Conflict disrupts humanitarian access, sustaining Emergency and risk of Famine in Nasir

• The number of areas facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes is expected to expand to 35 counties by May 2026, more than double that of December (14 counties). Severe outcomes are perpetuated by escalating conflict, the protracted impacts of flooding, high food prices, a deteriorating economy, and a high refugee and returnee presence, especially in the north and northeast. Acute malnutrition prevalence is projected to surpass the Critical threshold (15 percent) in 42 counties by May, with six counties surpassing Extremely Critical (≥30 percent): Duk (Jonglei), Rubkona (Unity), Abyei Administrative Area (Abyei), and Nasir, Ulang, and Baliet (Upper Nile). Preliminary partner assessments suggest acute malnutrition remains very high in parts of Fangak.
• Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, and Panyikang (Upper Nile); Fangak and Canal/Pigi (Jonglei); and Panyijiar (Unity) will remain of highest concern through May. Of these, some households are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in inaccessible parts of Nasir and Fangak. Rising insecurity in December forced another pause in humanitarian food assistance deliveries to southern Nasir and the evacuation of humanitarian staff from parts of northern Jonglei. While food aid is planned through May in Canal/Pigi, Fangak, Nasir, and Ulang, access disruptions will likely prevent larger gains in food security. Meanwhile, funding cuts are expected to delay the start of the 2026 lean season response, which targets an additional 18 counties, until May.
• Intensifying conflict in Greater Kordofan, Sudan, has driven a surge in arrivals and temporarily disrupted oil exports. The South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) have deployed to safeguard oil flows in the short term; however, the risk of renewed conflict that results in a prolonged oil export shutdown remains. If this occurs, further economic deterioration would accelerate food prices and drive expanded Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with increasing households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
• A risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) persists in Nasir through at least May amid ongoing humanitarian access disruptions and high levels of hunger and malnutrition. If conflict escalates to levels similar to or worse than early 2025, and the delivery of food assistance is restricted or prevented by the presence of armed actors, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.

This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 31, 2025. 

Conflict and heightened insecurity in December continue to disrupt trade flows, displace populations, and constrain humanitarian operations, exacerbating acute food insecurity (Figure 1). In Upper Nile and Jonglei, tensions are high in Ulang and Baliet following the deadly November attacks, subsequent SSPDF airstrikes in Ying and Doma payams of Ulang, and ongoing retaliatory intercommunal violence, causing WFP and partners to suspend distributions in Doma. Additional airstrikes in Jonglei occurred in December: in Magok payam in Ayod, Motot and Pieri payams of Uror, and Lankien payam of Nyirol. The latter two hit Médecins Sans Frontières facilities, disrupting medical services in areas with already very limited healthcare access. These latest airstrikes bring the cumulative number of drone strikes in 2025 to over 130, compared to just two in 2024, reflecting a key shift in conflict dynamics. Tensions also remain high in Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Panyikang in the Upper Nile-northern Jonglei border area following clashes between government and opposition forces in late November. As of the end of December, the government declared a no-fly zone over northern Jonglei, resulting in the evacuation of humanitarian staff from Fangak, Canal/Pigi, Akobo, and Nyirol, further disrupting assistance deliveries. Violent retaliatory attacks and cattle raiding intensified in December in parts of Akobo (Jonglei), Duk (Jonglei),  Gogrial East (Warrap) and Pibor (Greater Pibor Administrative [GPAA]), resulting in deaths, cattle looting, and livelihoods disruptions. 

In Greater Equatoria, sporadic armed clashes and insecurity continue to threaten livelihoods and disrupt market supply. In Budi (Eastern Equatoria), revenge attacks killed seven civilians and forced a pause on construction of a key road project. In Torit (Eastern Equatoria), continued armed clashes between SSPDF and opposition forces displaced civilians, disrupted health service deliveries, and hindered trade flows from Nimule to Torit. Despite few direct clashes in Western Equatoria in December, tensions remain high following severe violence in September — particularly in Nagero — which displaced over 16,000 persons. 

Escalating conflict in the Greater Kordofan region of Sudan is fueling further insecurity along the Sudan-South Sudan border. The RSF capture of Babanusa and Heglig oil field and facilities in early December resulted in displacement and the temporary disruption of oil processing and export. Localized SSPDF deployment has stabilized the area and allowed oil processing to resume, but the risk of further disruptions remains high. Over 33,500 people fled into South Sudan from November 1-December 18, with a surge of over 3,300 people crossing at the Panakuach Point of Entry in Unity. The continued influx is compounding an already high refugee and returnee presence, driving high humanitarian needs and competition over limited resources.  

