Emergency (IPC Phase 4) likely in parts of Bay/Bakool due to failed deyr rains

• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in parts of Somalia from October to January. Most pastoral livelihood zones face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, supported by sustained improvements in livestock health and holdings. However, extreme La Niña induced rainfall deficits during the deyr season are stalling further recovery from the 2020-2023 drought as pastures deteriorate and deyr cultivation is halted. Levels of acute food insecurity are increasing in both agropastoral and pastoral livelihood zones. 
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will become increasingly widespread from February to May, with parts of Bay and Bakool expected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The anticipated nearly-failed deyr harvests will limit household and market food stocks, amid sharp deterioration in pasture conditions during the January to March jilaal dry season. This will likely be followed by moderately below-average gu rains. If gu rains are significantly below average, delayed, or fail, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will spread and food assistance needs will increase sharply.
• The areas of highest concern include settlements hosting displaced populations; southern and northwestern agropastoral areas in Bay, Bakool, and Togdheer regions; and central and coastal pastoral areas. 
• Humanitarian food assistance needs are expected to increase through the projection period and peak at the low end of 5-5.99 million people from February to April. However, funding for humanitarian food continues to decrease.
• An estimated 3.8 million people remain displaced, many of whom are destitute. However, only 5-10 percent of the population received food assistance in September, and limited humanitarian funding suggests assistance levels will further scale down through into early 2025. As drought, conflict, and flood-displaced households lack the resources to meet their own needs, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated to occur across internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements through May. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 31, 2024.

Extremely poor deyr rains and protracted conflict expected to drive atypically high food assistance needs through mid-2025

Forecasted extremely below-average deyr rains are anticipated to drive near-crop failure for the deyr season and the deterioration of pasture conditions and livestock productivity in early 2025, stalling any meaningful recovery from the 2020-2023 drought. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in several settlements hosting conflict, flood, and drought-displaced populations through May 2025, and among crop-dependent agropastoralists worst-affected by deyr rainfall deficits in Bay/Bakool from February-May 2025. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will become increasingly widespread across livelihood zones through May 2025 due to rainfall deficit-related decreases in food and income. In some pastoral and agropastoral areas in the south and far north, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are supported by better livestock holdings and pasture availability, which are increasing livestock production and value. Increased food assistance and livelihoods support is essential to prevent worsening food consumption gaps and reduce high levels of acute malnutrition.

The number of IDPs in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is likely to increase from January to March 2025 during the jilaal dry season. Protracted conflict continues to drive new displacements amid substantial declines in food assistance. The delayed and below-average deyr rainfall and atypical July-September floods severely impact labor opportunities and wages for IDPs. Many IDPs face high competition for minimal labor opportunities, weak social support networks, poor harvests, and limited crop zakat. In Baidoa, Dhusamareeb, Galkacyo, Laascaanood, Dolow, and Xudur settlements, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through May amid insufficient food assistance.

Most agropastoral areas will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through May, with Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zone in Bay/Bakool regions deteriorating to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) from February to May. In crop-dependent livelihood zones, multiple consecutive below-average harvests, below-normal labor opportunities during the deyr season, and limited livestock assets have severely limited food and income access. Households will likely resort to negative coping strategies and be unable to meet their minimum food needs due to poor to no deyr harvests and poor alternative income source opportunities until March/April.

In pastoral livelihood zones, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be sustained in most pastoral livelihood zones through January due to recent gains, though food consumption gaps and widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are expected from February to May, particularly in central and northern pastoral livelihood zones. The past three seasons of favorable rainfall will buffer the La Niña-induced deyr rainfall deficits and support minimally adequate dry pasture availability through December; however, livestock productivity is expected to deteriorate during the forecasted atypically dry January to March jilaal dry season due to poor pasture. 

Forecasts suggest waning La Niña conditions in early 2025, which will likely drive an atypically hot and dry January to March jilaal dry season and moderately below-average April-June gu rainy season.This is expected to negatively impact off-season cropping and livestock productivity through March, with only meager seasonal improvement to gu cropping activities and labor demand in agropastoral areas and livestock productivity in pastoral areas in April/May 2025. In the event that gu rainfall is significantly below average, delayed, or fails, humanitarian needs are expected to sharply increase, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely spread in crop-dependent agropastoral areas of the Bay, Bakool, and Togdheer regions, as well as in central pastoral areas by mid-2025. 

Somalia contains a mixture of pastoral, agropastoral, and riverine livelihood systems. The country’s two main rainy seasons — the April to June gu season and the October to December deyr season (Figure 2) — dictate seasonal patterns of crop and livestock production. While locally produced crops are a key food source in cropping areas, imports account for 60 to 70 percent of domestic food consumption, and pastoralists typically purchase imported rice, wheat, and other staples. As of early 2024, the internally displaced population totaled 3.8 million (nearly 20 percent of the total population). 

Since 1991, conflict has forcibly displaced millions and rendered much of southern and central Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian actors. The impacts of al-Shabaab’s insurgency, exacerbated by government-led counter-insurgency operations, inter- and intra-clan violence, and chronic political instability, have undermined the local food system and driven a long-term decline in agricultural productivity. Violence, extortion, and movement restrictions frequently disrupt income-generating activities, livestock migration, and trade flows and render the food system more vulnerable to concurrent climate shocks.  

