Multiple areas across the south face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) if flooding is extreme

• Food assistance needs are expected to be extremely high through January 2027, with monthly estimates peaking at 6.0-6.99 million people in late 2026. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in highly crop-dependent areas of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan; multiple riverine areas in the south; multiple northern and central pastoral areas; and 12 major settlements of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some households likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected where the impacts of weather and insecurity are less severe. Consecutive poor harvests, low livestock productivity, worsening insecurity, and historically high food prices will severely constrain food access. 
• The key driver of acute food insecurity is shifting from drought during the April-June 2026 gu season to flooding during the October-December 2026 deyr season. FEWS NET previously warned of a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Bay, Bakool, and Gedo agropastoral areas in June-September if poor gu rains caused localized crop failure amid very high acute malnutrition levels. This scenario did not materialize: while the July/August harvest is well below average, cereal stocks will mitigate the severity of area-level outcomes in the near term. However, a strengthening El Niño and an anticipated strong Indian Ocean Dipole are expected to drive above‑average deyr rainfall and flooding, resulting in crop, livestock, and other asset losses, disrupted market supply flows, and water‑borne disease, thereby shifting the period of greatest concern to late 2026.
• FEWS NET assesses a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan agropastoral areas; all riverine areas (except in Lower Shabelle); and Baidoa, Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Dolow IDP settlements; between October and January in the event of extreme, widespread flooding. Under the most likely scenario, flooding is expected to be relatively concentrated in flood-prone areas, similar to 2023. However, if flooding is comparable in severity and geographic extent to historic flood years like 1997 and 2019, then extensive agricultural losses and isolation of communities from markets and lifesaving services would likely lead to Famine (IPC Phase 5), particularly given already high levels of acute malnutrition. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 25, 2026. 

Somalia contains a mixture of pastoral, agropastoral, and riverine livelihood systems. The country’s two main rainy seasons — the April to June gu season and the October to December deyr season — dictate seasonal patterns of crop and livestock production. While locally produced crops are a key food source in cropping areas, imports account for 60 to 70 percent of domestic food consumption, and pastoralists typically purchase imported rice, wheat, and other staples. As of January 2025, the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) totaled an estimated 3.3 million (20 percent of the total population).

Since 1991, conflict has forcibly displaced millions and rendered much of southern and central Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian actors. The impacts of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency, exacerbated by government-led counter-insurgency operations, inter- and intra-clan violence, and chronic political instability, have undermined the local food systems and driven a long-term decline in agricultural productivity. Violence, extortion, and movement restrictions frequently disrupt income-earning activities, livestock migration, and trade flows, and render the food system more vulnerable to concurrent weather shocks. 

Somalia is also subject to weather extremes, alternating between drought and floods. Severe droughts tend to occur after two or more consecutive poor or failed rains. Over the last 15 years, drought brought parts of Somalia to the brink of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2016/17 and 2022/23, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) claimed the lives of an estimated 260,000 people in 2010/11 and 220,000 people in 1992/93. Increasingly, severe drought is followed by record-breaking floods, as in 2019 and late 2023. The 2020-2023 drought drove widespread displacement and loss of livestock, and five consecutive poor harvests, leading to high household debt levels and a breakdown of social support systems. Subsequent favorable rains have facilitated some recovery; however, the once-in-a-century floods in late 2023 also inundated cropland, destroyed irrigation infrastructure, and displaced nearly a million people in southern riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. Recurrent weather shocks, protracted conflict, and chronically high poverty levels have increased household vulnerability to future hazards due to the erosion of livelihoods and coping capacity. Full recovery, especially sustainable levels of livestock ownership, would take several years of average rainfall. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas, the gu and deyr rains coincide with the cropping lean season prior to harvests in July and January. Maize, sorghum, and cowpeas are key staples, and cash crops (sesame, horticulture) produced by better-off households offer a source of labor income to poor households. During the June to January projection period, households rely on labor income, food purchases, and gu green harvests until the main harvest in July. The gu harvest typically provides food and income from July to October. During the subsequent deyr lean season, poor households rely on labor income and December green deyr harvests to meet their food needs before the main January deyr harvest. Riverine areas are susceptible to seasonal flooding but may benefit from improved wild food consumption and gu off-season labor employment and harvests in September.  Since the 2022 deyr season, repeated poor harvests have severely impacted Somalia’s agropastoral zones. Several livelihood zones have faced consecutive below-average or failed seasons, limiting agricultural labor opportunities, depleting household food stocks, and reducing income from crop sales and labor. These shocks have eroded coping capacity and livestock holdings, leaving households increasingly dependent on cropping activities, market purchases, and humanitarian assistance.

In pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak during and after the gu and deyr rains. During the June to January outlook period, food and income will be lowest during the rest of the xagaa dry season from July to September, when depleted pasture and water resources drive declines in livestock saleability and milk production. Conversely, seasonal improvements are pronounced from October to December, coinciding with livestock births and peak milk availability.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Somalia Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026 
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Somalia: April to September 2026 
• Latest Somalia Key Message Update: May 2026 
• Latest Somalia Food Security Alert May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to analyzing the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5)

• Rainfall: The April-June gu rainfall season was below average and atypically short, with a delayed onset and early decline in end-of-season rainfall amounts, resulting in atypically dry conditions through June. Rainfall performance was extremely erratic and geographically uneven across Somalia, with relatively better rainfall in parts of central and southern areas. 

• Crop production: Poor rains, especially from mid-May to early June, constrained gu crop development in southern and northwestern agropastoral areas. Late planting shortened the season, while moisture stress caused poor germination, weak crop vigor, widespread wilting, and stunted growth (Figure 1). Bird attacks (by queleas) further damaged crops during the reproductive stage of crop development. According to key informants, area planted was reportedly average, with sorghum dominating over 60 percent, followed by maize and intercropped cowpea. By early June, reduced production prospects and minimal weed growth amid moisture deficits lowered labor demand for harvests in the worst-affected areas. In riverine areas, irrigation has partially offset rainfall deficits. Recessional cultivation has begun ahead of the July xagaa showers. In the centrally located Cowpea Belt Agropastoral Livelihood Zone, relatively favorable gu rainfall in April and early May supported normal germination and good crop development, with most cowpea crops reaching seed-filling and harvesting stages. However, rising insecurity and displacement have reduced cultivated area, leaving some farmlands fallow. 
• Livestock: Livestock productivity remains atypically low in Somalia, but partial recovery is ongoing in the south, especially for shoats. In northern and central pastoral areas, above-average temperatures and strong winds continue to accelerate rangeland deterioration following the unfavorable gu rainfall, reducing forage and water access, and slowing recovery from recent droughts. Camel and cattle body conditions remain below average to poor. Small ruminant conditions are relatively better but below normal levels. Conception among small ruminants has begun, though births remain low. In contrast, conception and birth rates among cattle and camels are minimal following the poor 2026 gu season and high abortion rates during the jilaal dry season; in some cases, households have culled sheep offspring to preserve breeding females. Milk production and overall livestock productivity — particularly for cattle and sheep — remain substantially below average. 
• Livestock prices: In May, livestock prices remained generally stable compared to April, reflecting low availability of saleable livestock, and saw only slight increases of up to 10 percent in smaller markets. However, significant increases were observed in several key reference markets, where local goat prices increased by 14-41 percent compared to April according to Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) data. Prices exceeding the five-year-average varied by location, some reaching up to 95 percent, with the worst affected areas in Hargeisa, Borama, and Jowhar driven by strong demand during Hajj. Livestock exports to Gulf countries experienced mixed performance in early 2026, largely influenced by regional and environmental challenges. Middle East trade disruptions, combined with drought conditions that reduced the availability of export-quality livestock, most significantly affected Bosasso port where animal exports declined by approximately 22 percent according to FSNAU data. In contrast, Berbera port, primarily trading with Saudi Arabia, recorded strong growth, exporting 13 percent more livestock between January and May 2026 compared to the same period last year. Despite this positive performance in Berbera, overall livestock exports at the country-level for January-May 2026 were slightly lower than those recorded during the same period in 2025.
• Food and fuel prices: Local cereal prices remain at or near historic highs and continue to rise, driven by atypically high demand and low supply following the failed 2025 deyr season. In Baidoa, the price of red sorghum increased to a record 21,984 SOS/kilogram in May, up from the previous month (5 percent), the same time last year (86 percent), and the five-year average (119 percent). Fuel prices continue to trend upward, largely due to developments in the Middle East, contributing to broader food price inflation, including imported staples such as rice and wheat flour, which have risen modestly across most reference markets. In Mogadishu, both diesel and imported rice prices have increased significantly since March, by approximately 25-50 percent compared to last year and the five-year average. Continued depreciation of the SOS —19 percent between April and May— is also worsening inflationary pressures. 
• Conflict: Al‑Shabaab remains the principal security threat in Somalia, expanding control over strategic supply routes, taxing civilians, and sustaining attacks despite military operations. Drought conditions are deepening economic insecurity, resulting in an increase in recruitment by armed groups. Armed confrontations and remote violence continue at high levels, creating a volatile environment and severely constraining humanitarian access while driving displacement. Between January and June 2026, approximately 2,300-2,500 incidents and 4,200-4,600 fatalities were recorded, marking one of the most violent periods in recent years. Resource‑based interclan conflicts have intensified due to drought conditions, particularly in Hiiraan, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, and Mudug, disrupting movements of people, livestock, and goods. Political instability has escalated following the extension of presidential mandates into 2027, raising risks of parallel governance and election‑related violence, especially in Mogadishu. Insecurity related to Islamic State-Somalia activities, federal disputes, and geopolitical tensions also continues to worsen. 
• Displacement: Drought-related displacement totaled 536,390 people between January and June 25, 2026, a 70 percent increase compared to what was observed between July and December 2025. Between April and June 1, 34,534 new displacements were recorded. The highest displacement levels occurred in Mudug, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Juba. Most displacement remained intra-regional amid resource conflict, though about 30,500 people migrated to Mogadishu despite ongoing evictions, limited economic opportunities, and high food prices.

