High needs expected through September despite anticipated average <i>gu</i> rains

• Widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected from February to May 2026, with an increasing share of the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse through the end of the jilaal dry season in March. Pockets of households most impacted by displacement and consecutive poor rainfall seasons are expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Crop failures, skyrocketing food and water prices, and insecurity have left households facing widening food consumption deficits. Acute malnutrition will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a large scale-up of food assistance. Agricultural labor opportunities and rangeland conditions will slowly improve with the anticipated average gu rains starting in April but will be insufficient to impact area-level outcomes by May.
• From June to September, outcomes will be mixed. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist in central and northern pastoral areas due to unsustainably low herd sizes and low milk availability. Despite near-average gu harvests and improving livestock values, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected where households will have substantial debts or where livestock losses were greatest. Improvements to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) are expected in areas that had better livestock migration options or where agricultural labor opportunities are more plentiful.
• Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist in multiple internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements through September due to limited livelihood options, high food prices, and eroded coping capacities. Planned assistance distributions will only be sufficient to mitigate worse acute food insecurity outcomes in a few settlements in February and in Dhuusamarreeb through May.
• Humanitarian food assistance needs will remain extremely high throughout the projection period, peaking between February and April, when an estimated 6.0-6.99 million people will require assistance. The areas of highest concern include IDP settlements, Bay and Bakool agropastoral areas, and central, northern, and Juba Cattle pastoral livelihood zones.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 20, 2026. 

Somalia contains a mixture of pastoral, agropastoral, and riverine livelihood systems. The country’s two main rainy seasons — the April to June gu season and the October to December deyr season — dictate seasonal patterns of crop and livestock production. While locally produced crops are a key food source in cropping areas, imports account for 60 to 70 percent of domestic food consumption, and pastoralists typically purchase imported rice, wheat, and other staples. As of January 2025, the population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) totaled an estimated 3.3 million (20 percent of the total population).

Since 1991, conflict has forcibly displaced millions and rendered much of southern and central Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian actors. The impacts of Al-Shabaab’s insurgency, exacerbated by government-led counter-insurgency operations, inter- and intra-clan violence, and chronic political instability, have undermined the local food systems and driven a long-term decline in agricultural productivity. Violence, extortion, and movement restrictions frequently disrupt income-earning activities, livestock migration, and trade flows, and render the food system more vulnerable to concurrent weather shocks. 

Somalia is also subject to weather extremes, alternating between drought and floods. Severe droughts tend to occur after two or more consecutive poor or failed rains. Over the last 15 years, drought brought parts of Somalia to the brink of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2016/17 and 2022/23, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) claimed the lives of an estimated 260,000 people in 2010/11 and 220,000 people in 1992/93. Increasingly, severe drought is followed by record-breaking floods, as in 2019 and late 2023. The 2020-2023 drought drove widespread displacement and loss of livestock, and five consecutive poor harvests, leading to high household debt levels and a breakdown of social support systems. Subsequent favorable rains have facilitated some recovery; however, the once-in-a-century floods in late 2023 also inundated cropland, destroyed irrigation infrastructure, and displaced nearly a million people in southern riverine and agropastoral lowland areas. Recurrent weather shocks, protracted conflict, and chronically high poverty levels have increased household vulnerability to future hazards due to the erosion of livelihoods and coping capacity. Full recovery, especially sustainable levels of livestock ownership, would take several years of average rainfall. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas, the gu and deyr rains coincide with the cropping lean season prior to harvests in July and January. Maize, sorghum, and cowpeas are key staples, and cash crops (sesame, horticulture) produced by better-off households offer a source of labor income to poor households. During the February to September projection period, the gu harvest typically provides food and income from July to September. During the gu lean season, poor households rely on labor income to purchase food before the July gu harvest, which then provides food through September. Riverine areas are susceptible to seasonal flooding but may benefit from deyr and gu off-season harvests in March and September. Since the 2022 deyr season, repeated poor harvests have severely impacted Somalia’s agropastoral zones. Several livelihood zones have faced consecutive below-average or failed seasons, limiting agricultural labor opportunities, depleting household food stocks, and reducing income from crop sales and labor. These shocks have eroded coping capacity and livestock holdings, leaving households increasingly dependent on cropping activities, market purchases, and humanitarian assistance.

In pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak during and after the gu and deyr rains. During the February to September outlook period, seasonal improvements are pronounced from April to May, coinciding with livestock births; additionally, domestic and export demand for livestock for the Hajj will begin in May. Conversely, food and income will be lowest during the rest of the jilaal dry season from February to March, when depleted pasture and water resources drive declines in livestock saleability and milk production. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Somalia Food Security Outlook: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Somalia Food Security Outlook Update: December 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Somalia Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Agroclimatology: Extremely dry conditions persist during the current January-March 2026 jilaal dry season following a failed October-December 2025 deyr season, which in some areas marked the fourth consecutive below-average to failed season (see the December 2025 Somalia Food Security Outlook Update and East Africa Food Security Alert for further information). Vegetation conditions are far below-average in most of southern Somalia and much of the central regions (Figure 1). Additionally, the December-January xeys coastal rains in most northern areas were below average, despite near-average forecasts. 

Crop production: Local cereal supplies are extremely low, after poor and erratic 2025 deyr rainfall and low river levels led to near-total crop failure in southern agropastoral areas. Crop performance was poor in rainfed and irrigated zones, with widespread failure across maize, sorghum, cowpea, and vegetables. Recent crop assessment data collected by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and partners showed that nearly 80-90 percent of planted cereals in agropastoral areas in the Shabelles and Bay failed, eroding household food stocks and labor demand. Total cereal production was 83 percent below the long-term average, marking the lowest deyr harvest ever recorded (for additional information on 2025 deyr crop production, see Annex 5). 

At this time of year, riverine households would typically be engaged in deyr off-season crop production (recessional cropping). However, river water availability is generally too low for cropping, so there is little to no demand for associated agricultural labor. 

Staple food prices: Local cereal prices are extremely high, reflecting low supplies and atypically high demand. For example, red sorghum prices in Baidoa in February were 44 percent higher than last year and 59 percent above the five-year average. Prices increased by 7 percent between December 2025 and February, rather than seasonally easing with the deyr harvest. By contrast, imported staple food prices remain slightly above average but stable. Rice prices in the key reference market of Mogadishu are currently 11 percent below the same time last year but 16 percent above the five-year average. 

Water availability and prices: Most natural ponds and manmade water catchments and hand-dug shallow wells are depleted, forcing households to continue relying on trucked water at elevated prices. In January 2026, urban water prices for a 200-liter drum were 13-41 percent above the five-year average and 5-20 percent above January 2025 across several monitored markets. Rural areas faced sharper increases; the price of a 20-liter jerry can exceeded both last year and the five-year average. The steepest increases of 170-313 percent were observed in Bakool, Middle Juba, and Middle Shabelle. High temperatures and prices have increased poor households’ reliance on unsafe water from shallow wells and dried riverbeds, heightening risks of acute watery diarrhea and cholera. 

Livestock: Livestock productivity is extremely low and deteriorating amid extreme water scarcity and high and above-average temperatures (for additional information on how the 2025 deyr impacted livestock, see Annex 5). Rangeland degradation has sharply reduced forage and water availability, which has led to weakened livestock body conditions, low conception and birth rates, high abortion rates, and in extreme cases, the culling of offspring to save breeding females. As a result, milk yields and livestock productivity, particularly among cattle and sheep, are atypically low, while livestock deaths are rising. With worsening livestock conditions, prices fell across most markets. In January 2026, goat prices dropped 4-28 percent compared to January 2025 and 2-13 percent below the five‑year average. However, in some markets where supplies of livestock with average body conditions were limited, prices showed mixed trends, remaining above average but still lower than the same time last year. 

Displacement: Drought-related displacement rose sharply, from a monthly average of 3,808 people in July/August to 101,660 between October and December 2025, as livelihoods deteriorated. In January 2026, displacement increased further to 165,982 people. The highest numbers were recorded in Mudug, Sool, Sanaag, and Bari regions. Due to limited financial resources, most people migrated within their own regions. However, many IDPs migrated from Bay, Nugaal, and Sool regions to Mogadishu, Bossaso, and Burao, respectively.

