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Conflict, weather, and economic shocks likely to drive alarming increase in humanitarian needs

  • Food Security Outlook
  • East Africa
  • March 2022
Conflict, weather, and economic shocks likely to drive alarming increase in humanitarian needs

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  • Key Messages
  • Key Messages
    • Large-scale humanitarian food assistance, coupled with unhindered humanitarian access, is urgently needed to avert severe to extreme food insecurity outcomes, including Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The impacts of protracted conflict in northern Ethiopia and Yemen; conflict and floods in South Sudan; political and economic instability in Sudan; and an unprecedented four-season drought in Somalia, northern and eastern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia have eroded household capacity to access food and income, resulting in widening food consumption gaps. Many conflict- and drought-affected areas already have acute malnutrition levels within the Critical range, which is associated with increased levels of excess mortality. Humanitarian food assistance plans for 2022 are drastically underfunded, and the costs of procuring and delivering assistance have escalated due to global food and fuel price shocks.

    • Northern Ethiopia is the area of highest concern, and within this area, Tigray is of the most extreme concern. At a minimum, Tigray is in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with a sub-set of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5); more extreme outcomes are possible, but evidence is insufficient to confirm or deny. Most households have very limited access to food or humanitarian assistance. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is also likely to persist in adjacent, conflict-affected areas of Afar and Amhara regions, with particular concern for Wag Himra woreda in Amhara. Acute food insecurity is likely to worsen even further during the June to September 2022 lean season.

    • Other areas of very high concern include drought-affected areas in southern and southeastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern and eastern Kenya. Households face water shortages, multiple poor harvests, and the death of over three million livestock, leading to wasting among children and displacement. In Somalia, the drought has displaced about 645,000 people since October. Based on the rainfall forecast from March to June, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist. However, more extreme outcomes would be possible in Ethiopia and Somalia if delayed or failed rainfall leads to severe crop and livestock losses and food assistance does not reach the populations most in need.

    • Macroeconomic challenges, exacerbated by domestic cereal shortages and by global food and fuel supply shocks, have led to exceptionally high food prices across most of the region. Many rural and urban households face increasing difficulty purchasing sufficient food, especially in parts of Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, where households are exposed to concurrent conflict and/or weather shocks. In Sudan, for example, cereal prices in February reached 390-425 percent above the five-year average. 

    • According to international and regional forecasts, cumulative rainfall during the February – May main rainy season in Burundi is most likely to be average, with localized areas likely to experience below-average rainfall. Cumulatively average rainfall nationally is expected to result in near-average national 2022 B Season crop production; however, localized below-average rainfall will likely negatively impact the 2022 B Season bean production, which is sensitive to rainfall stress.
    • Key staple foods prices are above-average in January 2022, with the price of maize grain, cassava flour, and sweet potato 16-27 percent above the five-year average and likely to follow seasonal trends but remain above the five-year average. Compared to last year, bean prices in January 2022 are 5 percent lower than prices in January 2021, with comparable prices between 2022 and 2021 for rice and sweet potatoes. However, prices in January 2022 are 5 percent and 25 percent higher for cassava and maize compared to 2021, respectively. Residual stocks from the above-average 2021 B Season harvest and the ongoing 2022 A Season harvest are driving seasonal declines in bean prices, while the sanitary ban on maize imports, since March 2021, is driving below-average availability at markets and price increases. 
    • At the critical flowering stage, below-average rainfall in lowland areas in November 2021 resulted in below-average bean, maize, and sorghum harvests in localized areas. Poor 2022 A Season production and limited access to alternative income sources due to border closures are driving Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in the Eastern and Northern lowland livelihood zones through May. The worst-affected households who lost more than 50 percent of their 2022 A harvest due to the dryness are likely to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) through May 2022. Due to expected localized below-average rainfall, resulting in below-average 2022 Season B harvests and inaccessibility to cross-border income due to border closures, the Eastern and Northern Lowlands livelihood zones will likely face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through September 2022. 