Humanitarian food assistance

Already low levels of humanitarian assistance in Somalia have continued to decline despite increasing needs. According to information FEWS NET received from the Food Security Cluster, a total of 321,510 beneficiaries were reached in April, a 51 percent decrease from March. Assistance to IDPs has also consistently decreased (from 363,192 in December to 86,124 in April) and is understood to reflect worsening funding constraints rather than decreased physical humanitarian access. In May, 253,170 beneficiaries were reached with in-kind assistance, however FEWS NET does not currently have access to information on total cash assistance beneficiaries reached during the same period.

Area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are prevalent in Hiiraan Southern Agropastoral, Bay/Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral, and Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral livelihood zones, driven by consecutive poor rainfall during the 2025 deyr and 2026 gu seasons that led to widespread crop losses and minimal agricultural labor opportunities. Households face severe food consumption gaps due to very limited green cereal consumption and food stocks, little to no milk access, and sharply reduced income-earning opportunities (including bush product sales), while high food and water prices further constrain purchasing power. Many households have exhausted coping strategies and are increasingly relying on asset sales, credit, and social support. However, riverine households remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), driven by below-average harvests, high input costs, and low incomes, partially mitigated by irrigation, wild foods, and coping strategies. Acute malnutrition levels deteriorated to Critical (15-29.9 percent) in agropastoral areas in Bakool, Bay, and Hiiraan regions, and in the Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral of Middle Shabelle region, due to limited food access and increased disease. 

In contrast, Northwestern Agropastoral, Togdheer Agropastoral, and Southern Agropastoral areas of Bakool and Gedo are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, driven by relatively greater dependence on livestock, lower insecurity, or cross-border trade linkages. Below-average harvests, limited access to green maize, and depleted household cereal stocks constrain food availability. At the same time, reduced agricultural labor opportunities, low livestock production and sales, and above-average staple food prices weaken purchasing power. Poor households increasingly rely on coping strategies, including reducing meal frequency, purchasing food on credit, and reducing essential non-food expenditures. Consequently, acute malnutrition levels are likely to overall remain Serious (10.0-14.9 percent) among affected populations.

In northeastern and central pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread, with some households likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly where deyr 2025 and gu 2026 rains were poorest. In Addun, Coastal Deeh, and Northern Inland Pastoral Livelihood zones, poor and some middle-income households face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to eroded livelihoods and purchasing power. Recurrent shocks have reduced herd sizes to near-unsustainable levels, limiting food and income access. Successive seasons of poor rainfall have depleted pasture and water, triggered early migration, and slowed livestock recovery. Income-earning opportunities are limited, social support is overstretched, and high food prices alongside declining livestock-to-cereal terms of trade are further constraining food access. Acute malnutrition (AMN) levels in northern rural areas are likely Serious (10.0-14.9 percent) to Critical (15.0-29.9 percent), while southern and central areas remain Critical (15.0-29.9 percent).

In northwestern pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity persists, driven by cumulative drought impacts, below-average 2026 gu rainfall, and ongoing clan conflict in Sanaag, Sool, and Awdal. In West Golis Pastoral Livelihood Zone, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are ongoing due to below-average pasture, slow livestock recovery, and additional jilaal-related livestock losses. Declines in livestock income and limited alternatives are constraining access to food, with poor households engaging in coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit and reducing meal frequency and size. Acute malnutrition is likely Serious (10.0-14.9 percent) across Guban, Hawd, and West Golis, driven by worsening food insecurity and reduced access to health, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services. 

In southern and central pastoral areas in Gedo, Galgaduud, Hiiraan, and parts of the Juba regions, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist, driven by low livestock holdings, limited milk availability and sales income, and slow herd recovery following past droughts. Livestock productivity and value remain constrained amid high food prices. Severe pasture and water shortages during the prolonged jilaal depleted body conditions, causing livestock deaths from starvation at water points, while heavy rains in late April further increased mortality due to hypothermia. In contrast, other southern pastoral areas are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, supported by relatively better pasture availability and livestock values. Meanwhile, acute malnutrition has likely deteriorated to Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) in Bakool and Hiiraan due to low milk intake, disease, and limited access to health and nutrition services.

Among IDPs, the share of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remains high and likely increased in June. Protracted conflict and below‑average gu cropping activities have reduced labor demand and wages, intensifying competition for scarce income-earning opportunities. Weak social support and poor 2025/26 deyr harvests limited crop zakat in March-April, constraining food access across most settlements. In Baidoa, Beletweyne, Bosasso, Dhuusamareeb, Galkacyo, Garowe, Jowhar, and Xudur, repeated displacement has eroded assets and coping capacity. High food prices, limited income, and insufficient assistance are driving large consumption gaps and increased reliance on negative coping, including begging. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) persists where integration and labor access are relatively better, including Mogadishu and parts of Lower Juba and the Northwest. Small-scale assistance provides only marginal relief in June. Dollarization in southern Somalia has influenced IDPs’ livelihoods by increasing reliance on USD-denominated income sources while simultaneously raising the cost of essential goods and services, thereby affecting household expenditure patterns and limiting the purchasing power of economically vulnerable displaced populations. In north Gedo and Woqooyi Galbeed, acute malnutrition levels have likely deteriorated to Serious (10-14.9 percent) or worse driven by unsafe water, poor sanitation, limited milk, disease outbreaks, and inadequate health and nutrition services. 