Conflict: Conflict and insecurity remain a key driver of displacement and food insecurity countrywide. Between July and December 2025, Somalia recorded nearly 3,700 insecurity events and 4,130 fatalities, marking one of the most violent six-month periods in recent history. Insecurity was heavily concentrated in Lower Shabelle, Bari, and Lower Juba, which experienced sharp increases in armed clashes and targeted airstrikes. Galgaduud, Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, and Banaadir also faced elevated insecurity. The persistence of armed clashes and remote attacks underscores the continued volatility of the security environment, with significant implications for displacement and humanitarian access. Resource-related clan conflicts have reportedly increased due to the severity of the drought, especially in Hiraan, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, and Mudug. Additionally, conflict over landownership and political representation is increasing, most recently in Awdal region. Disputes have triggered recurrent clashes, disrupting livelihoods and displacing households. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Humanitarian food assistance levels have sharply fallen compared to recent years. Despite increased needs, in-kind and cash distributions reached approximately 734,000 beneficiaries in January 2026, 26 percent below the same time last year. In February, distributions are expected to increase by 10 percent, also representing 26 percent below the year before. Assistance is concentrated in southern regions, though delivery of in-kind assistance remains severely restricted in conflict-affected rural areas. Partners have scaled down operations to focus on 23 districts of highest concern. Coverage gaps highlight a significant anomaly in humanitarian reach relative to previous periods. 

As of February 2026, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread across Somalia. Cumulative impacts of multiple successive seasons of below-average rainfall, including the failed October-December 2025 deyr, are driving worsening food security conditions. Acute malnutrition is likely elevated across most of the country, reflecting poor food consumption and non-food-related causes, including poor access to water and sanitation, a chronically high disease burden, and limited access to essential health services. 

In northern and central pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread, with pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The most severe outcomes are expected in areas where the 2025 gu rains were also below average. Such rainfall deficits have depleted pasture, browse, and water resources and driven herd sizes below sustainable levels. Intensified competition for scarce grazing resources prompted atypically early livestock migration, placing additional strain on both herds and households. Livestock body conditions remain extremely poor, limiting the availability of saleable animals and milk. Elevated cereal prices and constrained herd productivity have resulted in declining livestock-to-cereal terms of trade (TOT), eroding household purchasing power and leaving many households forced to resort to selling productive livestock or begging. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) levels are expected to be Serious (10-14.9 percent) to Critical (15-29.9 percent). 

In northwestern pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing, driven by consecutive seasons of below-average rainfall and, in the case of Awdal, rising insecurity. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also now assessed to be ongoing in West Golis Pastoral Livelihood Zone, based on new evidence of poorer pasture and livestock body conditions as well as lower livestock holdings than previously understood. With sharp declines in pastoral incomes and limited alternative income-generating opportunities, many poor households are likely resorting to negative coping strategies such as purchasing food on credit or reducing portion sizes and meal frequency. Acute malnutrition is expected to be less severe than other similarly classified areas, Alert (5.0-9.9), in part reflecting relatively greater access to safe water.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zones. Pockets of households with exhausted coping capacities due to displacement or previous weather shocks are likely facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Widespread crop failures, no agricultural labor incomes, and little to no milk availability have left households unable to cope with skyrocketing food and water prices. These households are likely increasingly seeking in-kind and cash gifts or selling remaining assets to mitigate their widening food consumption gaps. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in riverine areas, where harvests were far-below average to failed. Households have access to more diverse income-earning sources, such as the collection of firewood, swamp-brush, and poles, and low-wage off-own-farm work. However, these sources cannot offset lost agricultural income, and many households are likely buying food on credit or reducing meal portions and frequency. Acute malnutrition levels are expected to be Critical (15-29.9 percent).