    For more information, see the Burundi Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • Ethiopia remains one of FEWS NET's countries of highest concern. In 2022, food assistance needs are expected to peak between June and September at record levels[1] with widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes across much of the country. Northern Ethiopia, and in particular Tigray, remains of highest concern, though outcomes are quickly deteriorating in drought-stricken southern and eastern areas, where the risk of extreme outcomes is increasing. To save lives and livelihoods, large-scale humanitarian food assistance, along with unhindered humanitarian access in northern Ethiopia, is needed urgently. Continued scale-up of assistance will be required throughout 2022.
    • As of February 2022, most of Tigray remains cut off from commercial trade and humanitarian supplies, and consequently, minimal assistance has been delivered. Many poor households across the region have likely already exhausted production from the 2021 meher harvest, and with constraints on market supplies and few opportunities to earn income, have extremely limited access to food. Minimal labor is expected with the upcoming 2022 kiremt season associated with agricultural activities due to limited agricultural inputs. At a minimum, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to be widespread with worst-affected households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). More severe outcomes, indicative of an extreme lack of food, 'Extremely Critical' levels of acute malnutrition, and high levels of hunger-related mortality remain possible, but information is insufficient to confirm or deny.
    • In Afar and Amhara, the impacts of the conflict that occurred in late 2021 continue to negatively affect poor households’ access to food and income. Many households have returned to their place of origin, though continued displacement and disruption of humanitarian activities persists in some areas, notably in Afar. Recent information on Wag Himra warn of deteriorating food security conditions, including visible severe acute malnutrition. In areas where conflict persists, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected, and some households are likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). 
    • Southern and southeastern pastoral areas are set to experience an historic fourth consecutive poor rainfall season with the forecast below-average March to May 2022 gu/genna season. Household purchasing power is already more than 40 percent lower than average and milk production is minimal. According to regional governments, over 1.5 million livestock have died due to drought as of February. Levels of acute malnutrition are at 'Critical' levels in much of the region, and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing. Although not considered the most likely scenario, if the 2022 gu/genna season fails and food assistance does not reach populations in need, food security could deteriorate to extreme levels, reflected in 'Extremely Critical' levels of malnutrition and high mortality.     
    • Poor economic conditions are expected in 2022, driven by low foreign reserves and low export earnings, which will cause continued depreciation in the Ethiopian Birr (ETB) and high inflation. This, coupled with below-average production in 2021 and high transportation costs, will continue to put pressure on markets, driving high food prices. Food prices across many markets are 150 percent or more above average. It possible for food prices to increase even higher than anticipated due to the Ukraine conflict, this analysis is still underway and be incorporated into future reporting.

    For more information, see the Ethiopia Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • The effects of a third consecutive below-average rainy season are resulting in deteriorating food security outcomes driven by the impacts of poor crop and livestock production, resource-based conflict, livestock disease and mortality, and the COVID-19 pandemic. In February 2022, the KFSSG's annual Short Rains Assessment reported that there are around 3.1 million food-insecure people in pastoral and marginal agricultural areas, a 48 percent increase since August 2021. Following the scale-up of the Emergency Hunger Safety Net Programme in Turkana, Marsabit, Wajir, and Mandera, at least one in four households are receiving 5,400 KES every two months, along with humanitarian assistance, which is driving Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. Other pastoral areas remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), with the decline in rangeland resources and the poor short rains harvest limiting household access to income and food. Area-level Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also emerging in parts of Samburu, Baringo, Meru North, and Kitui due to the poor short rains harvest and declining rangeland resources. 
    • Crop production was significantly affected by late-onset, poor temporal distribution, and cumulatively below-average rainfall during the October to December short rains, resulting in a significantly below-average harvest. According to the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG), the maize harvest in the marginal agricultural areas is 45-50 percent of the five-year national maize production average. There was widespread below-average crop production in the marginal agricultural areas, with crop failure in Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, and Tharaka Nithi, where maize production was 1–7 percent of the five-year average. In the marginal agricultural areas, most poor households have one to two months of food stocks, compared to a typical two to four months before household food stocks are depleted. 
    • In the pastoral areas, declining forage and water resources have kept livestock in dry season grazing areas and continuing to migrate in search of pasture and water, resulting in conflict among communities over rangeland resources. Due to starvation, disease, and long trekking distances, declining livestock health has resulted in widespread livestock deaths in pastoral counties. In Marsabit, up to 9 percent of livestock herds are estimated to have died due to the drought. The loss of livestock, below-average milk production, and declining goat-to-maize terms-of-trade across the northern and eastern pastoral areas are resulting in households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity outcomes. With around 11 percent of the 2021 Kenya Drought Appeal funded, further assistance is likely needed to save pastoral livelihoods during the forecast below-average 2022 March-May long rains.   

    For more information, see the Kenya Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • The severity of food insecurity has rapidly worsened in Somalia since the start of the dry season in January. Intensifying drought has caused acute water shortages, the loss of livestock essential to Somalia’s pastoral and agropastoral livelihood systems, and escalating staple food prices, exacerbated by ongoing conflict and global supply shocks. The deyr harvest in January was the third lowest on the 25-year record, and field information suggests households have lost up to 30 percent of their livestock holdings due to starvation or disease since mid-2021. Water and staple food prices rose 140-160 percent above the five-year average in some locations in February, rivaling the prices recorded during the 2010/2011 and 2016/2017 droughts. As a result, many households face widening food consumption gaps and the erosion of their coping capacity, leading to a surge in displacement. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is likely already occurring in central Somalia, and acute malnutrition is already at Critical levels in many areas of southern and central Somalia.
    • The severity of acute food insecurity is expected to worsen and remain elevated through September. Prevailing La Niña conditions, which typically bring below-average rainfall to the eastern Horn of Africa, are most likely to result in a historic, fourth consecutive below-average rainfall season in April-June 2022, according to FEWS NET’s partners at the NOAA, Climate Hazards Center, and USGS. Many households have a limited capacity to cope with another poor harvest and livestock reproduction cycle. FEWS NET and FSNAU anticipate 4-5 million people in Somalia (25-30 percent of the population) will need humanitarian food assistance to prevent Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes this year, inclusive of up to 1.0-1.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The areas of highest concern include Hawd Pastoral, Bay Bakool Low Potential Agropastoral, Addun Pastoral, Southern Agropastoral, and Togdheer Agropastoral livelihood zones, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected.
    • Although humanitarian food assistance reached 10-15 percent of the Somali population monthly throughout 2021, the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan is only 3.8 percent funded and the Somalia Food Security Cluster anticipates pipeline breaks to food assistance will occur by May or earlier. Field reports already indicate that current levels of food and water assistance are quickly being outpaced by the rapid increase in the size of the food insecure population, widening of household food consumption gaps, loss of livelihood assets, and worsening acute malnutrition levels. Food, water, and nutrition assistance must be scaled up and sustained throughout 2022 to save lives and rebuild livelihoods.
    • FEWS NET and FSNAU assess that Somalia faces a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in 2022. Based on median rainfall anomalies in years with similar La Niña conditions, the 2022 gu rains are currently expected to be moderately below average. However, in an alternative scenario in which the gu rains fail, purchasing power declines to record lows, and food assistance does not reach areas of high concern, Famine (IPC Phase 5) could occur in mid-2022. Past trends demonstrate the potential for multi-season droughts to lead to famine in Somalia, such as in 2011-2012 when an estimated 260,000 people died of hunger-related causes. Timely humanitarian action prevented more extreme outcomes during the last multi-season drought in 2017. Sustained humanitarian assistance, alongside improved humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas, is vital to prevent the loss of lives and livelihoods and to avert the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5)

    For more information, see the Somalia Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • Displacement due to inter-communal clashes, the below-average harvest of the main agricultural season, significantly above-average cereal and non-cereal food prices, and continued macroeconomic difficulties are contributing to higher-than-normal humanitarian food assistance needs in Sudan during the post-harvest period. Between February and May 2022, most of Sudan will face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food insecurity outcomes due to low purchasing power, while the conflict-affected areas in Darfur and Kordofan, parts of Jebel Marra, South Kordofan, and areas of marginal agricultural production in the Red Sea, Kassala, North Kordofan, and North Darfur states will likely be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to the impact of conflict, poor purchasing power, above-average staple food prices, and below-average rangeland resources. 
    • According to the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, the 2021/22 main agricultural season is expected to be significantly below average. Total cereal production is estimated at around 7.23 million metric tons, including a forecast of 725,000 metric tons of wheat to be harvested in March, approximately 19 percent below last year's harvest and like production in 2019/2020. The harvest is estimated to cover around 76 percent of the national total cereal requirement. As a result, cereal import needs for 2022 are likely to be at least 2.2 million tons.
    • Since the overthrow of the civilian government in October 2021, the macroeconomic situation in Sudan is continuing to worsen due to the suspension of international economic support. This is resulting in increased shortages of hard currency reserves and a rapid deterioration in economic conditions across Sudan. By February 28, 2022, the parallel market exchange rate is trading at 500-532 SDG/USD compared to 448-452 SDG/USD in October 2021. In comparison, the official exchange rate in February 2022 is set at around 443 SDG/USD, a slight increase from 439 SDG/USD in October 2021. The government is likely to continue with a managed floatation of the SDG, but the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates is expected to further widen with the increased need to import food and non-food essential items.
    • Staple food prices continued atypically increasing across most main markets in Sudan during the post-harvest period of February 2022. This is being driven by the below-average harvest of the 2021/22 main agricultural season, extremely high production and transportation costs, limited carryover stock from last year, above-average demand for local consumption-driven by low production at the household level in addition to shortages and soaring prices of imported wheat and wheat flour. Cereal prices in February 2022 remained on average 70-80 percent higher than prices in February 2021 and 390-425 percent higher than the five-year average.

    For more information, see the Sudan Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • In Karamoja, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to remain widespread during the lean season through at least July, driven by below-average 2021 crop production, insecurity related to livestock raids/thefts, below-normal household income, and declining terms of trade. Above-average rainfall from April to September is expected to support a timely start to the harvest in July. This will boost food availability, driving seasonal declines in staple food prices. Given this and increased availability of food for own consumption, outcomes are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in August and September.
    • In bimodal areas, off-season rainfall in the central and western regions is supporting early field preparation activities for the first season. Given the above-average March-May rainfall forecast, near-average to above-average crop and livestock production is expected to support normal seasonal access to food and income, with Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes expected through September. However, in the greater northern Uganda, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are now expected to persist through June given the impacts of two consecutive below-average crop production seasons.  
    • In refugee settlements, area-level Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected in the presence of food assistance covering 40-70 percent of beneficiaries’ kilocalorie needs. A slightly greater number of households than usual is unable to meet their needs without engaging in negative coping strategies, especially among refugees in southwestern settlements that experienced ration cuts in November 2021. Some households, though less than 20 percent of the refugee population, are facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes. In May/June, food availability will increase with the harvest and prices will likely decline, improving food security outcomes for many households, though area-level Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected to persist through September.

    For more information, see the Uganda Food Security Outlook from February to September 2022.

    • Civilians continue to suffer most from seven years of conflict in Yemen. Living conditions continue to worsen dramatically, as living costs increase in a context of significantly limited livelihood options and deteriorating provision of public services. Humanitarian assistances delivery has also become more challenging in recent months due to funding shortages, high fuel needs amidst shortages, and rising costs of food and fuel, with areas controlled by the Sana’a-based authorities (SBA) most affected. Given reduced assistance rations for 8 million beneficiaries (in Al Maharah, Aden, Hadramout, Taizz, Al Hudaydah, Sa’ada, Al Mahwit, Dhamar, and Raymah) since December—from around 80 percent to around 50-60 percent of energy requirements—food security is likely worsening for many households. Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are likely to continue at the governorate level, with additional worst-affected households likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
    • Increased tensions between the parties to conflict have contributed to more severe fuel shortages in SBA-controlled areas since late 2021. Long queues at fuel stations and surging parallel market prices have continued in February, especially in Sana’a city. As of February, fuel remained only sporadically available in official stations in SBA-controlled areas, at prices around 9,900 YER/20L, 72 percent higher than last year. Usually, people pay prices more than four times higher (around 40,000 YER/20L, equivalent to 67 USD) for parallel market fuel. While fuel remains generally available at official stations in areas controlled by the internationally-recognized government (IRG), the Yemen Petroleum Company in Aden raised official gasoline prices for the second time in one month, for a total 7.6 percent increase to reach 20,400 YER/20L in late February. This was mainly due to rising global price increases given the Russia-Ukraine conflict; Yemen experienced rapid fuel and food price increases—especially in IRG-controlled areas—in the days following the invasion due to its high dependence on imports and the absence of government price controls and strategic reserves.
    • In SBA-controlled areas, prices of public transportation have doubled due to fuel shortages. In response, authorities established free transportation buses in Sana’a city. Prices of other commodities including bread have increased by more than 10 percent, according to key informant estimates. On average in February, the cost of the Minimum Food Basket (MFB) across SBA areas was 4 percent higher than January and 29 percent higher than last year according to data from FAO. Meanwhile, in IRG areas, prices of commercial services (transportation, private hospital services) have continued to increase due to rising fuel prices. On average in February, the cost of the MFB across IRG areas was 3 percent higher than January and 82 percent higher than last year. More recently, according to media and key informants, wholesale prices of all basic commodities increased by more than 20 percent in IRG areas, with wheat flour and vegetable oil registering the greatest increases, due to the Russian-Ukraine conflict and depreciation of the currency. With no adjustment in government salaries and insufficient wage increases, many households nationwide will not be able to meet their food needs.
    • In February, levels of conflict including ground fighting across all of the active fronts (especially in Marib, Hajjah, Taizz, Al Dhale’e, and Al Hudaydah) and cross-border attacks declined relative to high levels in January, according to ACLED data. However, clashes continue to cause new population displacement. In February 2022, around 1,370 households (8,220 individuals) were displaced according to IOM data, a reduction of 44 percent compared to January 2022.  
    • On February 27, the Aden Central Bank’s Board of Directors issued a warning to consumers against depositing their savings with exchange shops. Additionally, the Ministry of Finance reached an agreement with the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit (CAC) Bank to disburse salaries to public sector employees, replacing the role of exchange shops, in order to limit exchange shops’ influence on the currency market. Given recent control measures and the continuation of public currency auctioning, the Aden-based Rial remained relatively stable in February, at 1,111 YER/USD on average that month, recording a 2 percent increase compared to the previous month, according to data from FAO. The exchange rate in SBA-controlled areas remained stable at levels around YER 600/USD, despite the ongoing fuel crisis.
    Remote Monitoring Countries[2]Rwanda
    • Seasonally high food availability from the Season A harvest and associated decline in food prices are driving Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes in Rwanda. Improved food supply chain flows, following the recent easing of COVID-19 restrictions, coupled with the re-opening of the border with Uganda, and resumed food imports in January, are expected to moderate food prices despite a less favorable outlook for the Season B harvest. Food imports will particularly benefit households in the Eastern Province, where Season A bean and maize harvests were below normal.
    • Urban households are seeing a gradual increase in income and purchasing power, facilitating Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes. Data collected by Rwanda's National Institute of Statistics (NISR) shows a gradual recovery in economic activity following the lifting of stringent COVID-19 control measures, a decline in new cases, and the ongoing vaccination campaign that has so far fully immunized 61.7 percent of the population. For instance, the December 2021 industrial production survey showed a 10.3 percent increase in manufacturing – mainly driven by the food sector – compared to December 2020. 
    • Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are likely occurring among Rwanda's refugee and asylee population, which number around 127,000 people. This population remains at risk of food insecurity due to their lack of productive assets and social support, compounded by the reduction of income sources under COVID-19 restrictions. The most recent WFP report indicates 113,475 people received assistance in December, with those categorized as highly vulnerable by WFP receiving a 92 percent cash ration and those categorized as moderately vulnerable receiving a 46 percent cash ration. Without food aid, this population would likely face food consumption gaps indicative of Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

    For more information, see the Rwanda Remote Monitoring Update for February 2022.


    [1] This statement is in relation to the time frame for which FEWS NET has comparable national needs estimates, which includes 2014-2022. Prior to 2022, the highest recorded needs in this time period were in 2016 following the El-Nino drought.

    [2] With remote monitoring, an analyst typically works from a nearby regional office, relying on a network of partners for data. Compared to previous series of countries in which FEWS NET has a local office, reports on remote monitoring countries may offer less detail.


    Table 1. Possible events over the next eight months that could change the most likely scenario.



    Impact on food security outcomes

    Northern Ethiopia

    Breakdown in mediation and resurgence of conflict in Tigray and/or the expansion of conflict into Amhara and Afar

    An increasing number of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) would be likely. Food and income access would be severely disrupted for millions more households in northern Ethiopia. Additional population displacements would occur, preventing recently returned households from re-establishing their livelihoods, which were previously destroyed by conflict.  Households’ already limited livelihood sources would even further reduce, with widespread populations facing increasingly large food consumption gaps, deteriorating levels of acute malnutrition with increased mortality, with a risk that nutrition outcomes would surpass the Extreme Critical threshold.

    Bi-modal areas of the eastern Horn of Africa

    (Southern and eastern Ethiopia, northern and eastern Kenya, and central and southern Somalia)


    Significantly delayed or failed March to June rainfall leading to severe crop and livestock losses

    If food assistance fails to reach populations most in need, then Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely be widespread in pastoral areas in Kenya and extreme food insecurity outcomes would likely occur in bimodal Ethiopia and Somalia. Many areas of pastoral and agropastoral livelihood zones in Ethiopia and Somalia are already in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and they would face a risk of extreme food consumption gaps and high levels of acute malnutrition and hunger-related mortality. Given already high levels of livestock deaths and livestock emaciation, low access to pasture and water beyond March/April would likely lead to additional, large-scale livestock deaths, driving drastic declines in herd sizes with the collapse of typical livelihood activities. Another poor to failed crop production season in agropastoral and cropping zones would drive worsening cereal shortages and soaring food prices. Drought-related destitution and displacement would likely be widespread.





    Inability of humanitarian actors to deliver assistance as planned especially in SBA-controlled areas

    Access to food would significantly reduce for many poor conflict-affected households. Beneficiary households would likely face widening food consumption gaps without food assistance to mitigate them, given well above average fuel prices and the escalation of imported food prices. In the context of the protracted 7-year conflict, many households would likely quickly exhaust any coping strategies that remain available to them. Worst-affected households would likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes.



    Increased economic and political instability, including the escalation of intercommunal clashes and more severe increases in food and non-food prices

    Increased political instability, further deterioration in the macroeconomic situation, and escalating staple food, fuel, and commodity prices would drive further deterioration in acute food insecurity. Areas of highest concern would include poor households across the country and conflict-displaced populations in South Kordofan and greater Darfur states. Additional displacement and destruction of livelihoods in rural areas would increase the number of IDPs and disrupt the next agricultural season, resulting in a second consecutive year of poor harvests. Increased political instability will likely result in further deterioration in the macroeconomic situation and reduce household food availability and access. Households already facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4).


    Figures The rainy season in northern pastoral areas, cropping areas in Ethiopia, and unimodal areas are from June to October. Rainy s

    Figure 1


    Source: FEWS NET

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

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