Flood waters continue to recede overall, allowing households to return to some areas (e.g., Pibor and Pochalla in Jonglei), but remain atypically high in the Sudd wetlands. FEWS NET’s field monitoring information confirmed high floodwaters in Fangak (Jonglei), and Rubkona, southern Mayendit, and western Leer (Unity). FEWS NET’s November assessment in Ulang confirmed high river water levels in the Sobat River, which broke a dike and caused localized flooding in Yomding and Rirnyang payams, affecting markets and submerging settlements. While persistent floodwaters are likely to continue limiting trade flow and market functionality, they are also sustaining high availability of fish and water lilies through March/April. 

South Sudan’s economy remains poor, driven by poor oil revenue management and ineffective monetized fiscal deficit policies, and characterized by high inflation and continued local currency depreciation. Recent attacks on the Heglig oil fields highlight South Sudan’s continued economic vulnerability to oil export disruptions. Meanwhile, markets and trade flows remain highly disrupted in the most conflict- and flood-affected counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile, and intermittently disrupted along the Juba-Mundri East, Nimule-Torit, and Kaya-Yei routes. In less affected areas, regional market functionality is typical, with most trade routes benefiting from improved feeder road conditions at the start of the dry season. 

In areas where ongoing harvests are improving market supplies, food prices remain stable or have declined slightly. In some areas, the presence of humanitarian assistance in the market is pushing prices down; for example, in Ulang, FEWS NET’s November rapid assessment found the retail price of a 50-kilogram (kg) bag of sorghum had dropped by 35 percent from October to November. Overall, however, food prices remain significantly above the five-year average due to high import and supply costs, aggravated by persistently poor macroeconomic conditions. 

Humanitarian food assistance

WFP has continued to prioritize seven counties of highest concern under the Famine Prevention Response — Nasir, Ulang, Fangak, Canal/Pigi, Longochuk, Panyikang – and the recently added Panyijiar. Between September and December 20, WFP provided monthly food assistance to 160,000 beneficiaries on average in these counties. Deliveries have been highest in Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Ulang, where 55-80 percent of targeted beneficiaries were reached on average between September and mid-December, equivalent to 10-35 percent of the county populations. In Nasir, deliveries were severely constrained according to WFP, where the majority of distribution sites require Sobat River access (only obtained in November and subsequently paused again by December 18 due to insecurity and disagreements between humanitarians and authorities on access). As of December 18, WFP reached 23 percent of targeted beneficiaries on average in Nasir, or 7 percent of the county population. These disruptions are likely driving an increase in households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), and acute malnutrition levels in Nasir are already estimated to be in the Extremely Critical range. Since prolonged exposure to extreme food consumption deficits and high levels of malnutrition is associated with rising mortality levels, the disruption to humanitarian access underscores the credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in southern Nasir.   

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the South Sudan Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Conflict is expected to intensify in hotspot areas where tensions are highest between government and opposition and allied forces. This includes parts of Upper Nile, northern Jonglei, and areas of Greater Equatoria, given the presence of multiple actors in these regions. Intercommunal violence, road ambushes, and cattle raids are expected to increase seasonally with the advance of the dry season and as election preparations begin, likely leading to new or secondary displacements; civilian deaths; and disruptions to assistance, trade, first season planting, fishing, and gathering of wild foods.
• The central processing facility at Heglig oil fields is expected to remain largely functional throughout the projection period given the mutual interest of all parties in sustaining the oil flow and associated revenues (demonstrated through the speed with which the tripartite agreement was enacted). However, there is an increased risk that fighting may again erupt around the oil fields, temporarily disrupting the processing and export of oil (Annex 1). Coupled with ineffective monetized fiscal deficit policies and ongoing import clearance challenges associated with new duties and regulations at Mombasa port, continued poor macroeconomic conditions are likely through May 2026.
• According to FEWS NET’s price projections, the retail price of a malwa (3.5 kg) of red sorghum in Wau and Juba is expected to trend 20 percent lower to 70 percent higher than last year and 169-360 percent above the five-year average from December 2025-May 2026 due to persistently poor macroeconomic conditions and SSP depreciation. Seasonal increases in market and household supplies are expected to support slight price decreases in the range of 13,300-21,000 SSP from December 2025-January 2025, but prices are expected to rebound following household stock depletion and range from 14,000-21,900 SSP during February-May 2026. Overall, prices are expected to peak at 360 percent above average in Juba and 280 percent above average in Wau. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• Between January and April, humanitarian food assistance will continue in the highest priority counties of Nasir, Ulang, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi, and begin in Duk (Jonglei). This assistance is expected to provide 70 percent rations on a monthly basis and target between 30-60 percent of the county populations in four counties – Nasir, Ulang, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi – and approximately 15 percent of the county population in Duk. However, conflict, insecurity, and high residual floodwaters are expected to continue to disrupt assistance delivery and distribution.
• The 2026 main lean season response is expected to begin in May 2026 and reach an estimated 1.1 million people with 50 percent rations on a monthly basis in 22 counties across Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, and Abyei. This represents less than 15 percent of the estimated population in need in May. Moreover, it reflects a shift from previous years in which assistance to highest priority counties began as early as February or March.  

