Widespread Emergency outcomes to emerge in January after failed deyr season

• Following the failed 2025 deyr rains and a stalled recovery from the historic 2020-2023 drought, FEWS NET now assesses that area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will emerge in January 2026 across parts of southern and northwestern agropastoral and much of northern and central pastoral areas. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in areas less affected by prior weather and conflict shocks or where households have marginally higher asset baselines. The deyr harvest has failed, and pasture and water resources are very low heading into the January-March jilaal dry season. Crop failure, livestock mortality, and negligible milk availability will severely restrict access to food and income. Rapidly increasing food and water prices and worsening resource-based clan conflicts will also exacerbate food access challenges. Increased internally displaced persons (IDPs) flows are expected as households migrate to IDP camps and urban centers.
• Between February and May, a higher share of the population is expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. Amid overstretched social support networks, some of the worst-affected poor households will likely face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), and acute malnutrition levels will rise. With little to no income from agricultural or pastoral activities, many poor households will likely resort to migrating to IDP camps, begging, or slaughtering remaining animals. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in many IDP settlements as drought-related displacement rises and competition for scarce resources intensifies. Other settlements will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), particularly those closer to urban employment opportunities or where IDPs are relatively integrated.
• Increased confidence in a transition from La Niña to ENSO-neutral conditions in early 2026 is strengthening forecasts of average April-June gu rainfall. However, an alternative scenario of moderately below-average rainfall (10-25 percent deficits) remains credible. Under this alternative scenario, area-level outcomes would remain the same, but the share of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and worse outcomes would increase. It is currently assessed that significantly below-average rainfall has a low likelihood of occurring; if such a scenario were to materialize, it would prompt an assessment of the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), with high concern for outcomes between June and September.

This report provides an update to the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook and the November 2025 Key Message Update. The analysis is based on information available as of December 23, 2025. 

December marks the last month of the deyr rains across most of the country, crucial for staple crop production and replenishing depleted water and pasture resources. The 2025 October-December deyr season was one of the driest on record. Southern Somalia and large swaths of the north received less than 30 percent of average rainfall, and many areas received effectively no rainfall. Extreme heat throughout the season exacerbated surface water and soil moisture losses, resulting in poor vegetation conditions across most of the country (Figure 1). Water trucking began atypically early as water catchment levels fell far below seasonal averages or dried up; water prices have reportedly increased nearly six-fold. The failed October-December deyr rains are severely disrupting cropping and pastoral activities across Somalia, and impeding households’ ongoing recovery from the historic 2020-23 drought. 

Conflict and insecurity are exacerbating the fragile food security landscape in the country. In December, Al-Shabaab continued to consolidate control of areas around Mogadishu despite the operations of government and regional armed forces. Additionally, the U.S. military's campaign of intensified airstrikes continued to target IS (Islamic State) in Puntland and al-Shabaab in Jubaland. Political disputes related to the 2026 general elections are also exacerbating tensions between the federal government and states, including Puntland and Jubaland. At the same time, localized resource-based clan conflicts are reportedly worsening. As pasture and water become increasingly scarce, pastoralists are migrating atypically far with their weakening herds, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Ongoing violence, extortion, and movement restrictions continue to restrict trade and market supplies, livestock movements, and households’ access to their livelihoods. 

In pastoral livelihood zones, rangeland conditions are worse than those observed during the historically poor 2016/17 and 2021/22 deyr seasons. Pasture and dry browse availability is poor to nearly depleted when it should be plentiful. Recent field reports from Addun Pastoral Livelihood Zone indicated that some livestock were having to consume purchased grain and sugar, or even plastic and paper refuse due to insufficient forage. Livestock body conditions have sharply declined and are generally poor, reducing milk production and forcing distress sales of weakened animals at low prices. Some households have reportedly culled offspring to protect breeding females, many of whom have stopped lactating. Increased livestock deaths and disease outbreaks have further eroded herd sizes and body conditions. Reduced livestock productivity is driving increased reliance on market purchases, but high staple food prices and declining livestock prices are driving atypically low household purchasing capacity. Goat to red sorghum terms of trade declined 7 percent between November and December and remain 12 percent below the 5-year average.

In agropastoral livelihood zones, most deyr staple crops failed to germinate or establish (or wilted shortly after), resulting in widespread crop failure and yields well below average. Agricultural labor opportunities have been minimal due to poor crop performance, reducing cash and in-kind earnings poor households depend on and weakening their purchasing power. The limited rainfall undermined water points and pasture regeneration, negatively impacting livestock conditions (Figure 2), reproduction, and productivity. Households able to harvest wilted crops are using them to feed their livestock. Others are selling swamp brush as fodder for livestock in urban centers. Milk availability has declined sharply, while livestock mortality has increased, negatively impacting household incomes, food sources, and asset bases. Staple food prices have also sharply increased and are contributing to atypically low household purchasing capacity. For example, in Baidoa, red sorghum prices rose nine percent between November and December, and were 71 percent higher than the same time last year.

Riverine farming has been severely disrupted by irrigation water scarcity, especially in downstream areas. Deyr harvest prospects are low following poor crop establishment. Most cash crops show moisture stress and are wilting, and sesame planting was suspended in December due to a lack of rainfall. Farmers are selling wilted maize and sorghum crops in local markets, while others are renting farms to pastoralists for use as pasture, and their wilted crops serve as fodder. Agricultural labor opportunities remain atypically low and limited to irrigation and fodder cutting. Poor households increasingly collect bush products like firewood, swamp brush, and wild fruits for consumption or sale, but quantities are dwindling, and returns are minimal. Though local milk supplies have increased due to atypical in-migration of livestock from pastoral zones, supplies are limited, and prices remain prohibitively high for poor consumers.

In IDP settlements, increased arrivals of newly drought- and conflict-displaced households are heightening competition over extremely limited resources and employment opportunities. During the month of November alone, 146,000 people were displaced, 104,000 of which were drought-related displacements. Since then, the rate of displacements has likely accelerated as it became clearer that the season was unsalvageable. Simultaneously, as increasing numbers of households move towards IDP camps, towns, and urban centers, agricultural and other temporary labor opportunities are atypically low. Local food prices remain persistently high, worsening limited purchasing capacity. A significant decline in humanitarian assistance compared to recent years has left many displaced households without adequate safety nets and little access to health services.

Humanitarian food assistance

Despite persistent funding shortages, humanitarian food assistance reached 578,070 people in November (54 percent higher than initially planned), reflecting significant efforts to scale up assistance. However, this improvement masks notable disparities compared to October 2025: assistance to IDPs declined by 24 percent, while support to non-IDP populations fell by 46 percent. These reductions highlight growing operational and resource constraints amid increasing food assistance needs.

FEWS NET has re-assessed the key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario for the Somalia Food Security Outlook from October 2025 to May 2026 based on new evidence. Revised assumptions include:

• Following the poor performance or near-total failure of the October-December 2025 deyr rains, soil moisture levels across most of Somalia are expected to remain below-average through May due to forecasted above-average temperatures.
• The deyr harvest is expected to fail in most cropping and agropastoral areas. Non-irrigated harvests are expected to be around 10 percent of average.
• In riverine areas, households are not expected to engage in deyr off-season production due to extremely poor water availability, and no deyr off-season harvest is expected in March 2026.
• The April-June gu rains across most of Somalia are expected to be average and to start on time, due to the anticipated transition from La Niña conditions to ENSO-neutral conditions between January and March, prior to the start of the gu rains. The expected timing of the transition and the level of confidence about when it will occur (>75 percent likelihood) is most comparable to what was observed in early 2023, when gu rainfall was largely favorable after the five-season drought. However, there remains some uncertainty in international forecast models linked to the ENSO transition, as models still point to equal chances of below-average, normal, or above-average rainfall. Analysis of the full set of analog years also suggests there is a credible risk of moderately below-average rainfall performance in which deficits range from 10-25 percent (Annex 1).
• Minimal agricultural labor opportunities will be available from late December through March/April due to crop failure in southern and central agropastoral zones and low riverine production. This will constrain seasonal labor demand, and increased labor supply will further suppress wages.
• Agricultural labor demand and wages will gradually increase from late March/early April as gu cropping activities commence. However, wages and labor opportunities will remain below average due to reduced hiring capacity following the poor deyr season.
• Rangeland resources (water, pasture, and browse) will remain extremely limited through March 2026. Pasture and water points will slowly begin to regenerate with the arrival of the gu rains but will remain below average through May 2026.
• Livestock body conditions are expected to remain poor and deteriorate further through March due to extremely poor pasture, water, and feed availability, compounded by above-average temperatures that increase their water needs. Constant trekking and migration in search of water and pasture will lead to severe exhaustion, heightened mortality risk, and suspension of lactation, resulting in minimal to no milk production for households. From April, body conditions will slowly improve as pasture resources begin to regenerate.
• Livestock birth rates will be extremely low during the gu season in most northern and central regions between April and May 2026, driven by both low conception and elevated abortion rates.
• Heightened livestock mortality, particularly among small ruminants and cattle, is expected through March. As the dry season progresses, households are increasingly likely to cull or abandon weakened animals to protect the rest of their remaining herds.
• Livestock prices in drought-affected areas across the country are projected to decline between January and May 2026 and remain below average due to poor animal conditions and increased supply of low-quality livestock sold locally. Sustained domestic demand offers limited price support, while the scarcity of export-quality animals reduces export volumes and revenue, further weakening overall market prices.
• No seasonal decline in local cereal prices is expected in the deyr post-harvest period in January and February. Prices, particularly for maize and red sorghum, are expected to remain significantly above average across most markets and continue increasing through May due to poor harvests and heightened reliance on purchased foods.
• Drought-related displacements are expected to sharply increase from January 2026 as the jilaal dry season begins, and households move to urban centers and IDP camps in search of assistance and temporary employment. Increased IDP populations are expected to further strain limited local resources and increase competition for employment opportunities.
• Returnee flows are expected to increase from late March onward as agropastoral, riverine, and pastoral households return to their places of origin for gu cultivation and wet-season grazing, respectively.  

In northern and central pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are anticipated to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in Addun, Northern Inland, and parts of Coastal Deeh Pastoral Livelihood Zones by January. A small but growing proportion of households is expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes and rising levels of acute malnutrition as coping capacities exhaust and social support networks become overburdened. Pasture and water resources are scarce following below-average 2025 gu rains, an atypically hot and dry xagaa season, and the subsequent failure of the October-December deyr rains; further deterioration is likely through March as high temperatures accelerate evaporation during the jilaal dry season. This is expected to worsen livestock body conditions as herd sizes continue to decline amid a lack of births, increased mortality, abandonment of weakened animals, and distress sales. Such herd dynamics will likely erode limited household assets and income sources linked to livestock and labor , undermining food availability and capacity to cope with future shocks. . Milk availability will also remain negligible, while reliance on costly market purchases will deepen as households face persistently high and increasing staple food and water prices. Households will likely adopt increasingly unsustainable coping strategies, including selling remaining female livestock or even begging. Despite these measures, households will face widening food consumption gaps and heightened malnutrition, with an increasing share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse through March. From April to May, the forecast average gu rains will gradually improve rangeland resources and livestock body conditions, but herd sizes and pastoral incomes will remain substantially below average due to the impacts of consecutive below-average seasons, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist. East Golis and Hawd Pastoral Livelihood Zones are expected to sustain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes through May, given relatively more diversified income sources and average December-January xeys rains in East Golis and larger herd sizes in Hawd Pastoral. 

In southern and central agropastoral areas, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected by January in the Low Potential Agropastoral Livelihood Zone, and by February in Bay and Bakool High Potential Sorghum Livelihood Zone, where households have marginally higher asset bases and coping capacities. A small but increasing proportion of poor households will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) due to crop failure, loss of income from harvest and post-harvest labor, near record-high local cereal prices, and increased dependence on market food purchases. Deteriorating water and pasture resources will drive livestock body conditions to decline, halting milk production, increasing mortality and distress sales of productive animals, and eroding household assets and access to food and income. Agricultural labor opportunities will be limited until gu planting begins in April, further constraining income access. Households will still face widening food consumption gaps despite resorting to negative coping strategies, including selling female livestock or increasingly seeking in-kind and cash gifts. In riverine areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May 2026, with an increasing share of the population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) until the start of the April gu rains. The anticipated failed deyr off-season cropping will force households to intensify firewood, swamp brush, and pole collection, as well as low-paid off-own-farm work, which cannot offset lost earnings. Households will increasingly resort to coping strategies such as consuming atypically high amounts of wild foods, skipping meals, or migrating to urban areas for work. 

In most northwestern agropastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May 2026. An increasing share of the population is expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through the end of the October-March dry season. However, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through May in Togdheer Agropastoral Livelihood Zone due to the cumulative effects of four consecutive below-average seasons. Household access to food and income will remain constrained due to depleted cereal stocks, declining milk consumption and sales, and persistently high staple food prices. Labor opportunities and associated income are anticipated to remain below average, while livestock sales income will be limited by below-average herd sizes and poor and deteriorating livestock body conditions and prices. As a result, household purchasing power is expected to weaken further, exacerbating food access challenges. However, the onset of the gu season in April, with average rainfall projected, will support typical cropping labor activities and ease water and pasture scarcity, offering gradual and limited relief through May. 

In IDP settlements, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to expand from Baidoa and Xudur to Dollo, Jowhar, Gaalkacyo, Dhuusamarreeb, and Burco by the start of the jilaal dry season in January and persist through May 2026. A small but increasing proportion of poor households will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and increasing levels of acute malnutrition. Rising inflows of drought-displaced households will overstretch fragile social support systems, and intensify competition for scarce resources. Increasing resource-based clan conflict and political instability will compound the effects of ongoing weather shocks. Declining bush product sales, a lack of agricultural labor opportunities, high water prices, and near-record high food prices will severely restrict household purchasing capacity. From April, labor opportunities will increase access to income, but low wages will maintain below-average household purchasing capacity. Other IDP camps are expected to maintain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through May 2026, particularly those with greater proximity to employment opportunities in urban areas, better security conditions, or where displaced populations have been settled for longer and are well integrated. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Empirical evidence suggests a moderate likelihood of below-average gu rainfall when there is a transition from La Niña to ENSO-neutral conditions. FEWS NET previously assessed the impacts of below-average gu rainfall in the October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook, and that scenario relied on the assumption of below-average, not failed, deyr rains. Households across the country will enter the 2026 gu season with lower access to food and income than previously expected, necessitating updated alternative scenarios. 

Below-average gu rainfall in April and May (on time start, approximately 75 percent of average cumulative precipitation)

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: 

This credible alternative scenario has been developed based on analog years with a transition from La Niña to ENSO-neutral, when rainfall was moderately below average with deficits ranging between 10 and 25 percent. 75 percent of average cumulative April to May rainfall, representing the lower bound of an analog year, would not be expected to change projected area-level acute food insecurity outcomes. This amount of rainfall would still be sufficient to begin gu cropping activities, gradually improve pasture and water availability, and stabilize livestock body conditions and herd sizes. Recovery would be marginally slower and more uneven than with average rainfall. Poor sanitation conditions, including atypically low access to safe water, will heighten the incidence of waterborne diseases and exacerbate acute malnutrition levels. The percentage of the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes between April and May would slightly increase relative to an average rainfall scenario. Area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) would still be expected in areas of highest concern – associated with high levels of acute malnutrition and elevated hunger-related mortality – but the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) within the February to May 2026 projection period would be low. 

Most pastoral livelihood zones would remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through May 2026, with localized improvements where pasture regenerates early. Addun, Coastal Deeh, and Northern Inland Pastoral Livelihood Zones would likely remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) due to prolonged asset erosion over consecutive, below-average seasons and poor short-term recovery prospects. Milk production would remain significantly below typical levels, limiting a key source of food and income. Income from livestock sales and labor will improve only marginally, as body conditions recover slowly and herd sizes take multiple seasons to recover. Persistently high staple food prices and weak purchasing power will continue to constrain household access to food. 

Agropastoral and riverine areas would remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) with Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral, High Potential Sorghum, and Togdheer Agropastoral Livelihood Zones remaining in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse would slightly increase. Crop establishment would likely be delayed and uneven. Reduced demand for planting and weeding would limit agricultural labor opportunities and depress wages. Pasture and water point regeneration would be below-average, slowing improvements in body conditions and limiting milk production and income. Persistently high local cereal prices, coupled with improved but still below-average livestock prices, will further weaken household purchasing power, constraining access to food and leaving many households unable to meet minimum consumption needs. In riverine areas, reduced river flow will limit irrigation and delay cropping activities, constraining improvements in agricultural labor incomes. Access to wild foods will improve but remain below-average, further constraining food consumption.

IDP populations would be less directly affected as their livelihoods depend less heavily on agricultural or pastoral activities than host populations. Settlements would remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through May 2026, and the proportion of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes would slightly increase. Slight improvements in seasonal labor demand in host communities will marginally improve access to income.

While a scenario of significantly below-average or failed rainfall is currently assessed to have a low likelihood of occurring, close monitoring of the weather forecast is nevertheless required as rainfall in the Horn of Africa is historically highly volatile. Should such a scenario materialize, it would prompt an assessment of the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), with particular concern for outcomes between June and September.

Many of the key sources of evidence utilized for FEWS NET’s October 2025 to May 2026 Food Security Outlook remain the same; however, new and additional sources of evidence are listed below.