Somalia is also subject to climate extremes, alternating between drought and floods. Severe droughts tend to occur after two or more consecutive poor or failed rains. Over the last 15 years, drought brought parts of Somalia to the brink of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2016/17 and 2022/23, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) claimed the lives of an estimated 260,000 people in 2010/11 and 220,000 people in 1992/93. Increasingly, severe drought is followed by record-breaking floods, as in 2019 and late 2023. The 2020-2023 drought drove widespread displacement and loss of livestock, and five consecutive poor harvests, leading to high household debt levels and a breakdown of social support systems. Subsequent favorable rains have facilitated some recovery; however, the once-in-a-century floods in late 2023 also inundated cropland, destroyed irrigation infrastructure, and displaced nearly a million people in southern riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. Recurrent weather shocks, protracted conflict, and chronically high poverty levels have increased household vulnerability to future hazards due to the erosion of livelihoods and coping capacity. Full recovery — especially sustainable levels of livestock ownership — would take several years. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas, the gu and deyr rains coincide with the cropping lean season prior to harvests in July and January. Maize, sorghum, and cowpeas are key staples, and cash crops (sesame, horticulture) produced by better-off households offer a source of labor income to poor households. During the October to May outlook period, the deyr harvest typically provides food and income from January to March. Riverine areas are susceptible to seasonal flooding but may benefit from off-season harvests in March. During the deyr lean season, poor households rely on labor income to purchase food before the harvest.  

In pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak during and after the gu and deyr rains. During the October to May outlook period, seasonal improvements are pronounced from November to January and April to May, coinciding with livestock births; additionally, domestic and export demand for livestock for the Hajj will begin in May. Conversely, food and income will be lowest during the jilaal dry season from January to March, when depleted pasture and water resources drive declines in livestock saleability and milk production. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Somalia June 2024 Food Security Outlook
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards

Conflict: 

National and clan conflicts have intensified since July, significantly impacting livelihoods in several parts of south-central Somalia. In September, the military and its allied local militias launched renewed counterattack operations against al-Shabaab in Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle regions, resulting in extensive clashes. In September and early October, military operations and terrorist activities reached the highest levels observed since July in central and southern Somalia, respectively, according to security agency reports. The increased levels of conflict have driven population displacement, negatively impacted trade, and disrupted land preparation for deyr cultivation. 

Similarly, inter-clan clashes are higher in the first nine months of 2024 than in 2023, particularly in Gedo, Lower Juba, and the Shabelles, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Clan-related conflicts intensified in Gedo Region between July and October, displacing an estimated 30,000 people and disrupting seasonal agricultural activities, livestock mobility, and trade flow. Similar events have been reported in Middle Shabelle (specifically in the Adale and Jowhar districts) and Galgaduud (specifically in Abudwak, Adado, Dhusamreb, Elbur, and Eldher districts) regions. 

Climate: 

The June to September karan season in northwestern Somalia was generally above average: Northwestern Agropastoral and West Golis Pastoral livelihood zones of Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed regions received karan rains 25-100 percent above average levels. The July to September xagaa rains in southern Somalia were largely below average, with poor spatiotemporal distribution. 

The October to December deyr rains – which typically begin in early October in the north and mid-October in the south – have failed to start across much of the country in October, based on CHIRPS remote-sensing data; however, light below-average rains were observed in localized parts of the north (Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer, and Nugal regions). In most central and southern regions, cumulative rainfall from October 1-31 ranged from 0-45 percent of the long-term mean in much of south-central Somalia (Figure 3). This has resulted in abnormal dryness amid atypically hot conditions.

Floods: 

The damage from previous El Niño-induced 2023 deyr and 2024 gu floods, such as unrepaired open river breakages, damaged infrastructure, and highly saturated soil levels in the riverine areas of Hiraan, Shabelles, Lower Juba, and Gedo regions, exacerbated the impacts of new flooding in September. Following heavy karan/karma rains in the Ethiopian highlands, atypical river and flash floods from July to September occurred in parts of Middle and Lower Shabelle, especially in Jowhar and Afgoye districts. Juba and Shabelle river levels have been unseasonably high, sustaining high flood risk. As of October 20, flood risk was moderate to high in the upper Shabelle River with several remaining open river breakages (Figure 4). While the September floods were not as severe as the 2023 deyr and 2024 gu season floods, the cumulative impacts of consecutive atypical floods have resulted in repeated waves of population displacement and have been highly detrimental to crop production, agricultural labor opportunities, and crop sales income.

Disease incidence: 

Data from the 2024 post-gu food security assessment conducted by FSNAU and partners indicate a high incidence of malaria, acute watery diarrhea (AWD)/cholera, and measles, reportedly due to water consumption from unprotected sources and poor WASH practices. According to joint WHO and Somalia Federal Ministry of Health reports, nearly 3,182 measles cases were reported between June and September 2024, maintaining epidemic levels. In the same period, 9,873 cases of AWD/cholera, 85,852 cases of malaria, and 3,182 cases of measles were reported. While the case numbers remain elevated, this represents a decrease of 80, 70, and 83 percent from the number of cases reported from June to September 2023, respectively. The declines in morbidity were likely supported by the early depletion of rainwater following the gu and subsequent poor xagaa seasons, resulting in increased reliance on protected water sources. 

Crop production:

While 2024 gu cereal production in southern Somalia was slightly over the recent five-year average (which includes years during which Somalia faced a historic five-season drought), production was nearly 20 percent lower than the last gu season and 45 percent lower than the long-term average (1995-2024) (Figure 5). Due to gu flooding in riverine areas and the erratic gu rainy season with an early end, below-average cropland was planted and seed germination failed in several areas, requiring multiple rounds of replanting. This was followed by periods of severe moisture stress, wilting, and insect infestation, resulting in unfavorable gu main season production. Meanwhile, the flooding and early cessation of gu rains and the delayed start of the deyr rains have supported favorable off-season cultivation conditions, and off-season cereal production in riverine areas has been above average. However, with the scale of main gu production deficits and the inadequate July to September xagaa showers during off-season crop development, off-season harvests were insufficient to offset the losses incurred during the main season. 