The scale and severity of acute food insecurity is expected to increase nationally, with the number of counties in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) expected to expand from 14 to 35 between December and May 2026. The persistence of severe outcomes is driven by a combination of multiple shocks, including escalating conflict and insecurity, persisting negative impacts of flooding, high food prices, deteriorating economic conditions, and high refugee and returnee presence, especially in the northern and northeastern states of the country. The prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM) is projected to surpass 15 percent (using weight-for-height z-scores [WHZ]) in 42 counties by May. GAM prevalence in six counties (Nasir, Ulang, Baliet, Duk, Rubkona, and Abyei) is expected to surpass the Extremely Critical threshold (≥30 percent WHZ) due to a combination of food and non-food factors, including exceedingly poor water, sanitation, and health access amid disease outbreaks. 

Seven counties of highest concern located in Greater Upper Nile region – Nasir, Ulang, Longochuk, Panyikang, Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Panyijiar – will remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with some pockets of populations in remote and inaccessible parts of Nasir and Fangak experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). While ongoing and planned humanitarian food assistance will episodically mitigate the severity of acute food insecurity among beneficiary households, disruptions in implementation are likely to prevent larger gains in food security. Recent partner assessments in November in Fangak highlight likely persistence of high levels of acute malnutrition and hunger in remote areas even amid ongoing assistance. Of particular concern are populations in southern Nasir, where little progress in assistance deliveries has been made, and disagreements between humanitarians and authorities over access have again forced a pause in distributions.   

In other parts of Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to remain widespread through May 2026. Sporadic localized intercommunal conflict will continue to displace populations and disrupt livelihoods; resources will be further strained by continued arrival of refugees and returnees fleeing Sudan in the northern and northeastern counties; own-produced stocks and access to livestock products will decline with the onset of the dry season and seasonal migration; and high food prices and low purchasing power will limit access to markets. Populations will become increasingly dependent on market purchases and wild foods, though access will vary across livelihood zones. Hotspot counties will remain those with recurrent severe conflict and displacement, including along the Sobat corridor in southern Upper Nile and northern Jonglei; central Jonglei and Pibor; parts of Warrap, southern Unity, and northern Lakes; northern parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal; and Abyei.  

In Greater Equatoria, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes likely in three counties of Eastern Equatoria (Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, and Lafon). In the Kapoetas, the deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is primarily driven by the seasonal movement of livestock and protracted impacts of cattle raiding and insecurity. In Lafon, below-average local production linked to poor season performance and insecurity is expected to drive large food consumption gaps indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes as stocks deplete. In other parts of Greater Equatoria, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are driven by poor crop performance linked to two to three weeks of dry spells and pest infestations, ongoing economic shocks, presence of returnees from Uganda and Kenya, and conflict and insecurity. Of particular concern are parts of Torit and Budi counties of Eastern Equatoria; Mundri East, Tambura and Nagero of Western Equatoria; and parts of Morobo and Yei counties of Central Equatoria. 

National 

Conflict erupts over the Heglig oil fields that leads to the prolonged disruption of oil flow and processing

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict erupts again in the Heglig oil fields in southern Sudan and causes a prolonged shutdown of the northern sector's crude oil processing and export. If this occurs, then a major part of South Sudan’s oil revenues and hard currency will be cut off. This would likely trigger further shortages of USD, depreciation of the local currency, and further deterioration in macroeconomic conditions, leading to extremely high food prices and a soaring cost of living. The resulting economic crisis would likely further destabilize political patronage networks and fuel additional violence. Consequently, many households would face large to extreme food consumption gaps, deepening the severity of acute food insecurity countrywide such that Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would likely become more widespread. 

Upper Nile-northern Jonglei border region

Localized conflict escalates to levels similar to or higher than recorded in March/April 2025

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: There is a credible alternative scenario in which conflict intensifies to levels similar to or higher than those observed in March/April 2025 and converges with a slow recession of high floodwaters in parts of Upper Nile and northern Jonglei. In Ulang, Fangak, and Canal/Pigi, an increase in conflict in a credible alternative scenario would likely result in renewed displacement, severe disruptions to livelihood systems, a surge in cholera cases, and more prolonged disruptions to humanitarian access. In this scenario, the share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) would likely increase substantially, with an increase in the population experiencing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in Fangak. In Nasir, it is credible that an increase in conflict would fully obstruct humanitarian access and isolate households from accessing remaining food sources; if prolonged, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur. Concern is highest for southern Nasir, where evidence indicates populations are already in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and acute malnutrition levels have likely already surpassed the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. 

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.