Below-average deyr rains to drive Emergency amid humanitarian funding cuts

• Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) are expected from October to January 2026, driven by consecutive below-average rainy seasons in central and northern areas, and likely La Niña-induced rainfall deficits during the October-December deyr. In pastoral areas, reduced pasture and atypically low milk production will likely constrain household purchasing capacity. In agropastoral and riverine areas, anticipated below-average deyr harvests, limited agricultural labor, and depleted food stocks will increase market dependence amid rising food prices.
• From February to May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand.Addun Pastoral and Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones are expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by February 2026. Projected below-average deyr harvests will likely limit agricultural labor income and food stocks, while the atypically dry January-March jilaal dry season will further deteriorate livestock body conditions and milk availability.
• Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to increase through the projection period, with 5.0-5.99 million people in need from February to April. The areas of highest concern include IDP settlements; southern agropastoral areas in Bay and Bakool; and central and northern pastoral areas.
• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in several internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements through May. IDPs are heavily reliant on humanitarian food assistance; however, the humanitarian response has been undermined by funding cuts, likely reaching only 5-10 percent of the population in need in November and December. Humanitarian assistance from January-May 2026 has not been secured but is expected to continue at similar reduced levels. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 17, 2025.

Somalia contains a mixture of pastoral, agropastoral, and riverine livelihood systems. The country’s two main rainy seasons — the April to June gu season and the October to December deyr season — dictate seasonal patterns of crop and livestock production. While locally produced crops are a key food source in cropping areas, imports account for 60 to 70 percent of domestic food consumption, and pastoralists typically purchase imported rice, wheat, and other staples. As of June 2025, the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) totaled an estimated 3.5 million (20 percent of the total population).

Since 1991, conflict has forcibly displaced millions and rendered much of southern and central Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian actors. The impacts of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency, exacerbated by government-led counter-insurgency operations, inter- and intra-clan violence, and chronic political instability, have undermined the local food systems and driven a long-term decline in agricultural productivity. Violence, extortion, and movement restrictions frequently disrupt income-earning activities, livestock migration, and trade flows, and render the food system more vulnerable to concurrent climate shocks. 

Somalia is also subject to climate extremes, alternating between drought and floods. Severe droughts tend to occur after two or more consecutive poor or failed rains. Over the last 15 years, drought brought parts of Somalia to the brink of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2016/17 and 2022/23, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) claimed the lives of an estimated 260,000 people in 2010/11 and 220,000 people in 1992/93. Increasingly, severe drought is followed by record-breaking floods, as in 2019 and late 2023. The 2020-2023 drought drove widespread displacement and loss of livestock, and five consecutive poor harvests, leading to high household debt levels and a breakdown of social support systems. Subsequent favorable rains have facilitated some recovery; however, the once-in-a-century floods in late 2023 also inundated cropland, destroyed irrigation infrastructure, and displaced nearly a million people in southern riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. Recurrent weather shocks, protracted conflict, and chronically high poverty levels have increased household vulnerability to future hazards due to the erosion of livelihoods and coping capacity. Full recovery — especially sustainable levels of livestock ownership — would take several years of average rainfall. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas, the gu and deyr rains coincide with the cropping lean season prior to harvests in July and January. Maize, sorghum, and cowpeas are key staples, and cash crops (sesame, horticulture) produced by better-off households offer a source of labor income to poor households. During the October to May projection period, the deyr harvest typically provides food and income from January to March. Riverine areas are susceptible to seasonal flooding but may benefit from off-season harvests in March. During the deyr lean season, poor households rely on labor income to purchase food before the harvest. 

In pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak during and after the gu and deyr rains. During the October to May outlook period, seasonal improvements are pronounced from November to January and April to May, coinciding with livestock births; additionally, domestic and export demand for livestock for the Hajj will begin in May. Conversely, food and income will be lowest during the jilaal dry season from January to March, when depleted pasture and water resources drive declines in livestock saleability and milk production. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Somalia Livelihoods Zones Map
• Somalia Key Message Updates: July to September 2025
• Somalia Food Security Outlook: October 2024 to May 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Climate: The xagaa seasonal performance from July to September resulted in mixed agroclimatic conditions across the country. In southern Somalia, particularly in xagaa rainfall-receiving coastal and adjacent inland areas of the Shabelle and Juba regions, cumulative rainfall was significantly below average and poorly distributed. Conversely, central and northern regions experienced an atypically hot, dry, and windy xagaa season. 

The October-December deyr rains, which typically begin in early October in northern Somalia and mid-October in southern regions, have generally seen a delayed and below-average start in October. While most of the country has remained dry, localized areas of northern and central Somalia, and parts of Hiiraan and Bay, have received limited rainfall starting two to three weeks late. Most southern regions experienced significantly suppressed rainfall in October, less than 30 percent of average (Figure 1). In northern and central Somalia, localized below-average rainfall was only recorded in parts of Bari, Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer, and Nugaal regions. Following the atypically dry and hot xagaa season, the delayed and below-average start to the deyr season compounds stress on already fragile agropastoral and pastoral systems, especially in central and northern Somalia, which have already seen three consecutive below-average rainfall seasons.

Crop production: In southern Somalia, declining river levels prompted an increase in the area under recessional cultivation as prolonged water recession enhanced land access; however, the below-average xagaa rains resulted in lower than anticipated and below-average crop yields during the off-season. According to the 2025 FSNAU post-harvest survey, the gu off-season cereal harvest yielded 10,500 metric tons (MT) — approximately 13-15 percent less than the projected 12,080 MT and the five-year average — due to insufficient soil moisture and constrained recessional cultivation, resulting in reduced food availability and limited agricultural labor opportunities. The poor start to deyr rainfall in the first half of October has caused anomalous dryness, poor soil moisture, delayed planting, and heightened risks to crop development, including low germination rates. 

In agropastoral areas in northwestern Somalia, crop development started poorly due to the delayed karan rains, which were followed by improved rainfall in August and September. Although planting was delayed by a month, improvements in rainfall supported crop growth and pasture regeneration. Crop establishment is in progress, benefiting from improved soil moisture, with white sorghum performing better than expected. While these improvements have supported relative improvements in crop establishment, crop growth and production thus far remain well below average. Dry spells, pest infestations, and erratic gu rains earlier in the season further contributed to the atypically low production.

Livestock Production: In north and central Somalia, livestock production and reproduction have been severely disrupted by the compounded impacts of the below-average 2024 deyr rainfall season, below-average 2025 gu rains, and atypically harsh xagaa conditions, and the current delayed and below-average start to the 2025 deyr rains. The consecutive rainfall deficits and atypically dry conditions have further degraded already fragile rangeland resources, resulting in atypically low access to water and forage. From October 11-20, vegetation conditions through much of southern and central Somalia were just 60 percent of average or lower. This is leading to deteriorating livestock body conditions, reduced birth and conception rates, atypically low milk production, and poor productivity. Consequently, households have atypically limited income from milk and livestock sales in northern and central pastoral communities.

Conflict: Conflict and insecurity persist as key drivers of displacement and food insecurity countrywide. Between January and September 2025, an estimated 296,000 people were displaced, with insecurity accounting for 60 percent of movements. Conflict-related displacements were concentrated in Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, Gedo, Bari, and Lower Shabelle, disrupting agricultural activities, livestock migration, and access to water and humanitarian assistance. From September to October 2025, Galmudug experienced a surge in conflict incidents. The highest number of incidents in October were reported in Lower Shabelle and Bari, according to ACLED. Insecurity has also disrupted trade flows and impeded land preparation and planting activities for the ongoing deyr agricultural season. The compounded effects of conflict, restricted humanitarian access, and elevated protection risks are particularly severe in areas concurrently affected by weather shocks and acute food insecurity. Inter-clan conflicts over resource control are prevalent, particularly in Galgaduud, Mudug, Hiraan, and Lower Shabelle, as the projected below-average October-December deyr rains exacerbate already strained access to pasture and water. These conditions are heightening existing tensions, contributing to increased instability, displacement, and restrictions on livestock mobility.

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian needs in Somalia remain critically high, yet the capacity to respond has been severely undermined by declining international funding. In October, an average of 1.3 million people are targeted, covering only an estimated 25-30 percent of households that FEWS NET estimates need food assistance. However, due to a 74 percent reduction in funding from April to September 2025, the population targeted for assistance has been scaled back substantially. In addition to reducing the number of beneficiaries, the Food Security Cluster partners reduced food rations and cash transfer values in July from 80 percent to 70 percent of the Minimum Expenditure Basket. These reductions come amid intensifying drought, conflict, and displacement, leaving millions without essential assistance.

In northern and central pastoral livelihood zones, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread, with a growing proportion of the population facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In the Coastal Deeh, Addun, Northern Inland Pastoral, East Golis, and Guban Pastoral livelihood zones, below-average gu rains and a dry xagaa season have hindered seasonal rangeland replenishment and livestock recovery. Scarce pasture and water availability have triggered atypical livestock movements, which are heightening competition and conflict between herders. Increased competition and insecurity are reducing herd mobility, leading to weakened body conditions as herders are unable to lead livestock to quality pasture, resulting in reduced income from livestock and milk sales, a decrease in milk consumption, and constrained financial access to food. This is exacerbated by the delayed and poor start to the deyr rains. The declining livestock income, high household debt, and elevated food prices are eroding household purchasing capacity, resulting in food consumption gaps among poor households. Households are relying on negative coping strategies, such as withdrawing children from school and relying on credit to purchase food, as well as consumption-based coping strategies such as purchasing less preferred foods and reducing meal frequency. The global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence in these livelihood zones increased to 11.8 percent (Serious, 10-14.9 percent WHZ) during the 2025 gu, up from 8.6 percent at the same time last year. This reflects a worsening nutrition situation driven by deteriorating food access due to limited milk consumption, low income, and high food prices. Malnutrition has been further aggravated by high morbidity, poor sanitation, sub-optimal feeding practices, and limited access to health services. 

The majority of northwestern agropastoral areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with small pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), driven by three consecutive seasons of failed harvests, which have limited household income and financial access to food. In October, households are relying on income from fodder sales from the early-harvested below-average karan production to purchase food from markets while awaiting the main karan season crop harvest in November. Significant production shortfalls and exceptionally low 2025 gu harvests in July-August have left households with minimal cereal stocks. Households have become atypically market dependent for food due to depleted food stocks and below-baseline livestock ownership, and are experiencing extremely low purchasing capacity. Medium calving rates in September following the karan rains, and subsequent increased milk availability for consumption and sale, is helping to partially bridge food consumption gaps. Labor demand has seasonally increased with the start of the harvest in October, increasing household income. For households benefiting from early harvests, consumption of green sorghum started by late October, offering partial relief. However, most households are heavily reliant on negative livelihood coping strategies to mitigate more severe food consumption gaps, including withdrawing children from school, as well as relying on consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing the number of meals consumed per day.

In parts of southern agropastoral and riverine areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in October due to poor xagaa rainfall and reduced soil moisture, which limited rainfed and irrigated crop production during gu off-season cultivation. Despite a generally favorable gu main harvest in southern regions, poor households retained only two to three months of cereal stocks after selling over half their own production to repay drought-related debts to cover essential food and non-food needs. Poor households generally became market dependent for food in October; however, households have poor purchasing power with limited remaining income to access food. While agricultural labor income rose modestly in September-October due to deyr land preparation and dry planting, the significantly below average start to the deyr season has limited typical labor opportunities. Households are relying on coping strategies, such as reducing the frequency and portion size of meals, and purchasing cheaper, less-preferred foods. Households struggling to close food gaps are also purchasing food on credit, seeking out social support, taking out cash loans for food, and increasing the harvesting and sale of bush products (timber and charcoal). Both agropastoral and riverine areas are experiencing Critical (15-29.9 percent GAM WHZ) malnutrition levels, reflecting deterioration over the last three seasons. The Shabelle and Bay regions are particularly affected, with high morbidity and poor infant and young child feeding practices contributing to the deterioration.

IDPs remain among Somalia’s most food-insecure populations, with most IDP settlements classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in October. Xudur in Bakool and Baidoa in Bay are likely facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes due to conflict and drought that continue to drive displacement, straining already limited resources and labor opportunities in the camps. Protracted conflict, recent xagaa dry conditions, and escalating violence have disrupted livelihoods and access to labor and markets. Gu cereal stocks are fully depleted and high competition for limited income-earning labor opportunities and self-employment have eroded purchasing power amid high staple food prices, widening food consumption gaps among displaced households. A substantial deterioration in acute malnutrition has been observed among IDPs compared to outcomes from the 2024 November-December deyr nutrition assessment, particularly in Baidoa, Galkacyo, Dhusamareb, and Bosasso — reflected by Critical (15-29.9 percent GAM WHZ) levels in IDP settlements. Key drivers of acute malnutrition among IDPs include disease outbreaks, limited access to clean water and sanitation facilities, and poor child feeding and care practices.

• The October to December 2025 deyr rains are expected to be significantly below average, influenced by forecasted La Niña conditions and a negative Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD). Most areas are expected to receive 50 percent or less of typical rainfall (Figure 2). Due to the rainfall deficits, there is an increased likelihood of drought in deyr-receiving agropastoral livelihood zones in southern Somalia.
• Following the below-average deyr season, the January to March jilaal dry season will be atypically dry.  

• The main deyr cereal harvest in agropastoral areas is expected to be largely below average. Analog year analysis suggests that national sorghum yields will likely be 25-30 percent below average (approximately 70-75 percent of typical) (see Annex 5) and maize yields will likely be 22-25 percent below average (approximately 75-78 percent of typical). The March deyr off-season harvest in riverine areas is also likely to be well below average due to moisture stress, high competition for irrigation, and limited river flooding.

• The November 2025 karan sorghum harvest in the Northwestern Agropastoral livelihood zone is expected to be better than originally anticipated, though yields are still expected to be below average. This anomaly stems from erratic gu rains, delayed karan rainfall, dry spells, and pest infestations. Despite late planting, improved karan rains later supported crop growth, with white sorghum performing better than expected.

• Agricultural labor opportunities will be below-average countrywide through March-April, when near-average gu land preparation and planting will support average labor opportunities. 

• Conflict and insecurity in central and southern Somalia will likely persist through the projection period. From October 2025 through May 2026, recent gains by Al-Shabaab are likely to enable the group to increase the frequency and intensity of attacks on Mogadishu, central Somalia, and the Ethiopian border. Al-Shabaab is expected to continue controlling strongholds in parts of southern and central Somalia, likely allowing the group greater freedom of movement across central and southern Somalia. 

• Clan-based violence is expected to seasonally escalate during the jilaal dry season (December-March) due to increased competition for water and pasture. Conflict will likely ease with the April-May gu rains as pasture is replenished.

• Household and market cereal stocks in southern, central, and northern markets are expected to be below-average due to dwindling stocks from the 2025 gu season and expected below-average deyr production.

• Local goat prices will remain average to above average through May 2026 across most south and central markets and will likely follow seasonal trends. In drought-affected northern areas with a weakened SOS, goat prices are projected to be below average.

• Retail prices of sorghum and maize in southern markets (Bay and Lower Shabelle) are projected to remain up to 10 percent above the five-year average from October to December. Prices will increase seasonally during the lean season (October-December) before declining briefly in January-February as below-average deyr harvests reach markets. However, due to anticipated tight supplies from the projected below-average deyr harvest, cereal prices are expected to rise atypically from February through May 2026.

• In northern and central Somalia, sorghum prices are expected to remain above average (39-62 percent in Hargeisa) and continue increasing above both last year’s and the five-year average throughout May due to low stocks from multiple seasons of below-average harvests. 

• Rangeland resources (water, pasture, and browse) in most central and northern pastoral areas are expected to deplete through December and deteriorate rapidly during the jilaal dry season (January-March), before seasonally increasing in April and May with the gu rains. Livestock body conditions will follow similar trends, remaining poor and deteriorating through March, before seasonally improving during the gu. 

• Widespread atypical livestock migration toward northwest areas that benefit from karan and xeys rains or receive near-average deyr rains is likely due to constrained rangeland resources. This influx of livestock from drought-affected areas is expected to accelerate the depletion of available resources in these destinations through February 2026, when water trucking will likely resume. 

• Camel and cattle calving are expected to be low in most southern and northern regions, and low to medium in most central regions during the 2025 deyr season. Due to increased disease incidence in November to December and higher abortion rates in the jilaal dry season due to atypically dry conditions, low birth rates are expected across species from April to May 2026.

• Milk availability for household consumption and sales is expected to be atypically low through the deyr season and seasonally increase in April and May with births and improved rangeland conditions. However, availability is likely to remain below typical levels across much of the country through the end of the projection period. The most significant deficits are likely in central and northern regions, as well as in parts of the south. 

• Humanitarian food assistance

• Food assistance is planned and funded to reach 5-10 percent of the population in need of assistance — an estimated 375,000 people per month in November and December — with 70 percent rations through December 2025 due to extreme funding shortfalls and restricted access in certain operational areas. While funding has not been secured for humanitarian assistance from January to May 2026, it can be assumed that food assistance will continue at similar reduced levels. 

In northern and central pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to continue from October 2025 to May 2026, with increasing households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly in the most drought-affected areas. Addun Pastoral livelihood zone is expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions from February to May 2026, driven by the cumulative effects of three consecutive below-average rainfall seasons that have severely degraded rangeland resources and livestock conditions, reduced milk consumption, and limited income sources. Due to the forecast significantly below-average deyr rainfall, poor pasture and water availability will lead to widespread emaciation of livestock, with increased mortality among offspring, elderly animals, and lactating females, and subsequent reduced market value. These losses will further reduce already below-baseline herd sizes, leaving households with limited saleable livestock and minimal access to milk for consumption or sale. Although some low to medium livestock births are expected, herd growth will remain negative due to anticipated deaths from starvation, disease, and distress sales. Milk availability will decline to atypically low levels as the jilaal dry season approaches, and poor households will increasingly sell animals at reduced prices to afford staple foods at high and rising prices, increasing food consumption gaps. High debt levels and weakened social support will continue to erode purchasing power, resulting in reliance on coping strategies such as reduced meal frequency and unsustainable borrowing. 

In northwestern agropastoral regions, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widely expected through May 2026, due to poor karan crop production and limited livestock holdings following consecutive below-average rainfall seasons, which are constraining access to income and food. While favorable karan rains in September temporarily boosted crop development in the Northwestern Agropastoral livelihood zone and slightly improved food access, the November harvest is expected to be largely below the 2010-2024 average. Household food and income access may slightly improve after the harvest, but reduced yields will limit consumption and cereal sales. Income from fodder and milk sales will be diverted to debt repayment and essential needs purchases. In Togdheer Agropastoral livelihood zone, some households will likely deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from October to January due to especially poor livestock conditions, reduced milk consumption, and limited income. From February to May, food consumption gaps and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be maintained across the region as food stocks deplete, milk availability becomes critically low, and households increasingly depend on market purchases amid record-high food prices, straining access to adequate calories and nutrition.

Southern and central agropastoral regions are expected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from October 2025 to May 2026, with localized deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by early 2026. In most areas, poor October-December deyr rainfall will lead to moisture stress, low crop yields, and reduced labor demand, resulting in substantially depleted cereal stocks, low income, and constrained purchasing power in typically productive regions. Households will likely face poor dietary diversity and increasingly employ consumption-based coping strategies, such as reducing the frequency of meals, reducing or eliminating consumption of essential food groups (including milk), as well as negative livelihood coping strategies, including increasingly seeking in-kind and cash gifts, and resorting to distress sales of livestock at low prices. From February to May, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zone is expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to the impacts of the La Niña-induced rainfall deficits, anticipated below-average harvest leading to depleted food stocks, low livestock productivity, and limited income-earning opportunities. Social support systems are expected to be overstretched and unable to meet growing needs. Families will increasingly face large food consumption gaps and likely rely on distress livestock sales and skipping meals. Riverine areas will sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through May 2026, though a slight improvement in food access from off-season harvests in March and wild food consumption is likely in riverine gravity irrigation zones. 

IDPs will continue to have very limited access to income and social support, sustaining widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely expand from Xudur and Baidoa to include Dhuusamareeb and Gaalkacyo from February to May 2026. Limited income-earning opportunities, few assets, and high food prices will continue to drive acute food insecurity among IDPs. Below-average deyr rainfall and drought- and conflict-induced displacement will further deteriorate food security conditions amid extremely limited and declining humanitarian assistance. A surge in drought-induced displacement is expected following the forecasted below-average deyr rains. With an influx of newly displaced populations, high competition for limited labor opportunities will force households to spend an atypically high share of their limited income on food and increase their reliance on credit. Anticipated poor deyr cereal production will increase local cereal prices and result in minimal crop zakat in January and February, suppressing purchasing capacity through early 2026 for households that are extremely market dependent for food. Many IDPs will begin to exhaust their coping capacity; those who can will seek out cash and food gifts, and most will forgo essential non-food purchases, but still experience large food consumption gaps. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a 

Below-average gu rains. 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: While the March-May 2026 gu rains in Somalia are currently forecast to be average, uncertainty exists given the long-range nature of the forecast. If gu rains are below-average, food insecurity would likely deteriorate during the projection period. 

In the northern and central pastoral livelihood zones, continued poor rainfall would further deplete pasture and water, driving further livestock emaciation, high livestock mortality, and minimal milk production, undermining both food and income sources. Household purchasing power would remain extremely low, while limited health access, poor water quality, and inadequate dietary diversity would drive high levels of acute malnutrition, particularly among children and pregnant and lactating women. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) likely among those with very low livestock or limited social support. East Golis, Coastal Deeh, Northern Inland Pastoral, and Hawd Pastoral livelihood zones would be expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by May.

In agropastoral and riverine areas, below-average rainfall and persistently high food prices would compound the effects of previous poor seasons. Reduced agricultural labor demand, lack of income from livestock and milk sales or fodder sales, and overstretched social support would sustain widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Cowpea Belt, Sorghum High Potential, and Togdheer Agropastoral zones by May. 

IDPs would face the most acute impacts due to minimal livelihood options, eroded purchasing power, and constrained humanitarian access. Widespread deterioration to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would be likely across IDP settlements due to significantly reduced labor income, rising cereal prices, and depleted natural resources, amid extremely limited humanitarian food assistance. Malnutrition levels would likely rise as households exhaust coping capacities and access to safe water, health care, and adequate food continues to deteriorate.

From 2020 to 2023, Somalia endured an unprecedented drought marked by five consecutive failed rainy seasons, which devastated ecosystems, depleted herds, and severely strained livelihoods and support systems. Despite some seasonal improvements and livestock herd rebuilding throughout 2024, a sustained and widespread recovery had yet to materialize entering 2025.

In the northern and central regions, a poor April to June 2025 gu rainfall was followed by an exceptionally dry July to September xagaa dry season, leaving the land dry and water sources severely depleted. Scarce pasture and water resources have triggered widespread atypical livestock movements, increasing competition over limited pasture. While in southern Somalia the 2025 gu was more mixed, with some areas receiving average to above-average rains, this was followed by below-average June to August xagaa rains and poor off-season recessional cropping. Dry weather compounded by atypically high temperatures triggered rapid evapotranspiration, and as a result, vegetation conditions had deteriorated rapidly and significantly by October (Figure 3). Households in southern regions are already becoming market dependent after selling their harvests to cover debt from previous droughts. The cumulation of many years of drought, followed by stagnated recovery,has resulted in areas being highly vulnerable to further weather shocks, such as the significantly below-average October to December deyr season. 

Forecast

Weak La Niña conditions began to develop in late September, with forecasts indicating continuation through December 2025-February 2026. Typically, a positive La Niña results in below-average precipitation in East Africa from September through January. After, a transition to El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO)-neutral is likely in January-March 2026 and will likely last through May. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) index will remain negative through November 2025 before turning neutral. A negative IOD typically also results in below-average levels of precipitation in East Africa. 

The combination forecast of La Niña and a negative IOD indicates below-average rainfall across much of Somalia for the October to December 2025 deyr season, with drought likely in deyr-receiving agropastoral livelihood zones in southern Somalia (Figure 4). These factors are expected to increase evapotranspiration and reduce soil moisture, threatening crop production and pastoral livelihoods that depend heavily on seasonal rains. Following this, the jilaal dry season is likely to be atypically hot and dry through at least March, compounding stress on already vulnerable communities. 

Impact

Drier and hotter conditions are expected to have a substantial impact on crop- and livestock-based livelihoods, especially for Somalia’s poorest households, who are highly vulnerable to another drought.

The combination of below-average rainfall and elevated temperatures across Somalia’s southern, central, and northwestern cropping areas will likely delay or prevent the start of the planting season, hinder germination, and stunt crop development. These impacts are anticipated to begin in October with delayed sowing, intensify through November and December as moisture deficits worsen, and result in poor sorghum and maize harvest outcomes by January (Figure 5). FEWS NET Agroclimatology Team found that when similar rainfall deficits occurred in prior years, the mean sorghum and maize yields were 25 and 22 percent below average, respectively.

In pastoral areas, rangeland conditions are unlikely to recover seasonally, and forecasted hot and dry weather is expected to drive deterioration of pasture and water resources, particularly in northern and central regions. In northern and central regions, deteriorating livestock body conditions, reduced milk production, and poor conception rates are likely to follow the poor onset of the October-December deyr rains. As conditions worsen, atypical livestock migration is anticipated, particularly toward better rainfed zones where competition for resources and exposure to livestock disease are high. Livestock deaths may also increase, especially among young and weak animals, further undermining recovery and reproductive cycles. The compounding impacts are likely to persist into the jilaal dry season through at least March, after which the forecast April-June gu rains will likely bring relief. Though southern areas of the country began the season with better quality pastures than the central and north due to more favorable 2025 gu rains, pasture and vegetation deficits are nonetheless likely to intensify through March, resulting in a critical shortage of graze and water – coinciding with widespread livestock nutritional stress.

Across Somalia, the below-average deyr rains are driving pastoral and agropastoral households to deploy a series of coping strategies to access food. This includes resorting to distress or premature livestock sales, likely at reduced market prices, and leaning on already over-burdened informal social support systems. Dietary quality and quantity are likely to suffer, contributing to widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) conditions across much of Somalia with localized deterioration into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and rising rates of malnutrition where the drought conditions are most severe.