Northwestern agropastoral areas are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in localities with the most severe crop losses. The 2025 gu/karan cereal harvest was the lowest harvest recorded since 1995. Cereal prices remain elevated, driven by low local production, reduced cross-border inflows, and ongoing SLS depreciation. Facing sharply reduced agricultural incomes and increasingly unaffordable prices, poor households are likely resorting to reducing meal size and frequency or essential expenditures on health services and education. Acute malnutrition levels are expected to be in Alert (5.0-9.9 percent). 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in most southern pastoral areas due to the impacts of severe water and pasture shortages on livestock productivity amid skyrocketing food prices. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in Juba Pastoral – Cattle and Goats Livelihood Zone. Extreme pasture and water shortages have left herds weakened, and many cattle have reportedly died near congested water points due to starvation and insufficient water access. However, some southern pastoral areas are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes due to relatively better livestock migration options (to Ethiopia or riverine areas), larger livestock holdings, or greater access to Mogadishu markets. Acute malnutrition levels are expected to be Critical (15-29.9 percent) in most areas, with non-food-related causes being the key driver in those facing lower acute food insecurity.

IDPs remain among the most acutely food-insecure populations in Somalia, with many major IDP settlements currently classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are ongoing in Dhuusamarreeb and Beletweyne, as current humanitarian assistance levels are sufficient to mitigate worse acute food insecurity outcomes. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in settlements facing lower levels of insecurity, where displaced households are more integrated, or where employment opportunities are relatively more available (such as Mogadishu). Increased arrivals of people newly displaced by drought and conflict-related displacements have driven up competition for scarce resources and income-earning opportunities. Persistently high food prices, insufficient income‑earning opportunities, and eroded purchasing power have left many displaced households unable to afford sufficient food given little remaining coping capacity. Acute malnutrition levels are likely Serious (GAM 10-14.9 percent) to Critical (15-29.9 percent). 

• The ongoing January-March jilaal dry season is expected to be atypically hot and dry. Above‑average temperatures will likely accelerate seasonal declines in pasture and water availability.
• The April-June 2026 gu rains are expected to be average and timely. ENSO neutral conditions are most likely to persist until mid‑2026, with the likelihood of El Niño increasing through September 2026.
• The June-September karan rains in northwestern Somalia and the July-September xagaa rains in the southern coastal regions are expected to be average. However, uncertainty remains given the long‑range nature of the forecast.
• Main season gu harvests in July and gu off‑season harvests in September are expected to be near average.
• No meaningful deyr off-season harvests are expected between February and March as the Shabelle and Juba rivers will be nearly or completely dry until April.
• Agricultural labor opportunities are likely to be near average between late March and August. Wages are expected to be below average due to atypically high local labor supply.
• Pasture and water point regeneration and improvements in livestock productivity during the gu will be slow and incomplete, especially in areas that have experienced multiple, consecutive seasons of below-average rainfall.
• Livestock body conditions are expected to be poor, deteriorating into April. Severe emaciation of livestock is expected as water and pasture shortages intensify, further reducing livestock productivity and market values. Body conditions are expected to stabilize around April, improve to fair to good by early July, and remain stable through September. Improvement to above-average body conditions will likely occur in areas benefiting from xagaa or karan rains.
• Low camel and cattle calving rates are expected in April-June, driven by poor 2025 gu and 2025 deyr conceptions and increased abortions in the jilaal. Low to no small ruminant kidding and lambing is expected from April to May.
• Milk production will remain below average but improve modestly from May onwards as body conditions improve. However, medium to high livestock conceptions in May to July and limited conception in deyr 2025 will suppress the number of lactating animals.
• Maize and red sorghum prices are expected to be 30-75 percent above the five-year average in the south and 65-82 percent above the five-year average in the northwest. Below-average cereal production in Ethiopia is expected to negatively affect cross-border import volumes of sorghum and maize. Prices are expected to peak in May/June and decline with the July gu harvest.
• Imported food prices are expected to remain above average but mostly stable; however, intermittent price increases related to shipping disruptions and insecurity are likely.
• Prices for livestock with average body conditions are projected to remain favorable. High livestock mortality, low birth rates, and poor body conditions are likely to constrain the volume of saleable livestock. However, periodic oversupply is anticipated as households resort to distress sales to cope with elevated food, feed, and water costs. Based on FEWS NET’s analysis for the key reference markets of Galkayo and Burao, prices for local quality goats are projected to range from near average to up to 10 percent above the five-year average, with the lowest prices expected during the jilaal dry season (Figure 2).

