Conflict escalation drives Emergency and risk of Famine in Jonglei and Upper Nile

• FEWS NET estimates up to 8.0-8.99 million people will need humanitarian food assistance to prevent widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and worse outcomes through September, with needs peaking from July to September. Escalating conflict in Jonglei and Upper Nile is driving the spread of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the typical post-harvest period. Amid widespread displacement and massive disruption to commercial and humanitarian access, household access to food and basic health services is severely constrained. Although limited food assistance and cholera response efforts are underway for recently displaced populations, coverage is insufficient, and humanitarians remain unable to reach populations in remote and highly insecure areas. In the most likely scenario, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to deepen across north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile, with increasing numbers of people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through September.  
• There is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Nasir and Ulang (Upper Nile) and in Ayod, Duk, Nyirol, Uror, Akobo, and Fangak (Jonglei). Levels of hunger and acute malnutrition are already high, with levels of acute malnutrition expected to surpass the Extremely Critical threshold by July in some counties, particularly as cholera incidence surges during the rainy season. Displaced populations who may become trapped in these areas are of particular concern. If conflict escalates and isolates populations – preventing movement and access to local food sources and humanitarian assistance for a prolonged period – then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur. The period of greatest concern for the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) is the upcoming lean and flooding seasons (June-September).
• Countrywide, 31 counties are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) betweenFebruary and May, rising to 32 counties between June and September. In addition to Upper Nile and Jonglei, parts of Unity, Warrap, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes will remain of high concern. Increasing conflict, flooding, elevated staple food prices, and a high returnee presence, are expected to drive large food consumption gaps, indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through September. In addition, acute malnutrition is projected to exceed the Critical threshold (15 percent) in 42 counties by July.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 27, 2026. 

South Sudan has endured a complex humanitarian crisis for over a decade, driven by recurrent, cyclical bouts of conflict, flooding, and displacement amid poor economic conditions. Following secession from Sudan in 2011, the country was mired in civil wars in 2013-2014 and again in 2016-2018 that led to the deaths of an estimated 400,000 people, displacement of 4.5 million people both internally and across borders, and the declaration of Famine in central Unity in 2017. The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) ended the civil wars and ushered in a Transitional Government of National Unity (R-ToGNU). However, sub-national conflict continued to flare since 2018 with recent escalation pushing the country closer to the brink of renewed civil war and near collapse of the peace deal. In 2025 and early 2026, fighting has intensified in north-central Jonglei and southern Upper Nile, as well as in parts of Unity, Warrap, and Greater Equatoria, displacing hundreds of thousands of people and severely disrupting humanitarian access in north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile. The security situation in these areas remains extremely volatile. 

Flooding has become a severe and recurring shock. Seven consecutive years of severe-to-extreme flooding in 2019-2025 led to extensive displacement, asset loss, and, in conjunction with the impact of conflict in some areas, near-complete livelihoods collapse. Floodwaters are increasingly failing to recede during the dry season, driven by sustained record-high upstream lake levels and episodic, high-intensity rainfall. Additionally, the impacts of conflict and livestock raids have driven shifts from pastoralism to agropastoralism in areas with marginal crop productivity, which has further raised household vulnerability to new shocks. In late 2020, the combination of conflict and flooding led to a second Famine classification in Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA). Many areas of eastern and northern South Sudan have faced high and severe levels of acute food insecurity for the past five years or more. 

On top of the longstanding impacts of conflict and flooding, two and a half years of war in Sudan have resulted in the arrival of over 1.3 million returnees and refugees since April 2023. The pace of arrivals has slowed in recent months, and evolving conflict dynamics in both countries in 2025 have led to some reverse flows back to Sudan. However, the scale of displacement in already acutely food-insecure areas with scarce resources and meager livelihood opportunities is placing high pressure on local South Sudan communities. Many returnees are heavily dependent on relatives and host communities for their food needs, while others lack local knowledge and social networks to access support or establish sustainable livelihoods. 

Macroeconomic conditions have continued to deteriorate, driving up the already high costs of living. The national economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports with little to no diversification, and it has been characterized by steadily deteriorating exchange rates and rising import inflation. A pipe rupture in February 2024 that took over a year to repair, followed by conflict over Heglig oil fields in southern Kordofan region, highlight the vulnerability of the country to disruptions to oil exports. Prolonged non-payment of salaries, combined with elevated staple food prices, a cash liquidity crisis, and the high cost of living in general, continue to erode household purchasing power and drive low effective demand. As a result, poor households, particularly in the worst-affected areas, remain highly dependent on low levels of food assistance amid increasingly constrained funding environment.

These shocks have sustained high levels of acute food insecurity during the post-harvest periods (February-May) and leading up to peak lean season (June-September) in the unimodal north and east. Farming households in these unimodal areas typically begin land preparation and planting between March and May, while livestock seasonally migrate to distant areas in search of pasture and water, reducing household access to livestock products during the dry season. The arrival of the main rains between June and September allows for rejuvenation of pastures and water points for livestock, facilitating their return, though also heralding the start of seasonal flooding that typically displaces households, disrupts agricultural production, and interferes with livelihood activities to varying degrees. Green harvests are typically available in these areas by August, with the main harvesting complete by November. In bimodal areas in the south and west, harvests from the first season production typically become available by June and July, and planting for the second season occurs in August and September, to be harvested between November and January. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest South Sudan Food Security Outlook: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest South Sudan Food Security Outlook Update in December 2025 and Key Message Update in January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Escalating conflict and insecurity since December 2025, particularly in north-central Jonglei and southern Upper Nile, is displacing hundreds of thousands of people, suspending assistance delivery, and critically disrupting humanitarian access, trade and market functioning, and livelihood activities. The clashes between Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and opposition forces allied under Sudan People’s Liberation Alliance-in Opposition (SPLM‑IO) in Uror, Nyirol, Akobo, Duk, Ayod and Canal/Pigi (Jonglei) and Panyikang, Baliet, Ulang, and Nasir (Upper Nile) have so far displaced approximately 375,000 people internally (IDPs), with more fleeing to neighboring parts of Lakes and Central Equatoria.¹  

Conflict has also erupted in parts of Unity State, where clashes between SSPDF and SPLM-IO in Rubkona, Guit, Leer, Abiemnom, and Mayom displaced over 48,000 people, severely disrupted domestic trade flow and humanitarian access, and triggered an influx of people into Bentiu IDP camp. Sporadic armed clashes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO allied with National Salvation Army (NAS) persist in parts of Greater Equatoria, displacing households (recently 2,000 in Kapoeta East, while over 84,000 remain displaced in Tambura) and disrupting trade flows.  Inter‑clan violence and revenge killings are also rising in Gogrial East, Tonj East, and Twic (Warrap) and in Cueibet, Rumbek East, Rumbek North, and Rumbek Center (Lakes). The violence has resulted in deaths and loss of cattle (a key source of food and income for agropastoral households). 

The scale of displacement is driving a resurgence of cholera cases — especially in Duk and Ayod — as IDPs are exposed to overcrowding, contaminated water sources, and severe lack of health care services. Latest estimates indicate nearly 1,200 cholera cases and at least 28 deaths in Duk between December and mid-February, with at least 64 new cases in Ayod (reported February 2-15). Nearby Nyirol and Akobo have previously recorded the highest case fatality rates; however, limited or no access to these areas has constrained surveillance, raising concerns for undetected outbreaks and deaths. Based on observed trends in Duk, similar surges are likely in many inaccessible areas and displacement sites and are likely contributing to deteriorating acute malnutrition in severely conflict-affected counties in Jonglei. 

Humanitarian access in Jonglei and Upper Nile remains extremely constrained despite recent tentative improvements. Between December and mid-February, access deteriorated sharply amid escalating conflict, the declaration of a no-fly zone, suspension of flights, evacuation of humanitarian workers, and the looting of a Sobat River convoy carrying 1,500 metric tons (MT) of food assistance. Trade and humanitarian flows along the Sobat had already faced repeated suspensions since December, disrupting both assistance delivery and critical market flows. Attacks on humanitarian assets have also increased. Since December, at least 19 health facilities have been looted or damaged, 16 organizations have reported stolen assets, and WFP reported that at least five warehouses in Jonglei were vandalized. Humanitarians have also been forced to evacuate staff and suspend services on top of the recent massive reductions in health interventions. Limited authorizations granted on February 2 and 5 allowed delivery of supplies in Akobo, and were later expanded on February 16 to permit requests for humanitarian travel to previously restricted locations, though the duration and reliability of access are unclear. Deliberate misrepresentation of humanitarian activity further undermines operations. In Ayod, civilians were reportedly lured with promises of assistance and then attacked, with 25 killed. Such incidents not only constitute grave abuse but also pose serious risks to future distributions. 

Household food stocks have likely depleted atypically early in the most severely flood- and conflict-affected counties of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile, increasing reliance on wild foods and food assistance where accessible. While preliminary results from the Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) indicate that overall national cereal production from the 2025 harvest will likely be higher than last year and the five-year average, crop production in low-lying, severely flooded, and conflict-affected counties in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile was likely lower than last year. Cereal production is typically low in these deficit-producing agropastoral areas; however, the cumulative effects of conflict, erratic rainfall, and poor agricultural practices render production even more precarious than in recent years. Harvests that previously supported households up to nine months now typically last two to four months, at best.  

Trade flows and market functionality are severely disrupted in main markets of north-central Jonglei (Lankien, Motot, Pathai, Walgak) and southeastern Upper Nile (Naisir Town, Ulang, Yomding, and Baliet) due to the ongoing conflict between SSPDF and SPLA-IO. Airstrikes and planned offensives deliberately target main towns as both sides seek to gain control of urban centers and trade routes, including the Sobat corridor (Figure 1). These areas were already experiencing some of the highest prices in the country. In January, the cost of the survival minimum expenditure basket increased sharply month-on-month in Akobo (15 percent) and Canal/Pigi (44 percent). Compared to the same time last year (January 2024), the basket cost was 34 percent higher in Akobo, driven by poor macroeconomic conditions and market disruptions. Although trade and markets are operating with fewer disruptions in relatively calmer parts of the country, staple food prices remain higher than the five-year average due to high supply costs and SSP depreciation. 

Livestock body and pasture conditions deteriorated further in February, ranging from fair to poor across pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones as the dry season progresses. The largest deterioration in body and pasture conditions has been reported in Pibor County of GPAA, Greater Kapoeta, Terekeka, parts of Cueibet, Tonji South, and Jur River. Available satellite monitoring information confirms below-average pasture conditions, and Alert or Near-Dry status of watering points atypically early in most grazing areas. Key informants report that livestock have already migrated to dry season areas in Warrap, Lakes, Unity, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and parts of Upper Nile. While pastures remain average to above average in some areas along rivers and in the Sudd wetlands, the current conflict is preventing access, likely leading to congestion and grazing pressure in areas considered safe for displacement. In Aweil North and West (Northern Bahr el Ghazal), the conflict in Sudan is continuing to drive an atypically high influx of Rezeigat and Messiriya herders from Sudan, increasing livestock density and pressure on pasture and water. 

Humanitarian food assistance

The conflict has severely disrupted planned distributions and threatens to critically undermine the ongoing pre-positioning of food for the upcoming lean season. Between February and May, WFP plans to reach about 311,000 beneficiaries in five of the highest priority counties – Canal/Pigi, Fangak, Duk, Nasir, and Ulang – providing food rations that meet 70 percent of daily kilocalorie needs along with monthly nutrition assistance. In January and February, some distributions were conducted in Canal/Pigi, Nasir and Fangak, reaching about 66,000 people, representing 5-15 percent of each county’s population. Conflict and insecurity, particularly along the Sobat River, disrupted full implementation across these counties and prevented distribution in Ulang. With the rapidly evolving crisis, WFP announced that they registered 6,000 recently arrived IDPs in Canal/Pigi for a multi-sectoral response incorporating both food and nutrition assistance and plan to scale that up to 500,000 IDPs across Jonglei State, provided access is sustained. Road repairs are underway to facilitate the movement of convoys and rapid distribution of food and nutrition assistance. However, access to more remote areas will remain a challenge. The rapid response has been in part supported by the recent allocation of 10 million USD from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) targeting newly displaced families. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes have expanded in February (the start of the post-harvest period). Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are mainly concentrated in conflict hotspots in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and the pastoral areas of the southeast. Food insecurity outcomes are driven by escalating conflict and displacement; critical disruptions to trade flows and market supplies; atypically early food stock depletion; sustained returnee and refugee inflows; and a renewed cholera outbreak, all of which are further compounded by deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and elevated staple food prices.  

North-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile are of highest concern; already deeply strained access to food and income sources has been severely disrupted by the ongoing violence. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread in Nasir, Ulang, and Baliet of Upper Nile; and Fangak, Uror, Duk, Ayod,and Nyirol of Jonglei with some households, particularly in remote and inaccessible areas and among IDPs, experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). With household food stocks depleted, trade flows restricted, markets disrupted, and humanitarian access obstructed, households are heavily reliant on community support, as well as fishing and wild foods, though access to these latter resources is limited by insecurity. IDPs in particular lack sufficient access to food and income sources and are increasingly engaged in negative coping strategies including widespread reduction in meals to one per day and increased begging. Acute malnutrition is rising amid the widening food consumption deficits, large-scale displacement into overcrowded sites, lack of access to health care, and surging cholera cases. A recent Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) screening in Duk and Twic East found a proxy Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate of 24.3 percent, prompting the scale up of the currently ongoing inter-cluster response with food assistance, health, and nutrition services.

In north-central Unity, protracted impacts of six years of severe flooding and sporadic conflict, the large presence of returnees and IDPs, plus the spill-over effect of the Sudan war and high disease burden, are driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in Rubkona, Panyijiar, Guit, and Leer. As food stocks decline, households are increasingly relying on wild foods, humanitarian assistance where accessible, and markets; however, financial access is limited by poor purchasing capacity. Relatively calmer security conditions in other parts of Greater Upper Nile region (such as northern areas of Upper Nile and parts of Unity) are facilitating better market and trade functionality, as well as relatively better access to livestock products and fish, although the areas remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). 

In Greater Bahr el Ghazal region, access to wild gathering, including fish and game, is lessening the severity of acute food insecurity; however, persistent intercommunal conflict, displacement, security-related disruptions to trade flows and markets, and high staple food prices are driving widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are present in Twic of Warrap, Aweil East and North of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Rumbek North of Lakes.  

In parts of Greater Equatoria, persistent armed clashes and insecurity, high returnee presence, and high staple food prices amid weak purchasing power are sustaining widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Of particular concern are the Kapoetas and Lopa/Lafon of Eastern Equatoria, where ongoing insecurity continues to disrupt livelihoods during the peak pastoral lean season when household food stocks are already depleted, sustaining Emergency(IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

• Conflict is expected to intensify in hotspot areas where tensions are highest between government, opposition, and allied forces. This includes parts of Upper Nile State, northern Jonglei (along White Nile and Sobat River corridors), parts of Unity, and areas of Western and Central Equatoria. Intensification is likely to be most severe through the end of the dry season in April/May as both sides attempt to seize territory and consolidate gains before the rainy season onset. Intercommunal violence and cattle raids are expected to increase seasonally with the dry season (through May/June), then decline as the rainy season progresses. Preparations ahead of the December 2026 elections are likely to intensify intercommunal violence and armed group activities as political elites maneuver ahead of a potential vote.
• The number of South Sudanese returnees and refugees will likely remain exceptionally high amid projections of continued conflict in Sudan, with a disproportionate share expected to remain in the northern states. The daily arrival rate from Sudan will likely continue to decline slowly, with periodic surges as conflict evolves in the Greater Kordofan Region and Blue Nile. UN High Commissioner for Refugees projects that 124,000 refugees will arrive from Sudan in 2026. Some Sudanese refugees are likely to return to relatively calm parts of Sudan. In the south, returnee flows from refugee camps in Kenya and Uganda are expected to continue amid reduced food assistance.
• New and protracted displacement is expected to remain high through September. Conflict-induced internal displacements are particularly anticipated in the Upper Nile-northern Jonglei, parts of Warrap, Lakes, and Greater Equatoria, with a high likelihood of households facing multiple re-displacements. Likewise, flood-induced displacements will increase during the rainy season.
• The March-May 2026 first season rains in bimodal South Sudan are likely to be average according to ensemble forecasts.
• The June-September rainy season in unimodal South Sudan is likely to be average. 