• In the riverine areas, off-season harvests began in September and are above average, enhancing household food stocks. Riverine farmers planted approximately 18,300 hectares between June and September and harvested 5,000 MT of maize, 1,600 MT of sesame, and 800 MT of cowpeas. However, river flooding from May to September inundated 65 percent of the farmland in riverine areas, causing damage to standing crops and limiting off-season crop sales incomes, particularly in Middle Shabelle. Despite these continued river floods in Middle Shabelle, approximately 3,000 hectares of riverine cropland were harvested in late August and September. 
• In the agropastoral livelihood zones in the south, following the early cessation of rainfall in May, crop development in much of the southern agropastoral areas was stunted resulting in substantial crop losses. The 2024 gu harvests have been significantly below average, particularly in Bay Bakool Low Potential and Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones in Bay and Bakool; cereal production in Bakool was 95 percent below last year and 81 percent lower than the five-year average production (Figure 5, 6). This has resulted in atypically limited household cereal stocks and insufficient carryover stocks. Due to the early cessation of gu rains and low dry season rains, agropastoral areas did not receive gu off-season harvests. 
• In the Cowpea Belt Agropastoral livelihood zone in central Somalia, gu cowpea crop production was the highest since 2018 and well above the five-year average, with an estimated 450 MT produced. Cowpea, a more weather-resilient crop, benefited overall from the above-average gu rains in April and early May despite the early cessation of rainfall. However, the high levels of insecurity in the central regions – including population displacement and frequent disruption of cropping activities – limited land preparation and weeding, resulting in cowpea production remaining below 2010-2023 average levels. 
• In the northwestern agropastoral areas, the early cessation of gu rains in May and June resulted in extremely limited and delayed karan planting. While the July to September karan rains were cumulatively above average and boosted the development of standing crops, the early season deficits and delayed planting resulted in wilting and widespread crop loss. Despite substantial late planting with the late season rains, crops did not reach maturity before the cold season in October and will be harvested and sold prematurely for crop fodder, providing some marginal income for households. The worst-affected area isTogdheer Agropastoral livelihood zone, where cereal production has nearly failed.
• Due to the poor gu and karan crop production in both southern and northwestern agropastoral areas, farmers have produced large quantities of crop fodder for their own use as animal feed and for sale. Some farmers with failed harvests are renting their land out to pastoralists to allow their herds to feed on the remaining standing crop residue, while livestock are also fertilizing their land for the deyr season. Income from crop fodder sales is currently higher than normal; however, it is insufficient to mitigate the losses from poor crop sales.   

Rangeland conditions: 

As of mid-October, vegetation conditions deteriorated to below-average levels in most of southern and central Somalia (Figure 7) due to impacts of the early gu cessation, the erratic xagaa rains, the delayed deyr rains, and atypically hot conditions through October. The past three above-average rainfall seasons have partially mitigated more severe deterioration. Despite the dry conditions, field reports indicate that dry pasture and browse are still largely available to sustain livestock. Parts of the north, particularly the northwest, are experiencing more favorable vegetation conditions following the cumulatively above-average karan rains.

Livestock production:

The access to dry pasture and browse are generally supporting normal livestock body conditions and health in October, even in the southern and central regions which are worst affected by the early gu cessation and delayed deyr rainfall. However, deyr season livestock conception – which partially hinges on livestock’s access to nutrient-rich green pasture (not dry pasture) – has had a slow start in October, resulting in low livestock conception rates across most of the country. 

Milk availability has seasonally declined to atypically low levels in October. Camel milk yields have deteriorated significantly below average in parts of Addun, Guban, Hawd, and Northern Inland Pastoral livelihood zones due to the reliance on dry pasture and increased livestock movements in search of better pasture. In areas where cattle are predominantly reared (including Northwestern Agropastoral and Juba Cattle Pastoral livelihood zones and agropastoral areas of Bay, Hiiraan, Gedo, and Juba regions), cattle milk availability has deteriorated as lactating cows are drying ahead of conception in November. These trends are not only limiting household milk consumption and income from sales, but also resulting in a decline in poor households’ access to cow milk gifts from middle and better-off households. 

In the northwest, in West Golis Pastoral, Guban Pastoral, and Hawd Pastoral and Northwestern Agropastoral livelihood zones, livestock body conditions have seen a strong recovery due to enhanced rangeland resources from the above-average karan rains. In these areas, while milk availability is normally seasonally low in early October, the start of medium goat kidding and low cattle calving in October began to slightly increase milk availability for consumption and sales. 

While livestock herd sizes have reached near-baseline to baseline levels in much of southern pastoral areas, herds in much of central and northern Somalia generally remain below baseline levels. In central and northern pastoral areas worst affected by the 2020-2023 drought, such as Addun and Coastal Deeh Pastoral livelihood zones, livestock holdings declined slightly further in September and October. Livestock productivity is low – with limited milk availability for consumption or sales amid required livestock zakat – and households are atypically selling livestock to purchase food and pay back debts. 

Off-own-farm sources of income:

Overall, agricultural labor opportunities seasonally increased in September for deyr land preparation in agropastoral areas and ongoing gu off-season cultivation in riverine areas. In southern riverine and agropastoral areas, daily agricultural labor wage rates seasonally increased alongside demand in September, but are mixed relative to previous years. In Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, agricultural wage rates are 28 to 42 percent higher than last year and 44 to 80 percent higher than the five-year average in September. However, in the agropastoral areas of Bakool and Bay regions, where the 2024 gu season saw near-crop failure, average wage rates in September are 44 and 30 percent lower, respectively, than last year. Additionally, in Bakool, wages are 18 percent below the five-year average.  

Households are increasingly engaged in natural resource collection and sale activities – including firewood collection and charcoal making – particularly among poor households in rural areas. Firewood prices were stable between July and September 2024 in most markets in flood-affected riverine areas. However, in Jowhar, one of the most flood-affected areas, the price of a firewood bundle in October 2024 rose as much as 128 percent (7,500 to 10,000 SOS) when compared to October 2023 due to persistent flooding-related impacts and escalating conflict which have hindered transport to markets.

Market supplies: 

Overall, the market supply of locally produced cereals is near average in September. The 2024 gu harvest seasonally increased cereal market supply in July/August, and off-season maize production has further boosted maize supply in September. Modest carryover stocks from the previous deyr season are partially buffering supply gaps due to the poor gu harvests.

In September, locally produced cereal prices in southern Somalia are generally slightly lower than in August due to the above-average off-season harvests, as well as relatively similar to or below last year’s prices in key reference markets. In Baidoa of Bay Region, the key reference market in sorghum-producing areas, the price of sorghum was 8,667 SOS/kilogram (kg) in September: stable compared to August and last year but 14 percent lower than the five-year average. While sorghum prices are generally similar to or lower than last year in southern regions, prices are considerably higher than last year in central and northern areas due to multiple consecutive below-average sorghum harvests in the northwest (Figure 8). In Qorioley of Lower Shabelle Region, the key reference market in maize-producing areas, maize prices remain similar to or slightly below last year and the five-year average. In Middle Juba, recent significant off-season maize harvests replenished the markets and supported prices that were roughly 50 percent lower than last year and the five-year average (Figure 9).

Cross-border sorghum and maize imports continue to help mitigate the supply gap in central and northern markets. In northwestern agropastoral areas, sorghum prices remain elevated but have declined slightly in September compared to August due to the increase in imported supply from the Somali Region of Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the prices of most imported foods (such as vegetable oil, wheat flour, and rice) indicate mixed trends. Imported food prices are stable or declining slightly month-on-month in most parts of the country, except in markets in Somaliland, where the depreciation of the local shilling has caused elevated and above-average prices. International shipping costs are increasing due to the Red Sea crisis and piracy. More information on locally produced and imported cereal and commodity prices in key reference markets can be found in the September Somalia Price Bulletin. 

Household purchasing capacity: 

In most agropastoral areas, households are experiencing favorable purchasing capacity in September at levels higher than last year and the five-year average, largely attributable to favorable cereal prices and seasonally high agricultural labor demand. In most southern regions, including Bay, Hiiraan, and the Shabelle and Juba regions, stable or low cereal prices in September amid seasonally elevated labor demand are supporting Terms of Trade (TOT) higher than last year and the five-year average in most areas. In Bay Region, one day of casual labor could buy 27 percent more sorghum in September 2024 than last year or the five-year average. Similarly, in Bardera market of the Gedo Region, a day of casual labor in September 2024 could buy 23 kg of red sorghum (35 percent more than last year and 53 percent more than the five-year average). 

In pastoral areas, household purchasing capacity has remained mixed across the country. In parts of the north, households are generally facing a low TOT for imported rice to local quality goat, largely driven by the high imported rice prices and the depreciation of the local shilling. In Burao market in Togdheer Region, the TOT is 34-44 percent lower than last year and the five-year average. Meanwhile, in parts of southern and central regions, the rice-to-goat TOT is more favorable. In Galgaduud, one local quality goat can purchase 53 kg of imported rice (15 percent higher than last year and 26 percent above the five-year average), with similar favorable pastoral purchasing capacity in Middle Juba in the south, largely driven by above-average goat prices in these regions. However, many poor pastoralists face limitations on their purchasing power due to limited livestock assets: current herd sizes are still low and recovering from previous droughts. 

Meanwhile, poor urban and IDP households are largely reliant on market purchases for food access and have extremely limited income-earning opportunities, resulting in constrained household purchasing capacity despite mostly stable food prices. 

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

From July to September 2024, a range of 1.2-1.3 million people – 5-10 percent of the total population of 18.7 million people – received food assistance each month (Figure 10): roughly 88 percent received cash and voucher assistance, and 12 percent received in-kind assistance. However, according to the Food Security Cluster (FSC), the cycle and ration sizes of food assistance are reportedly decreasing in Somalia. Due to funding shortages, food assistance rations have reportedly been reduced, and food assistance distribution cycles have also reportedly shifted such that households are no longer receiving distributions each month, resulting in a substantial decrease in food access for thousands of households. Humanitarian access challenges due to protracted conflict also continued to constrain the delivery of humanitarian food assistance in several regions in southern and central Somalia. FEWS NET did not have access to further information about the shifts in food assistance ration sizes or distribution cycle as of the end of October.

IDPs: 

An increasing number of IDPs are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in October. The below-average gu harvests, lack of strong social support networks, and limited crop zakat for poor displaced households in August and September have resulted in inadequate access to food in most IDP settlements. IDP households face high competition for the few labor opportunities available and have limited technical skills to access higher-paid employment, substantially limiting access to income. Repeated displacement from conflict, drought, and flooding over the last several years has led to the loss or exhaustion of household and livelihood assets, severely eroding household coping capacity. The ongoing delivery of food assistance is outpaced by the level of need, and most IDPs are experiencing moderate food consumption gaps indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. However, in Baidoa, Xudur, Dhusamareeb, Galkacyo, Laascaanood, and Dolow settlements, the compounding impacts of increases in conflict, sustained impacts of flooding and past droughts, lack of income-earning opportunities, and high market reliance amid extremely depleted coping capacity and reduced levels of food assistance are driving large food consumption gaps and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Households are relying on coping strategies associated with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) such as begging. 

Riverine areas: 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in riverine areas in southern Somalia as households continue to recover from the impacts of multiple consecutive severe floods. Food security in the Gravity Irrigation Riverine livelihood zone in Lower and Middle Juba and Middle Shabelle regions has improved from Emergency (IPC Phase 4) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with the above-average gu off-season maize harvests, improving household cereal stocks and income, increasing agricultural labor income opportunities from the ongoing recessional cultivation activities, and reducing maize prices for households purchase-dependent for food. Flood recession has also led to increased availability of fish and wild fruits/vegetables. In the Riverine Pump Irrigation livelihood zone in Gedo and Hiiraan regions, the severe floods resulted in a loss of irrigation infrastructure, and limited farm inputs and low cereal production have resulted in high cereal prices and limited household food stocks; households are market dependent in a context of limited income, low purchasing capacity, and poor financial access to food. These areas are currently facing area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with a substantial number of poor households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Pastoral areas: 

Most pastoral livelihood zones in southern, central, and northern Somalia are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in October. Up through September, many pastoralists continued to see the gradual recovery of livelihoods from the 2020-2023 drought, benefiting from three consecutive cumulatively above-average rainfall seasons, resulting in increased access to milk and livestock holdings relative to recent years. However, most herd sizes remain below-baseline levels, and few poor households have saleable animals, particularly in central and northern Somalia, constraining access to income and the ability to meet all essential non-food needs. In Addun and Coastal Deeh Pastoral livelihood zones in central regions, however, the impacts of considerably below-baseline livestock holdings, high reliance on limited milk sales, and a lack of saleable animals are compounded by recent escalations in conflict-related disruptions to market functionality and normal livestock migration, resulting in limited access to income or food. This is amid a high household debt burden, further reducing household purchasing capacity. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely ongoing, with a proportion of poor households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) that have severely depleted coping capacity and minimal access to food assistance to mitigate food consumption gaps. Meanwhile, in Southern Inland Pastoral livelihood zone of the Juba, Shabelle, and Hiiraan regions, where herd sizes are normal to near normal and vegetation conditions have supported improved body conditions, improved livestock herd sizes, and favorable milk availability for consumption and sales, Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are ongoing, despite intermittent conflict-related disruptions to livelihood activities.

Agropastoral areas: 

In Bay/Bakool Low Potential and Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones in Bay and Bakool regions – crop-dependent livelihood zones in the south – are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in October. Extremely poor gu cultivation, followed by poor July to September xagaa showers, and slightly reduced agricultural labor opportunities have resulted in maize and cowpea crop losses, limiting income and food access. Poor households were unable to earn income from agricultural activities to meet their essential non-food needs, despite the declining local cereal prices. These households have difficulty purchasing adequate food and are currently relying on coping strategies associated with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, such as reliance on food loans, seeking cash and food gifts from family members, and removing children from schools/madrassas. In livestock-dependent agropastoral areas in the south (including Cowpea Belt, Southern Agropastoral, and Southern Rainfed Agropastoral areas), Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are assessed. To mitigate the impacts of poor gu crop production, households are able to rely on food and income from livestock, benefiting from favorable births during the gu and access to milk for consumption and sales, as well as increased livestock herd sizes and favorable livestock prices. However, to meet their minimum food needs, poor households are reportedly reducing their non-food expenditures. 

In agropastoral areas in the northwest, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely ongoing in October. In Togdheer Agropastoral livelihood zone, poor crop production and low livestock holdings following several consecutive below-average rainfall seasons are limiting adequate access to food. Poor April to June gu rainfall and delayed deyr rains in October impeded the development of sorghum and grass ratoons, resulting in low income from livestock and crop sales. Households are atypically purchase-reliant for food, while having extremely low purchasing power, resulting in poor financial access to food. In Northwestern Agropastoral livelihood zone, despite the improved karan cropping activities, household purchasing capacity remains constrained. Households are highly dependent on markets given limited household cereal stocks and below-baseline livestock ownership. Poor households are facing moderate food consumption gaps and relying on selling household assets, reducing non-food expenditures, and relying on cash and food gifts from relatives. 

National: 

Based on SMART survey data collected by FSNAU and partners in June and July 2024, global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence by weight-for-height z-score (WHZ) ranges from Serious (10-14.9 percent) to Critical (15-29.9 percent) in most analyzed areas in the country. The most severe acute malnutrition outcomes are assessed to be among conflict or flood-affected displaced populations, as well as central pastoral areas and agropastoral areas of Bay and Bakool, driven not only by poor food consumption but also by a high prevalence of morbidity, limited access to water, sanitation, and hygiene, and minimal access to health and nutrition services. Based on the results of the August post-gu 2024 Acute Malnutrition IPC analysis, acute malnutrition was projected to deteriorate in October relative to the levels assessed in June to September, primarily in Bay Region in the south as well as some central and northern pastoral areas. 

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• The October to December 2024 deyr rains are forecast to be extremely below average with atypically hot temperatures, influenced by La Niña conditions, the strong negative Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) observed in October, and negative sea surface temperatures. Central and southern Somalia are expected to be worst affected, where forecasted rain through November 20 will be less than half of the long-term average. 
• The December to January xeys rains in northeastern coastal and northern regions (including East Golis Pastoral and Guban Pastoral livelihood zones) are expected to be below average.
• Following the extremely below-average deyr season, the January to March jilaal dry season will likely be hotter and drier than normal. However, dry season conditions will likely be near normal in the Northwestern Agropastoral livelihood zone, which received above-average karan rainfall from July to September 2024.
• The April to June 2025 gu rains are likely to be moderately below average given the forecast of waning La Niña. 
• Conflict and insecurity in central and southern Somalia will likely persist through the projection period. From November 2024 through May 2025, the military’s counterinsurgency will likely struggle to sustain gains observed earlier in 2024 while also holding recently captured territory, particularly following the withdrawal of ATMIS. Al-Shabaab is likely to recapture some areas lost in recent military operations.
• Intercommunal violence between rival clans will continue, driven by disputes over land ownership and resource management, particularly in Gedo, Hiiraan, and central regions. Clashes are likely to cause disruptions to trade, drive population displacement, and disrupt normal livestock migration, as well as result in the loss of lives and assets. 
• The deyr cereal harvest in January is expected to be extremely poor or nearly fail, given very dry conditions during the deyr. Crops will likely be harvested and sold as crop fodder before reaching maturity. However, off-season deyr production prospects in riverine areas are expected to benefit from a lower likelihood of river flooding, permitting recessional cropping activities to continue through March. 
• In March/April, area planted for gu cultivation by households will likely be near normal.
• The retail price of red sorghum in the Bay key reference market is not expected to follow seasonal trends due to extremely poor anticipated deyr harvests. Prices are expected to increase through the projection period and will likely reach levels slightly above the five-year average. Maize prices in the Qorioley reference market are expected to increase from late 2024 through May 2025, reaching above-average levels due to low carryover stocks and projected below-average deyr production. 
• In northern and central Somalia, sorghum prices are expected to remain above average; however, supply from the below-average karan harvest in the northwest and some cross-border imports from Ethiopia are expected to partially mitigate the severity of high prices. Imported food prices – including rice, the main staple food in central and northern Somalia – will likely remain moderately above the five-year average due to high freight shipping costs due to the continued insecurity in the Red Sea.
• Based on FEWS NET’s price analysis for the reference markets of Galkacyo and Baidoa through May 2025, local goat prices are projected to be above average in northeastern, central, and southern Somalia, though anticipated to follow seasonal trends. However, in northwestern Somalia, while prices are expected to follow seasonal trends, they will generally remain below the five-year average due to political tensions impacting livestock trade.
• During the deyr and gu rains in October and April, urban labor opportunities – largely related to construction – will seasonally decline slightly during the rainy season. However, the forecasted atypically dry conditions will facilitate greater road access than normal during the rainy seasons, sustaining some labor opportunities. 

Sub-national assumptions for agropastoral and riverine areas

• In northwestern agropastoral areas, the November karan sorghum harvest is expected to be below average due to the poor and erratic gu rainfall at the start of the season and prolonged dry spells in May/June. 
• In agricultural areas in the south, labor demand for weeding in November/December and harvesting in January is likely to be low based on the projected extremely below-average deyr rains and nearly failed harvests.
• Agricultural labor demand in all riverine areas will remain at below normal levels from November to the end of deyr off-season cultivation in March due to the below-average deyr rains.
• Agricultural labor demand in the northwest agropastoral areas is anticipated to be below normal through the karan harvest in November due to the poor crop harvests. Following the harvest, labor demand will seasonally decrease until April 2025, when demand will increase again as households prepare land for 2025 planting.
• Agricultural daily labor wages will likely remain below the five-year average in most agropastoral areas through May 2025, driven by the reduced labor demand for weeding and harvesting with the below-average rains. 

Sub-national assumptions for pastoral areas

• Despite the early cessation of gu rains and delayed deyr rains, the past three consecutive seasons of favorable cumulative rainfall are expected to support sufficient dry pasture to maintain adequate livestock health and slightly limited livestock productivity through December. However, pasture is expected to deplete more rapidly during the January to March 2025 jilaal dry season. Livestock body conditions and productivity are expected to seasonally decline through April, as is typical. Livestock body conditions will likely gradually improve starting in May with the 2025 gu rains. 
• Medium to low camel and cattle calving rates are expected during the 2024 deyr season. Low to medium camel and cattle calving is expected in the 2025 gu. Goat and sheep kidding/lambing rates will sustain medium levels across the country in the upcoming deyr and gu.
• Milk availability is likely to increase seasonally from November through January in both pastoral and agropastoral areas, with the highest availability in south-central pastoral livelihood zones. However, milk volumes per animal will likely be slightly lower than normal due to forecasted significantly below-average deyr rainfall and deteriorating pasture conditions, particularly in central regions. Milk availability will likely seasonally decline from February to May. In riverine areas, milk availability increases when livestock migrate to the riverine dry season grazing areas to access green pasture and river water from January to March.
• Livestock body conditions are expected to deteriorate in much of the country during the jilaal dry season with only slight anticipated improvement during the 2025 gu rains. However, in some northwest and south-central areas, livestock body conditions are expected to remain normal. In the south this is due to the proximity to the Juba and Shabelle rivers and access to crop fodder for purchase, whereas in the northwest the body conditions will be sustained by the favorable late season karan rains, which improved rangeland conditions. 
• Despite improvement in herd sizes, limited saleability of livestock will continue to limit household income from sales, due to herd sizes being below baseline levels in most areas.
• Favorable livestock retail prices – especially for goats – are expected due to low market supply and high urban and export demand. There will likely be a seasonal increase in demand and livestock prices during Ramadan (March) and the start of Hajj restocking months (April/May).

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• Food assistance will likely continue to reach less than 10 percent of the population each month throughout the projection period and due to severe funding shortages, targeted beneficiaries are expected to gradually decrease through May 2025.

Sub-national assumption for IDP settlements

• While areas with populations of highest concern, such as large IDP populations, will most likely continue to be prioritized for food assistance deliveries, it is assumed that deliveries will reach less than 25 percent of the population at the district or IDP-site level, and decline during the projection period due to funding constraints.

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

IDPs: 

IDPs in settlements will continue to have very limited access to income and social support amid reducing humanitarian food assistance rations, resulting in widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some settlements (Baidoa, Dolow, Dhuusamareeb, Galkacyo, Laascaanood, and Xudur) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through May 2025. Despite some decreases in local cereal prices with the gu off-season harvests, high competition for extremely limited labor opportunities will force IDP households to spend an atypically high share of their limited income on food and increase their reliance on credit to purchase food. The poor deyr cereal production will result in extremely limited crop zakat in January and February and increase local cereal prices, suppressing household purchasing capacity through early 2024 for a population that is extremely purchase-reliant for food. IDPs are expected to seek out cash and food gifts and forgo many essential non-food purchases but will be unable to bridge food consumption gaps. Through the projection period, an increasing proportion of refugees will face increasingly wide food consumption gaps through at least March. In March/April, while the availability of income opportunities will improve seasonally with the start of gu cropping activities, these improvements will not be sufficient to mitigate food consumption gaps. 

Based on SMART survey data collected by FSNAU and partners in June and July 2024 and the results of the August 2024 Acute Malnutrition IPC Analysis, between July to December IDPs in Baidoa, Bosasso, Dolow, Galkacyo, and Kismayo districts, as well as among Bay Agropastoral, Beletweyne Rural, and North Gedo riverine areas will likely experience Critical (15-29.9 percent) levels of acute malnutrition from October to December. 

Riverine areas: 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security outcomes are anticipated to persist in riverine areas of southern Somalia through May 2025, with a substantial portion of poor, flood-affected households remaining in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The above-average off-season gu maize harvests are expected to provide some relief, increasing access to food and income associated with crop sales and labor opportunities and slightly improving household food consumption through December. However, households continue to face the lasting impacts of three consecutive poor and below-normal harvests due to severe floods, which will be followed by a fourth poor harvest in January 2025. The large proportion of cropland that remains flood-inundated – as well as the high continued river flood risk – will also severely limit deyr cultivation and labor opportunities through January 2025, limiting a primary source of household income. Poor households have depleted their household assets and coping capacity to mitigate consumption deficits in recent years and will likely sustain substantial food consumption gaps through January. The late January to March deyr off-season cultivation, followed by 2025 gu cultivation activities from April to May, will slightly increase incomes and access to food, especially for poor, casual labor-reliant households. However, these improvements will not substantially mitigate the sustained food consumption gaps due to increasing local and imported food prices, high reliance on crop sales rather than consumption, and low coping capacity.

Pastoral areas: 

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist in most pastoral livelihood zones through the projection period, with widening acute food insecurity from February to May. While many households have gradually started to rebuild livelihoods from past droughts, there has not been sufficient time to fully recover, and households remain extremely vulnerable to new shocks. From November to December, households will benefit from some seasonal improvement in access to food and income amid peak livestock birthing. However, with the deteriorating pasture conditions, slightly below-normal milk production and deteriorating livestock body conditions will begin to limit income, especially for poor households with below-baseline livestock herd sizes by January. During this period, most households will maintain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) conditions supported by the recent births and favorable livestock-to-cereal TOT, although Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in Addun and Coastal Deeh Pastoral livelihood zones, where households have been unable to recover from the 2020-2023 drought and livestock ownership remains below-baseline. 

From February to May, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate, particularly in central and northern pastoral livelihood zones. Following the poor deyr rains and during the anticipated atypically dry January to March jilaal dry season, pasture and browse are expected to largely deplete, and livestock productivity and health will likely begin to deteriorate, decreasing household income. This is amid increasing local and imported food prices following the poor deyr harvests, decreasing pastoral households’ purchasing power. In April and May, with the start of the forecasted consecutive below-average – though less severe – gu rainy season, the limited rains are expected to only partially mitigate worsening livestock productivity and reproductivity. Northern Inland, Hawd, and Addun Pastoral livelihood zones in northern and central regions and Juba Pastoral livelihood zone in the south are expected to deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) by at least March 2025. 

Conversely, most southern pastoral areas will maintain Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes, supported by increased livestock numbers and better resource access. A combination of increasing livestock numbers, anticipated medium calving, kidding, and lambing; improved access to milk for consumption and sale; and better availability of pasture and water should enable relatively favorable outcomes in southern pastoral areas.

Agropastoral areas: 

Most agropastoral livelihood zones in central and southern Somalia will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through the projection period,with an increasing proportion of poor households likely facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by May. In crop-dependent Sorghum High Potential and Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones, the multiple consecutive below-average harvests, below-normal labor opportunities during the deyr season, and limited livestock assets have severely depleted coping capacities. Households will have exhausted the gu seasons’ carryover stocks, and alternative sources of income will be extremely limited. From February through May, with minimal to no deyr harvests and minimal labor opportunities until March, households will resort to household asset sales, limiting the purchase of essential non-food needs, and seeking gifts. While gu season labor demand will provide some household incomes in April and May, high market prices will inhibit increased purchasing power. In Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral, harvests will be even lower, and conflict’s continued impacts on typical livelihoods will widen food consumption gaps and increase reliance on coping strategies associated with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Households will still be unable to meet their minimum food needs, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected from February to May.

In more livestock-dependent agropastoral areas in south/central regions, including Cowpea Belt Agropastoral, Southern Agropastoral, and Southern Rainfed Agropastoral livelihood zones, while livestock productivity and births in November will help sustain households through December/January, the extremely poor harvests and deteriorating livestock body conditions and productivity from February to May will drive deterioration to area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in most areas. 

In agropastoral livelihood zones in the northwest, extremely limited karan harvests and crop fodder sales will support minor increases in income in November/December, but it will exhaust rapidly and be insufficient to meet households’ minimum food needs. After multiple consecutive poor of nearly failed cropping seasons and limited alternative sources of income amid extremely high sorghum and imported rice prices, household purchasing power, and coping capacity are extremely poor, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will be sustained through May 2024. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

April to June 2024 gu rains are significantly below average or delayed

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Significantly below-average or delayed gu rains would likely result in an increase in area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in both agropastoral and pastoral livelihood zones by May. In agropastoral livelihood zones, this would result in a substantial reduction in gu cropping activities and labor demand in April and May, severely limiting access to income. Poor households already extremely limited access to food and income in agropastoral areas of southern and central regions, as well as in the northwest, following the near-failed deyr harvest in December/January and a significantly below-average previous gu harvest in 2024. The delayed or poor rains would also likely result in sharper increases in food prices in April and May in anticipation of the poor June/July harvests, further reducing household purchasing power. With depleted coping capacity and limited access to humanitarian assistance, particularly in conflict-affected Bay and Bakool regions, Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral livelihood zone would likely deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by May, and an increasing proportion of households in Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral livelihood zone would likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with a small proportion in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In pastoral livelihood zones, following a severely dry jilaal season, a delay or below-average start to the gu season would result in severely depleted pasture and graze and limited water resources. Households will likely atypically migrate further distances in search of pasture. Livestock body conditions will further deteriorate and productivity will decrease, substantially limiting availability and access to milk. Some pregnant livestock may atypically miscarry ahead of the typical May/June birthing period and an increase in livestock diseases in the worst affected areas would be likely. Households would also likely atypically sell livestock to repay debts, purchase livestock inputs, or access credit for food. In Addun and Coastal Deeh Pastoral of central regions, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely materialize by May. In Hawd and Juba Cattle Pastoral livelihood zones, an increasing population would likely endure Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with a large portion of households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). An increase in the prevalence of acute malnutrition would also be expected in the worst-affected areas. 

IDP settlements in Baidoa, Bay Region (Figure 11)

Reason for selecting this area: There are multiple areas of high concern in Somalia, including several settlements hosting displaced populations. FEWS NET has selected one area of concern for this report to illustrate the long-term impacts of the conflict and drought-driven displacement. Bay Region has experienced over a decade of conflict as well as was among the worst affected areas during the 2020-2023 drought, driving mass displacement and resulting in inadequate access to food, shelter, water, health services, or sanitation facilities. 

Protracted conflict and recurrent weather shocks (drought and floods) have severely impacted southern Somalia, driving mass displacement to Baidoa town of Bay Region. IDPs comprise about 95 percent of the town's population, living in the over 200 overcrowded camps and informal settlements surrounding the town. Most of the IDPs originated from Bay and Bakool regions, where they were engaged in agropastoral livelihoods. 

According to UNHCR PRMN data, nearly 500,000 IDPs are estimated to live in Baidoa displacement settlements. Between August and October 2024, roughly 8,000 IDPs have newly arrived in Baidoa. This is considerably fewer than arrived during the same period in 2023 (37,000 IDPs), most of whom arrived following the severe 2023 deyr floods. Even though the absolute number of new arrivals has reduced year-on-year, new arrivals among an already extremely large IDP population further strains available resources amid a decline in funding for humanitarian assistance. 

Most IDPs have limited assets and income sources, with the majority depending on casual labor (including agricultural labor), charcoal and firewood sales, and petty trade. Less than 10 percent of respondents in the July assessment reported engaging in skilled labor. While many IDPs cultivate small plots of land that serve as a minor source of income and food, these are typically minor and insufficient to provide sufficient food stocks. Additionally, recent gu production was below average, estimated at 74 and 44 percent below the five-year and long-term averages, respectively. As a result, household food stocks are lower than normal among Baidoa IDPs. Households are primarily purchase-dependent for food. According to the post-gu survey conducted by FSNAU and partners in June, over 90 percent of IDPs reported relying on market purchases for food and other non-food needs. 

The price of sorghum in Baidoa in September declined relative to August and the five-year average. This, amid slightly increased daily wage rates for casual labor in August, has supported a temporary increase in labor-to-sorghum terms of trade relative to last year and the five-year average. However, despite this, purchasing power remains extremely constrained. Extremely high competition for minimal labor opportunities constrains access to income. IDPs are still unable to access sufficient food from the market. Additionally, imported staple cereal prices (rice and wheat flour) were above average in September; wheat flour was 17,600 SOS/kg (4 percent higher than the average), and rice was 24,800 SOS/kg (42 percent higher than the five-year average). 

Additionally, humanitarian food assistance in 2024 has decreased significantly compared to 2023 due to reduced funding. In the July to September period, the average percentage of households receiving humanitarian food assistance was 14 percent, down from 22 percent in April through June and 27 percent from January through March.

According to the 2024 post-gu assessment (collected in June by FSNAU and partners), 27 and 35 percent of Baidoa IDPs were experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, respectively. Roughly 20 percent of the population had a food consumption score indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and over 50 percent of households indicated levels of hunger associated with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse levels of acute food insecurity. To mitigate these food consumption gaps, nearly 40 percent of households reported employing livelihood coping strategies associated with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, including withdrawing children from school, sending household members to eat elsewhere, and resorting to begging, reflecting the severity of the livelihood crisis. Following the nearly-failed gu harvests in Bay, no off-season harvests in August/September, and now delayed labor demand during the deyr and limited improvement in alternative income opportunities, IDPs have limited physical or financial access to food and it is likely levels of acute food insecurity remain extremely poor, with large food consumption gaps and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in October. 

Assumptions

• The protracted conflict between the government and Al-Shabaab insurgents in Bay Region is likely to continue through the scenario period, constraining household mobility, disrupting engagement in cultivation, and limiting the supply of goods between Baidoa and rural areas.
• Increased displacement is likely between October and February due to poor 2024 deyr rainfall in October through December.

Between October 2024 to January 2025, food consumption gaps will be further compounded by expected low access to and income from deyr agricultural labor activities and atypically high cereal prices. Humanitarian food assistance is projected to be insignificant during this period. Households will employ negative coping strategies, but wide food consumption gaps are likely to continue through the next gu season. In the absence of any significant humanitarian assistance, IDP households in Baidoa are expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes amid increasing levels of acute malnutrition

Between February and May 2025, food consumption gaps among IDP households are not expected to improve. Given the forecasted below-average deyr rainfall, the deyr harvest is projected to be unfavorable and households will receive minimum own-produced food to support their food stocks through May. Although access to some agricultural labor is likely between March and May, and labor income is expected to slightly mitigate food access constraints, high cereal prices are expected to outpace income improvements and constrain purchasing power. Other sources of income, such as self-employment and casual labor, will not compensate for the food consumption gaps. IDP households are, therefore, expected to continue facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in the absence of humanitarian assistance.