• The June to September karan rains in northwestern Somalia and the July to August xagaa rains in coastal areas are expected to be below average. 
• Moderate El Niño conditions are present and are expected to strengthen to strong conditions in late 2026. In addition, a positive Indian Ocean Dipole is then expected to emerge in August and strengthen from moderate to strong in late 2026. These conditions are expected to drive forecasted above-average October to December deyr rains, with a high likelihood of riverine and flash floods. Antecedent below-average soil moisture and above-average rainfall will increase flash flood risks, especially at the beginning of the rains during October when dry soil and intense rain lead to rapid surface runoff. This scenario assumes that flood severity and extent is most likely to be concentrated in low-lying, flood-prone areas, similar to 2023, when strong El Niño and a strong positive IOD were also present. However, see Annex 4 for details on a credible alternative scenario in which flood severity and extent is more extreme. 
• The December to January xeys rains in extreme northwestern Somalia (Guban Pastoral) and the East Golis Pastoral livelihood zone are expected to be average, though uncertainty remains given the long-range nature of the forecast. 
• Main season gu harvests in July are expected to be substantially below average in Hiiraan, Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle agropastoral areas, and below average in riverine areas. Off-season gu harvests in September are expected to be slightly below average given increased pump irrigation costs and below-average soil moisture in some riverine areas; however, riverine Juba and Lower Shabelle will have relatively better harvests.
• Karan harvests in October/November are expected to be below average.
• Main season deyr harvests in January are expected to be near to below average. Increased flooding is expected to cause substantial damage to newly planted crops in some riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. 
• Agricultural labor opportunities are likely to be below to near average through January. Wages are expected to be below average due to atypically low demand or high local labor supply. 
• Above‑average temperatures will likely accelerate seasonal declines in pasture and water availability from July through September. Pasture and water availability is expected to be below average and decreasing in areas that do not receive July to August xagaa rains until September, while it will stabilize in areas that do. Conditions will improve to above average between November and January. 
• Livestock body conditions are expected to be average in areas benefiting from xagaa or karan rains between July and September yet deteriorate until October in most central and northern regions and Hirraan, due to significant gu rainfall deficits and limited access to pasture and water. From October to January, conditions will remain relatively stable in northwestern areas during the dry season and continue to improve to above-average in areas benefiting from the deyr rains.
• Minimal camel and cattle births are expected between June and July and November to December across the country, driven by poor 2025 gu and 2025 deyr conceptions and increased abortions in the 2026 jilaal dry season. Medium to high small ruminant kidding and lambing is expected from October to November. 
• Milk production will remain below average through January, given the decrease in number of lactating animals from limited conception during the previous two seasons.

• Maize and red sorghum prices are expected to be 81 to 114 percent above the five-year average in the south, and 20 to 70 percent above average in the northwest, through at least July, due to extremely low stocks and increased demand. Cross-border inflows from neighboring Ethiopia are expected to be below average, most significantly impacting market supply in central and northern areas. Prices are expected to briefly and shallowly decline with the gu harvest in July through September and rise again until the deyr harvest in January (Figure 2).
• Imported food prices are expected to be generally stable at or increase slightly and remain above average due to the lagging effect of increases in fuel prices, shipping and transport costs, and supply disruptions resulting from ongoing events in the Middle East. Continued disruptions to Red Sea shipping will exert upward pressure on food and fuel prices through increased freight charges and delayed imports. 
• Prices for livestock with average body conditions are projected to remain favorable. Low livestock holdings, low birth rates, and poor body conditions are likely to constrain the volume of saleable livestock. However, periodic oversupply is anticipated as households resort to distress sales to cope with elevated food, feed, and water costs. 
• Goat-to-cereal and labor-to-cereal terms of trade (TOT) are projected to remain below average due to above-average domestic and imported cereal prices. The labor-to-cereal TOT will improve moderately in favor of laborers starting in July as local cereal supplies improve with the gu harvest, later declining beginning in October until the January deyr harvest.
• Livestock exports to Saudi Arabia are expected to be near average. However, meat exports to Gulf markets remain disrupted and are expected to remain below average through January 2027.
• Rising conflict and insecurity linked to political instability are expected to trigger new displacements and periodically impede market access, trade flows, livelihood activities, and humanitarian access. The likelihood of violent clashes will remain greatest around Mogadishu and other urban centers. Skirmishes between federally aligned forces and opposition forces are also likely to escalate through January 2027.
• Insurgent attacks against civilian and military targets are expected to intensify in Mogadishu and across south‑central Somalia as armed groups exploit political uncertainty. 
• Resource-related clan conflicts are expected to escalate beyond levels observed in 2025, particularly in drought‑affected areas of Hiiraan, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, and Mudug regions. Conflict incidents are likely to be highest from July until the end of the dry season in September, and intermittently disrupt trade flows, market access, and engagement in agricultural and pastoral activities. 
• Remittance flows from Gulf countries are expected to be below average.

Humanitarian food assistance

• According to the Food Security Cluster, planned humanitarian food assistance is expected to reach 677,178 people in June. As no plans for assistance beyond July have yet been developed and shared, this analysis assumes there will be limited to no humanitarian food assistance distributed through UN agencies and their implementing partners between July and January. 

Northern pastoral areas

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist across Northern Inland, Central Hawd, Addun, and Coastal Deeh Pastoral livelihood zones between June and January 2026, with some households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). These outcomes are driven by below‑average pasture and water availability and deteriorating rangeland conditions following consecutive seasons of poor rainfall performance. Atypically low herd sizes and reduced livestock productivity, including low conception rates and below‑average milk production, constrain both food and income sources. Additionally, conflict and resource‑based clan clashes expected to peak through September will likely disrupt seasonal migration, grazing access, trade flows, and market access, further restricting household food access. Between October and December, above-average rainfall and flooding will likely lead to deaths of weakened animals from hypothermia and intermittently disrupt market access. Below‑average remittance inflows will further limit coping capacity. Acute malnutrition levels are likely to remain Critical (15.0-29.9 percent) through January.

By contrast, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with an increasing proportion of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are expected across Guban, West Golis, Northern Hawd, East Golis, Southern Inland (Bakool and Gedo), Coastal Deeh (Middle), and Juba Pastorallivelihood zones between June and January 2026. These areas will face relatively less severe outcomes due to a combination of factors including relatively better rainfall performance, livestock migration options, or security conditions. Between June and September, below‑average karan and xagaa rainfall will lead to declining pasture and water availability alongside above‑average temperatures, further deteriorating livestock production and increasing reliance on distress coping strategies. Between October and December, the impacts of flooding in areas that receive the deyr rains will also negatively impact access to markets and key income sources. Above‑average staple food prices, limited livestock productivity, below-average labor incomes, and below‑average cross‑border imports will further restrict purchasing power and food access. 

Agropastoral and riverine areas 

Between June and September, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are expected in highly cropping-dependent areas of Bakool, Bay, Gedo, and Hiiraan regions. Successive crop failures, very low labor incomes, limited livestock holdings, and record‑high food prices will significantly restrict household purchasing power. Poor households are likely to exhaust their limited food stocks by September and will struggle to afford sufficient food at markets, even as they resort to liquidating remaining assets or begging. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across the Southern Agropastoral Livelihood Zone of Gedo, Juba, and Bakool and riverine Gedo and Hiiraan, driven by below‑average gu rainfall and crop production, reduced agricultural labor demand, and constrained income from livestock and crop sales. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in Southern Rainfed Agropastoral and riverine zones of Juba and Shabelle regions, supported by improved agricultural labor opportunities in June/July and comparatively better crop production, river levels, and irrigation access. Atypically increased sesame production, a more lucrative crop, will also boost incomes. 

From October to January, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist across most of Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and High Potential Sorghum Livelihood Zones due to very low income from livestock and milk sales, high reliance on markets and social support, and weak purchasing power. Additionally, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are also expected to emerge in riverine areas as anticipated, atypically bad flooding disrupts agricultural activities and labor opportunities – constraining a critical source of income at this time of year – and damages crops, causes livestock losses from disease and hypothermia, and increases water‑borne disease incidence, likely leading to further increases in acute malnutrition levels. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across less-flood prone southern agropastoral areas, driven by limited or no household cereal stocks, high dependence on market purchases, below‑baseline herd sizes, and unfavorable terms of trade. In general, food security improvements are unlikely in any southern agropastoral or riverine areas until after the deyr harvest in early 2027.

Northwestern agropastoral areas

In Northwestern and Togdheer Agropastoral livelihood zones, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through January 2027 with an increasing population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), driven by below‑average karan rainfall and harvests, limited household food stocks, and low income from crop and livestock sources. Compared to southern agropastoral areas, northwestern agropastoral areas face lower food prices due to cross-border sorghum trade flows from Ethiopia and have better access to crop fodder, social support, and credit, which will mitigate the severity of impacts from the poor karan season. The October/November karan harvest is expected to be below average and will only improve access to food and fodder in the short-term. Milk production will remain below average due to limited births, and heightened competition for labor opportunities will constrain incomes. Most households are likely to remain highly dependent on market purchases amid weak purchasing power and will likely resort to selling assets or reducing meal portions and frequency. 

IDP Settlements

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in 12 major IDP settlements through January 2027, with an increasing proportion of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), reflecting persistently high food prices, below‑average remittances, extremely limited income opportunities, and anticipated flood-related displacement and livelihood disruption. In Berbera, Burao, Hargeisa, and Laasanood, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected, partly mitigated by gifts, social support from the diaspora, and seasonal labor opportunities. Flooding is expected to directly impact many IDP settlements, especially low-lying Baidoa and those in riverine towns such as Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Dolo. Other southern IDP settlements are likely to see increased arrivals of newly displaced people, heightening competition for limited informal jobs and resources. Many households will likely resort to begging to try and mitigate their food consumption gaps, but support will be limited by ongoing currency issues. Limited access to clean water, sanitation, and health services will exacerbate Critical (15-29.9) levels of acute malnutrition, and increased water-borne diseases are expected during the deyr rains.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan agropastoral areas; all riverine areas (except Lower Shabelle); and Baidoa, Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Dolow IDP settlements

Extreme, widespread flooding during the deyr season in southern agropastoral and riverine areas 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If extreme, widespread flooding occurs during the deyr season, similar to what was observed in 1997 or 2019, a third consecutive below-average to failed season would likely ensue in agropastoral areas of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan regions, as well as in all riverine areas (except Lower Shabelle due to relatively better crop performance during the last two seasons). Baidoa, Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Dolow IDP settlements would also likely be inundated, newly displacing thousands of households who have already suffered repeated displacements and severing critical humanitarian access. Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur between October and January amid large increases in extreme hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality. Historically, strong combined El Niño and positive IOD events have caused widespread flooding resulting in major crop losses, physical damage, and fatalities; most notably in 1997, large swathes of southern Somalia were rendered inaccessible, destroyed crops, and drove mass displacements (see Annex 5 for further information). Repeated weather shocks and consecutive poor seasons led to Famine (IPC Phase 5) in southern agropastoral areas in 2011 and 2016/17, as well as bringing the country close to Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2022/23. 

Extreme, widespread flooding would occur in a context of exceptionally high vulnerability to additional shocks among poor households in southern Somalia. Below-average and extremely erratic rainfall during the 2026 April to June gu season exacerbated moisture deficits that had already accumulated during the failed October to December 2025 deyr season, delayed planting and crop establishment across many south-central agricultural areas. Fuel prices also decreased access to irrigation in riverine areas. As a result, gu harvests are expected to be substantially below average and even fail in the worst-affected areas. Repeated below-average harvests, weakened livestock conditions, declining herd sizes, historically high food, water, and fuel prices, and rising household debt have continued to erode livelihoods and households’ capacity to absorb additional shocks and have impeded recovery from the historic, five-season 2020-2023 drought. At the same time, conflict and insecurity have disrupted livelihood activities and market functioning, fuel prices have surged due to events in the Middle East, and traditional social support systems have become increasingly overstretched. The situation is further compounded by historically low levels of humanitarian assistance and reductions in already limited nutrition and health services. 

Acute malnutrition remains high and has substantially worsened in southern Somalia within the last year. In late March/early April, GAM rates in southern agropastoral areas, as well as accessible riverine areas of Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba, were already at Critical levels (15.0-29.9 percent, WHZ) and likely continued to deteriorate through June.¹ In Bay agropastoral areas, April 2026 nutrition assessments found GAM and SAM WHZ prevalences of 25.2 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively, representing a statistically significant increase from the 19.5 percent GAM WHZ and 4.4 percent SAM WHZ prevalences recorded during the 2025 deyr lean season. This increase marked movement toward the 30 percent acute malnutrition WHZ threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5).² Morbidity rates also increased from 30.5 percent to 36.4 percent over the same period. In agropastoral areas of Bay Region’s Burhakaba district, GAM and SAM prevalence reached 37.1 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively, with GAM exceeding the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. Malnutrition lowers immunity, which increases susceptibility to illness and death. High maternal malnutrition, seen in 27.3 percent of IDPs in Baidoa in April 2026, was also reported, which could exacerbate future increases in child malnutrition and mortality. 

If extreme, widespread flooding occurs during the 2026 deyr season, FEWS NET assesses there is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) between October and January due to crop failure, large-scale livestock and asset losses, mass displacements, and prolonged market and humanitarian access disruptions. Available evidence points to a moderate likelihood of this scenario materializing, including general agreement among international forecasts that there is a high probability that the ongoing El Niño will strengthen to a strong event and that a strong positive IOD will likely develop by August/September 2026. While flooding is incorporated into the most likely scenario, uncertainty remains regarding the geographic extent, severity, and duration. Among historical analog years with concurrent strong El Niño and strong positive IOD conditions, 2023 represents the analog for the most likely scenario, while 1997 – the worst flood year on record – serves as a plausible worst-case analog. Although ENSO conditions were neutral in 2019, the exceptionally strong positive IOD produced the second worst flood year on record, making 2019 another plausible worst-case analog for the magnitude and severity of flooding that could occur. These analogs illustrate the range of plausible flooding outcomes under similar large-scale climate conditions.

Famine (IPC Phase 5) would emerge between October and January in low-lying, flood-prone riverine and agropastoral areas. In line with historical trends, heavy rains and flash flooding would likely begin atypically early in late September. Remaining off-season gu crops in riverine areas would likely be destroyed as parts of the Shabelle and Juba rivers’ banks burst. Fields would be inundated or too muddy to plant, causing farmers to suspend main season deyr cropping. Agricultural labor demand would plummet, restricting the primary source of income for poor households. Mass displacements would occur as floodwaters rise. Market and humanitarian access would become extremely limited and trade flows would be severely disrupted, leading to supply shortages, price spikes, and a steep drop in household purchasing capacity. This would occur as most poor households exhaust their food stocks from the gu season and become market-dependent. Households would also be physically unable to transport and sell remaining livestock. Many livestock would also likely perish due to drowning, increased disease outbreaks, or hypothermia, further reducing households’ coping capacities. Livestock values would also fall due to increased distress sales and limited demand. Informal non-agricultural labor demand and petty trade would also drop off. Wild foods and bush products would likely be heavily damaged or destroyed, constraining access to alternative food and income sources. Water-borne disease outbreaks, such as cholera, would likely spread and force households to choose between medical expenditures and food; however, both physical and financial access to treatment services would be extremely limited. Social support networks would become overwhelmed, and many poor households would be unable to mitigate large food consumption gaps. Extreme hunger, high acute malnutrition and morbidity, and further reductions in already limited access to critical health and nutrition services signal a risk of mortality rates crossing the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold if this scenario materializes. 

The emerging October–December deyr 2026 forecast indicates a high likelihood of above-average rainfall across Somalia, driven primarily by the anticipated development of a strong El Niño. Forecasts also suggest that a strong positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) will develop, which typically enhances moisture transport from the Indian Ocean into Eastern Africa. A combined strong El Niño and strong positive IOD event is associated with even greater rainfall intensity and frequency than either event in isolation. Current forecasts indicate strong odds that cumulative precipitation from September to November will exceed 120 percent of the historical average (Figure 3). 

The years 1997 and 2023 are widely regarded as important historical analogs for wetter-than-normal deyr seasons in Somalia. These seasons were marked by strong El Niño and positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) conditions. As such, these years provide valuable insights into the potential opportunities and risks that an above-average deyr season poses.

The 1997 deyr season coincided with one of the strongest El Niño events and one of the strongest positive IOD events on record, producing exceptionally heavy rainfall that resulted in severe flooding along the Juba and Shabelle rivers (aerial footage linked here). Due to the magnitude of the flooding and its socioeconomic impacts, 1997 is often considered a benchmark year for extreme flood risk in Somalia. In some areas, flooding was so expansive that the two rivers merged into a vast 12km wide lake. According to FAO, an estimated 1,500 people died, 230,000 were displaced, 35,500 livestock were lost, and 50,000 hectares of farmland were destroyed in Somalia’s “breadbasket”, resulting in a 57 percent reduction in typical deyr agricultural production output. Infrastructure and property loss was widespread as were major disruptions in market functionality. Eventually, once floodwaters receded, some parts of the south saw improved off-season crop production. In central and northern areas, the abundant rainfall was reportedly mostly beneficial, including improved pasture and rangeland conditions, replenishment of water resources, enhanced livestock productivity, and favorable conditions for crop production. 

The 2023 deyr floods were driven by the same combined influence of a strong El Niño event and a strong positive IOD. Severe flooding in southern and central areas resulted in the displacement of 1.2 million individuals, loss of 8,000 livestock, and the destruction of 11,000 hectares of cropland, with a total estimated economic loss of approximately 193.4 million USD, with impacts more geographically concentrated than in 1997. The most severely impacted districts included Doolow, Luuq, Baardheere, Bu’aale, and Jilib in Jubaland, as well as Belet Weyne, Bulo Burto, Jalalaqsi, Jowhar, and Balcad in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle. Baidoa District in Bay region also experienced severe flash flooding, particularly in IDP settlements (Figure 4) and low-lying areas. In southern agropastoral areas, deyr harvests fell to 66 percent of the long-term mean, and maize production in riverine and agropastoral lowlands performed poorly. In areas that escaped severe flood impacts, above-average rainfall was favorable for both agricultural and livestock production. Crops performed well in the Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zone and some areas also saw increased off-season, recessional crop production.

Households in Somalia will enter the deyr season in a precarious position following a failed 2025 deyr rainfall season, subsequent atypically hot and dry jilaal dry season, and a poor 2026 gu rainfall season. Area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, with some households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), are already ongoing across large swathes of the country, with no meaningful improvement expected before January 2027. Although the gu rains provided some relief, recovery from successive droughts remains fragile and uneven. Rangeland conditions, herd sizes and productivity, and household coping capacities also remain below normal. Most poor southern cropping households are expected to prematurely exhaust their food stocks by September; worsening insecurity, persistently high food and fuel prices, and currency depreciation will make food access even more difficult. The coming July to September xagaa season is also expected to be atypically harsh. Forecast below-average rains and high temperatures across many parts of the country will intensify heat stress on crops and livestock, placing additional pressure on already constrained water and pasture resources. Soil moisture is also expected to further deteriorate, increasing the likelihood of atypical flash flooding events early in the deyr season. Riverine areas and Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan agropastoral lowland areas remain the areas of greatest concern. 

FEWS NET assesses that the most likely scenario is that flooding during the deyr season will be contained to the most flood-prone areas, similar to what was observed in 2023.However, food security conditions at the start of the deyr season in October are expected to be much worse than in 2023, and households have even less capacity to cope with additional shocks. Riverine and low-lying agropastoral areas along the Shabelle and Juba rivers are likely to experience the most severe flooding, leading to crop losses, damage to homes and infrastructure, increased displacements, disruptions to markets and humanitarian access, and increased human and livestock disease outbreaks. These factors will drive area-level deteriorations to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in riverine livelihood zones in October and sustain ongoing area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through January in highly crop-dependent areas in Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan.

While other areas of the country are likely to see flooding as well, flooding will most likely be geographically concentrated. In less flood-prone areas (especially northern and central Somalia), above-average rainfall will provide some much-needed relief following multiple, consecutive poor rainfall seasons. Pasture availability, rangeland regeneration, ground and surface water availability, and crop production (in the cowpea belt) are all expected to improve. Increased access to saleable animals, livestock market values, and crop/livestock productivity will improve access to food and income for pastoral and agropastoral communities. Despite these factors, area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are still expected between October and January due to the long-term impacts of repeated weather shocks, worsening insecurity, persistently high food prices, and above-average fuel and transport costs.  

However, should extreme, widespread flooding emerge similar to what was observed in 1997, FEWS NET assesses there is a credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in agropastoral areas of Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiiraan regions, most riverine areas, and Baidoa, Jowhar, Beletweyne, and Dolow IDP settlements between October and January (see Annex 4). Households do not have the capacity to cope with a third consecutive below-average to failed season, substantial livestock and asset losses, or prolonged disruptions to market and humanitarian access. Social support networks would become overwhelmed and access to critical health and nutrition services would be extremely limited, unable to prevent hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality from exceeding the three technical thresholds of Famine (IPC Phase 5).

To inform the June 2026 to January 2027 Somalia Food Security Outlook (FSO), FEWS NET conducted a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA), assessing how access to food and cash income will be affected by ongoing and anticipated shocks. HEA OA is one of six direct food consumption outcome indicators on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table and is used in FEWS NET’s convergence of evidence approach. It is the only outcome indicator that provides evidence of future outcomes. FEWS NET considers two main factors to assess the reliability of HEA OA results as direct evidence of food consumption: 

• Likely accuracy of the problem specifications, which is largely dependent on the availability of credible information to estimate or make inferences about key sources of food and income. 
• Relevance of the baseline to current livelihoods, which is often – but not always – tied to the age of the baseline. 

FEWS NET assesses that the information available for developing problem specifications of Bay Bakool Low Potential AgropastoralLivelihood Zone (SO16), Burhakaba District, Somalia was sufficient but with some deficiencies. The reference year for the baseline of Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zone (SO16) is July 2019 to June 2020, and FEWS NET assesses the current relevance of the baseline is moderate. Based on these factors, FEWS NET has moderate confidence that the results of the HEA OA accurately present the size of food consumption deficits experienced by the population group of analysis.

Problem specifications: The table below provides a broad overview of the quantity and price problem specifications (PS) behind the HEA OA. A PS translates a shock into food security consequences at the household level through a quantitative assumption on the quantity and price of key food and cash income sources during the projection period relative to levels documented in the reference year. While the OA assigns a point estimate to each key food and cash income source (e.g., maize, wheat, rice) , the annex summarizes these point estimates into broader categories (e.g., main staple grains) and approximate ranges for the purpose of a high-level summary.   

Results: Following the PS table, there are two sets of OA results presented. Annual results are presented in graphs with three bars. The first (left) bar shows the relative importance of different food and cash income sources in the reference year (a typical year). The second (middle) bar shows the sources of food and cash income available in the year of analysis, after incorporating the impact of shocks and household coping capacity. This is compared against two thresholds shown in the third bar: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. Seasonal results are presented in a graph with multiple bars showing month by month results for the consumption year. This is where FEWS NET derives results that inform the projections of acute food insecurity outcomes over the eight-month period of the FSO. The Survival Threshold represents the costs of covering minimum food needs (2,100 kilocalories per person per day) and other essential survival items (e.g., soap, salt, kerosene for cooking, water for consumption, etc.). The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represents the cost of the Survival Threshold plus the costs of maintaining livelihoods (e.g., commodities and services such as productive inputs, health, and education).

Population group: OA is typically conducted across three to four wealth groups which are the population group of analysis, i.e., Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Middle (M) and Better Off (BO) households.

Description of scenario(s): As an input to the June 2026-January 2027 Food Security Outlook analysis, FEWS NET conducted an OA based on the most likely scenario for the Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zone (SO16). The problem specifications and results for this scenario are summarized below.

Problem specifications: