Conflict and flooding to drive Emergency and risk of Famine through September

• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be widespread in 34 counties through September, driven by conflict escalation, large-scale displacement, anticipated flooding, deteriorating economy, high food prices, and restricted humanitarian access (particularly in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and the Warrap-Unity border region). Areas of highest concern are Akobo, Nyirol, Uror, and Fangak (Jonglei), and Nasir and Ulang (Upper Nile) where some populations are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) due to the scale of disruption to livelihoods and humanitarian access amid conflict.
• The prevalence of acute malnutrition is expected to further worsen during the upcoming rainy season. Up to 11 counties in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and Abyei are expected to face Extremely Critical levels of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM>30 percent) by June amid conflict-driven disruptions and access to health, nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene services, rainy season conditions, and increasingly severe disease burden. 
• Humanitarians continue to face critical access challenges, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile. While planned assistance levels will be scaled up during the lean season response between May-August, targeting on average 1.6 million people (less than 20 percent of those in need), conflict and flooding are likely to disrupt delivery. Assistance is expected to mitigate more severe outcomes in only five counties through May, declining to just three counties (in Unity) in June-September.  
• There is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Akobo and Nyirol (Jonglei), and Nasir and Ulang (Upper Nile), with particular concern for inaccessible areas hosting large numbers of internally displaced populations (IDPs), such as Nyatim and Chuil of Nyirol. IDPs have fled violence and destruction often multiple times, lost income and food sources, and are most exposed to surging disease outbreaks in overcrowded conditions. If conflict escalates and isolates populations, including local food sources and food aid, for a prolonged period, then Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur.

This report provides an update to the February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook and March 2026 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of April 30, 2026.

Conflict remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity in South Sudan, displacing thousands of people, restricting humanitarian access, and disrupting markets, trade, and livelihoods (Figure 1). Direct clashes between the government and opposition forces continued across the country amid ongoing political re-shuffling at national, state, and county levels. Meanwhile, intercommunal violence, cattle raids, and revenge attacks escalated between armed youth in Unity and Warrap, and Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) and Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria, and Upper Nile. 

• Government vs opposition forces: In Jonglei, renewed clashes in mid-April in Akobo culminated in the opposition forces retaking the town one month after government forces had captured it. The contested control of Akobo is restricting humanitarian access, disrupting market functionality, causing repeated displacements, and preventing the return from Ethiopia of over 100,000 people who fled violence in March. Clashes and insecurity are also restricting access to wild foods and disrupting market and humanitarian operations in Nyirol, Uror, Canal/Pigi, and Fangak. While clashes are not currently ongoing in Nyatim of Nyirol, the area is of high concern as authorities continue to obstruct humanitarian access. Overall, over 300,000 people remain displaced in Jonglei State as of mid-April. In Upper Nile, airstrikes and clashes continued in Ulang, Nasir, Longochuk, and Tonga of Panyikang as both sides vie for control over towns, supply routes, and associated revenue streams. These attacks continue to disrupt assistance delivery, wild food gathering, and fishing. In Greater Equatoria, clashes between government and opposition forces increased in Yambio and Kapoeta North, temporarily disruption markets and livelihoods, while tensions remained high in Ezo, Yei, and Nzara following attacks in March. 
• Intercommunal conflict: Violent cattle-raiding escalated through April, resulting in the loss of lives and livelihood assets. In Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Eastern Equatoria, cattle raids involving Murle and neighboring communities increased in March and April, with particularly fatal raids in Akobo (April 20), Ulang (April 21), and Uror (March 25). In Warrap and Unity, the incidence of revenge attacks and cattle raids remained high in March and April. Likewise, tensions remain high between farmers and pastoralists in southwestern areas of Wau, likely interfering with farming. On April 6, armed youths from Terekeka attacked Rejab (Central Equatoria), looting over 2,000 cattle and killing 24 people. 

With fighting continuing in both Sudan and South Sudan, cross-border flows between the two countries are increasingly dynamic. New arrivals from Sudan declined between February (17,000) and April (12,500) and remain much lower than peaks seen earlier in the war. At the same time, relative calm in parts of eastern Sudan (particularly Khartoum and Al-Jazirah), have encouraged population returns, estimated at 300,000 people as of mid-April. Nonetheless, the cumulative presence of high numbers of returnees and refugees (over 1.3 million), particularly in northern states, is contributing to high humanitarian needs. 

Household food stocks from last year’s production have already depleted in the deficit-producing, severely conflict- and flood-affected counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile region, and are seasonally declining in the more productive areas.  While 2025 national net cereal production is estimated to be 8 percent higher than last year and 27 percent above the five-year average, the country remains deficit-producing overall, meeting only 80 percent of its own cereal needs. Cereal deficits vary widely across the country, from very high deficits (60-80 percent) in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity state to surplus production in the more productive and relatively calmer areas of Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Western Equatoria, Warrap, and Eastern Equatoria. In Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity, the atypically early depletion of own stocks by January and February left most households reliant on markets, fish, wild foods, and food assistance, while access to these sources has become increasingly constrained by ongoing conflict, insecurity, and rising prices. Even in more productive states, food stocks are expected to deplete seasonally by April and early May. 

With declining stocks from domestic production, markets are increasingly supplied by imports in April. Based on FEWS NET cross-border trade flow monitoring data, the volume of imported maize grain, maize flour, and sorghum grain at the Nimule border crossing point with Uganda increased by 8, 10, and 12 percent, respectively, between February and March. At Gok Machar border crossing with Sudan, slight increases in sorghum imports from Sudan and sharp declines in the re-exportation of wheat flour originally sourced from Uganda are indicative of rising local demand. Domestically, trade flows remained severely disrupted in the conflict-affected areas of Akobo, Nyirol, Uror, and Ayod (Jonglei), and Nasir, Ulang, Panyikang, and Baliet (Upper Nile). Trade flows along the Bor-Twic East corridor improved marginally by the end of March, but overall trade activities and market functioning remain limited.

Staple food and fuel prices continue to rise in most regional markets and in severely conflict-affected regions, driving a high cost of living amid poor purchasing capacity and contributing to rising criminality. The retail price of one malwa (3.5 kilograms) of red sorghum in Juba and Aweil Centre rose 5-16 percent between February and March as stocks decline, supply costs rise, and poor macroeconomic conditions persist. Compared to February, fuel prices in March were 50-75 percent higher in the same markets, with early observations in April suggesting sustained increases due to the conflict in the Middle East and continued SSP depreciation. Compared to the same time last year, the SSP declined 7 percent on the parallel market, while the gap between the official and parallel market increased by 30 percent. Overall, the increasing cost of living is reflected in the rising cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket, up 10-80 percent month-on-month in April and 20-40 percent higher than last year in markets in Rumbek Centre, Bentiu IDP camp, Torit, and Tambura and 95 percent in Juba (the highest increase). 

The start of the 2026 rains has been atypically early in both bimodal and unimodal parts of the country. In the southwestern bimodal areas, the March to May rainy season began 10 to 30 days early. However, variable rainfall throughout the season (higher in March and lower in April) has resulted in cumulatively average rainfall by late April. Northeastern unimodal parts of South Sudan experienced an atypically rainy March and April, with rains beginning more than 40 days early, resulting in one of the wettest March-May periods in Jonglei and Upper Nile in the 40-year record. Key informants report the start of planting in some areas due to the early rains, with heightened risk to crop growth given the observed spatiotemporal irregularities. Nonetheless, satellite imagery of flood extent indicates that flood waters remain slightly lower overall this April (14,792 square kilometers [km²]) compared to the same time last year (17,328 km²), though well-above pre-2020 norms. While the heavy early rainfall has led to some atypical flash flooding as seen in Leer (Unity) and Malakal (Upper Nile), cumulative flood extents are not expected to break records set in recent years.

Household access to health and nutrition services is critically limited and continues to decline in several counties due to conflict and funding constraints, leading to widespread closures of health facilities and nutrition sites, and reduction in services. In the severely conflict-affected counties such as Nyirol and Akobo, health systems have nearly collapsed following facility destruction. Likewise, WASH conditions have worsened in many counties due to poor sanitation and limited access to safe water, increasing the disease burden (cholera, malaria, and diarrhea), and driving high levels of acute malnutrition with heightened risk of child mortality.   

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarians continue to face critical access constraints, particularly in parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and the Warrap-Unity border region. Amid escalating need, planned assistance increased considerably from what was originally expected in March and April (just over 300,000 people) to WFP aiming to reach over 1 million people. Given access constraints, WFP reached just over 760,000 people with food and cash assistance across all its active emergency responses in March, approximately 10 percent of FEWS NET’s estimated population in need. In counties where assistance has been ongoing since September (Nasir, Ulang, Fangak, Canal/Pigi), access has most consistent in Fangak and Canal/Pigi, though recent insecurity in Canal/Pigi disrupted March distributions to IDPs (Figure 2). Distributions in Nasir and Ulang have been repeatedly constrained by conflict, with both air and river deliveries still suspended. In February, WFP initiated the Jonglei crisis response, targeting nearly 285,000 IDPs mostly in Jonglei, as well as some who fled to Mingkaman (Lakes) and Mangalla (Central Equatoria). While reduced conflict in March allowed for increased access in parts of Jonglei, access remains severely constrained in Nyatim of Nyirol and Akobo due to the lack of access clearance from the local authorities in Nyatim and renewed fighting in Akobo. Additionally, stalled clearances of 535 tons of water, sanitation, and hygiene and non-food supplies are delaying pre-positioning for over 570,000 people across the country ahead of anticipated flooding.

Most of the assumptions that underpinned FEWS NET’s analysis of the most likely scenario for the South Sudan Food Security Outlook from February to September 2026 remain valid; however, the following updates have been made to incorporate new evidence:

• Fuel prices are likely to remain elevated in most markets across South Sudan due to the disruptions in fuel supply linked to the crisis in the Middle East. High fuel prices will drive high supply costs and food and non-food commodity prices. 
• Based on FEWS NET’s integrated price projection analysis, the retail price for a malwa (3.5 kg) of red sorghum in Juba, Wau, and Aweil reference markets is expected to trend 6 to 26 percent higher than last year in Wau, but is likely to remain up to 77 percent lower than last year’s level in Aweil and Juba. Overall, the sorghum price in Juba, Wau, and Aweil is expected to remain up to 180 percent above the five-year average during the April-May period (9,000-19,000 SSP), and up by 200 percent between June and September (6,000-20,000 SSP) due to deteriorating economic conditions, below-average trade flows, rising supply cost, and the persisting national cereal deficit.

Humanitarian food assistance

• In May, WFP plans to reach nearly 1.8 million beneficiaries per month with food and cash assistance. Of these, nearly 285,000 are IDPs displaced by the Jonglei crisis and expected to receive rations meeting 70 percent of daily kilocalorie needs. The increase in May reflects the initiation of the main lean season response, with rations in most areas planned at 50 percent of daily kilocalorie need.  
• In June and July, the peak of the lean season response, WFP plans to reach 1.7 million people in 32 counties with rations meeting 50 percent of daily kilocalorie needs on a monthly basis, inclusive of the 280,000 people displaced due to the Jonglei crisis. This figure will reduce to 1.2 million people in August as the lean season response concludes. However, conflict and flooding are expected to disrupt timely and consistent distributions across many of the highest priority areas, including planned operations in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity. 

South Sudan will continue to face high levels of acute food insecurity and acute malnutrition, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected to increase to 34 counties by September due to escalating conflict, large-scale displacement, anticipated flooding, deteriorating economic conditions, high food prices amid poor purchasing capacity, and restrictions to humanitarian access. FEWS NET estimates 8.0-8.99 million people will be in need of humanitarian food assistance through September, with needs peaking from July to September.

Between April and May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be widespread in 29 counties, mainly in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap, and parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Planned humanitarian food assistance reaching at least 25 percent of the county population and meeting at least 25 percent of the required daily kilocalorie needs is expected to mitigate acute food insecurity in five counties – Duk and Uror of Jonglei; Leer and Rubkona of Unity; and Aweil East of Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Akobo, Nyirol, Uror, Fangak, Nasir, and Ulang will remain areas of highest concern, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) expected through May. Up to 11 counties in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and Abyei are expected to face Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition by June due to conflict-driven disruption to the provision of and access to health, nutrition, and WASH services, and an increasingly severe disease burden. Conflict-affected households are likely to mainly rely on fish, wild foods, and some food assistance, as access permits. 

Between June and July, food security outcomes are expected to further deteriorate amid the peak lean and flooding season, with widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes expected in 34 and 39 counties, respectively. During this period, market supplies will likely tighten, prices will rise, and conflict and flooding are expected to disrupt household access to markets, humanitarian assistance, and local food sources (e.g., livestock and wild foods). While plans are in place to scale up food assistance, conflict and flooding are expected to prevent consistent delivery in all but three counties (Rubkona, Leer, and Mayendit of Unity). Akobo, Nyirol, Uror, Fangak, Nasir, and Ulang will remain areas of highest concern, with populations persisting in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) through September. Conditions in Canal/Pigi, Ayod, and Duk (Jonglei) will require close monitoring through September, given the high share of the population (70-85 percent) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse, in addition to anticipated negative impacts of conflict and flooding.

Jonglei and Upper Nile states

Conflict escalates and drives prolonged restrictions on household mobility and humanitarian and commercial access 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition are already projected to emerge in parts of north-central Jonglei (Akobo, Duk, Fangak, and Uror) and southeastern Upper Nile (Nasir, Ulang, Baliet/Akoka) due to the interaction of hunger and disease. However, there is a credible alternative scenario in which hunger, disease, and acute malnutrition rapidly escalate, driving up mortality levels such that all three thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are surpassed. This would occur if the conflict is sustained at a heightened intensity and geographic scope, preventing households from fleeing and isolating households from accessing food sources (including humanitarian assistance) and health services for a prolonged period. Concern is highest for Akobo, Nyirol, Ulang, and Nasir, particularly amid the ongoing large-scale displacement and anticipated constraints to humanitarian access. While levels of acute malnutrition were also expected to be in the high range of Critical, with some surpassing Extremely Critical levels (>30 percent) in other states, humanitarian access is expected to be more consistently sustained than in areas of highest concern where humanitarian access will remain limited. 

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s February to September 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.