• Between February and May, floodwaters are expected to partially recede but remain atypically high. During the main rainy season (June-September), elevated flooding is expected based on persistent flood extents in the Sudd Wetlands given consistently reduced recession in the last several years, persistently high upstream lake and river levels (particularly along the White Nile), and increased frequency of high intensity rainfall in recent years.
• The 2025/26 harvest is expected to be above average nationally; however, duration of household food stocks is expected to vary widely by state and county. In the severely conflict- and flood-affected areas of the typical deficit-producing areas of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei, where the harvest was substantially below average, food stocks have already depleted or will deplete atypically early by March at the latest. In relatively stable areas of the west and southwest, where the main season harvest is expected to be better than last year and the five-year average, food stocks will last between seven to nine months, declining by April.
• Harvests from the first season rains in bimodal parts of South Sudan are expected to be average.
• Consumption of livestock products is expected to be low through the dry season as herders move livestock to more distant grazing areas and away from conflict. During the rainy season, access will improve for households in relatively calmer areas. However, in severely conflict- and flood-affected areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei, access will remain constrained. Overall, livestock holdings among poor households are expected to remain low.
• Availability of fish and wild foods is expected to peak seasonally in March/April before declining through June/July. As the rainy season progresses, availability will increase again; however, access will be limited by high flood waters and rising river levels. Overall, ongoing insecurity and widespread displacement are expected to reduce access to these local food sources through September, leading to below-average access in hotspot areas.
• South Sudan’s poor macroeconomic conditions are expected to persist through September due to expected declines in brent crude oil prices (56 USD/barrel in 2026), limited investments in productive sectors, projected high debt to income ratios (66 percent), expected high consumer price indices (16 percent), continued disruption to oil production, and reduced humanitarian footprint with considerable reduction in job opportunities. Any economic recovery will be undermined by the reduction in foreign assistance, minimal external receipts, leakage of non-oil revenues, low exports, deteriorating foreign reserves, and poor governance. Foreign exchange rates are expected to remain volatile and depreciate further due to weak economic fundamentals.
• Cross-border sorghum trade from Tanzania and Uganda is expected to be below last year due to reduced yields, but will peak as is typical between February and May. Prices will be elevated due to increased regional demand amid reduced supply. Export volumes are projected to remain similar to last year in Uganda, but 47 percent lower in Tanzania during the projection period due to reduced harvests. Overall, South Sudan-Sudan trade flows will continue to be influenced by mercenaries, leading to high transaction costs and elevated prices.
• Trade flows from Juba and some relatively calm areas of Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr el Ghazal regions are expected to remain uninterrupted through May, but will likely be disrupted by seasonal deterioration in feeder road conditions throughout the main rainy season. Domestic trade flows in conflict- and flood-affected areas in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity are likely to remain disrupted through September.
• Based on FEWS NET’s integrated price projection analysis, the retail price for a malwa (3.5 kilograms [kg]) of red sorghum in Juba, Wau, and Aweil reference markets is projected to range between 12,700-22,500 SSP from February to May, and between 13,000-21,100 SSP from June to September. In Wau, these prices are near last year’s, while in Aweil and Juba, these prices reflect a 60-83 percent decrease. However, these projected prices are still 200-340 percent above the five-year average.
• Communicable diseases like cholera are expected to spread rapidly, particularly in areas of north-central Jonglei and southern Upper Nile. The near-collapsing health system is expected to remain underfunded, ill-equipped, under-supplied, and subject to further attacks and looting. Health services will likely be unable to respond to rapidly rising needs during the rainy season when flooding will further exacerbate the spread of waterborne diseases, particularly among IDPs.   

Humanitarian food assistance

• Between February and April, 311,000 beneficiaries in five of the highest priority counties – Canal/Pigi, Fangak, Duk, Nasir, and Ulang – are expected to receive food rations (meeting 70 percent of daily kilocalorie needs) and monthly nutrition assistance. With new funding released due to the deepening crisis, WFP plans to reach an additional 500,000 IDPs, particularly in north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile. However, access is expected to remain disrupted by the conflict and insecurity and be sporadic, at best.  
• Between May and August, WFP plans to implement the main lean season response, targeting just over 1 million people monthly in 22 counties out of the 49 prioritized in 2026. However, conflict and flooding are expected to disrupt pre-positioning and prevent timely and consistent distributions across many of the highest priority areas, including Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity. 

Between February and May 2026, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in 31 counties, while 43 counties will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. During the peak lean season (June to September), food security will further deteriorate, with 32 counties expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4); the share of the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse in these counties will likely deepen due to more widespread stock depletion; elevated conflict- and flood-related disruptions to market, trade flows and livelihoods; the persistence of poor macroeconomic conditions including high food prices; increasing disease outbreaks; and sustained high returnee pressure. Acute malnutrition levels were projected to surpass the Critical threshold (15 percent) in 42 counties by July, and to surpass the Extremely Critical threshold (30 percent) in five counties: Nasir, Ulang, Baliet, Rubkona, and Duk. However, given the escalation of conflict and large-scale displacement since these projections were made, additional counties are expected to surpass the Critical threshold during the projection period. FEWS NET estimates 8.0-8.99 million people will be in need of humanitarian food assistance through September 2026.  

In north-central Jonglei and southeastern upper Nile, acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition are expected to deepen sharply between February and September 2026. Conflict is expected to remain intense throughout the projection period, while seasonal flooding is expected to impact these areas during the main rainy season. The combination of conflict and flooding will drive continued disruptions to trade, markets, livelihoods, and humanitarian deliveries, and severely limit household access to food sources in these regions. In Nasir, Ulang, Uror, Ayod, Fangak, and Duk, an increasing proportion of the population is expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), peaking during the June-September period, with highest concern for IDPs. Humanitarian access is expected to be sporadic at best and thus unable to substantially mitigate the severity of acute food insecurity and malnutrition.

In other counties of Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes concentrated in north-central Unity; Twic, Gogrial East, and Tonj East of Warrap; Aweil East, Aweil North, and Aweil South of Northern Bahr el Ghazal; and Rumbek North of Lakes. Escalating intercommunal conflict, flooding, high returnee and IDP presence, high staple food prices, and low purchasing power will drive the persistence of high acute food insecurity. However, access to livestock products and wild foods will mitigate some of the severity between June and September.  

In Greater Equatoria, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be widespread during the February to May period. Three counties are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, and Lopa/Lafon of Eastern Equatoria due to persisting insecurity, the pastoral lean season, and sustained high food prices. In parts of Western Equatoria, the arrival of the first season green harvest in June, as well as the availability of wild foods and game meat, are expected to mitigate lean season impacts and sustain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in several counties between June and September. However, ongoing insecurity, particularly in Tambura, Nagero, and Mundri East of Western Equatoria, as well as Morobo and Yei of Central Equatoria, will likely disrupt agricultural activities and drive Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Conflict escalates and spreads in a manner consistent with the return to civil war    

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict escalates to levels similar to or higher than recorded in March/April 2025 in southern Upper Nile, and again in January/February 2026 in north-central Jonglei, due to political disagreements over the implementation of the remaining provisions of the 2018 peace deal or electoral dynamics, leading to total collapse and a return to an all-out civil war. If this occurs, conflict will expand to additional areas, causing widespread displacement, severely disrupting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and restricting household access to food sources. Consequently, many households would face large to extreme food consumption gaps, deepening the severity of acute food insecurity countrywide such that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread. In the most severely affected areas of north-central Jonglei and southeastern Upper Nile, the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) would be applicable (see alternative scenario for Jonglei and Upper Nile states below), and the risk would likely expand to additional areas.

Conflict causes prolonged disruption of oil flow and processing 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict erupts again over the Heglig oil fields in southern Sudan and leads to a more prolonged disruption of the northern sector’s oil processing and export. If this occurs, a major source of South Sudan’s revenues and hard currency will be cut off, leading to further shortages of USD, depreciation of the SSP, increasing inflation, escalating food prices, and a soaring cost of living. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread. 

Jonglei and Upper Nile states

Conflict escalates and drives prolonged restrictions on household mobility and humanitarian and commercial access 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition are already projected to emerge in parts of north-central Jonglei (Ayod, Akobo, Duk, Nyirol, Uror, and Fangak) and southeastern Upper Nile (Ulang and Nasir) due to the interaction of hunger and disease. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which hunger, disease, and acute malnutrition rapidly escalate, driving up mortality levels such that all three thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are surpassed. This would occur if the conflict is sustained at a heightened intensity and geographic scope, preventing households from fleeing and isolating households from accessing food sources and health services for a prolonged period. Concern is highest for southern Nasir, Ulang, Fangak, and Duk, as well as in areas with large concentrations of IDPs who may become isolated and unable to move on, such as in Akobo. In addition, levels of acute malnutrition were also expected to be in the high range of Critical in surrounding areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile, and surges in conflict and displacement into these areas would likewise exacerbate levels of malnourishment and lead to elevated mortality. If these areas are also isolated, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would similarly be likely, though the pace of increase in hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality may be slower relative to the areas of greatest concern. 

The escalating conflict in Jonglei and Upper Nile is severely impacting households’ ability to engage in livelihood activities and access food, income, and basic health care, driving sharp deteriorations in food security and malnutrition. These areas are primarily agropastoral, but years of conflict and recurrent floods have reduced both crop production and livestock ownership, leaving households with limited capacity to cope with new shocks. Over the years, these areas have also remained hotspots for clashes between SSPDF and elements of the White Army—loosely organized, community-based Nuer militias that are present predominantly in parts of Jonglei and Upper Nile. During the 2013-2018 Civil War, factions of the White Army aligned at times with forces loyal to Riek Machar, but do not operate as a regular army unit and are not under command of SPLM-IO. 

In March/April 2025, the fighting shifted from localized skirmishes to more structured maneuvered warfare. This included a higher focus on two strategic transport corridors — the Sobat River and White Nile River — and on control of urban centers in Nasir, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi. Fighting continued to percolate with another peak in clashes and airstrikes reported in September last year; however, the launching of a new offensive by opposition armed groups in late December ushered in a new period of heightened intensity. In December, near-daily clashes were reported across Upper Nile, while insecurity intensified in northern and central Jonglei. SPLA-IO and allied Nuer White Army militias captured several key towns, including SSPDF’s Pajut base, which threatened the state capital, Bor. In response, the SSPDF declared Operation Enduring Peace, a counteroffensive aimed at seizing control of opposition-held areas. Meanwhile, the nature of the conflict shifted to incorporate a significantly higher reliance on airstrikes. In 2024, there were 3 airstrikes recorded. In 2025, this had increased to 162, and in January and February of 2026 alone, 22 were recorded.  

The conflict escalation is affecting household food insecurity via multiple avenues: through reduced humanitarian access; disrupted commercial flows and movement; and population displacement, the latter of which is associated with lost access to primary sources of food and income, increased exposure to diseases (e.g., cholera) in overcrowded IDP sites, and high risk of re-displacement. 

Humanitarian assistance: Humanitarian access has steadily deteriorated since March 2025, particularly in southeastern Upper Nile following the escalation of fighting between the SSPDF and White Army allied to SPLA-IO. Humanitarian access via the Sobat River and airdrops was critically disrupted/obstructed through the 2025 lean season response, particularly in southern parts of Nasir. Intermittent humanitarian access was achieved in late 2025, though far below needs. In early 2026, the epicenter of the conflict shifted to northern and central Jonglei. This shift was accompanied by the expansion of humanitarian access constraints, including: 

• No-fly zones and suspension of flights on January 2.
• Evacuation orders on January 26.
• Repeated disruption to humanitarian use of the Sobat River corridor since March/April 2025 and continuing through February 2026 — evidenced most recently by the attack and looting of the 12-boat convoy departing from Malakal and destined for Ulang and Nasir carrying 1,500 MT of humanitarian food assistance.
• Increasing attacks and looting of humanitarian assets: at least 13 health facilities are reported as damaged or looted across Uror, Nyirol, Ayod, Duk, and Akobo counties since the start of the escalation in December;
• Closure and disruption of services: many facilities are reporting closure or pause in services due to looting, damage/destruction and/or stock-outs of essential medicines or shortages of therapeutic nutrition supplies. At least 24 nutrition sites have closed in Jonglei, particularly in Nyirol. Operational facilities are reporting increased trauma and non-trauma caseloads.  

Cumulatively, the restrictions on access are severely constraining the delivery of life-saving assistance and supplies to the conflict-displaced population, who are already facing high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition. While authorities authorized two one-day windows for humanitarian flights to Akobo on February 2 and 5, followed by the authorization for resumption of limited humanitarian access to all areas starting February 16, it remains unclear how this will be operationalized given the volatile conflict context. 

Markets and trade flows: The use of the Nile and Sobat Rivers have been disrupted, marked by looting, multiple checkpoints, and illegal taxation. Similar challenges persist along main feeder roads into the region. Cross-border trade with Ethiopia has also been disrupted, driving low local market supply and extremely high food prices. Armed actors have consistently targeted main market towns in these counties which are primary suppliers to smaller local markets. Market structures have been burned and supplies looted in Walgak, Lankien, Ayod, Canal/Pigi, and Yuai.  

Population displacement: Over 375,000 people have been displaced during the recent escalation, fleeing to Uror (105,400), Nyirol (57,000), Duk (27,100), Ayod (17,000), and Akobo (136,000) of Jonglei. In areas with higher levels of displacement, the number of IDPs represents 10 to over 50 percent of the county population, a huge increase of individuals who are reliant on scarce resources amid minimal community support. The majority of IDPs are women and children who are in dire need of assistance. Displaced households have been forced to abandon food stocks and livestock, the primary food and income sources of the local economy. IDPs are living in overcrowded sites, with limited or no access to basic health and nutrition services, and are exposed to risks of diseases (e.g., cholera) and a high likelihood of secondary displacements in search of food. Some IDPs have crossed to other states, including 29,500 people in Awerial County, Lakes State (mostly from Duk), Twic East and Bor Counties of Jonglei, and over 12,000 people from Nyirol to Ulang of Upper Nile. Many IDPs are likely to miss crop production if the fighting persists through May or June (the critical main season planting period).   

Impact on access to food and income: Escalating conflict and insecurity are undermining household access to nearly all food and income sources. Displaced households have been forced to abandon assets and have very limited income-earning opportunities. Market supplies are critically reduced, driving further price increases and eroding purchasing capacity of civilians, especially IDPs. Most households are likely heavily reliant on wild food gathering, bush product sales, and minimal community support, resulting in widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes or worse in February. 

Fighting is expected to worsen through the dry season (February-May) as armed groups seek to increase territorial control before the rains, and the share of the population experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse is expected to increase. While recent funding increases from CERF are supporting emergency targeting of IDPs in the region, access is expected to be sporadic at best, sustaining Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes with increasing numbers of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) during the lean season (June to September), particularly in Nasir and Ulang and Baliet of Upper Nile; and Fangak, Uror, Duk, Ayod, and Nyirol of Jonglei.  

The South Sudan economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues (estimated at 90 percent) with limited diversification. Despite immense contributions to the country’s economy, the potential of both the oil and non-oil revenue sectors is undermined by years of severe mismanagement, corruption, and weak accountability, rendering the government unable to provide basic services, to service debts, or to pay salaries regularly. 

The situation has been further aggravated by impacts of the Sudan war, particularly the year-long shutdown of the Dar Blend pipeline (February 2024-April 2025), which transports over 60 percent of South Sudan’s oil through Sudan, and funding cuts since early 2025. The sharp reduction in oil production from nearly 160,000 barrels per day (bpd) to an average of 60,000 bpd during the pipeline shutdown resulted in a severe fiscal crisis and contraction in the economy by 23.8 percent in FY 2025. While oil exports resumed in April 2025 following repairs, drone attacks on Port Sudan in May 2025 and fighting between the SAF and RSF around the Heglig oil facilities – a crucial transit point for oil exports through Sudan – in early December further resulted in the temporary disruption of oil processing and export. 

The persistent low oil production, compounded by lower global oil prices, resulted in a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in FY 2025 from a surplus of 4 percent in FY 2024, and significant SSP depreciation (198 percent) amid limited inflows of hard currency and high inflation, with the parallel market premium remaining elevated at 30 percent in late 2025. Although forced fiscal consolidation and efforts to mobilize non-oil revenues helped to contain the deficit to an estimated 1.3 percent of GDP in FY 2025, monetization of physical deficits led to increased SSP supply and an annual average inflation to 183 percent in 2025. 

The deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, marked by a persistent liquidity crisis and substantial decline in the value of SSP since the pipeline shutdown in 2024, are driving high commodity prices and a high cost of living, reflected in the increased minimum expenditure basket price. Based on available monitoring data, the minimum expenditure basket has increased by 175-600 percent between January 2024 and January 2026 in Juba, Torit, Rubkona, Rumbek, Yambio, Aweil, Wau, and Kuajok. Over the same period, the retail price of a malwa (3.5 kg) of sorghum increased by 200-1,200 percent in Aweil, Torit, Rumbek, Wau, Juba, and Rubkona. Although trade and markets are operating with fewer disruptions in relatively calmer areas, staple food prices remain higher than the five-year average overall, limiting adequate access to market purchases for many poor, market-dependent households. 

Income-earning capacity has been steadily deteriorating in recent years. Between 2016 and 2022, poverty incidence increased by 6.7 percent and extreme poverty by 4.1 percent. By mid-2024, the World Bank assessed that poverty was endemic and widespread, with roughly 92 percent of the population living on less than 2.15 USD per day. The World Bank estimated that nearly the entire population (99.7 percent) was at risk of remaining or falling into poverty, including those headed by highly educated or salaried workers. The impact of a deteriorating economy is increasingly impacting salaried and wage-dependent urban poor households such as in Juba, Yambio, Wau, Torit, and Aweil, who are highly dependent on markets for food and services and who are facing ongoing job losses, increased prices, and declining income-earning opportunities. 

The economic strain on households is aggravated by the shifting humanitarian landscape in South Sudan. Foreign assistance have played an outsized structural role in the South Sudanese economy, not just in providing food assistance and health services, but also in job opportunities and infrastructure development. The current reduction in humanitarian funding is therefore not only reducing critical assistance but also contributing to further job losses and erosion of purchasing capacity. In December 2025, the terms of trade for unskilled wage labor to a Malwa (3.5 kg) of red sorghum showed declines of 10-75 percent compared to last year, and 35 to 80 percent compared to the three-year average in Wau, Torit, Rumbek Center, and Bor markets (Figure 5). The inadequate access to income-earning opportunities and food is also further contributing to high crime rates in most urban centers. 

Overall macroeconomic conditions are likely to remain poor through the projection period due to expected sporadic threats to oil production, constrained humanitarian funding environment, mismanagement of revenues, and high government spending on upcoming elections in December 2026. Estimated revenue from oil production and export of 95,000 bpd, an approved economic stabilization budget of 187 million USD, and reform policy are expected to boost the GDP growth in FY 2026, stabilize the exchange rate, and ease inflation; however, these improvements are unlikely to offset the persisting poor economic baseline. Import inflation and high demand for hard currency are also expected to result in further SSP depreciation in the range of 4,600-5,000 SSP/USD and 6000-6,500 SSP/USD on official and parallel markets, respectively. FEWS NET projected the price of sorghum to remain above the five-year average by up to 205 percent between February and May and 340 percent between June and September. Amid these macroeconomic challenges, below-average access to food on markets is likely to sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in most urban centers and towns where market dependence is highest. Overall, the macroeconomic deterioration is expected to contribute to sustaining very elevated needs, estimated at 8.0-8.99 people through September 2026, or more than 60 percent of the country’s population, and push 8 in 10 people into extreme poverty by 2027.