. 
• Above-average prevalence of diseases such as cholera and measles is expected through March/April 2025 in locations affected by floods and hosting large populations of new arrivals from Sudan (particularly transit sites). Disease incidence will be driven by persistent inundation and over-crowding/congestion and be compounded by low or no access to improved water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities and services. Elevated disease prevalence is likely to drive high levels of morbidity and acute malnutrition. 

Sub-national assumptions for Upper Nile Region 

• Clashes are expected to increase through May 2025 between Padanga Dinka and Shilluk communities over territorial competition and between Nuer and Shilluk communities of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei, driven by the influx of South Sudanese returnees and continued presence of Nuer White Army members around Tonga in Panyikang County. The continued mobilization of Agwelek forces is expected to fuel local tensions and violence in the Upper Nile-Jonglei border region. 
• In parts of Unity and neighboring areas of Warrap, Lakes, and Ruweng Administrative Area, cattle raiding and revenge attacks are expected to continue. In central Unity, sporadic armed clashes between SSPDF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO) forces are likely given shifting allegiances and high tension. 
• Tensions are expected to continue in north-central Jonglei and GPAA. These tensions will likely manifest in the form of continued cattle raiding, abductions, and road ambushes.   

Sub-national assumptions for Greater Bahr el Ghazal region

• The conflict in Sudan is likely to exacerbate insecurity in the northern border areas. In particular, the presence of armed Misseriya militia along the Sudan border with Northern Bahr el Ghazal Region is likely to increase tension with the Ngok Dinka communities and disrupt trade flow and livelihood activities in Aweil North, Aweil East, and parts of northern Unity (Pariang, Mayom, and Abiemnhom). 
• Nomadic groups originating from Sudan are expected to increase migration to Northern Bahr el Ghazal and parts of northern Unity with the onset of the dry season, joining those who stayed atypically throughout the rainy season due to conflict in Sudan, increasing the pressure on available grazing resources and sustaining high tensions among pastoral communities and with farmers.   
• In Warrap, intercommunal conflict, cattle raiding, and revenge attacks are expected to continue at or slightly above the levels reported throughout 2022 and 2023 and remain elevated through May 2025. In the Abyei-Twic area, intercommunal attacks are likely to persist at their current levels through May.

Sub-national assumptions for Greater Equatoria Region

• The frequency of roadside ambushes and banditry is likely to increase through May 2025 due to deteriorating economic conditions, high staple food prices, and rising cost of living. In Eastern Equatoria, disruptions along the Juba-Nimule highway are likely in the coming months, and attacks by the JCC and other rebel groups on vehicles transiting the highway are expected, with likely impacts on trade flows and market access. 
• Violent activity by cattle keepers is expected to continue across the region throughout the projection period, with an expected increase from October through at least February 2024, before subsiding during the peak of the dry season. However, the dry season peak will also likely see increased clashes over scarce water and grazing land. 
• In parts of Western and Central Equatoria, sporadic fighting between the National Salvation Front (NAS) and SSPDF is likely to occur amid ongoing dialogues with hold-out groups, including the Nairobi peace talks.
• In Western Equatoria, there is a low to moderate likelihood that escalating violence in Tambura will lead to larger-scale conflict similar to that in 2021. In Eastern Equatoria, sporadic armed clashes and cattle raiding among the Toposa and Tennet communities and between the Toposa and Murle are expected to continue through May 2025, leading to livestock theft and lethal clashes.   

Humanitarian food assistance

• Following the end of the lean season response as of mid-September, WFP and partners will continue flood response assistance through November 2024, targeting 1.3-1.4 million flood-affected people located in GPAA; Fangak, Canal/Pigi, Akobo, Ayod, Duk, Uror, and Twic East of Jonglei; Abyei AA; Guit, Koch, Leer, Mayendit, Panyijiar, and Rubkona of Unity; Fashoda, Luakpiny/Nasir, Maiwut, Melut, Panyikang, Ulang, Baliet, Maban, and Malakal of Upper Nile; Rumbek North of Lakes; Aweil South and Aweil East of Northern Bahr el Ghazal; and Lafon of Eastern Equatoria. However, given the expected severity of flooding expected to peak in October/November and persist through early 2025, distributions are likely to be disrupted by access constraints and exacerbated by continued sporadic conflict. All assistance will pause in December and the 2025 lean season response will likely start in limited high-priority counties as early as January (likely to include Rubkona of Unity, Pibor and Duk of Jonglei; Malakal of Upper Nile; and Aweil East of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, though the list could shift depending on emerging new areas of high concern). The second tier of priority counties will likely begin receiving lean season 2025 assistance in March 2025.  

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

National

The severity and scale of acute food insecurity are expected to remain high in South Sudan between October 2024 and January 2025 – particularly in severely flood- and conflict-affected counties – due to the disruptions to crop production and to the harvest, significant disruption to market supplies, and high cost of living. While the main season harvest is expected to improve food availability in non-flooded areas of Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, poor feeder road networks and high supply costs are expected to limit domestic trade flows to deficit areas. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be widespread across the country with 12 counties in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Counties that experienced severe flooding and those that are hosting a large share of South Sudanese returnees will be of highest concern due to large numbers of households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Humanitarian food assistance is expected to primarily mitigate large food consumption gaps in the Greater Upper Nile region. 

From February through May 2025, acute food insecurity outcomes are expected to deteriorate seasonally through dry season, compounded by atypical depletion of household food stocks, reduced availability of wild foods and livestock products, elevated staple food prices, and low household purchasing power. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist country-wide with a growing number of counties (32) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). During this period, humanitarian food assistance is expected to mitigate outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) primarily in the Upper Greater Nile region. Some households are expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Malakal, Uror, and Pibor, as well as among returnee households, as the next lean season approaches. 

Greater Upper Nile region

The highest severity and scale of acute food insecurity is expected in Greater Upper Nile region due to sustained negative impacts of years of floods and conflict on local production, trade flows, and household coping capacity. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be widespread, with nine counties (Fangak, Canal/Pigi, Nyirol, and Twic East of Jonglei; Pibor of GPAA; Malakal, Panyikang, and Renk of Upper Nile; and Rubkona of Unity) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through January 2025. The population of greatest concern will be flood-affected and returnee households in Unity and Upper Nile who are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes due to limited access to food and exhausted coping capacities. However, food assistance is expected to prevent deterioration in 10 counties under the flood response mechanism, leading to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). Continued trade flows from Uganda through Juba to Bor and good access to fish and functional markets in Bor are expected to drive Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in Bor South of Jonglei. 

From February through May 2025, outcomes are expected to worsen due to rising staple food prices amid high market dependency; low availability and access to wild foods; and reduced access to livestock products and milk sale income due to livestock migration to distant dry season grazing areas. Although trade flows and physical access to markets are expected to recover with the recession of floodwaters, many poor households will be unable to financially access food due to low purchasing power. As a result, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand to 15 counties across Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity, with Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) expected among returnees in transit areas (such as in Renk, Malakal, Rubkona), and among resident populations in Malakal and Pibor. At the same time, humanitarian assistance is expected to mitigate worse outcomes in 11 counties with the expected start-up of 2025 lean season response, leading to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes.   

Greater Bahr el Ghazal region

Between October 2024 and January 2025, increased availability of food (from main season harvests, wild foods, fish, and livestock products) combined with a seasonal decline in market food prices (albeit limited) are expected to marginally improve household food consumption and drive widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes across Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, and parts of Warrap.However, persistent negative impacts of both floods and intercommunal conflict on local agricultural and livestock production, coupled with significant disruptions to trade with Sudan, are expected to drive Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in 4 counties of Tonj East, Gogrial East, and Twic of Warrap, and Abyei. The Twic-Abyei border region is likely to be particularly food insecure due to intercommunal conflict, cattle raiding, flooding impacts, and disrupted cross-border trade with Sudan.

From February through May 2025, local stocks from the 2024 harvests are expected to deplete atypically early. Access to food from markets, livestock products, and wild foods is likely to also decrease and remain limited. Although the dry season is expected to facilitate greater trade flows and humanitarian deliveries, sporadic localized intercommunal conflict and persistent insecurity are likely to restrict commercial, humanitarian, and household movements and drive an expansion of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes to 15 counties. In contrast, functional markets and moderate supply, average local production, and relative calm are expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in eight counties.  

Greater Equatoria

Between October 2024 and January 2025, persistently poor macroeconomic conditions, high market dependency, high staple food prices, and conflict- and localized insecurity-related disruptions to harvests and market supplies are expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes across 16 counties, though Lopa/Lafon of Eastern Equatoria is expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to low local production for the second year in a row, this year linked to flooding. Increased food availability from second season production and relative calm are expected to support Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in Magwi of Eastern Equatoria and Ibba, Maridi, Mundri West, Nzara, and Yambio of Western Equatoria. 

Between February and May 2025, household food consumption gaps are expected to widen in many areas due to depletion of food stocks and increases in staple food prices. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to be widespread. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely expand to Kapoeta East and Kapoeta North as the pastoral lean season deepens, marked by low milk and livestock product supply. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely to persist in Yambio, Nzara, and Ezo due to expected carryover stocks from 2024 surplus production.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

The extension of the transitional period by an additional two years, leads to increased tensions amongst local communities and key political parties.  

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the event that key political parties to the 2018 peace agreement disagree during the extended implementation period leading to political tensions, the levels of conflict and violence along ethnic and political lines would increase, disrupting trade, assistance delivery, movement of people, and restrict access to food and incomes sources.  As a result, the proportion of the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes will increase dramatically, leading to widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4).  

Oil production and export is resumed successfully, more oil revenues are generated and available to the government of South Sudan, and traders are able to resume greater quantities of imports. 

Impact on food security outcomes: In the event that the government of South Sudan successfully resumes oil exports via port Sudan and is able to regain sufficient oil revenues, it will help to improve hard currency availability for imports, decrease the SSP depreciation, lower prices of food and non-food, and improve household purchasing capacity. This will also permit timely payments of civil servants.  As such, the proportion of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would decline.  

Humanitarian funding is mobilized beyond what is planned and likely, and humanitarians prioritize areas in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), not just Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse.

Impact on food security outcomes: Increased humanitarian funding – for South Sudan in the remainder of 2024 and into 2025– would enable the scale up of assistance delivery to more vulnerable groups, including host and returnee communities, refugees and IDPs, and areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. This would mitigate moderate to large food consumption gaps and drive lower food insecurity classifications to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) or lower in many counties. 

Sub-National (Greater Pibor Administrative Area and south-central Jonglei)

An increase in the frequency and scale of conflict between groups, including Murle, Dinka, and Lou Nuer communities, beyond what is already expected.

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An increase in the frequency and scale of conflict between rival groups would lead to significant disruptions in livelihoods activities, trade, markets, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, leading to some households being cut-off from accessing food and income. Many households would face large to extreme food consumption gaps. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely be sustained in Duk, Nyirol, Uror, and Pibor, but with higher proportions of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) than currently projected in Pibor.

Sub-National (Twic-Abyei border region of Warrap, parts of Unity, Upper Nile, and Lakes)

An increase in the levels of inter-communal conflict and violence beyond what is already expected under the most likely scenario. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If inter-communal conflict and violence escalate beyond what was forecasted under the most likely scenario in the Twic-Abyei border region, Pariang, Rubkona and Mayom of Unity, and Lakes, disruptions to trade flow and assistance delivery would be expected, including restriction to fishing and wild food gathering and livestock movement to grazing areas. As such, the proportion of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would increase, with some pockets in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Abyei and Rubkona. 

Conflict occurs in conjunction with severe flooding in areas with high returnee burden.

Impact on food security outcomes: If conflict occurs in conjunction with severe flooding at levels sufficient to isolate households from assistance and restrict household ability to migrate in search of food and income for a prolonged time, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would become more widespread, levels of acute malnutrition would escalate from already high rates, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur. Of particular concern are overcrowded areas with high numbers of returnees who lack assets, are unfamiliar with the gathering and consumption of wild foods (a key coping strategy in these areas), and are already subject to high levels of food insecurity, disease, and acute malnutrition due to poor conditions in transit centers.

Fangak county of Jonglei state of Nile Basin Fishing and Agropastoral livelihood Zone (LHZ SS08) and Rubkona county of North-Western Nile Basin Cattle and Maize livelihood zone (LHZ SS09), (Figure 9)

Reason for selecting this area: There are multiple areas of high concern in South Sudan, located in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions, and southeastern pastoral zones. FEWS NET has selected Fangak county of Jonglei in LHZ SS08 and Rubkona county of Unity in LHZ SS09 to illustrate the impacts of very high returnee burden, protracted flooding and conflict events, and asset erosion leading to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) that can be extrapolated to surrounding areas.

Fangak county of Jonglei and Rubkona of Unity both have high levels of displacement from current severe flooding and from prior conflicts and/or flooding. According to OCHA, as of October 18 about 16,200 people in Fangak and 36,000 in Rubkona were affected by floods, though reports from key informants and partners suggest these figures could be an underestimation. Although conflict has been relatively low since mid-June 2024 in both areas, tension remains high in Rubkona due to the influx of returnees, and in Fangak due to the mobilization of Agwelek forces. Both populations face persisting impacts of prior conflict and/or flooding that significantly eroded many traditional livelihoods (including crop and livestock production) and forcefully displaced and confined thousands of households in displacement camps and higher-ground locations. According to updated IOM/DRC camp management data, 216,885 people (29,769 households) in Rubkona and 66,036 people (11,157 households) in Fangak are still internally displaced  and dependent on humanitarian for food, health, and nutrition supplies.

In addition to conflict and flood impacts, these areas (especially Rubkona) have received a significant influx of South Sudanese returnees from Sudan since the conflict began in April 2023. According to IOM/UNHCR/RRC data, about 44,000 and 5,000 South Sudanese returnees are currently living in Rubkona and Fangak, respectively (though these figure are also likely an underestimation). The returnee burden has exacerbated both acute food and nutrition insecurity as most arrivals have limited assets and low coping capacity.

The Sudan conflict has disrupted trade flows, contributing to soaring commodity pricesand worsening household purchasing capacity even further, limiting household access to market food. According to the available information from WFP and FAO, a majority of households in Fangak and Rubkona reported atypically high staple food prices as a major shock affecting adequate access to market food. Many households are unable to afford their basic needs as measured against the MEB. This was considerably worse in Rubkona, where a majority is unable to afford the survival basket (SMEB) or bare minimum of required to survive. Household monthly per capita food expenditure share has also increased from 13,667 SSP in 2023 to 34,571 SSP in 2024 in Fangak, and 8,090 SSP to 20,570 SSP in Rubkona, reflecting significant increases in food basket costs. Additionally, over half of households in Fangak and Rubkona, respectively, reported spending over 75 percent of total expenses on food.

While more households in Fangak and Rubkona had access to land and planted or intended to plant crops in 2024 compared to 2023, according to available information collected by WFP and FAO, flooding resulted in crop damage in areas not protected by dikes. While key informants report households were already consuming green maize in August, the overall harvest is low and likely to deplete atypically early. 

Livestock production and ownership, though an important component of livelihoods in both areas of concern, remains low due to the protracted impacts of flood, conflict, and cattle raiding. According to recent information from WFP and FAO, more households own livestock in 2024 compared to 2023, but ownership is still lower than the five-year averages. Recurrent flooding, high floodwater extent, disease outbreaks, and pasture inundation continue to negatively affect livestock production in both areas. Key informants reported that most livestock herds are kept in distant higher-ground locations, thus limiting livestock-owning household access to livestock products for consumption and income. 

The availability of wild food sources such as water lilies, fish, and green leaf have seasonally increased in both areas, but access is limited by floodwaters, insecurity, and lack of fishing equipment (especially among returnee households). Some households indicated it was more difficult to find fish than normal, and key informants report that the risk of snake bites is also discouraging fishing engagement in Rubkona. Wild food gathering/fishing and sales are the key income and food source for most vulnerable households in Fangak during October and expected to remain so in October; In Rubkona, households are also engaged in the sale of forest products.

Humanitarian food assistance remains a key source of food for most vulnerable households in both areas of concern. Analysis of WFP distribution data confirmed that assistance was provided to a significant share of the population; however, the assistance was likely shared widely given the high returnee burden and high levels of hunger, reducing the impact on mitigating the size of food consumption gaps.  

In October 2024, many households are facing large food consumption gaps indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in both Fangak and Rubkona, with some returnees facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes. Available information from WFP and FAO pointed to high levels of hunger in the lean season that have likely persisted among host populations into October given the disruption caused by flooding and sharing of resources with high numbers of returnees. Meanwhile an even greater share of returnee households are likely facing severe hunger indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in October. Consistent humanitarian food assistance during the peak lean season, combined with emergency livelihood coping strategies and increased availability of wild foods, fish, and milk among host populations with access, likely prevented more extreme manifestations of household hunger. However, food access was limited for returnees and high floodwater, insecurity, lack of access to fishing equipment, and extremely high staple food prices amid extremely low household income earning opportunities are constraining access for all households. Available nutrition data collected by WFP and FAO in July shows levels in the range of Critical for GAM in both Fangak and Rubkona, further indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in both areas during the September-October harvesting period.  

Assumptions

In addition to the national assumptions, the following apply to the areas of concern:

• Crop production and harvest are expected to be similar to or lower than last year and the five-year average in both areas due to flood-related impacts. Food stocks in both Fangak and Rubkona are expected to deplete atypically early (between October-December).
• Trade flows from Sudan to the areas of concern are expected to remain significantly disrupted due to the persistence of conflict and insecurity in Sudan, likely driving low market supplies and higher staple food prices compared to last year and the five-year average throughout the projection period. 
• Crowding due to high numbers of displaced people, exposure to floodwater, and poor access to WASH services in both areas of concern are expected to increase the incidence of waterborne disease outbreaks (such as dysentery and cholera) through January 2025, which may worsen acute malnutrition. 
• WFP plans to reach over 90 and 23 percent of the population in Fangak and Rubkona, respectively, with 50-70 percent rations in October and November under the flood response mechanism. In Fangak, WFP’s humanitarian food assistance will be paused between December and February 2025 before resuming in March 2025 under the lean season response mechanism for a targeted 90 percent of the population. In Rubkona, assistance will pause in December and scale back up in January to target an estimated 80 percent of the population with 70 percent rations.  

Projected outcomes

Between October 2024 and January 2025, large food consumption gaps indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in both areas of concern due to expected below-average local production linked to negative flood-related impacts and atypical stock depletion as households consume larger than usual shares of production as green maize. Atypically high staple food prices, limited income-earning opportunities, and low market supply are likely to drive below-normal access to market food. While the availability of wild foods is expected to increase seasonally, household access for gathering and purchase is expected to be constrained by high floodwaters and extremely low purchasing power. Significant proportions of poor households (including returnees) are likely to engage in emergency livelihood coping strategies such as moving to areas with food and income-earning opportunities and seeking community leaders’ support to secure food. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in both areas, with Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes among flood-displaced households and newly arrived returnees who have limited coping capacity and few to no assets. 

From February through May 2025, the start of the lean season is expected to worsen household food consumption gaps in both areas of concern as households exhaust food stocks and livestock migrate to distant grazing areas. Although trade flows and market functioning are expected to improve with floodwater recession during dry season, increasingly high food prices and low household purchasing power are likely to prevent adequate access to market food. Access to fish and other wild foods is likely to be constrained by limited access to fishing equipment, insecurity, and high competition among the host households and returnees. Under WFP’s most likely and funded plan, high levels of food assistance are likely to be sustained in Rubkona, reaching 82 percent of the population with 70 percent rations; however, the rations are expected to be shared which will reduce the daily kilocalorie contribution from assistance. Nonetheless, the relatively high levels of assistance are expected to mitigate area-level outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!), though some households are likely to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with some newly-arrived returnees likely even in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In Fangak, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist, with at least 20 percent of the population expected to face large consumption gaps  as humanitarians face difficulty accessing this area to deliver assistance, due to high residual flood waters.