Dry conditions in south/southeast threaten pastoral livelihoods once again

• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist through at least May in pastoral areas of Zone 2 and Zone 4 of Afar that were severely impacted by the 2020-2022 conflict in northern Ethiopia. In these areas, the conflict severely eroded livestock holdings (the primary household asset). Currently, poor households have minimal to no livestock, resulting in constrained food and income and atypically high reliance on social support and coping strategies, such as selling firewood and charcoal, labor migration, migrating to live with relatives, and consumption of wild foods.
• In the pastoral south and southeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected, but there is potential for rapid deterioration if the current and subsequent rainy seasons fail. The October to December deyr/hageya rains performed poorly in October, and it is increasingly likely that recovery of livestock holdings from the historic 2020-2023 drought will stagnate due to diminishing pasture and water resources. Declines in livestock productivity will in turn suppress household capacity to purchase sufficient food. Furthermore, the gu/genna rains in early 2025 are also expected to be below average. If both rainy seasons were to fail, food assistance needs would rise sharply and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely emerge by mid-2025. 
• Across the rest of Ethiopia, the near-average national meher harvest and favorable consecutive livestock production seasons are resulting in moderate improvements in acute food insecurity outcomes. While staple food prices are not expected to decline with the meher harvest, cash income from a rebound in agricultural labor opportunities should partially improve household purchasing power. However, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in areas where recovery from drought and conflict is prolonged.
• Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to become more widespread in early to mid-2025 as households gradually exhaust their harvested food stocks and become increasingly market reliant amid high food prices. In hard-to-reach areas of Tigray where market and income-earning activity is highly limited, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in early 2025. 

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 30, 2024.

Meher harvest provides relief, but the long-term impacts of conflict and drought persist 

The ongoing meher harvest in central, northern, western, and southern areas of country, coupled with food assistance has alleviated food consumption deficits for millions of households in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, food assistance needs remain elevated for this time of year as poor and displaced households are still recuperating from the severe asset losses associated with conflict and drought from 2020 to 2023. Areas of western Afar remain of highest concern: Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are most likely through at least mid-2025. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) are expected to be widespread in much of the rest of the country as conflict, drought recovery, and economic shocks disrupt households’ ability to access sufficient food and income. 

In western Afar, many households face extreme limitations on access to food and income, primarily due to the loss of livestock. This hardship is largely a result of the prolonged effects of past droughts and the 2020-2022 conflict in the north. A SMART+ survey conducted in July in the Teru Pastoral zone (encompassing several woredas in Zones 2 and 4) found a Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate of 19.4 percent, categorizing it at a Critical level (15 to 29.9 percent). Furthermore, Food Consumption Score and food consumption coping indicators indicated that 45 percent of the population have poor diets in terms of both quantity and quality. The Household Hunger Score, which gauges respondents' experiences of caloric deficits, found that approximately half of the population was facing moderate or severe hunger, with nearly 20 percent enduring severe hunger. Taken together, these findings highlight a significant gap in food consumption indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. The likely below-average early 2025 rainy season will slow any recovery.

In Tigray and Amhara, the start of the meher harvest in October is anticipated to ease the severity of household food consumption deficits and alleviate malnourishment as households gain access to food through their own production or stocks shared by other members of their community. Households will also likely earn seasonal income from harvest-related activities, which will relatively improve their purchasing power as food prices decline. However, by early 2025, households are expected to consume their own food stocks and harvesting activities will end. Poor households will again face increasing difficulty accessing sufficient food and income, and their purchasing capacity is expected to remain inadequate to purchase their minimum food needs. Overall, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through at least May 2025. While a small portion of the population likely faces Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes between October and January, this population is expected to increase between February and May, leading to the re-emergence of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes in areas along the Eritrean border where market activity is most restricted. 

In the pastoral south and southeast, the extremely poor start of the October to December deyr/hageya rains is expected to stall the recovery of household livestock holdings from the 2020-2023 drought. Households are facing deteriorating livestock body conditions, which will likely affect demand for their livestock and limit the amount of income they can earn. With little rainfall expected this season (Figure 1), the pastoral lean season is anticipated to begin in early 2025. Forecasts of waning La Niña conditions in early 2025 are also expected to cause a consecutive – but less severe – below-average rainy season from March to May, which would only partially mitigate worsening livestock production conditions. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes with pockets of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse are expected, and humanitarians should prepare for rising needs in early 2025. If the gu/genna rains fail, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would likely occur in the worst-affected areas during the mid-2025 dry season, which begins in June. The precise areas depend on rainfall distribution patterns, but concern is highest for areas along the border with Somalia, which were among the worst-affected in the 2020-2023 drought.

Ethiopia's livelihood systems are complex, influenced by multiple rainy seasons and rugged geography, which in turn define multiple marketing systems. Ethiopia contains three major rural livelihood systems – pastoral, agropastoral, and cropping – which are deeply rooted in seasonal change, dictated by rainy season onsets, peaks, and ends (Figure 2). October typically marks the end of the main rainy season – the June to September kiremt season – for nearly the entire country (besides the south and southeast). The kiremt season is also known as the karan/karma season in northern pastoral areas, where rainfall tends to dominate from July to September. The meher harvest follows the kiremt rains, typically beginning in northern cropping areas in September/October and slowly advancing south. The other main rainy seasons include the October to December deyr/hageya and March to May gu/genna in the south and southeast pastoral areas, and the February to May belg in northern and central Ethiopia. The main lean season in cropping and agropastoral areas typically aligns with the main rainy season, and in pastoral areas with the dry seasons (when livestock are unlikely to be giving birth or producing milk).

Ethiopia has faced compounding conflict, drought, and economic shocks since 2020. The shocks were most severe in northern Ethiopia and southern and southeastern pastoral areas, where household assets and the ability to access typical food and income sources have been severely eroded. Poor households in these areas are heavily reliant on humanitarian food assistance, community support, and negative coping strategies. Full recovery of livestock herds, labor markets, and household assets is expected to take multiple years, with past shocks increasing vulnerability to future ones. 

The 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray Region severely affected livelihoods in Tigray and neighboring areas of Amhara and Afar. While the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 ended the war, areas remain contested, including West Tigray and hard-to-reach areas along the border with Eritrea. New conflict erupted in Amhara in late 2022 between FANO militias and government forces. While this conflict has been largely isolated to towns and roadways with limited impacts on civilians, it negatively impacts trade flows between Amhara and Addis Ababa. Additionally, localized conflict is also a driver of acute food insecurity in areas of Oromia. Overall, active conflict disrupts households' normal livelihood activities by limiting access to fields for cropping activities and markets for buying and selling goods, as well as limiting livestock migration in pastoral areas. 

In northern Ethiopia, crops, livestock, and labor migration – along with the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) – are typically the most important sources of food and income throughout the year. Households typically plant crops at the start of the June to September kiremt rains and harvest green crops in September before the main harvest in October. In a year with normal production, the average household can typically rely upon own production and stocks through at least February. Thereafter, households rely on earning income to purchase food. In Afar, livestock births and milking provide food and income, with peak livestock births typically occurring in April/May and July/August. The conflict in northern Ethiopia resulted in few livestock per household (notably the very poor), as livestock were stolen, killed, or used for income during the conflict and drought. Poor households typically engage in labor migration during the kiremt season to work on larger farms in West Tigray and other areas of the country, but these options are currently limited due to continued tensions. Households typically rely heavily on PSNP from February to July (when PSNP was unavailable from late 2020 to 2023, PSNP households were eligible for humanitarian food assistance). In 2024 the program resumed; however, the duration of the program has been shortened by two months.

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peak with the seasonal improvements associated with the gu/genna (March to May) and deyr/hageya (October to December) seasons. Domestic and export livestock demand peaks during the Hajj, which will be in June in 2025. Food and income are typically lowest during the dry season from January to March and August to October, when livestock body conditions and saleability decline along with pasture and water availability. The 2020 to 2023 drought severely eroded livestock herd sizes, and poor households have seen only nascent recovery of their livestock holdings since then, supported by multiple goat birth cycles in 2023 and 2024 and the first substantial cycle of cattle and camel livestock births in May/June 2024. While most households have benefited from recent livestock births, meaningful recovery from drought is takes multiple years. Some pastoral households can rely on agricultural labor and community support for food and income; a portion of households (mostly in riverine areas) have started engaging in cropping where/when possible. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Ethiopia Food Security Outlook: June 2024 to January 2025
• Latest Ethiopia Key Message Update: September 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict:

Levels of reported conflict events declined slightly on aggregate at the national level in September compared to August, but localized conflict events continued. Conflict in mid to late 2024 has been concentrated in Amhara and Oromia regions, predominantly between armed actors such as Fano and the national defense forces (ENDF) (Figure 3). In Amhara, conflict incidents have risen over the course of 2024, primarily in West Gojjam, East Gojjam, North Wello, and North Shewa zones. There is no specific epicenter of conflict, as the intensity of clashes shifts from one place to another at different times. Fighting along highways is common and road control is fluid. From September 2023 through August 2024, Fano entrenched itself in rural areas and seized small towns. Additionally, Fano carried out attacks along roadways and other high-value targets and attacked the ENDF in strategic cities that Fano cannot capture and hold. Most attacks and clashes in Amhara were between Fano and the ENDF, though rates of civilian targeting by both increased in 2024.

In Oromia, the frequency and intensity of attacks have lessened, but sporadic road and market blockages still hinder the movement of commodities and people, particularly in parts of Guji, West Guji, East Borana, Wollega, and central zones where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is active. Additionally, these areas have experienced repeated vehicle attacks, kidnappings, and civilian killings. 

Despite relative calm in Tigray, areas of the region remain hard to reach along the Eritrean border/West Tigray due to security tensions. This has disrupted supply flows, population movement within and outside the region, and agricultural production. Households in Tigray previously migrated to West Tigray to cultivate and earn income from agricultural activities, and these sources of food and income are therefore constrained. 

Weather shocks:

The June to September kiremt/karan/karma rainy season ended in September/October with average to above-average rainfall in most areas (Figure 4). However, several hazards occurred in localized areas. In western Ethiopia, rainfall was moderately below average but sufficient for crop development (this area receives sufficient water even in below-average years). Some localized areas, such as Bale and Arsi zones of Oromia, saw negative effects on agricultural production due to below-average rainfall, especially localized areas in Dubti, Kori, and Elidar woredas of Afar that faced a prolonged dry spell. Conversely, flooding, landslides, and snow/hail occurred in northern, central, southern, and some western areas of the country, disrupting crop development. Heavy rainfall from mid-July to early August – mainly in southern regions, some parts of central and eastern Oromia, and eastern Amhara – resulted in localized flooding and landslides that caused deaths and crop damage. As previously reported by FEWS NET in August, landslides in South and Southwest Ethiopia and Sidama regions killed over 200 people and displaced over 400. In some parts of Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia, heavy rains and hailstorms caused flooding, landslides, and waterlogging that resulted in the loss of human lives and livestock, destroyed properties and assets, and damaged growing crops. However, information on the scale of damage isis still limited at this time. 

In the pastoral south and southeast, October was marked by few rainfall days with rainfall deficits as large as 30 to 35 percent of normal. One to two days of rainfall were recorded in localized areas of the Somali Region in the final days of October. Similarly, the onset of rainfall was delayed in Borena, East Borena, West Guji, and East Bale zones of Oromia (Figure 5). In the lowland areas of Bale and Guji zones, the rains started on time around mid-September but have been erratic and below average in some woredas.

Displacement:

The latest IOM data indicate that as of May 2024 there were over 3.3 million IDPs in Ethiopia, similar to the number of IDPs in late 2023. Displacement numbers may be higher than officially reported since site accessibility remains a challenge to data collection in Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and South Ethiopia. Conflict and drought remain the primary drivers of displacement, with most displaced populations concentrated in Somali, Oromia, and Tigray regions. In Tigray, over 870,000 people were displaced, a decline from previous rounds due to planned and spontaneous returns of IDPs. In Oromia, the number of new displacements has declined. However, more than 887,000 IDPs remained, primarily displaced by conflict and climate shocks (including drought and landslides); those displaced by flooding have mostly returned home. 

According to UNHCR, Ethiopia hosts over 1.0 million refugees and asylum seekers as of the end of September, predominantly from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. In Afar, more than 60,000 refugees (most from neighboring Eritrea) reside in Berhale and Asayita woredas, while more than 358,000 refugees reside in Somali Region. According to the latest UNHCR report, as of the end of August the total number of refugees has increased slightly compared to last year. The number of new arrivals had declined between January and May but began increasing in June, particularly new arrivals from Sudan.

Macroeconomic conditions:

Macroeconomy conditions in Ethiopia remain poor, despite a moderate improvement in hard currency reserves with the release of IMF and World Bank funds to Ethiopia following an economic reform package in late July. Notably, the Ethiopian birr (ETB) has depreciated month-on-month. As of mid-October, the value of the ETB compared to the USD has declined by 58 percent on the official market and nearly 20 percent on the parallel market compared to July (Figure 6). Additionally, fuel prices rose by around 10 percent in the first week of October compared to the previous month due to fuel shortages. The shortages are defined by lengthy queues in most fueling stations and associated with impediments to market activity.

The severity of inflation has declined but remains high overall. According to the Ethiopia Statistical Services agency, annual headline inflation in September was 16.9 percent, down by nearly 11 percentage points compared to September 2023 (Figure 7). Non-food inflation (14.4 percent) has declined at a faster pace than food inflation, which remained high at 18.7 percent in September and is the primary driver of the elevated headline inflation rate. 

Crop production: 

The meher harvest has started in northern areas and is slowly progressing southward. Average to above-average June to September kiremt rainfall resulted in favorable meher crop development, with crops currently ranging between the vegetative, flowering, and maturing stages. While not all crops are ready for harvest, barley and wheat are nearly ready in many lowland and dry midland areas of northern cropping areas. Thus far, over 200,000 hectares of land have been harvested in Amhara Region. While cropping conditions have been generally favorable overall, localized hazards and inadequate access to agricultural inputs will most likely result in reduced yields in various areas. Input utilization in most areas is similar to recent years, with a persisting shortage of improved seeds and agricultural chemicals in many regions. However, untimely heavy rain, flooding, and landslides affected the maturation of crops, mainly in West Hararghe, West Guji, Bale, and Arsi zones. 

Farmers in agropastoral areas in the south and southeast planted seeds at normal levels at the start of October in preparation for deyr/hageya rainfall. However, those crops have failed to germinate and develop due to limited rainfall. Farmers in the localized areas that did receive rain have started replanting fields, but the planting window for the short growing season has now passed. Planted crops are currently at vegetative and early growth stages and exhibit poor development. 

Livestock production:

Consecutive favorable rainy seasons have led to overall pasture regeneration and water source replenishment across most of the country, resulting in average livestock body conditions, production, and productivity in most areas (Figure 8). However, in the southern and southeastern pastoral areas, milk availability and access remain below average due to persisting below-normal herd sizes in the aftermath of the 2020-2023 drought. In addition, the poor deyr/hageya rains have led to modest declines in livestock body conditions amid declining pasture and water resources. While poor households face a below-normal increase in goat milk production this season, there are instances of wealthier households temporarily transferring some of their large ruminant milking animals to poorer households in exchange for herding services. 

In northern pastoral areas, herd sizes are even lower than in the south and southeast due to past drought and conflict. However, livestock body conditions are generally favorable, permitting conceptions across all species, albeit at lower rates than normal due to the low availability of herds for reproduction. Milk availability (particularly from goats) has improved compared to the previous two seasons, while livestock milk production from camels and cattle – a primary household food source – remains below normal due to small herd sizes. Production conditions are relatively worse in several localized areas of Afar, such as Kori and Elidar woredas of Zone 1, where pasture availability is below normal due to localized rainfall deficits during the karma season, which in turn led to poor livestock body conditions. 

Off-own-farm sources of income: 

Key off-own-farm income sources vary depending on the area and include migratory labor, construction labor, the sale of firewood and charcoal, petty trading, remittances, salt mining, and collecting gum arabic and incense.

In Amhara, ongoing conflict has restricted labor migration to western sesame-producing areas and other regions for construction work. Conversely, relative calm in Tigray is facilitating the recovery of economic activity, but the degree of improvement in most income-earning activities from last year is minimal. Movement restrictions from Tigray to Humera and Wolkayit for weeding and harvesting labor persist. The availability of construction labor in both regions is still limited.

In Afar, income from off-farm activities remains low but slightly better compared to last year (particularly in Zone 1 and Zone 3) following the favorable 2024 rains and cessation of the Afar-Issa conflict. Additionally, income from the sale of firewood and charcoal, petty trading, transportation services, and related off-farm opportunities (such as loading and unloading goods) has improved along the Djibouti-Semera-Awash-Adama Road – the main route for trade flows and transportation service – particularly following the cessation of Afar-Issa clan conflict in August. 

In most of Somali Region, according to the regional Disaster Risk Management Bureau, labor migration wages in September increased by 10 and 20 percent compared to the previous month and the same month last year, respectively. Due to dry conditions in October, some activities (such as making firewood and charcoal) are atypically available at this time of year; however, activities that usually occur during the rainy season – such as wild food collection, gum and resin collection, and salt mining – are atypically low. 

Market supply and prices: 

In most regions, market supply and activity are typical for this time of year as newly available harvests reach the market. In conflict-affected areas (primarily Oromia and Amhara), some disruptions in trade flows have been observed, however. In Amhara, significant disruptions in market supplies occurred in August due to increased conflict between Fano fighters and government forces. In Tigray, the flow of market supplies from Amhara and other regions must adapt to different routes depending on the nature and intensity of the conflict in Amhara. The Semera-Mekele road is often used as an alternative route. In Afar, the ongoing conflict between the ENDF and Fano in Amhara, along with the political instability in Tigray, are also disrupting the regularity of market supply flows to and from the region.

The availability of staple foods from the meher harvest is stabilizing domestic food prices across most of the country. However, on average, staple grain prices are trending up to 25 percent above last year and 60-95 percent above the four-year average nationally (Figures 9 and 10). The increase in fuel prices, devaluation in local currency, and weak macroeconomic conditions have all contributed to higher staple food prices compared to previous years. In Sekota, Amhara, for example, sorghum prices in September were 44 percent higher than the four-year average, while in Mekele, Tigray, maize prices were 32 percent higher than the four-year average. In Addis Ababa, contrary to the national trend, staple food prices actually increased compared to previous months despite normal market supply, with September reflecting the highest price increase yet in 2024 compared to last year and the previous four-year average.

Meanwhile, significant price increases among imported foods (e.g., rice, oil, sugar) have continued month-on-month due to the devalued exchange rate and high transportation costs, particularly in regions with high consumption of imported food such as Somali Region. The price of imported rice increased by 11 percent in September compared to August and by 71 percent compared to September 2023. Domestic staple food prices in the Somali Region, including maize, sorghum, and wheat, also experienced moderate price increases of between 8 and 25 percent in the main markets compared to July. 

Household purchasing capacity: 

Nationally, the daily wage rate has increased compared to the previous year and four-year average in most markets. Wage rates currently range between 300 to 450 ETB per day. The Ethiopian government has not only maintained fuel subsidies but has also announced an increase in civil servants’ salaries to mitigate the economic reform’s impact on household purchasing amid elevated prices of staple foods and other essential goods. 

At this time, however, wage rates have not kept pace with rising food prices in many markets and the amount of maize a household can purchase with a day’s wage labor is below normal. For example, the price of maize in Dessie, Amhara, in September was approximately 56 ETB per kilogram, while the daily wage rate was around 360 ETB. The day’s wage can buy only 6.2 kg of maize, which is 15 and 24 percent lower than the terms of trade during the same month last year and the previous four-year average, respectively.

In northern pastoral areas, purchasing power of pastoralist households remains particularly limited, especially in conflict-affected areas where households have limited to no livestock for sale. Despite higher livestock prices, cash income from sales is low due to decreased livestock holdings and a subsequent reduction in supply and sales. The terms of trade between livestock and staple foods remain unfavorable, as staple food prices have risen significantly compared to livestock prices (Figure 11). In Logia, Afar, the sale of a single sheep in September enabled a household to buy around 60 kg of maize, sufficient to feed a household of seven for approximately 15 days (a decrease from 67 kg last year). 

In the southern and southeastern pastoral areas, rising livestock prices have improved the livestock-to-maize terms of trade as of September. Additionally, the growth in herd sizes in 2023 and 2024 have provided poor households with some saleable sheep and goats to earn income for food purchases. In the Chereti market, the sale of a sheep in September can buy about 55 kg of maize, sufficient to feed a household of seven for approximately 14 days (an increase of nearly 25 percent compared to last year).

Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP): 

PSNP is ongoing only for direct support beneficiaries, who receive year-round distributions. Wage rates vary by region, ranging from 95 to 114 ETB per person per day. Despite a 34 percent increase in the wage rate compared to last year, the cash transfer is insufficient to purchase the intended 15 kg ration due to increased staple food prices and fewer distributions. For example, in South Ethiopia, the PSNP wage rate of 106 ETB per day can purchase 13 kg of maize.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable. 

According to the Food Cluster, humanitarians assisted around 2.7 million people nationally in September, excluding the Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Commission’s (EDRMC) distributions (EDRMC data were unavailable at the time of analysis). The number of people reached in September is the lowest monthly total since food aid fully resumed in early 2024; however, declines in assistance distribution are common at this time of year as the harvest becomes available and households experience seasonal increases in food and income (Figure 12). Assistance distributions declined by nearly 40 percent compared to August when roughly 4.4 million people were reached, with declines in beneficiaries reached across all regions besides the Somali Region. While the overall decline is likely driven by seasonality, access and security challenges – such as in contested areas of Tigray, Somali, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, and Oromia – have also led to significant delays or suspensions in the delivery and distribution of assistance. Additionally, a substantial resource gap continues to challenge partners in adequately addressing the needs of all food-insecure individuals.

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

Northern Ethiopia (Amhara and Tigray)

In Tigray and the Wag Himra zone in Amhara, Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are ongoing in many areas as of October, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in areas where food assistance is not significant. The start of the 2024 meher harvest is providing an increasing amount of green and mature crops for household consumption. Some better-off and middle households are also hiring laborers for the harvest, providing a source of income. While staple food prices have not yet declined in response to the harvest, household income is providing a relative increase in purchasing capacity as well. However, more substantial improvements in acute food insecurity outcomes remain limited by the loss of productive assets and erosion of market activity by the 2020 to 2022 conflict and 2023 drought. Ongoing food assistance is playing a role alongside the meher harvest in mitigating food consumption deficits in many woredas prior to the full availability of the harvest.

In other conflict-affected areas of northeastern Amhara, the ongoing green and dry meher harvest is improving household food stocks, particularly in areas that benefited from an average July 2024 belg harvest (with food stocks expected to last through November/December). However, conflict is causing intermittent disruptions to market functionality, which is impeding the degree of improvement in access to food and income at the household-level by constraining income earned from crop sales and contributing to elevated prices. Furthermore, the impacts of macroeconomic-related pressures are also driving up prices overall, resulting in below-average purchasing power capacity for households. While Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are ongoing at the woreda level, there are likely households within these areas who continue to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

Northern pastoral areas (Afar)

Poor households in Zones 1, 3, 5, and 6 in Afar are able to meet their minimum food needs, but not all essential non-food needs, without engaging in negative coping strategies. Most parts of central, southern, and southeastern Afar are experiencing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. However, parts of northeastern Afar, specifically the Elidar and Kori woredas in Zone 1, did not receive adequate rainfall during the July to September karma season and therefore experienced no noticeable improvement in income and food from livestock. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing.

Most households in western Afar face severely constrained access to food and income due to the loss of livestock, the key food and income source. A livelihood zone-based SMART+ survey conducted in July in the Teru Pastoral livelihood zone (covering many woredas in Zones 2 and 4) indicated a Critical level of Global Acute Malnutrition (19.4 percent), reflecting Critical (GAM 15 to 29.9 percent) levels of acute malnutrition. Additionally, the survey’s household food security indicators showed that 37 percent of the population have borderline food consumption scores, and 45 percent have poor food consumption scores as well as high levels of consumption-based coping. Household Hunger Score, which measures respondents experience of caloric deficits, estimated that about half of the population was experiencing moderate or severe hunger with those experiencing severe hunger approaching 20 percent. Such high levels of hunger and acute malnutrition are indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4).   

Pastoral south and southeast (Somali, Oromia, South Ethiopia)

In the pastoral south and southeast, the impacts of poor rainfall observed in October are currently being mitigated by prior favorable rainfall seasons. Livestock body conditions are broadly favorable, sale prices have been steadily increasing, and access to milk has improved following recent cattle births. Some households who have a limited number of saleable animals, particularly shoats, have also benefited from income from the sale of livestock products. However, food assistance needs remain elevated amid atypically low herd sizes (a lingering impact of the previous droughts), which continue to limit access to milk and cash income and household purchasing capacity. Consequently, many poor pastoral households still face food consumption deficits and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are widespread.

Central and southern areas of the Oromia Region 

In central and southern Oromia Region, households are depleting their food stocks atypically early due to consecutive below-average harvests in the previous seasons, compounded by the localized failure of the 2024 belg harvest. Additionally, the large drop in khat prices that has occurred this year has severely reduced labor-related cash income for poor households in East and West Hararghe zones, as khat is a key cash crop that contributes up to 50 percent of annual income for households in this area. Based on therapeutic feeding program admissions from Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit, levels of acute malnutrition are increasing, exacerbated by outbreaks of cholera and widespread cases of malaria and scabies. Ongoing emergency food distributions and PSNP transfer payments contribute to household food access but are unable to bridge food consumption gaps. Humanitarian assistance has remained well below needed levels throughout 2024, with IDPs the worst affected by inadequate aid. Poor households in parts of the Central Rift Valley; the lowlands of Arsi, Borena, East Borana, and Guji; West Guji, Bale, and East Bale; and most parts of East and West Hararghe zones are experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• October to December 2024 deyr/hageya rainfall in the pastoral south and southeast will most likely be significantly to moderately below average.
• February to May 2025 belg rainfall in central and southern Ethiopia is forecast to be uneven and below average. 
• March to May 2025 gu/genna seasonal rainfall in southern and southeastern Ethiopia will most likely be moderately below average. The March to May 2025 diraac/sugumrains in northern pastoral areas are forecast to be below average over southeastern areas of the region, and mostly average elsewhere in the south.
• The number of armed clashes, attacks, and kidnappings perpetrated by the OLA will most likely continue at rates observed in 2023/2024. Periodic escalations in armed clashes are expected as the ENDF continues operations aimed at degrading the OLA’s ability to conduct attacks and enforce blockades on roadways. 
• The total national internally displaced population is expected to decline moderately, with some subnational variation expected. In most conflict-affected areas of Oromia and Amhara, however, the displaced population is expected to continue increasing moderately, associated with the ongoing conflict. 
• The total refugee population in Ethiopia is expected to increase moderately as continued conflict in Sudan will result in people fleeing to Ethiopia. Most refugees living in and entering Ethiopia are expected to reside in camps. 
• Nationally, the aggregate meher harvest is expected to be average, with favorable yields in the west off-setting yield losses elsewhere. However, due to limited access to agricultural inputs, various hazards (flooding and pests/diseases), and conflict, the meher harvest is expected to be below average in areas of Tigray, Amhara, Central Rift Valley, eastern Oromia, and southern regions.
• The anticipated below-average 2025 belg rainfall is expected to negatively impact belg crop cultivation, and below-average area planted is expected.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor, and the ETB is expected to continue to deteriorate further over the near-to-medium term. There are still shortages of hard currency, albeit slightly improved, due to a lack of hard currency auctions. A significant amount of demand remains in the parallel market, leading to a gradual increase in the parallel exchange rates. Inflation is projected to be on an upward trend through 2025. 
• The government is expected to implement its original plan to subsidize agricultural inputs; prices are likely to remain near last year’s and not significantly impact seed access. Nevertheless, financial access to improved crop seeds and pest control chemicals is expected to be limited among poor households.
• Market functionality and trade flow disruptions are anticipated in conflict-affected areas of Amhara, Oromia, and bordering areas of Afar and Tigray regions. Traders’ movements will be limited due to insecurity, resulting in disruptions or declines in the movement of goods to and from these areas. Conflict in Amhara will also likely temporarily disrupt the movement of goods between Addis Ababa and Amhara, leading to supply shortages.
• High prices and fuel shortages will continue to increase transportation and supply costs, especially as the government gradually withdraws subsidies; however, fuel shortages are expected to be less severe than last year.
• Staple food prices are expected to remain stable through the end of January 2025 in most surplus markets in the western half of the country, as average meher production is likely to enhance market food supplies. However, prices will remain well above last year and the average. Food prices are expected to increase to well above average beginning in February, as market food supply declines and market demand increases.
• Remittances from urban to rural households are likely to remain below average as increases in the urban cost of living reduce the amount urban households can send to their relatives. 
• PSNP distributions are ongoing and will continue through the end of 2024 for direct support beneficiaries. In 2025, the PSNP is expected to commence around February as is typical, both for direct support and public work beneficiaries. Based on anecdotal information, the payment value for beneficiaries is expected to increase moderately; however, it will likely be insufficient to purchase the intended amount of food.

Sub-national assumptions for northern cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

• Clashes between Fano and the ENDF within Amhara are highly likely to continue through at least May 2025. Periodic escalations are expected as Fano attempts to gain control of strategic towns (including Gondar and Lalibela) and the ENDF attempts to degrade Fano’s capabilities through clashes, airstrikes, and shelling. A temporary de-escalation is likely from September through November during harvesting season.
• Periodic intensifications of conflict and resulting disruptions to road travel are likely to limit deliveries of vital commodities and humanitarian assistance to Amhara through May 2025, though some consistency in assistance distributions is expected.  
• In southern and western Tigray, low-level clashes between militias are likely to persist in disputed areas.
• In both Tigray and Amhara regions, the labor supply for construction is expected to remain low as conflict and insecurity is preventing labor migration, but higher than in recent years as the economy slowly recovers. 
• Agricultural labor is expected to improve slightly relative to recent years during the October/November meher harvests. However, in belg-dependent areas, the demand for agricultural labor will likely be below normal due to the forecasted below-average belg rainfall. 
• Migratory labor opportunities in late 2024/early 2025 are expected to remain limited, particularly for poor households in central and eastern Tigray as the Wolkayit and Raya administrative disagreement has not been resolved.

Sub-national assumptions for northern pastoral areas

• Water and pasture availability will be sufficient for livestock through the end of January before seasonally declining in February. Conditions will then likely be below normal from February to May due to the anticipated below-average March-May 2024 diraac/sugum rains.
• Livestock body conditions are expected to improve to normal levels by January, followed by a gradual decline starting in February through May. Livestock production and productivity, particularly from cattle and camels, are anticipated to improve as births begin between January and April 2025; however, births will remain below normal levels (particularly in areas with low herd sizes related to the conflict). 
• Livestock prices are expected to improve in many areas except Afar, where prices are expected to remain stable or slightly decline due to the ongoing conflict in Amhara and political instability in Tigray, which restricts the free movement of traders. However, prices will still be higher than in previous years and the average.
• Agricultural labor opportunities – predominantly in agropastoral areas using irrigation schemes around the Awash River catchment (Perennial River) – are expected to remain near average. 

Sub-national assumptions for southern and southeastern pastoral areas (Somali, Oromia, South Ethiopia)

• Pasture and water availability is anticipated to increasingly deteriorate to below-normal levels, but in quantities that are expected to be minimally adequate for livestock consumption until the gu/genna season begins in March 2025. Livestock body conditions will deteriorate throughout this time as reliance on dry pasture increases, given that the nutritional value of dry pasture is low. Pasture and water availability is expected to be only partially replenished by the forecasted below-average gu/genna rains from March to May. Additionally, if atypical livestock migration occurs and livestock are concentrated in a few areas, pasture is expected to deplete atypically fast.  
• Livestock body conditions are expected to deteriorate in late 2024, with poor livestock body conditions expected by late 2024/early 2025. Livestock body conditions are expected to reach their lowest point during the dry January/February jilaal season. Body conditions are expected to partially improve but remain below normal from March to May, when the below-average gu/genna rains will moderately replenish pasture and water resources.
• Milk production from cattle and camels will be available until February, albeit at below-normal levels due to low herd sizes. Milk availability will decline in January/February as pasture conditions and water availability deteriorate. Conversely, milk from shoats – especially goats that are relatively more resilient in dry conditions – is expected to remain seasonally available through May.
• Livestock prices are expected to decline during the January/February jilaal dry season but will remain higher than last year and the average. The supply of saleable livestock is expected to decline mainly due to low herd sizes and poor livestock body conditions, while demand for exports is anticipated to be lower than normal as livestock body conditions will not be attractive to exporters.
• Area planted and harvests in agropastoral areas are expected to be well below normal for the deyr/hageya and gu/genna seasons due to the anticipated below-normal forecast. It is likely that the deyr/hageya harvest starting around January will be minimal to failed due to poor rainfall. 

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

Humanitarian food assistance is expected to decline during the October to December period as is typical during the harvesting period. A planned 2.3 million people will be targeted with food assistance. However, based on historical distribution data, it is unlikely that the targeted number of beneficiaries will be fully reached. Available plans from the Food Cluster suggest that populations in Somali, Tigray, Afar, Amhara, and Oromia regions will most likely be prioritized through December. While food assistance distributions are also expected to occur from January to May, detailed plans are not yet available at this time; these plans are usually fully developed by the Food Cluster and humanitarians following the November/December meher seasonal assessment. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

Northern Ethiopia (Amhara and Tigray)

In most of Tigray and in Wag Himra zones in Amhara, most households will obtain significant food and income from the meher harvest and agricultural labor opportunities through late 2024/early 2025. Stability in staple food prices coupled with seasonal income will most likely enhance purchasing power compared to recent years, mitigating the severity of household food consumption gaps. However, poor households will still face difficulty accessing sufficient food given that the availability of income and food sources remain well below normal compared to pre-2020. Additionally, high prices for food and other essentials will continue to blunt the positive impact of the harvest on food security compared to a typical year. As a result, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through January. During the post-harvest period and start of the lean season in early 2025, food assistance needs are expected to gradually rise as poor households will most likely exhaust their food stocks from the below-average harvest atypically early. At the same time, high food prices and below-normal income will increasingly place constraints on the purchasing power of poor households. In most areas, an increasing number of people are expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from February to May, and a subset of the population will likely deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Emergency (IPC Phase 4) area-level outcomes are expected in remote areas of Tigray, which are mainly located along the border with Eritrea. 

In the rest of northeastern Amhara, 2024 meher production prospects are better than in Wag Himra and will likely improve food security significantly. Green and dry harvests began in October, enhancing household food availability and access. Staple food prices are expected to remain stable due to the fresh harvest supply and reduced demand, and this combined with seasonal agricultural income are expected to improve household purchasing power. However, conflict-driven constraints on income sources will persist, meaning households will face difficulty meeting their food consumption needs without foregoing other essential non-food needs or investment in their livelihood. Additionally, while food stocks from the expected near-average meher harvest are anticipated to last through April/May, some poor households may have lower yields and will deplete their stocks earlier. Therefore, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through May, with a rising number of households in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) expected between February and May.

In belg-producing areas of Amhara, the ongoing meher harvest will add to existing household food stocks from the prior 2024 belg harvest, with stocks expected to last through January 2025; however, conflict will negatively impact income from labor, self-employment, and other livelihood activities. Consequently, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through January, with some households likely experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3). After January, food insecurity is expected to deteriorate as food availability and access decline, exacerbated by low purchasing power due to conflict-related income deficits and expected high food prices. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to emerge in February and persist through May.

Northern pastoral areas (Afar)

Most households in Afar Region will likely face moderate to significant food consumption gaps due to a lack of access to meaningful income sources through at least May. While some improvement in milk availability is expected from large ruminant livestock between January and April, overall levels of milk production will remain below average, especially in conflict-affected woredas in Zones 2 and 4. This is due to both low herd sizes and the anticipated below-average 2025 sugum rains. Recovery of pastoralist livelihood assets takes a long time given that there are only 1-2 livestock birth cycles per year. Food prices are also expected to rise significantly due to increased transportation costs and anticipated weak macroeconomic conditions, further limiting households’ food access. Poor households are expected to face food consumption gaps, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes expected in western Afar and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes expected in the rest of Afar through May.   

Pastoral south and southeast (Somali, Oromia, South Ethiopia)

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, milk production and income from livestock sales are expected to remain below average due to small herd sizes, poor livestock body conditions, and high food prices. Furthermore, the effects of forecasted below-average rainfall on livestock health and saleability are expected to increasingly suppress household income and result in stagnating herd size recovery. In localized riverine and agropastoral areas, the below-average rains will also result in below-average deyr/hageya crop yields and below-normal demand for agricultural labor, affecting another source of income. However, the increased ability for households to access some milk and income from shoat sales, as well as the sharing of food and income among community members, relative to the past few years is expected to mitigate the severity of food consumption deficits among a large share of the population. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through May, with an increasing share of the population likely deteriorating to Emergency (IPC Phase 4), especially in areas along the border with Somalia that were worst-affected by the 2020-2023 drought. These same areas are also forecasted to experience relatively stronger rainfall deficits in late 2024/early 2025 than other areas of the south/southeast. 

Rest of country

In belg-dependent areas of Sidama, Central Ethiopia, and South Ethiopia regions, the 2024 meher production is expected to support sufficient access to food and income among most households through February. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) or Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through January. By March, the main lean season will begin and the majority of poor households (particularly in the low-lying areas of Sidama, Wolayita, Haridya, Gamo, and the southern special woredas) will deplete their food stocks. The anticipated unfavorable 2025 belg rains are then expected to suppress seasonal food and income from own production and agricultural labor from February to May, especially amid expected increases in staple food prices. From February to May, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected along the Rift Valley, while the other areas that have relatively better food availability and access will likely experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes. 

In the lowlands of East and West Hararghe, the Central Rift Valley, and the lowland woredas of Arsi, households are expected to access a typical level of food from their own harvests from October onwards. Staple food prices are anticipated to be stable but high during the harvest period, limiting the extent to which normal levels of cash income from agricultural labor will support their purchasing power. Livestock body conditions and productivity are likely to be normal. While households should be able to meet their minimum food needs, high food and non-food prices will place strain on their ability to cover their essential non-food needs, and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through January. Thereafter, most households are expected to exhaust their food stocks, and they will increasingly struggle to meet their food needs amidst increasingly high staple food prices in the post-harvest period paired with seasonal declines in agricultural labor income. As a result, these areas are expected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes from February to May. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Scale-up of humanitarian food assistance 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If humanitarian food assistance is scaled up and reaches a wider population with at least 25 to 50 percent of monthly kilocalorie needs in areas projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, this holds potential to prevent or mitigate food consumption gaps among at least 20 percent of the population in areas with high food assistance needs. Significant levels of food assistance may result in improvement to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes, respectively. 

Areas of Tigray and northeastern Amhara regions

Escalation in conflict (beyond the level in FEWS NET’s most likely scenario) 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation in conflict beyond that currently projected would limit population movement and further disrupt trade, likely causing a further decline in typical food and income sources and market functioning and supplies. An increase in conflict during the harvest (from October to January) or the 2025 belg agricultural season (beginning in April/May 2025) would be a particularly urgent concern, given the potential to further disrupt access to agricultural labor income sources and the ability to harvest or cultivate own-produced foods. This would likely result in more widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Pastoral areas of southern and southeastern Ethiopia (Somali, Oromia, South Ethiopia)

October to December 2024 deyr/hageya season fails 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Given that livestock holdings are already small, poor households have limited capacity to cope with the effects of a failed rainfall season. Rainfall failure would lead to more severe deterioration in livestock health and reduce the potential for livestock reproduction and milk production. However, given that the past three rainy seasons were favorable, dry pasture and water will be available even in the event of rainfall failure, and households would still be able to engage in some livestock sales to a low degree. A significant increase in the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would likely occur, raising the scale of food assistance needs. 

March to May 2025 gu/genna season fails or is significantly below average

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely during the February to May 2025 period in a scenario where rainfall is significantly below average during the deyr/hageya season and moderately below-average during the gu/genna. However, ff the gu/genna rainfall season fails or is significantly below average, an increase in the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would likely occur. While beyond the projection period, deterioration to area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes would subsequently be expected by the mid-2025 dry season, as households have minimal ability to cope with multiple poor seasons. The failure of the gu/genna season would lead to minimal pasture availability, a rapid decline in already poor livestock body conditions, and severely reduced milk production, limiting income from milk sales. Households would likely rely on coping strategies such as selling their remaining livestock, increasing dependence on community support, migrating to new areas, and begging for assistance.

Teru Pastoral (TER) Livelihood Zone of Afar Region (Figure 13)

Reason for selecting this area: There are multiple areas of high concern in Ethiopia, primarily located in Tigray, northeastern Amhara, and western Afar regions, as well as the pastoral south and southeast in Somali and Oromia regions. FEWS NET has selected the Teru Pastoral Livelihood Zone (the epicenter of the conflict) to illustrate how the long-term impacts of the 2020-2022 conflict in Afar and the 2023 drought are expected to drive Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.

Households mainly rear camels, cattle, and shoats in the TER livelihood zone. While the June to September karma rains in 2024 were broadly average to above average, livestock herd sizes remain far below normal due to the impact of conflict, consecutive years of drought, and related overselling as a negative coping strategy to earn income to purchase food. This is outweighing the positive effects of the recent rains, which restored water and pasture availability to their seasonally normal levels (except for the localized areas of Dubti and Kori, which experienced localized dry spells and below-average rainfall in August). While livestock body conditions are normal and milk availability, particularly from goats, has improved compared to recent years, livestock milk production remains significantly below normal overall. Additionally, the first favorable cycle of livestock births and milk production from cattle and camels in several years will not occur until January 2025.  

Maize is a major staple food in the livelihood zone and was previously sourced from the neighboring North Wello woreda in Amhara and areas of southern Tigray, but ongoing conflict in Amhara is disrupting market and trade activities around and between these locations, forcing most households to access food primarily from Logia/Semera. The supply of maize and other grains (such as sorghum and beans) is declining seasonally, and when combined with high transportation costs and currency devaluation, is driving an increase in prices above last year’s levels. In September, 100 kg of maize sold for 7,200 ETB in Logia, similar to the preceding month but nearly 25 percent higher compared to September 2023.

In addition to conflict in Amhara, political instability in Tigray is contributing to disruption in typical market activities, mainly by forcing households to pursue livestock trading activities in local and regional markets rather than in more profitable markets in western Tigray and Amhara. The oversupply of livestock relative to local demand is resulting in the stagnation of livestock prices despite the recent improvements in livestock body conditions, which would normally be associated with an increase in value relative to recent drought years. While livestock prices exhibited a slight increase in August/September, this was primarily associated with seasonal demand for the Ethiopian New Year and Finding of the True Cross (Meskel) Festivities, and the trend is not expected to last. In September, a medium-sized goat price sold for 4,320 ETB on the Logia market, 3.5 and 10.3 percent higher than the previous month and September 2023, respectively. The more important indicator is the goat-to-maize terms of trade, which have been low since November 2023, primarily due to rising maize prices. In August 2024, a household could purchase only about 48 kg of maize with the sale a medium-sized goat, compared to 80 kg of maize for the same goat in August 2023.

Non-pastoral income sources are limited. Poor and very poor households typically seek construction labor in towns, but this demand for construction labor is impacted by poor economic conditions, while the routes that would enable them to migrate to the towns remain insecure. Gifts, remittances, and social support have also remained low, as many middle and better-off households were negatively impacted by conflict and weather shocks in 2020-2023 and have less disposable income to share as gifts. Meanwhile, urban households and relatives working abroad (primarily in Arab countries) either face an increased cost of living or low wage rates, reducing their ability to send remittances or to send as much as before. In addition, while PSNP distributions to direct beneficiaries has been ongoing for 10 months with increased wages (from 84 to 114 ETB/person/day), the new wage rate can only purchase the same amount of maize as last year at the old rate due to high food prices. A total of 16,665 direct support beneficiaries have been assisted in this livelihood zone. 

As of August 2024, overall humanitarian assistance in TER livelihood zone has been irregular and inadequate. Since April 2024, only Teru woreda in Zone 4 has received humanitarian assistance. In Zone 2, Erbti and Megale woredas received regular assistance through August. 

As a result, most poor households in the TER livelihood zone face moderate to large food consumption gaps. A livelihood-based SMART+ survey undertaken in July 2024 in the TER livelihood zone, which covered many woredas of Zone 4 and Zone 2, revealed a Critical level of Acute Malnutrition (GAM of 19.4 percent). The severity of household food security outcome indicators strongly suggest these high levels of malnourishment are drive by poor food intake, with 37 and 45 percent of the population have borderline and poor Food Consumption Scores, respectively, and 31 percent and 19 percent of households reporting moderate and severe hunger, respectively, using the Household Hunger Scale. Over 80 percent of the community also reported using at least one negative food consumption-based coping strategy. Taken together, the convergence of all available evidence is strongly indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes.   

Food and income sources are not expected to meaningfully increase between October and May. While some improvements in milk availability are expected (particularly from cattle/camels between January and April), overall livestock production will remain very low compared to normal, and recent gains in livestock productivity will most likely be set back by the anticipated below-average March to May 2025 sugum rains. The associated decline in pasture and water availability is anticipated to affect livestock body conditions, leading to below-normal reproduction in 2025. Staple food prices are also expected to rise heading into 2025, further constraining household purchasing power. Poor and very poor households are expected to continue to experience large food consumption deficits, resulting in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May.