Conflict and poor rains to sustain Emergency and risk of Famine through the harvest

• FEWS NET estimates 8.0-8.99 million people will need food assistance through September. Conflict, displacement, and deteriorating economic conditions – exacerbated by global economic shocks, seasonal flash floods, and emerging drought – are driving severe market disruptions and high food and fuel prices. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be widespread in 26 counties across the north, center, and east during the lean season, while food assistance will likely mitigate the severity of outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in 10 counties through September. In Jonglei and Upper Nile, some populations in inaccessible areas of Akobo, Nyirol, Uror, Nasir, and Ulang are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 
• Levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) likely stand at Extremely Critical (GAM ≥30 percent) in June in Akobo, Nyirol, Fangak, Uror, and Duk of Jonglei and Baliet, Ulang, and Nasir of Upper Nile as conflict has critically disrupted access to income, food, and health services amid high displacement, extremely poor water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) conditions, and elevated disease outbreaks. In Akobo, a recent screening of 13,400 children found 35 percent acutely malnourished as humanitarians raced to scale up the nutrition response during an ongoing, relative lull in conflict. 
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to remain widespread from October to January, as seasonal harvests are expected to be inadequate to compensate for expected declines in food assistance. In the typically deficit-producing areas of Greater Upper Nile, harvests are expected to be minimal at best due to current insecurity and displacement; below-average rainfall linked to El Niño during the main agricultural season; flash flooding; and renewed conflict during the dry season.   
• A credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Akobo, Nyirol, Nasir, and Ulang. If conflict re-escalates given tensions between government, opposition, and allied forces; further displaces households; obstructs humanitarian and commercial access; prevents market recovery; and constrains household mobility for a prolonged period, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 24, 2026.  

South Sudan has endured a complex humanitarian crisis for over a decade, driven by recurrent, cyclical bouts of conflict, flooding, and displacement amid poor economic conditions. Following secession from Sudan in 2011, the country was mired in civil wars in 2013-2014 and again in 2016-2018 that led to the deaths of an estimated 400,000 people, displacement of 4.5 million people both internally and across borders, and the declaration of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in central Unity in 2017. The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) ended the civil wars and ushered in a Transitional Government of National Unity (R-ToGNU). However, sub-national conflict has continued to flare since 2018, with recent escalation pushing the country closer to the brink of renewed civil war and near collapse of the peace deal. Since late 2025, fighting has intensified in north-central Jonglei and southern Upper Nile, as well as in parts of Unity, Warrap, and Greater Equatoria, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and severely disrupting humanitarian access in north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile. The security situation in these areas remains extremely volatile. 

Flooding has become a severe and recurring shock. Seven consecutive years of severe-to-extreme flooding in 2019-2025 led to extensive displacement, asset loss, and – in conjunction with the impact of conflict in some areas – near-complete livelihood collapse. Floodwaters are increasingly failing to recede during the dry season, driven by sustained record-high upstream lake levels and episodic, high-intensity rainfall. Additionally, the impacts of conflict and livestock raids have driven shifts from pastoralism to agropastoralism in areas with marginal crop productivity, which has further raised household vulnerability to new shocks. In late 2020, the combination of conflict and flooding led to a second Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification in Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). Many areas of eastern and northern South Sudan have faced high and severe levels of acute food insecurity for the past five years or more. 

On top of the longstanding impacts of conflict and flooding, over three years of war in Sudan have resulted in the arrival of over 1.3 million returnees and refugees since April 2023. The pace of arrivals has slowed in recent months, and evolving conflict dynamics in both countries in 2025 have led to some reverse flows back to Sudan. However, the scale of displacement in already acutely food-insecure areas with scarce resources and meager livelihood opportunities is placing high pressure on local South Sudan communities. Many returnees are heavily dependent on relatives and host communities for their food needs, while others lack local knowledge and social networks to access support or establish sustainable livelihoods. 

Macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate, driving up the already high cost of living. The national economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports with little to no diversification and has been characterized by steadily deteriorating exchange rates and rising import inflation. A pipe rupture in February 2024 that took over a year to repair, followed by conflict over the Heglig oil fields in southern Kordofan, highlight the vulnerability of the country to disruptions to oil exports. While global price increases for oil due to the Middle East conflict in 2026 have increased South Sudan’s oil revenue, a combination of a cash liquidity crisis, prolonged non-payment of government salaries, rising transport costs, elevated staple food prices, and the high cost of living in general are contributing to the steady erosion of household purchasing power and low effective demand. As a result, poor households, particularly in heavily conflict-affected areas, remain highly dependent on low levels of food assistance amid an increasingly constrained funding environment.

These shocks have sustained high levels of acute food insecurity that peak during the lean season (June-September) in the unimodal north and east. Farming households in these unimodal areas typically begin land preparation and planting between March and May, while livestock seasonally migrate to distant areas in search of pasture and water, reducing household access to livestock products during the dry season. The arrival of the main rains between June and September allows for rejuvenation of pastures and water points for livestock, which facilitates their return but also marks the start of seasonal flooding that typically displaces households, disrupts agricultural production, and interferes with livelihood activities to varying degrees. Green harvests are typically available in these areas by August, while the main harvest is typically completed by November. In bimodal areas in the south and west, harvests from first season production typically become available by June and July, and planting for the second season occurs in August and September, to be harvested between November and January. See Annex 3 for a detailed seasonal calendar.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest South Sudan Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for South Sudan: April to September 2026 
• Latest South Sudan Key Message Update: May 2026 
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Conflict and insecurity remain the primary drivers of acute food insecurity, constraining humanitarian operations, displacing households, disrupting markets and social services, and preventing the return of displaced populations. Conflict involving government and opposition forces, specifically in Jonglei and Upper Nile, displaced more than 420,000 people between January and May. While a lull in conflict in May has enabled the scale-up of assistance and encouraged some returns, tensions remain high and sporadic attacks continue, including in some parts of Jonglei, eastern Upper Nile, Warrap, Unity, and Central and Eastern Equatoria (Figure 1). 

• In April and May, roughly 79,000 people who had fled to Ethiopia in March returned to parts of Jonglei and Upper Nile, including 5,000 to parts of eastern Nasir and 36,000 to Akobo. An additional 27,000 people who were previously internally displaced have also returned to parts of Jonglei. 
• The relative calm has facilitated the scale-up of humanitarian assistance deliveries in counties assessed to face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), with over 30 trucks delivering 200 metric tons (MT) of food and nutrition supplies in May. In Akobo, about 60,000 people received food assistance – representing 26 percent of the county population – though overall needs remain high given large-scale displacement and the near-collapse of livelihoods. Nutrition interventions have reached over 6,000 women, over 30,000 have received high-energy biscuits, and over 15,000 children have been screened, with 3,000 children admitted for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM).
• Sporadic attacks between government and opposition forces continued in May and June, notably in Canal/Pigi, Uror, and Nyirol of Jonglei; Morobo of Central Equatoria; and Nasir of Upper Nile in late May through late June. These incidents disrupted humanitarian access and livelihoods and resulted in 34 deaths (see Annex 5 for additional details).  
• Intercommunal violence linked to revenge killings and cattle raiding intensified in mid-May through late June, with over 70 incidents reported across multiple locations in Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Greater Upper Nile region, and parts of Greater Equatoria. These events resulted in the deaths of 121 people and the loss of over 700 cattle, while disrupting humanitarian access, trade flows, and main-season crop production.

The daily inflow of returnees and refugees from Sudan remains low and has continued to slowly decline since mid-2025, due to relative calm in some eastern areas of Sudan on the one hand and both increased conflict and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in South Sudan on the other hand. Nonetheless, the elevated presence of nearly 1.4 million people continues to strain resources and sustain high needs. While returnees are encouraged to reintegrate in their areas of origin, most have remained in informal settlements in Renk (Upper Nile) due to fear of renewed conflict, lack of family or community ties, or the hope of returning to Sudan when conditions improve. Nationally, 2.5 million people are internally displaced in South Sudan as of May 2026. 

While cumulative rainfall for the March-May first rainy season was average, spatial and temporal variations in rainfall distribution is likely to lead to reduced yields and below-average first season harvests in bimodal Equatoria (Figure 2). Prolonged dry spells since April have resulted in emerging drought conditions and contributed to poor growth conditions for maize crops as reported by key informants in Tambura, Ezo, Mvolo, Mundri East, and Nagero (Western Equatoria); Juba, Terekeka, and parts of Lainya (Central Equatoria); and parts of Budi, Torit, and Ikotos (Eastern Equatoria).

The start of the June-September main rainy season has been below average across the country (Figure 3), driving a growing soil moisture deficit and prolonged dry spells in April and mid-June that has affected main-season crop planting and germination, as well as pasture regeneration. Key informant and field monitoring information confirmed wilting of early planted crops and some delayed planting in Greater Kapoeta and western Magwi (Eastern Equatoria); parts of Juba (Central Equatoria); parts of Fangak and Ulang (Upper Nile); and most of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, and Warrap. In conflict-affected areas of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and parts of Unity, crop production is also being disrupted by pervasive insecurity.

Variable rainfall, above-average temperatures, and conflict-related restrictions on livestock movement are contributing to localized, persistently poor-to-fair livestock body conditions in agropastoral zones. Typically, livestock conditions would be improving as the onset of rains replenishes pasture and water resources; however, pasture conditions in northern-central Upper Nile and parts of Unity, Warrap, and Aweil East (Northern Bahr el Ghazal) remain below the long-term mean. Surface water availability is ranging from Watch to Near-Dry levels in June amid the poor rainfall performance. In areas where pasture growth has improved, such as in Jonglei and southern Upper Nile, conflict and insecurity are still limiting livestock movement. Meanwhile, households face a persistent lack of access to veterinary services, contributing to poor livestock body conditions.

South Sudan continues to face poor macroeconomic conditions amid a critical cash liquidity crisis, low inflows of foreign currency, and persistent SSP depreciation. As of late June, the SSP exchange rates remain relatively similar in both markets, trading at 4,760-4,790 SSP/USD on the official market and 6,600-6,650 SSP/USD on the parallel market. However, the SSP lost value by 4 and 12 percent on the official and parallel markets, respectively, between May and late June. This continued depreciation is driven by a deteriorating economy and high inflation of 33 percent, despite increased oil revenues from increased crude oil production and high global oil prices. While the government continues to pursue diversification strategies to help strengthen the SSP – the latest of which relates to using gold as collateral, building on initiatives involving commercial banks and e-permit systems that were started earlier in the year – ongoing fiscal mismanagement continues to undermine economic recovery.

Households continue to face challenges accessing food through markets due to elevated food and fuel prices and limited income-earning opportunities. The month-on-month changes in the cost of the Multi-Sector Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket were mixed, with roughly half of those with available data registering increases of between 7 and 35 percent between April and May, particularly in Upper Nile and Western Equatoria. However, the cost remains significantly higher than the five-year average across the country. Rising fuel prices in regional markets are worsening the already high supply cost and driving elevated food prices. Compared to February 2026 (when fuel prices first spiked), fuel prices in May were 45-105 percent higher in Aweil Centre, Juba, Rumbek Centre, Wau, and Bor South, and 50-90 percent higher than the same month last year. Based on price monitoring data, the retail prices of red sorghum per malwa (3.5 kilograms) in Wau, Rumbek Centre, Juba, and Aweil Centre were 8-50 percent higher in May than in February due to rising supply costs layered on top of seasonal increases in demand as household harvest stocks become depleted. 

Trade routes in many areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile remain critically disrupted by conflict and insecurity, as well as flooding and seasonally poor road conditions (Figure 1). Based on FEWS NET and REACH market and trade monitoring, as well as Logistic Cluster road condition monitoring, the lull in conflict in May facilitated some recovery in markets, trade flows, and physical market access in Twic East, Duk, and Ayod (Jonglei); Baliet and Wau Shilluk (Upper Nile); Pibor (GPAA); Abiemnhom, Ganyiel, Koch, Mayendit, Leer, and Mayom (Unity); and Tambura, Nagero, and Mundri (Western Equatoria). In June, however, seasonal deterioration once again reduced physical market access, particularly to Duk, Ayod, and Uror and onward into northern Jonglei, as well as in Pibor and Akobo, constraining trade flows and humanitarian access. River movement along the Sobat River has enabled some access to parts of north-central Jonglei and southern Upper Nile, but this remains limited by insecurity, while roads in the area are largely impassable due to flooding.

South Sudan continues to face multiple disease outbreaks that are contributing to worsening malnutrition. Cumulative cholera cases have surpassed 100,000 since the start of the outbreak in September 2024, reaching 105,505 cases and 1,688 deaths by mid-June. The outbreak has been concentrated in Unity, Lakes, and Upper Nile states, with recent cases reported primarily in Rubkona, Mayom, Leer, Koch, and Renk counties. Displaced populations, such as those in Bentiu IDP camp, are particularly vulnerable to cholera transmission due to overcrowding, poor WASH conditions, and severely limited access to health care. Other communicable diseases also continue to rise with the onset of the rainy season, including malaria, acute respiratory infections, and skin diseases. Measles cases are also a concern, with new cases reported in Lakes (10), Upper Nile (six), Western Bahr el Ghazal (four), and Central Equatoria (two) in the first two weeks of June, indicating a heightened risk of continued localized spread. No Ebola cases have been reported to date, though the risk of transmission into South Sudan remains high due to highly used and porous borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.     

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarians are taking advantage of the ongoing lull in conflict to scale up lean season responses in accessible areas, though seasonal and security-related constraints continue to limit access, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile. Nationally, WFP initiated the lean season response in 26 counties in May, alongside the ongoing Sudan crisis response and camp-based IDP and refugee operations, reaching a total of 1.7 million people with food and cash assistance in May, equivalent to approximately 20 percent of FEWS NET’s estimated population in need of assistance. In 11 top priority counties — Ayod, Duk, Canal/Pigi, Fangak, and Uror (Jonglei); Pibor (GPAA); Leer, Mayendit, Panyijiar, and Rubkona (Unity); and Abyei — more than 25 percent of the county population received food and cash assistance equivalent to more than 25 percent of their daily kilocalorie needs, supporting the classification of Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!). 

South Sudan continues to face high levels of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition during the lean season in June, driven by conflict, displacement, and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and exacerbated by global economic shocks. The impact of high food and fuel prices countrywide, as well as critical market disruptions in severely conflict-affected areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile, are particularly severe during the lean season since households’ meagre food stocks have been depleted. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread in 25 counties, while the scale-up of food distributions in May and June under the lean season response have mitigated severity to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in 11 counties, mostly in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and parts of Unity. Of these areas, Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror of Jonglei and Nasir and Ulang of Upper Nile are of highest concern, as populations in inaccessible areas are facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) amid limited access to food and nutrition assistance. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in 43 counties and food consumption gaps are likely widening for poor households in the major urban centers, including Juba, Wau, Aweil, and Rumbek Centre due to the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions coupled with rising unemployment and high fuel prices. 

According to the IPC Update in April 2026, acute malnutrition prevalence was projected to surpass Extremely Critical (GAM ≥30 percent) levels in 11 counties – Duk, Fangak, Uror, Akobo, Baliet, Akoka, Nasir, Ulang, Abiemnhom, Rubkona, and Abyei Administrative Area (Abyei) – by June due to little to no access to WASH, health, and nutrition services, a rising disease burden, and worsening food consumption deficits. Although SMART surveys are planned in many of these counties (12 in total), results are currently only available for Maiwut (Upper Nile), where the GAM rate reached 15.1 percent in April. Available screening data nevertheless support continued concern: in Akobo, a mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) screening of 13,400 children conducted by UNICEF in June found a GAM rate of 35 percent as partners race to set up treatment programs. Humanitarian nutrition programming is providing critical treatment for already malnourished children in several high-priority counties, but coverage remains uneven, prevention programs are limited, and the risk of relapse is high. For example WFP’s targeted supplementary feeding program (TSFP) reached two to three times the targeted number of children in March and April in Fangak, Nyirol, Uror, and Longochuk, but coverage remained much lower in Canal/Pigi and Duk, reaching only 30-50 percent of the target. 

• In Greater Upper Nile region where conflict has critically disrupted livelihoods, markets, and humanitarian access – particularly in north-central Jonglei, southern Upper Nile, and north-central Unity – levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition remain among the highest in the country. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in 12 counties, with some displaced households and households in inaccessible areas likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror of Jonglei and Nasir and Ulang of Upper Nile. The scale-up of the lean season response in May and June, facilitated by the lull in conflict in some areas, has mitigated the severity of acute food insecurity to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in 10 counties. However, with market access severely disrupted, most poor and displaced households are heavily dependent on fish, wild foods, and food assistance. Newly arrived South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees, as well as those living in transit centers, are among those most likely to face moderate to large food consumption gaps, with the highest concentration of these households present in counties such as Renk and Malakal (Upper Nile) and Rubkona and Pariang (Unity). 
• In Greater Bahr el Ghazal, persistent intercommunal conflict, high food and fuel prices, and limited income-earning opportunities are driving high levels of acute food insecurity, while the depletion of food stocks is increasing market reliance. Ten counties are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In Warrap and Lakes, severe intercommunal conflict is restricting movement and limiting livestock production and market access, while in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, the high presence of newly arrived refugees and returnees from Sudan is placing pressure on already strained resources in host communities. In calmer areas, slight improvements in access to livestock products and income from agricultural labor are expected to support Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, though high prices and low purchasing capacity will continue to limit food access. Food distributions in May and June have mitigated the severity of acute food insecurity to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in Abyei. 
• In Greater Equatoria, sporadic attacks and insecurity and localized displacement; the deteriorating economy marked by high food and fuel prices and low-income earning opportunities; and poor rainfall performance in April-May are limiting food availability and access. Amid disrupted trade flows and high prices, many poor households are increasingly market reliant, and they heavily depend on selling natural resources, hunting and gathering, and kinship support to access income and food. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is widespread in 21 counties, with three in Emergency (IPC Phase 4): Kapoeta East and North, and Lafon of Eastern Equatoria.

• Conflict is expected to persist at low to moderate intensity in hotspot areas through September, where tensions between government, opposition, and allied forces remain high. Fighting is likely to intensify again between October and January 2027, when dry season conditions improve mobility of forces, though overall intensity is likely to remain at lower levels than seen in early 2026. The areas likely to see the greatest intensification include parts of Upper Nile and Jonglei as opposition forces are determined to retake territories lost in early 2026, while government forces strengthen their positions to maintain control. Sporadic attacks are expected in parts of Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria through January 2027. These attacks are expected to displace populations and disrupt assistance delivery and livelihoods.
• Intercommunal violence and cattle raiding are expected to occur sporadically through January 2027 in parts of Warrap, Lakes, Jonglei, Pibor County of GPAA, and Greater Equatoria. Preparations for the scheduled December 2026 elections are expected to escalate violence, as electoral politics are likely to deepen existing intercommunal tensions as the political elites struggle for influence and power.
• Ambushes, looting, and economically driven criminality are expected to increase due to the ongoing deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, reduced humanitarian assistance and declines in associated job opportunities, and rising cost of living amid global, regional, and domestic pressures.  
• The daily arrival rate of South Sudanese returnees and refugees will likely continue to decline slowly. However, periodic surges in daily arrivals are anticipated as conflict evolves in the Greater Kordofan Region and Blue Nile. Returnee flows from refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda are expected to continue due to reduced food assistance rations and economic hardships in the hosting countries.
• New and protracted internal displacement is likely to remain high through January 2027 due to conflict and flooding in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and parts of Unity, Warrap, Lakes, and Greater Equatoria, with a high likelihood of households facing repeated displacements. 

• With the emergence of the strong El Niño in June, the June to September rainy season in South Sudan is likely to be below average, particularly in eastern areas, and with increasing odds of severe rainfall deficits (Figure 4).
• Temperatures will likely be 0.5-2.5 degrees Celsius hotter than typical across much of South Sudan and over 2.5 degrees Celsius in some parts of eastern South Sudan from July to September.   
• Soil moisture forecasts indicate that soil moisture deficits will steadily worsen between June and September in large parts of South Sudan, likely negatively affecting yield potential.
• Seasonal flooding in South Sudan is expected to be less severe than last year and recent record-breaking years, driven by below-average June-September rainfall expectations (Figure 5). However, expected flooding will remain above pre-2020 norms due to the persistently above-normal levels of inundated areas in the Sudd Wetlands at the outset of the rainy season and high upstream lake and river levels. Above-average forecasted rains toward the end of the year may drive additional flooding in October.  
• First season crop harvests in bimodal parts of South Sudan are expected to be below average in some areas due to poor spatiotemporal rainfall distribution during the March-May rainfall season that likely impacted key crop growth stages.
• The 2026/27 main season harvest is expected to be below average nationally, given El Niño-driven forecasts of below-average rainfall, as well as conflict and displacement expectations. 
• Consumption of livestock products is expected to seasonally improve for households with access to livestock given the increased availability of water and pasture for livestock through January 2027; however, below-average rainfall during the main rainy season will negatively affect quality and availability of these pastoral resources, while projected improvement in rainfall after October are likely to facilitate pasture recovery later in the season. However, in severely conflict- and flood-affected areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei, access will remain constrained. 
• Availability of fish and wild foods is expected to peak seasonally from June/July through January due to rainfall. However, sporadic conflict and heightened insecurity are expected to reduce access to these local food sources, leading to below-average access in hotspot areas. 
• South Sudan’s macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor through January despite a gradual increase in crude oil production and associated revenue and attempts to expand non-oil revenue collection. Any recovery will be undermined by reduced foreign assistance, entrenched corruption, weak governance, continued depreciation, high inflation, and limited investment, leading to a high cost of living and pervasive poverty. While inflation is expected to ease in 2026 relative to past years (105 percent in 2024 and 234 percent in 2025), it is projected to remain elevated at 33.3 percent, driven by the reduced inflow of foreign currency, the rapid depletion of available reserves due to a high import bill, and low Central Bank reserves.  
• Cross-border trade for maize from Tanzania and Uganda is expected to be average, despite high supply costs and the new tax as traders seek to profit from exceptionally high retail prices in South Sudan as compared to other markets in the region. However, cross-border trade for sorghum from Uganda is expected to be average to below average due to low availability at the regional level and disrupted production in the northern areas of Uganda. Overall, South Sudan-Sudan trade flows will continue, but at reduced levels due to poor road conditions and lean season declines in supply through October, before picking up between November and January with the harvests and as the feeder road conditions improve. 
• Domestic trade flows from Juba and some relatively calm areas of Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions are expected to be disrupted by seasonal deterioration in feeder road conditions throughout the main rainy season through October, before improving through January. However, trade flows in conflict- and flood-affected areas in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity are likely to remain disrupted through January. 
• Prices will be elevated due to tight supply amid rising market demand through September, before reducing seasonally with the main season harvest from October through January. Based on FEWS NET’s integrated price projection analysis, the retail price per malwa is projected to rise and range from 8,800 to 18,300 SSP during June-September 2026 lean period (25 to 27 percent lower compared to 2025) before declining to between 7,300 to 18,700 SSP in the October-January harvesting period (11 percent higher to 12 percent lower compared to 2025). Compared to the five-year average, prices will likely remain 80 to 210 percent higher in Wau, Aweil, and Juba regional markets due to persistently poor macroeconomic conditions and depreciation, an expected national cereal deficit, and high supply cost linked to high fuel price. 
• Cases of diseases such as cholera, diarrhea, and malaria are expected to increase during the main June to September rainfall season, with high concern for displacement sites within the Sudd Wetlands and severely conflict-affected areas in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and parts of Unity due to overcrowding and poor WASH and health services. Surveillance and response to disease outbreaks may be intermittently impacted by conflict, insecurity, and anticipated flood-induced disruptions. The increasing disease burden during the rainy season will drive high levels of acute malnutrition with heightened risk of child mortality.

Humanitarian food assistance

• Between June and July, which is the peak of the lean season response, WFP plans to reach 2.2 million people with rations meeting 50 percent of daily kilocalorie needs on a monthly basis, inclusive of the 611,000 people displaced due to the Jonglei crisis. This figure will decline to 1.2 million people in August as the lean season response concludes in most of the 26 targeted counties. WFP will implement a post-lean season extension from September through December in seven high-priority counties for famine prevention, though details are not yet available on which counties will be targeted. However, conflict and flooding are expected to disrupt timely and consistent distributions across many of the highest priority areas, including planned operations in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity. WFP plans to incorporate river and air deliveries in the highest priority areas, such as Akobo, during the rainy season as road access deteriorates.  

At the peak of the lean and main rainfall seasons between June and September, severe food insecurity will persist, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected in 26 counties in the north and east. Planned and most likely humanitarian food assistance is expected to mitigate severity to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in 10 counties, mostly in parts of Jonglei and Unity. While a nutrition response will also be scaling up, the levels of acute malnutrition are expected to remain at Critical to Extremely Critical in several counties in Upper Nile and Jonglei as disease outbreaks spread in the context of extremely limited access to health care, poor WASH conditions, large-to-extreme food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in 36 counties. FEWS NET estimates 8.0-8.99 million people will be in need of humanitarian food assistance through September. 

The most severe outcomes are mainly concentrated in Jonglei and Upper Nile, as well as parts of Unity and Warrap, due to the anticipated negative impacts of conflict, insecurity, deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, high food prices, complete exhaustion of food stocks, and seasonal floods on household access to food and incomes. Many poor host and conflict- and flood-displaced households, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region, will likely rely heavily on wild foods, fish, and food assistance to partially mitigate consumption gaps. Akobo, Nyirol, Ulang, and Nasir will remain of high concern, with some households likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in inaccessible areas and among the displaced. Early green harvests that typically become available in late August and September are likely to be severely limited in these areas due to a combination of conflict and below-average rainfall, and unlikely to ease consumption gaps. In Greater Equatoria, poor first season harvests, localized banditry, and insecurity are expected to drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in most counties, except for Greater Kapoeta in Eastern Equatoria, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected. The anticipated poor rainfall forecast will negatively impact livestock production in these mostly pastoral areas, driving poor livestock body conditions and eroding purchasing capacity as cereal prices rise during the lean season. 

Between October and January, the typical harvesting period, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to remain widespread in 25 counties, while 44 counties will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Main season harvests are expected to be inadequate to compensate for expected declines in food assistance as the lean season response largely concludes. Acute malnutrition is also expected to remain at Critical and Extremely Critical levels in several counties of Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Warrap, consistent with IPC AMN projections, due to limited access to WASH, health, and nutrition services, and persisting large-to-extreme food consumption gaps. At the national level, access to harvests in many parts of the country (even if below average) and declining food prices are expected to reduce the severity of food insecurity slightly. FEWS NET estimates that the population in need of humanitarian food assistance will decline to 7.0-7.99 million people by January. 

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will be concentrated in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, and parts of Warrap where conflict is expected to re-escalate, flash flooding risk is highest, harvest prospects are poorest, trade flows are likely to be disrupted, and prices will remain elevated. In the areas of highest concern in Jonglei and Upper Nile, marginal harvests are expected given anticipated conflict and weather shocks. Akobo, Nyirol, Ulang, and Nasir will remain of high concern given severely constrained engagement in agricultural activities, high levels of displacement, and likely resumption of conflict expected to continue disrupting market functioning and access. In these counties, households will continue to depend almost entirely on wild foods and fish and limited humanitarian assistance. While WFP’s updated operational plan is not yet available, the agency plans to continue providing humanitarian food assistance in seven counties of high concern under the Famine Prevention Response through December. 

In other agropastoral parts of northern unimodal South Sudan, poor households with access to own harvests and functional markets are expected to rely on own production during the main October-January harvest period, though reliance on markets will likely increase atypically early due to below-average production. Many poor households are likely to increase reliance on livestock products, wild foods, and fish to mitigate consumption gaps. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in counties expected to experience intercommunal violence and cattle raiding, particularly in Tonj East of Warrap and Rumbek North and Cueibet of Lakes state. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Elections scheduled to occur in December proceed without meeting the pre-conditions set out in the peace deal and leads to political violence  

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which the government proceeds with conducting the December general elections, but without fully meeting the pre-conditions (including constitutional review, unification of the forces, conduct of census, civic and political space) set out in the 2018 peace deal, leading to political disagreements among the parties over the electoral process and rejection of the results. If this occurs, there will be widespread political violence across the country, driving widespread displacement, disruptions to livelihoods, markets, and trade flows, restricting humanitarian access, and increasing assistance needs. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread. In the most severely conflict-affected areas of north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile, there is a credible risk that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur under this scenario (see alternative scenario for Jonglei and Upper Nile states below).

Macroeconomic conditions deteriorate further and drive a severe liquidity crisis, high inflation, and increased cost of living   

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which macroeconomic conditions deteriorate further due to mismanagement of both oil and non-oil revenues and high expenditure on the elections scheduled for December. If this occurs, there will likely be further declines in investments and imports, leading to a worsening liquidity crisis marked by severe shortages of USD, depreciation of the SSP, and increasing inflation. Escalating food prices and a soaring cost of living would likely trigger a more pervasive poverty rate and mass urban-rural migration in search of food and income sources, particularly artisanal gold mining, fishing, and other natural products. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread.

Rainfall deficits are more severe than currently forecasted across all of South Sudan 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If El Niño drives rainfall to below average levels worse than forecasted across all of South Sudan, crop production in the more productive areas of the southwest and in the northwest will likely be severely affected. As a result, harvests would likely be significantly below average and pasture regeneration would be weaker than anticipated in the agropastoral areas. Livestock productivity would decline and migration would begin atypically early, while food stocks would also deplete atypically early. In the southwest, this would likely result in more widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, while in the north and northwest, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would be more widespread.    

Jonglei and Upper Nile

Conflict escalates again in conflict hotspots and drives further displacements and prolonged restrictions to humanitarian and commercial access

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are projected in Akobo and Nyirol of Jonglei and Ulang and Nasir of Upper Nile, with some households likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and GAM at Extremely Critical levels. Households are expected to remain heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance, wild foods, and limited livestock products. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict escalates again given tensions between government, opposition, and allied forces in north-eastern Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile. Renewed escalation would likely further displace households, obstruct humanitarian and commercial access, and prevent recovery of markets and household movement. If this escalation were to restrict household movement and humanitarian access for a prolonged period, a higher proportion of households would likely face extreme food consumption gaps. Given that Extremely Critical acute malnutrition levels are already present, the interaction of worsening hunger, a high disease burden, and further restrictions on access to nutrition treatment would likely lead to a rapid increase in hunger-related deaths. Under this scenario, it is highly like that all three thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be crossed in these four counties.

Jonglei and Upper Nile

Conflict and insecurity remain a primary driver of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in South Sudan, causing displacement; disrupting livelihoods, trade flows, and humanitarian access; and contributing to the collapse, destruction, and looting of already sparsely available public infrastructure and services in many areas, notably for health care.  Between January and May 2026, conflict newly displaced over 420,000 people across the country, according to the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. The escalation in violence in Jonglei and Upper Nile since December 2025 between South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), along with its allied White Army militia, accounts for most of this new displacement in 2026 (324,100 people). The region remains a flashpoint of violent confrontation as the political and military elites and their allies try to consolidate territorial control ahead of the political transition. This national dynamic is superimposed on deep local grievances over cattle and grazing land and infused with widely available weaponry.

In 2026, clashes escalated considerably between January and March before relatively declining in May through mid-June (Figure 6). This relative decline largely reflects seasonal and operational shifts toward more defensive postures among armed groups: SSPDF’s Chief of Defense Forces issued a directive in early June calling for restraint and limiting operations to self-defense; however, SPLA-IO and its allied forces have maintained that there can be no ceasefire unless Dr. Riek Machar and other detainees are released. Sporadic attacks persisted in May and June, including in Motot of Uror, Waat and Lankien of Nyirol, Atar of Canal/Pigi, and Jikmir and Burebiey of Nasir. However, there were no reported airstrikes in May, marking the first month without aerial bombardment since January 2026.

The reduction in violence has enabled tentative improvements in humanitarian access and facilitated the scale-up of distributions for the start of the main May-August lean season response (Figure 7). Humanitarians were able to expand their reach in eight high-priority counties in May, two of which (Akobo and Nyirol) face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5).  However, these gains are extremely fragile, as tensions remain high, armed groups continue to obstruct assistance delivery, and seasonal deterioration in road access is ongoing. Between January and May 2026, a cumulative total of 327 humanitarian access incidents were recorded by partners, representing a 74 percent increase compared to the same period in 2025. In the last week of May (May 21-28), a total of 19 access-related incidents were reported. Some key categories of events include:  

• Politically motivated obstruction of humanitarian access by local authorities: In multiple locations, local authorities have cited the presence of or control by opposition forces as a reason to prevent or tightly restrict humanitarian access. This includes Nyatim (West Nyirol), Akobo West, Udier (Longochuk), Canal/Pigi, and Mandeng and Torkech towns (Nasir). 
• Extortion of humanitarian actors: The proliferation of checkpoints along key routes continues to serve as a primary means of extorting humanitarians and delaying operations. For example, 14 checkpoints currently exist along the Rubkona-Mayom-Abiemnhom corridor (Unity), operated by armed youth groups, while soldiers along the route to Pibor demanded payment from a 32-truck convoy in April. 
• Violence against humanitarian personnel: Deliberate targeting of humanitarian staff has also escalated, prompting suspension of activities in some cases, with around 24 aid workers killed between February and May across Jonglei and Central Equatoria, alongside other reported cases of abduction and assault. 
• Looting of humanitarian assets: Between February and May, 33 health facilities, including nutrition sites, were damaged and looted during conflict in Jonglei and Upper Nile, notably in Akobo, leaving an estimated 1.4 million people without access to health services. This has heightened the risk of disease outbreaks, including cholera (which remains a major public health concern nationally), and Ebola (no cases have been confirmed, but the risk of transmission into South Sudan remains elevated given porous borders and weak health systems).

Sporadic conflict, high levels of insecurity, and the persistent threat of violence are similarly preventing regular resumption of commercial flows or market functionality. Traders face frequent looting and illegal taxation by armed groups, alongside seasonal barriers to access. The illegal taxes along the Nile and Sobat rivers have also contributed to driving food prices even higher. Households are unable to access typical livelihood activities and markets, and are heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance, supplemented by limited wild food gathering, fishing, and some livestock products for those with access. Engagement in crop production is extremely limited due to the conflict, with anticipated below-average rainfall likely to further reduce any production that does occur. While many of the displaced are currently returning to areas where they can access humanitarian assistance, they are also likely to miss participating in crop production due to loss of productive assets and fear of insecurity in accessing their farms. Similarly, those that remain displaced are expected to continue to strain local host community resources, increasing the risk of resource-based conflicts. As a result, households are not expected to benefit in any meaningful way from harvests during the typical harvest and post-harvest period (October-January). With the planned reduction in humanitarian assistance at the end of the lean season and anticipated resumption of conflict during the dry season, the number of areas facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are thus expected to rise sharply again, with some households likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 

Warrap, Unity, Lakes

Cyclical intercommunal violence, revenge killings, and fatal cattle-raiding are deeply entrenched in parts of Warrap, Unity, and Lakes, conducted primarily by armed youth groups. Additionally, some political elites are also fueling intercommunal violence and cattle-raiding via illegal provision of small arms to the local youth under the pretext of community protection, which are then used for violence and cattle raids. Past efforts by the government to disarm civilians, as well as local peace initiatives with support from UNMISS to de-escalate intercommunal conflicts in these states, have not been successful.   

In May and June, intercommunal conflicts related to cattle raiding and revenge attacks persisted in Tonj East, Tonj North, Tonj South, Gogrial East, and Twic in Warrap; Rumbek North and Cueibet in Lakes; and Rubkona in Unity. In Warrap, from April to June, 23 incidents of intercommunal attacks were carried out on communities in Tonj South, Tonj East, Tonj North, and Gogrial East. In late May, additional cycles of cattle raids, attacks, and retaliatory violence between the Thony and Malual Muok communities in Tonj South prompted authorities to impose a curfew. June saw further attacks between the Thony, Muok, and Dinka sections in Tonj South, and intra-Dinka violence in Tonj North, Tonj East, and Gogrial East, as well as cattle raid attacks by Nuer groups from Mayom targeting Twic. These incidents have restricted farmers’ access to farmland and disrupted trade flows between affected parts of Warrap. Intercommunal tensions are expected to persist at similar levels, as effective conflict resolution mechanisms remain limited, and the rainy season continues to constrain the movement of security forces. These disruptions are likely to limit household access to food, leading to many households facing moderate to large food consumption gaps, indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during the June to September peak of the lean and seasonal flooding period.  Additionally, conflict and insecurity will not only disrupt crop cultivation but also interfere with harvest activities, limiting the degree of food security improvements during the October to January harvest and post-harvest period. As such, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected to remain widespread.

South Sudan’s agropastoral and pastoral livelihoods are highly sensitive to weather variability due to heavy reliance on rainfed crop and livestock production systems. Six years of above-average rainfall and severe flooding, combined with ongoing conflict and displacement and a deteriorating economy, have driven livelihoods in many areas to near collapse and eroded the capacity of communities to recover from successive natural and manmade shocks. Floodwaters in the expansive Sudd wetlands are no longer receding as was typical, and water levels in upstream lakes and rivers have remained above average, facilitating the rapid re-expansion of floodwaters with the onset of rains during the June to September main rainy season. Indeed, the atypically elevated first-season rainfall in March and April – with rainfall extending into parts of unimodal northern South Sudan that are typically dry at that time – drove early expansion in floodwaters (20,937 square kilometers [km²] in May 2026 compared to 12,824 km² in May 2025) and flood-driven displacement. 

However, this year’s main rainy season is projected to be characterized by widespread below-average rainfall linked to an ongoing and strengthening El Niño, with increased chances of severely below-average rainfall in the east and southeast of the country. Already, the start of the main rainy season is showing sharp rainfall deficits. Cumulative rainfall between May 26 and June 10 currently ranks among the driest in the 30-year historical record of rainfall in South Sudan (Figure 8). Although recent below-average rainfall is not yet widely reflected in vegetation conditions – as measured by the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) – this is likely due in part to the impact of above-average rainfall from March and April (Figure 9). However, below-average rainfall is forecast to persist through the September (Figure 4) and, when combined with anticipated above-average temperatures, this will likely drive deterioration in crop and pasture development, particularly in the east and southeast of the country (Figure 10). Meanwhile, high intensity rainfall episodes may continue to drive flash flooding given the already elevated river water levels and expansive Sudd wetlands. Looking further out, a forecasted positive Indian Ocean Dipole is expected to develop after October, which is typically associated with above average rainfall, particularly in the southeast of South Sudan. This may bring increased risk of flooding but may also somewhat alleviate rainfall deficits in the pastoral southeast and allow for some pasture recovery. 

Impacts on food security through January 2027

The chances of below-average rainfall are highest over the east and southeast of South Sudan – Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria – areas which are also the most heavily affected by ongoing conflict and displacement. These areas are also structurally deficit in cereal production, typically producing less than 20 percent of the population’s annual cereal needs, according to CFSAM trend analyses. However, nearly all households typically engage in some limited cultivation of maize and sorghum, which are harvested as early as August and September. These early green harvests are typically important for easing lean season food consumption gaps; however, below-average rainfall and anticipated resurgent conflict are likely to reduce crop production, leading to marginal harvests at best, particularly across agropastoral areas of northern Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile. As a result, most of the counties in these areas are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. In Eastern Equatoria, late-season rainfall, combined with a less severe conflict forecast, is expected to result in comparatively less severe Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between October and January.