• Goat-to-cereal TOT are projected to remain below average but improve slightly from July as cereal prices reach seasonal lows and goat body conditions and market values improve. Labor-to cereal TOT is expected to be significantly below average through June due to high cereal prices, then improve from July as cereal supply improves and prices decline following the gu harvest.
• In central and northern markets, the goat-to-rice TOT is likely to range from near to moderately below average, as persistently high rice prices outpace livestock price gains. In southern markets, remarkably high maize and sorghum prices are expected to drive a moderate to significant deterioration in both goat-to-cereal and cattle-to-cereal TOT, further constraining household purchasing power.
• Rising conflict and insecurity linked to political instability are expected to trigger new displacements and periodically impede market access, trade flows, livelihood activities, and humanitarian access. The likelihood of violent clashes will remain greatest around Mogadishu and other urban centers. Skirmishes between federally aligned forces and opposition forces are also likely to escalate through September 2026.
• Insurgent attacks against civilian and military targets are expected to intensify in Mogadishu and across south‑central Somalia as armed groups exploit political uncertainty.
• Resource-related clan conflicts are expected to escalate beyond levels observed in 2025, particularly in drought‑affected areas of Hiraan, Galgaduud, Middle Shabelle, and Mudug regions. Conflict incidents are likely to be highest through the end of the dry season in March, and intermittently disrupt trade flows, market access, and engagement in agricultural and pastoral activities. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• From February to June, planned humanitarian assistance is expected to reach a monthly average of 314,674 people. This reflects an approximate 66 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2025, and an 83 percent decrease from 2024. Assistance packages will be significantly reduced, with support duration dropping from twelve to three months and transfer values covering only about 70 percent of minimum food needs. The response will target high‑risk groups such as newly displaced persons, pregnant and breastfeeding women, elderly and disabled people, and malnourished children. Minimal to no humanitarian food assistance is expected from July to September. 

Northern and central pastoral areas

From February to May, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Addun Pastoral, Northern Inland Pastoral, and Coastal Deeh Pastoral Livelihood Zones, with pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In areas less impacted by previous poor seasons, insecurity, or where households have better migration options, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected. Scarce pasture and water resources deteriorate through the end of the jilaal season in March, driving increasing livestock mortality. The gu rains will stabilize livestock body conditions around May. However, low livestock market values, negligible milk availability, and high cereal prices will severely constrain food access. Pastoral households will likely resort to distress livestock sales to mitigate their widening consumption gaps. Acute malnutrition is expected to deteriorate to Critical (15-29.9 percent) by April.

Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist from June through September 2026. Although gu rains will bring some seasonal improvements, pasture regeneration will be slow and limited. Livestock body conditions will gradually improve, but milk availability will remain low and decline from August onwards as livestock conceptions increase. Income from livestock sales will also remain low as households have fewer saleable animals. Continued insecurity will compound the situation. Despite improving food prices, households will be unable to mitigate their consumption gaps without resorting to reducing essential expenditures on health and education, selling productive animals, or begging. Only limited improvements in acute malnutrition are expected. 

Southern agropastoral and riverine areas

Between February and May, area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral and Sorghum High Potential Livelihood Zones, with pockets of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Other southern agropastoral and riverine areas with relatively more diverse income sources or greater proximity to Mogadishu markets are expected to sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Outcomes are driven by the cumulative impacts of failed or well‑below-average crop production. Food consumption will continue to deteriorate during the jilaal, as households face skyrocketing cereal and water prices, and limited labor opportunities. With limited coping capacity after years of weather and conflict shocks, many households will face widening food consumption gaps. Increased agricultural labor opportunities around April will marginally improve household food and income access, but not enough to impact area-level food security outcomes. Acute malnutrition levels are expected to be Critical (15-29.9 percent).

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are projected to persist through September in most areas. Green harvests in June will strengthen food access, and the anticipated average July gu harvest will further replenish household stocks, provide labor opportunities, improve market supply, and reduce local cereal prices. Riverine and rainfed cropping areas will benefit from July/August xagaa showers, supporting late‑planted and off‑season crops. However, such improvements will be limited by households’ substantial debt obligations and above-average food prices. Improvements to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) are likely following the gu harvest in riverine areas and in Southern Agropastoral (Bakool, Gedo and Juba), where households have more significant livestock holdings. Acute malnutrition levels are expected to be Critical (15-29.9 percent) through June with limited improvements after the harvest.

Northwestern agropastoral areas

From February to May, northwestern agropastoral areas are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is now projected in Togdheer Agropastoral Livelihood Zone based on new evidence that the area benefited more from the karan rains than previously understood. However, households still face extremely limited food stocks following a historically poor gu/karan 2025 harvest, limited milk availability, and increasingly expensive food prices. Many households will likely resort to reducing meal portions or frequency. Acute malnutrition is expected to deteriorate from Alert (5-9.9 percent) to Serious (10-14.9 percent).

From June to September, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist as households recover from multiple poor seasons. Anticipated average karan rains will support pasture regeneration and improve livestock productivity. However, below normal herd sizes, limited milk availability, and above-average food prices will constrain food access. While social support during the Hajj and seasonally increased agricultural labor opportunities will offer some relief, households will likely continue to rely on negative coping strategies such as reducing expenditures on health and education or reducing meal portions and frequency. Only limited improvements in acute malnutrition are expected. 

Southern pastoral areas

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will persist from February to May due to severe water and pasture shortages, poor livestock body conditions, minimal milk availability, and high cereal and water prices. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Juba Pastoral – Cattle and Goats Livelihood Zone, where extreme water and pasture shortages and rising cattle deaths have sharply reduced incomes. Although average gu rains will gradually improve water and pasture conditions and stabilize livestock conditions, recovery will be slow given cumulative livestock losses, low conception rates, and high debt burdens. 

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected from June to September, where households had better livestock migration options, larger herd sizes, or greater market access. Food access will improve as the country’s gu green and main harvests ease cereal prices and improve market supplies. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in Juba Pastoral Livelihood Zone given extensive cattle losses, insecurity, and above-average food prices. Acute malnutrition will remain Critical (15–29.9 percent) and deteriorate until the gu green harvest, followed by limited seasonal improvements.

IDP settlements

Most IDP settlements will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency through September, with little anticipated improvement. From February to May, IDP settlements in riverine areas, agropastoral zones, and conflict‑affected urban centers are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with pockets in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). From June to September, improvements to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are only anticipated in Kismaayo and Doolow, where displaced populations are more linked with neighboring rural areas and will directly benefit from the gu harvest. Though food prices will ease as supplies improve, informal labor and trading activities tend to decline during the rainy season, which will limit improvements in food access. Prolonged conflict, ongoing displacement, heightened competition for limited employment opportunities, and above-average food prices will continue to erode household purchasing power. Many households are likely to reduce meal portions or frequency or resort to begging. Limited access to clean water, sanitation, and health services will exacerbate already Critical (15-29.9) levels of acute malnutrition, and a spike in water-borne diseases is expected during the gu rains.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

National 

Below-average gu rainfall in April and May (on time start, approximately 75 percent of average cumulative precipitation)

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Slightly below-average gu rainfall would not alter projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes but would likely cause a somewhat slower and more uneven recovery. Rainfall at this level would still support gu season cropping activities, gradually improve pasture and water resources, and help stabilize livestock body conditions and herd sizes. The share of the population in need between April and September would remain marginally higher than an average rainfall scenario. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas, even somewhat below-average main and off-season gu harvests would support area-level improvements to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through the immediate post-harvest period into September, with a marginally higher share of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. In pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would still be expected given poor short-term recovery prospects following consecutive below-average seasons. Increased populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse would be expected through September in areas with relatively lower pasture and water regeneration. Poor sanitation, including atypically limited access to safe drinking water, would continue to drive increased waterborne diseases and worsen acute malnutrition, especially among displaced populations.

While a scenario of significantly below-average or failed rainfall is currently assessed to have a very low likelihood of occurring, close monitoring of the weather forecast is nevertheless required as rainfall in the Horn of Africa is historically highly volatile. Should such a scenario materialize, it would prompt an assessment of the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), with particular concern for outcomes between June and September.

Somalia’s October to December 2025 deyr rainfall season was historically poor, and rains effectively failed. Rains began latest in southern and northern regions and stopped prematurely. Most of the country received below-average rainfall compared to the long-term mean. Southern Somalia, the country’s breadbasket, received less than 30 percent of average rainfall, and many areas received essentially no rainfall. Critical seasonal improvements in soil moisture, pasture conditions, and water availability failed to materialize, halting the ongoing recovery from the historic 2020-23 drought.

The delayed onset and erratic distribution of rainfall disrupted planting schedules, leaving many farmers unable to sow on time or forced to replant after failed germination. In areas where crops did emerge, the insufficient and uneven rainfall limited growth, leading to stunted plants and sharply reduced yields. Water stress during critical stages of crop development, particularly for sorghum and maize, resulted in widespread crop failure in southern and central regions, while irrigated areas along the Shabelle and Juba rivers faced challenges from both reduced river flow and prolonged dry spells. Farmers were left with no choice but to harvest and sell wilted crops as livestock fodder.

Crop cultivation during the 2025 deyr season varied sharply across regions and livelihood systems. According to the 2025 post-deyr crop assessment conducted by FSNAU and partners, agropastoral areas experienced widespread crop failure. In Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions, up to 90 percent of planted crops failed due to poor rainfall and insecurity (Figure 3). For instance, Bay and Lower Shabelle planted 70,000 and 50,500 hectares, but harvested 9,500 and 3,850 hectares, respectively. Available district-level crop production data does not differentiate between riverine and non-riverine harvests. However, riverine areas are understood to have performed slightly better, but still below average. Limited irrigation and flood recessional cultivation in some parts of Juba and Shabelle supported partial harvests. Hiraan’s riverine zones managed modest sorghum and maize yields, but crops in non-riverine zones failed. Overall, the riverine system provided the only meaningful harvests, albeit at historically low levels, while agropastoral zones across southern Somalia and the Cowpea Belt experienced near-total losses. 

Maize fared better than sorghum in terms of distribution and volume. However, both harvests exhibited significant declines compared to last year and historical averages, underscoring the severity of production shortfalls in deyr 2025. Sorghum output was concentrated mainly in Bay and Hiraan. While Bay’s production was only a fraction of past levels at around 7 percent, Hiraan performed relatively better, reaching 51 percent of the long-term average and 73 percent of last year’s output. Other regions such as Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, and Lower Juba contributed small amounts of sorghum, but these were far below historical averages, and Bakool recorded no sorghum at all. Maize production was relatively more successful, even though production was still below long-term averages. Lower Juba produced 95 percent of the long-term average, followed by Middle Juba, Gedo, and Middle Shabelle, each producing between 43 and 78 percent of the long-term mean. Harvests in Lower Shabelle, a major maize producing district, were just 8 percent of the long-term average, and Bakool again had zero production. 

The poor performance of the October to December 2025 deyr rains also had severe impacts on pasture and water availability and livestock conditions across Somalia. With rainfall well below normal, rangelands failed to regenerate adequately, leaving grazing areas depleted and water sources such as berkads dried, shallow wells, and rivers at critically low levels when they should have been at their most plentiful. This scarcity led to widespread deterioration in livestock body conditions, with sheep and cattle (Figures 4 and 5) particularly affected by emaciation due to prolonged feed and water shortages. As animals weakened, mortality rates rose, especially among herds in southern and central regions where deficits were most pronounced. Milk production dropped sharply, reducing both household consumption and sales. Consequently, the value of livestock and livestock products declined, undermining pastoral incomes and eroding purchasing power. 

Three to four consecutive poor seasons have driven extensive livestock losses in northern and central pastoral zones, while southern areas such as Gedo and Juba have nonetheless recorded severe herd depletion. Information gathered during the post-deyr assessment revealed that in northern and central areas, goat and sheep herds have fallen to 61–83 percent of baseline levels and camels to 33–87 percent. Hawd and Addun Pastoral Livelihood Zones have been hardest hit, losing up to 70 percent of camels and 39 percent of goats/sheep compared to baseline, eroding assets holdings, milk availability, and incomes. Juba Pastoral – Cattle and Goats Livelihood Zone recorded the country’s worst losses of 63 percent of cattle and 71 percent of goats/sheep. In Gedo, goat/sheep declined to 61–70 percent of baseline and camels to 49–66 percent, with households in the Sorghum High Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zone losing 67 percent of cattle and small ruminants. 

The failure of the 2025 deyr season triggered a rapid and cascading deterioration in food security conditions, sharply reducing crop production, weakening herds, and eroding household coping capacity. Recovery from such a severe and all-encompassing shock will be slow, especially in pastoral areas. Lost crop and labor incomes, above-average food and water prices, high debt burdens, and limited milk availability will continue to constrain food access, undermine livelihoods, and heighten households’ vulnerability to future shocks. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected across most agropastoral and pastoral areas of the country through at least May 2026, and through at least September in areas with the poorest short-term recovery prospects.

To inform the February to September 2026, Somalia Food Security Outlook (FSO), FEWS NET conducted a Household Economy Analysis (HEA) Outcome Analysis (OA), assessing how access to food and cash income will be affected by ongoing and anticipated shocks. HEA OA is one of six direct food consumption outcome indicators on the IPC Acute Food Insecurity reference table and is used in FEWS NET’s convergence of evidence approach. It is the only outcome indicator that provides evidence of future outcomes. FEWS NET considers two main factors to assess the reliability of HEA OA results as direct evidence of food consumption: 

• Likely accuracy of the problem specifications, which is largely dependent on the availability of credible information to estimate or make inferences about key sources of food and income.
• Relevance of the baseline to current livelihoods, which is often – but not always – tied to the age of the baseline.

FEWS NET assesses that the information available for developing problem specifications for the Northern Inland Pastoral (SO06) Livelihood Zone, Qardho district, Somalia, was moderate. The reference year for the baseline of Northern Inland Pastoral (SO06) Livelihood Zone is October 2018 to September 2019, and FEWS NET assesses the current relevance of the baseline is moderate. Based on these factors, FEWS NET has moderate confidence that the results of the HEA OA accurately present the size of food consumption deficits experienced by the population group of analysis. 

Problem specifications: The table below provides a broad overview of the quantity and price problem specifications (PS) behind the HEA OA. A PS translates a shock into food security consequences at the household level through a quantitative assumption on the quantity and price of key food and cash income sources during the projection period relative to levels documented in the reference year. While the OA assigns a point estimate to each key food and cash income source (e.g., maize, wheat, rice), the annex summarizes these point estimates into broader categories (e.g., main staple grains) and approximate ranges for the purpose of a high-level summary. 

Results: Following the PS table, there are two sets of OA results presented. Annual results are presented in graphs with three bars. The first (left) bar shows the relative importance of different food and cash income sources in the reference year (a typical year). The second (middle) bar shows the sources of food and cash income available in the year of analysis, after incorporating the impact of shocks and household coping capacity. This is compared against two thresholds shown in the third bar: the Survival Threshold and the Livelihoods Protection Threshold. Seasonal results are presented in a graph with multiple bars showing month by month results for the consumption year. This is where FEWS NET derives results that inform the projections of acute food insecurity outcomes over the eight-month period of the FSO. The Survival Threshold represents the costs of covering minimum food needs (2,100 kilocalories per person per day) and other essential survival items (e.g., soap, salt, kerosene for cooking, water for consumption, etc.). The Livelihoods Protection Threshold represents the cost of the Survival Threshold plus the costs of maintaining livelihoods (e.g., commodities and services such as productive inputs, health, and education).

Population group: OA is typically conducted across three to four wealth groups which are the population group of analysis, i.e., Very Poor (VP), Poor (P), Middle (M), and Better Off (BO) households.

Description of scenario(s): FEWS NET conducted countrywide OA covering 19 livelihood zones in Somalia. For illustrative purposes, FEWS NET selected the results of the Northern Inland Pastoral (SO06) Livelihood Zone, Qardo district to be presented in this annex. As an input to the FSO analysis, FEWS NET conducted the OA based on the most likely scenario, and the PS and results for this scenario are summarized below.

Problem specifications:

Results: