Peak lean season emerges as El Niño stalls kiremt rains, risking seasonal recovery

• From June to September as the 2026 lean season peaks, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in northern, central, and southern areas is most likely due to high food prices, limited income-earning opportunities, and high market reliance. Concurrently, the belg harvest is improving food access in East and West Hararghe, Tigray, Amhara, and South Ethiopia regions. In East and West Hararghe, the increased availability of green maize and sweet potatoes is improving household food and income access, reducing food consumption gaps among agropastoral households, though Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to persist in the lowlands due to lower productivity.
• Starting in October, despite the likely below-average meher harvest, the food that becomes available is expected to improve food access to support improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Although, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will most likely persist where conflict and localized crop losses and continued weak purchasing power limit food access, including conflict-affected areas of Tigray and Amhara, northern pastoral areas, and much of the pastoral south and southeast. 
• In the pastoral south and southeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to persist through at least January 2027, with some households facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes. This is driven by the cumulative effects of poor early 2026 rainfall and slow recovery from prior droughts. The most severe conditions are expected in the southeastern parts of the country where the March to May 2026 rainfall season performed below average, limiting pasture regeneration, water availability, and livestock productivity. El Niño-related flooding risks during the deyr/hageya October to December rains due is likely to threaten crops and livestock health.
• The ongoing El Niño is expected to result in below-average June/July to September kiremt/karan/karma rainfall, with the largest deficits forecast in central and northeastern areas. The deficits are likely to negatively affect meher production, particularly rainfed maize and sorghum in eastern Amhara, Tigray, northeastern Oromia, and other areas of central and northeastern cropping areas. Short-cycle crops (typically planted in June/July and harvested in October) will likely be impacted if prolonged dry spells occur during critical growth stages.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 30, 2026. 

Ethiopia’s livelihood systems are shaped by rugged geography and multiple, overlapping rainy seasons, which define production patterns and seasonal food and income dynamics across the country. The three primary rural livelihood systems — pastoral, agropastoral, and cropping — are closely tied to rainfall timing and sequencing. 

In northern and central cropping areas, the main kiremt rains run June to September, overlapping with the July-September karan/karma rains in northern pastoral areas. The main meher harvest then begins in the north and advances south through the end of the year. The October-December deyr/hageya rains in the pastoral south and southeast close out the year. The first rains of the calendar year include the February-May belg in some northern and central areas, the March-May gu/genna rains in the pastoral south and southeast, and the April to May diraac/sugum rains in northern pastoral areas. In cropping and agropastoral areas, the lean season typically coincides with peak rainy months, when household stocks are lowest. In pastoral areas, lean seasons align with dry periods, when livestock births and milk production are limited.

Between 2020 and 2023, compounding conflict, drought, and economic shocks severely eroded household assets and access to typical food and income sources, especially in the north and pastoral south and southeast. Poor households relied heavily on humanitarian assistance, community support, and negative coping strategies. Recovery of livestock herds, labor markets, and household assets is expected to take years, leaving households highly vulnerable to future shocks.

Across livelihood systems, market access plays a central role in food security outcomes, as many poor households are net food buyers for much of the year. Structural factors — including high population density and land fragmentation in the highlands, limited income diversification, and widespread underemployment — constrain livelihood capacity even in average years. Chronic malnutrition remains prevalent, further limiting households’ ability to withstand shocks. The Productive Safety Net Program remains an important source of food access for many poor households.

In northern Ethiopia, livelihoods remain severely affected by the 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray. Although the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement formally ended large-scale fighting, insecurity persists in contested and hard-to-reach areas, including West Tigray and areas along the Eritrean border. Internal divisions within the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) also raise concerns about the durability of the agreement. In Amhara, clashes between Fano militias and government forces continue to disrupt road access and market activity, while in western Oromia, conflict between the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) and government forces constrains typical livelihood activities.

In northern cropping areas, including Tigray and Amhara, households primarily depend on crop production, labor migration, and PSNP for food and income. Crops are typically planted with the kiremt rains, with green harvests beginning in September ahead of the main meher harvest. In a typical year, households rely on own-produced stocks through at least February, after which market purchases increase. Poor households also commonly rely on seasonal labor migration during the kiremt season, though insecurity and access constraints have reduced these opportunities.

In northern pastoral areas such as Afar, livestock births and milk production typically peak in April/May and July/August, providing critical food and income. Conflict-related livestock losses have left many very poor households with few animals. Poor households also rely on casual labor, firewood and bush product sales, and PSNP assistance, particularly between February and July. In eastern agropastoral areas, including much of eastern Oromia and adjacent lowlands, households pursue mixed livelihoods based on rainfed cereals, pulses, and small ruminants. In East and West Hararghe, khat production is especially important and often accounts for roughly half of total household income.

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, food and income from livestock production — particularly milk, births, and sales — typically peak after seasonal improvements linked to the gu/genna and deyr/hageya rains, with additional income generated during periods of strong domestic and export demand, including around the Hajj. Food and income are lowest during the dry seasons from January to March and August to October, when reduced pasture and water availability drive declining livestock body conditions. The 2020-2023 drought sharply reduced herd sizes, leaving many poor households with minimal livestock holdings. Since then, mixed seasonal performance — including the extremely dry October to December 2025 deyr/hageya — has slowed herd regeneration. As a result, some households increasingly rely on agricultural labor, community support, or limited cropping near rivers.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Ethiopia Food Security Outlook: February to September 2026
• Latest Food Security Outlook Update for Ethiopia: April to September 2026 
• Latest Ethiopia Key Message Update: May 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis 
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Countrywide

The June to September kiremt rainfall and associated agricultural activities, which typically begin in June, have yet to fully establish across most of the country. As of June 20, rainfall deficits exceed 100 millimeters in some areas, marking the driest start of season on record in central Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. The delayed start of the season is raising concerns for meher planting amid forecast below-average kiremt rains. Land preparation and planting are delayed; in Tigray, less than half of the average long-cycle crop area has been planted, according to the regional Disaster Risk Management (DRM) office.

Macroeconomic conditions are characterized by high inflation, exchange rate depreciation, and constrained foreign exchange availability. According to the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS), annual headline inflation increased to 13.4 percent in May 2026 – the highest level in 10 months.

Diesel prices rose by approximately 40 percent nationally between December 2025 and May 2026, following three successive fuel price adjustments. In localized areas of northern Afar, low fuel stocks have pushed fuel prices to more than 60 percent higher than regulated national prices. 

Food prices have reached their highest levels in 2026 due to high transportation costs, despite sufficient market supply. In May, maize prices are 12 percent above March levels in Addis, while maize and sorghum prices in Sekota rose by 23 and 26 percent compared to April, respectively, and were more than double the five-year average. 

Labor demand for land preparation and planting of meher crops is below average. However, the wage rate remains above average at 400-600 ETB/day in crop-dependent areas and 700-800 ETB/day in pastoral areas, which between 80 and 114 percent higher than the five-year average wage rate. 

Northeastern cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

March to May 2026 belg rainfall was poorly distributed in North Wello, South Wello, North Shewa, and South Tigray zones, despite favorable rains in most other belg-benefiting areas of the country. While the season began with favorable rainfall, rains ended early in some areas, causing moisture stress and crop wilting during critical growth stages, reducing harvest prospects. The belg harvest is delayed and likely to start in July, as crops are still maturing. 

Conflict between armed groups continues across Amhara with a marked increase in violence ahead of the elections in early June. Clashes between armed groups in Tsagibji woreda in Wag Himra Zone drove the displacement of 4,000 additional people to Sekota in May. Conflict continued to escalate in Amhara, though conflict incidents declined in Oromia. 

In Tigray, political tensions escalated following the TPLF's reinstatement of the pre-war council and government formation in May. Afterwards, a series of airstrikes in northern Tigray and skirmishes along the western Afar and South Tigray border were reported. 

Conflict is disrupting local livelihood activities and market function (Figure 1), though in many areas activities quickly resume when fighting subsides. Non-agricultural labor opportunities, particularly those associated with urban construction and related activities, remain severely constrained due to insecurity. Access to typical labor migration opportunities – including sesame farms in the west – remains limited.

Eastern meher cropping areas (East and West Hararghe)

Households – particularly in East Hararghe – planted short-maturing varieties of maize and sorghum early to take advantage of the favorable belg rainfall, given concerns for El Niño-driven below-average June to September kiremt rainfall. As of mid-June, the Zonal DRM reported 77 percent of land planted in East Hararghe in anticipation of below-average kiremt rain, whereas only 40 percent was planted in West Hararghe following more typical planting schedules. 

Northern pastoral areas (Afar and northern Somali)

Despite the favorable March-May sugum/diraac rainy season, high daily temperatures have driven rapid pasture deterioration, resulting in below-average pasture availability, particularly in northern Afar. Migration to better pasture has resulted in favorable livestock conditions; however, below-average herd sizes are driving below-average milk production, livestock sales, and herding labor.

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas (southern Somali and southern Oromia)

The March to May gu/genna rains were mixed, with the largest precipitation deficits in Dollo, Korahe, and parts of Shabelle zones. In these areas, rainfall was more than 50 percent below average, limiting sustained pasture and water regeneration, which will drive early pasture depletion. 

Heavy rainfall caused late-April flooding in low-lying areas along the Shabelle River. According to a May multi-agency assessment, the flooding affected 7,700 acres of crops at or near the harvesting stage, displaced 2,500 households, and disrupted livelihoods for 9,000 households. In Afder Zone, flooding washed away salt reserves, stored salt, and production sites, disrupting an important income source. 

Humanitarian food assistance

According the Joint Emergency Operation Program (JEOP) and the Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC), approximately 1.1 million people received food assistance in May, with distributions concentrated in Amhara and Tigray, a 59 percent reduction compared to March. 

Refugee food assistance remains constrained by funding-levels, fuel shortages, and – in Gambela – insecurity. Established refugees continue receiving rations equivalent to 60 percent of the standard ration, while newly arrived refugees, including those who face registration delays in Luakdong, receive full rations.

Northeastern cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

As the peak of the lean season begins, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in central and eastern areas of Tigray and Amhara, with some households, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), experiencing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Poor households have been completely market-reliant for over five months amid below-average income and purchasing power, driven by conflict-related disruptions to livelihood activities and high staple food prices. Furthermore, the belg harvest is delayed, extending the lean season. To meet food needs, households are engaging in atypical labor migration to distant towns or abroad, increasing sales of firewood and eucalyptus poles, and increasing engagement in artisanal mining activities, though these opportunities are irregular and limited. Although households are substituting preferred foods for cheaper alternatives, their income is insufficient to meet their minimal food needs, causing food consumption gaps. For IDPs and very poor households along the Tekeze River, limited access to land, livestock, and labor income is constraining coping capacity. Many are resorting to begging while still facing significant food consumption gaps; although some households are receiving food assistance that is mitigating these deficits, a proportion of these households remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Eastern cropping areas (East and West Hararghe)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are occurring in lowland East and West Hararghe, while midland and highland areas are Stressed (IPC Phase 2) following belg-related improvements in pasture and harvest availability. Improved livestock conditions are supporting goat milk consumption and sales, while limited production of green maize, sweet potatoes and haricot beans is improving food consumption and income from crop sales. However, lowland households are still recovering from livestock production losses after two consecutive poor seasons. Poor households are minimizing non-food expenditures, increasing livestock, firewood, and charcoal sales, and engaging in casual labor opportunities including labor migration, though food consumption deficits persist in the lowlands. 

Northern pastoral areas (Afar and northern Somali)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are persisting in northern Afar, as poor households continue to face high food prices, limited income, and few remaining assets following prior livestock losses and asset sales. Multiple poor rain seasons have eroded livestock holdings and slowed recovery, and conflict in Tigray continues to limit livestock marketing, labor migration, and other livelihood opportunities. To access food, poor households are relying on livelihood coping strategies, including increased firewood and charcoal sales, borrowing, migration for casual labor , and zeka (community support from better-off households). Even with these strategies, households shifted to low-grade wheat and rice instead of their preferred maize, sorghum, and higher-grade wheat, while goat milk consumption remains limited. These food and income sources are reducing, but not eliminating, food consumption gaps among poor households. In southern Afar and northern Somali, better market access, typical herd sizes, and typical production and productivity levels, coupled with relatively good rainfall performance are driving localized Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas (southern Somali and southern Oromia)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist across southern and southeastern pastoral areas where poor pasture availability and slow recovery from previous droughts has constrained livestock productivity and household income. Recovery from the 2020-2023 severe drought has stalled due to mixed rainfall seasons in 2025 and 2026, limiting households’ ability to access sufficient income from livestock for food purchases, especially as herd sizes remain below average and high food prices persist. Reduced milk for sale and consumption and declining livestock-to-cereal terms of trade continue to limit household food access. To access income, households are increasing livestock sales despite below-average herd sizes and low prices, and more heavily rely on firewood and charcoal sales. Reliance on community support mechanisms are also increasing, including zeka support and irmaansi (temporary access to lactating animals for milk).

Central cropping areas (Sidama, Central Ethiopia, and South Ethiopia)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is ongoing across meher-dominant central cropping areas where the June to September lean season has begun, reflecting seasonal increases in market reliance to access food and food prices. Income from agricultural labor and sales of livestock and livestock products are providing some food and income; however, these sources remain insufficient and purchasing power remains weak. As a result, many households are still facing food consumption deficits and are employing livelihood coping strategies, including migration to neighboring towns and firewood and charcoal sales.  

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are present in areas where the belg harvest is providing access to income-earning opportunities and own-produced foods. However, rising staple food prices mean poor households can only marginally meet their basic food requirements and are unable to acquire non-food essentials. 

Refugees

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is ongoing among refugee populations. With limited access to labor, productive assets, and sufficient assistance, many refugee households are expected to rely on community support, while still facing food consumption gaps. Meanwhile, ongoing refugee arrivals from neighboring countries are likely to continue placing pressure on limited humanitarian resources and host communities. 

• The June belg harvest is likely to be below average and delayed in some highland areas of Tigray and Amhara.

• The June to September kiremt rains and the July to September karan/karma rains are likely to be below average, with significant rainfall deficits indicative of drought expected in northeastern and central areas (Figure 2). Unseasonal rain is likely in October to January across meher harvesting regions in the north, northwest, and central highlands.
• The October to December deyr/hageya rains are likely to be above average in the south and southeast pastoral areas, driving an above-average risk of flash flooding.
• The meher harvest is likely to be below average nationally, driven by poor kiremt rainfall and below-average access to agricultural inputs. The largest production deficits are expected in northern, central, southern, and eastern areas. Expected above-average fertilizer prices due to the crisis in the Middle East Further are also likely to negatively impact the meher harvest. Conflict in Amhara and western Oromia will also affect the timeliness of agricultural input distribution in those areas.
• Agricultural labor demand is likely to be below average due to the anticipated negative impacts of poor rainfall on land preparation, planting, crop cultivation, and harvesting.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor, and inflation is likely to remain high, near current levels. Similarly, the ETB is expected to continue deteriorating during the projection period. 
• Market function and trade flows are expected to be normal in much of the country; however, disruptions and restricted trader and good movements are likely in conflict-affected areas, particularly western Oromia, Amhara, bordering areas of Tigray, and some areas bordering Afar. 
• Fuel prices are expected to remain above average, with additional domestic price adjustments likely through the remainder of 2026 as Ethiopia maintains its fuel pricing reforms and exchange-rate depreciation continues to increase import costs. This will subsequently maintain elevated transport costs, contributing to above-average food marketing costs and upward pressure on staple food prices during the lean period between June and September 2026.
• Staple food prices are expected to rise from June to September, remaining well above average due to seasonal supply declines and high transport costs linked to elevated fuel prices. From October to January, prices will likely remain stable but above the five-year average due to anticipated below-average meher production.
• Water and pasture availability in northern and central pastoral areas are expected to be marginally available with the onset of karan/karma rains, but will deteriorate atypically early starting in October due to below-average rainfall. In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, water and pasture availability will likely remain below average through the long June to September dry season, though conditions are expected to improve to above-average levels with the likely favorable deyr/hageya rains. 
• Livestock body conditions and productivity in northern areas are expected to remain below average as limited pasture and water beginning in October will reduce reproduction, milk production, and livestock values. In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, body conditions are also expected to remain below average, particularly where poor early 2025 rains slowed recovery; however, conditions will likely improve in late 2026, while productivity remains below normal due to reduced herd sizes.
• Livestock prices in northern pastoral areas are expected to remain below average due to poor body conditions and weak market linkages with Tigray and Amhara. However, seasonal demand during major holidays and religious celebrations will likely temporarily improve livestock demand and prices. In the pastoral south and southeast, livestock prices are anticipated to remain above average, driven by continued inflationary pressures.
• Conflict in Amhara – and to a lesser extent Oromia – will likely remain high, with both Fano and OLA continuing to fight against the ENDF. 
• Tensions in Tigray are likely to remain elevated through January 2027. The federal government will likely avoid direct confrontation with the TPLF/TDF in the near term. However, even low-level skirmishes could draw in further ENDF involvement, raising the risk of a conventional war in Tigray. 
• Displacement is likely to increase, driven by an anticipated increase in conflict intensity between the armed forces in Amhara, Tigray, and Oromia and the ENDF.
• Refugee populations are likely to increase due to the ongoing conflicts in South Sudan and Sudan.
• Khat export volumes and income revenue from the global market are likely to remain low as regional instability intensifies.  
• PSNP transfers between June and December 2026 are likely to be limited to direct support beneficiaries only. The full-scale renewed PSNP program implementation is likely to start in January 2027. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• The government of Ethiopia is expected to respond as feasible to shocks and food security emergencies, with case-by-case distributions targeting those most in need. 
• Food assistance distributions to refugees are expected to remain slow in reaching beneficiaries given the continued high influx of new arrivals, resource constraints, and the limited capacity of the Refugees and Returnees Service (RRS). 

Northeastern cropping areas (eastern Tigray and Amhara)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist as the lean season peaks, with households relying on market purchases amid rising food prices, limited income-earning opportunities, and reduced safety net assistance. Households will likely rely on migration to urban centers domestically and abroad; borrowing from relatives; livestock, firewood, and charcoal sales; and artisanal mining. Minimal diets will remain unaffordable and food consumption gaps will persist. Labor-poor IDPs and some very poor households along the Tekeze River that face prolonged market reliance will likely be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These households are expected to engage in more severe coping strategies, including excessive livestock sales, begging, and taking loans; significant food consumption gaps are expected, likely contributing to acute malnutrition. 

In October, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to emerge with the meher harvest and persist through January, as households access own-produced food. While the meher harvest is expected to be below average, food stocks are expected to last three months. In areas along the Tekeze River catchment, however, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to persist. Below-average and erratic rainfall is expected to drive significant meher crop losses, particularly given small farm sizes . Limited livestock holdings and income will reduce households’ ability to offset these losses, constraining coping capacity. Poor households in these areas will likely rely on livestock, firewood, and charcoal sales; labor migration; and loans, while still facing food consumption gaps.

Eastern cropping areas (East and West Hararghe)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in lowland areas through January 2027. Households are expected to consume belg crops and goat milk through September. Long-cycle meher crops planted during the belg rains and short-cycle meher crops planted in kiremt season will likely begin to be harvested in October, but below-average production will drive continued reliance on markets, supported by livestock, firewood and charcoal sales; and casual labor. Limited income and high staple food prices will drive moderate food consumption gaps. In the midland and highlands, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are projected through January 2027. Lower moisture stress is expected to support better crop production, while crop residues and marginal pasture improvements will continue to support milk consumption and livestock sales. Income from khat production in higher-elevation areas will support food access. Upland households will likely minimally meet their food needs but remain unable to afford non-food essentials.

Northern pastoral areas (Afar and northern Somali)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to persist through January 2027 in conflict- and drought-affected areas of northern Afar. Although near-average March to May diraac/sugum rainfall improved livestock productivity, recovery is expected to remain below average as poor July to September karma/karan rainfall constrains gains. Milk consumption and sales will improve but remain below average. Households are expected to increase labor migration to urban areas; sell livestock, firewood, and charcoal; and rely on zeka support, yet they are unlikely to meet minimum food needs, driving persistent food consumption deficits through January. 

Agropastoral areas of Fafan Zone, northern Somali, are expected to likewise face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June through September, but access to own-produced crops beginning in October will improve outcomes to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Other areas of southern areas of Afar and northern Somali will remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through January 2027. Near-average March to May diraac/sugum rainfall, coupled with access to pasture along the Awash River Basin, is expected to support livestock productivity and milk consumption. Poor households will also access income from local agricultural labor opportunities and zeka support. Combined, these food and income sources are expected to enable poor households to minimally meet food needs.

South and Southeast pastoral areas (southern Somali, southern Oromia, and eastern South Ethiopia)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are likely to persist among poor households, with some households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly in Dollo, Korahe, and parts of Shebelle Zone, where the gu/genna March to May rainfall season was below average. Although October to December deyr/hageya rainfall is expected to improve livestock body conditions, sale prices, and milk consumption, recovery will remain slow. Poor households are expected to sell livestock, firewood, and charcoal. However, high food prices will limit purchasing power, and even cheaper food purchases and zeka support, households are unlikely to meet minimum food needs. Areas where pasture quality remains poor are likely to have more severe food consumption gaps and a higher share of households in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

Central and southern cropping (Sidama, Central Ethiopia, and South Ethiopia)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist from June to September in most meher-dependent areas, as households rely heavily on market purchases amid seasonally high staple food prices and limited agricultural labor income due to poor kiremt rainfall. Poor households will continue to earn income by migrating to neighboring towns in search of work, engaging in petty trade, and selling firewood and charcoal. Food consumption gaps will persist until the meher harvest in October improves access to own-produced crops and seasonal income, supporting improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2). 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario. 
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National

Significantly below-average meher production in northern, central, and eastern areas

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If kiremt rainfall performs worse than currently anticipated, leading to significantly below-average meher production in northern, central, and eastern cropping areas, food security outcomes could remain in or deteriorate to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse, rather than improving to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) following the meher harvest in late 2026 as currently anticipated. 

In many meher-dependent areas, poor households have relied on markets since as early as January following below-average 2025 production and have already been using livelihood coping strategies for several months, including labor migration, livestock and firewood sales, borrowing, and petty trade. Further rainfall underperformance or prolonged delays would reduce agricultural labor demand during the growing season and could result in reduced area planted, crop wilting, delayed crop development, and significant meher crop losses. A reduced harvest would also limit the typical seasonal increase in own-produced food and income from crop sales in October as the meher harvest becomes available, while increasing staple food prices, which would likely remain high in many areas. In this scenario, many poor households would likely intensify livelihood coping while still facing food consumption gaps, and the lean season could begin as early as late 2026 in the worst-affected cropping areas, instead of around July.

Northeastern meher cropping areas (eastern Amhara and Tigray)

Intensification and expansion of conflict in Tigray

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If a major intensification and expansion of armed confrontation involving the TDF, Fano armed groups, and the ENDF occurred during the lean season, livelihood activities would be severely disrupted, constraining agricultural labor opportunities, trade flows, and market functioning at a time when staple food prices are already high and most poor households are highly market dependent. Population displacement would further reduce household access to food and income. As a result, many poor households would likely face large food consumption gaps and experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

If such an intensification occurred during the harvest period, the harvest would still provide some seasonal improvement in accessing food from own production; however, agricultural labor opportunities would be disrupted, and insecurity could prevent households from harvesting their crops, resulting in partial or complete crop losses. Population displacement would further limit access to harvested production. Trade and market functioning would also be disrupted, reducing market supplies and putting pressure on staple food prices. Consequently, most households would likely face food consumption gaps and be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

Northern pastoral areas

Significantly below-average pasture

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In northern pastoral and agropastoral areas, worse-than-anticipated karma/karan rainfall would limit pasture and water availability, slow or reverse livestock body condition recovery, and reduce milk availability for consumption and sale. Livestock prices would likely decline as body conditions deteriorate, while staple food prices remain elevated, further weakening livestock-to-cereal terms of trade and household purchasing power. Poor households, particularly those with below-average herd sizes following recent droughts, would likely intensify livelihood coping, including increased livestock, firewood, and charcoal sales; local and international labor migration; borrowing; and reliance on zeka support. However, these strategies would likely remain insufficient to prevent widening food consumption gaps. As a result, some pastoral and agropastoral areas currently expected to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) could stay or deteriorate into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse in late 2026, particularly where herd recovery remains limited and market access is constrained.

South and Southeastern pastoral areas

Potential of severe flooding

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The current El Niño, combined with a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), is expected to drive above-average to well above-average October to December 2026 rainfall across the southern and southeastern pastoral and agropastoral areas of Ethiopia. The heaviest rainfall is likely in arid and semi-arid areas, increasing the risk of flash flooding and riverine flooding, particularly along the Genale, Dawa, and Wabi Shabelle river basins. 

If flooding is more severe than anticipated – akin to 2019 – then roads market infrastructure and other critical infrastructure will likely be damaged, disrupting market access, and livestock movement. Flooding would also displace households, damage crops and pasture in localized areas, and contribute to soil erosion. In the most severely flood-affected areas, these impacts would likely result in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes

El Niño and the June to September kiremt rainfall forecast

El Niño is expected to persist at least through January 2027, overlapping with two critical rainfall seasons in Ethiopia: the June/July to September kiremt and karan/karma rains across much of central, northern, northeastern, and eastern Ethiopia, as well as the October to December deyr/hageya rains in southern and southeastern areas. Typically, El Niño events are associated with suppressed kiremt and karan/karma rainfall – including below-average totals, delayed onset, uneven distribution, prolonged dry spells and/or early cessation – as well as excessive rains for the deyr/hageya rains.

Forecasts from NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center and Physical Sciences Laboratory, the Ethiopian Meteorological Institute, the IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre, and other global climate centers all indicate an increased chance of below-normal rainfall during the June to September kiremt season (Figure 2). Already, rainfall totals for June are well below average across many kiremt-benefiting areas of the country, with central and northeastern areas experiencing the largest deficits. This trend is expected to continue, with greater deficits expected in central and northeastern areas. Since these areas typically receive less seasonal rain compared to western areas, the impact of reduced rainfall will likely be significant. Forecast above-average temperatures are likely to compound the impacts of below-average rainfall by accelerating soil moisture loss and heightening crop moisture stress.

In the south, above-average October to December deyr/hageya rainfall is forecast by NOAA’s Physical Sciences Laboratory (Figure 3) and the potential interaction with a positive Indian Ocean Dipole could further increase the likelihood of heavy rainfall and flooding. As a result, while the deyr/hageya rains typically support pasture and water regeneration, this year they pose risks of flash floods, riverine flooding, displacement, market disruptions, disease outbreaks, livestock disease, and post-harvest losses, particularly if rainfall is intense or erratically distributed.

The severity of impacts will depend on the timing, duration, and spatial distribution of rainfall deficits from June/July to September, the extent to which high temperatures compound moisture stress, and whether heavy October to December rainfall results in flooding and related disruptions.

Potential food security impacts through January 2027

Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are occurring across northeastern, central, and southern Ethiopia as the peak lean season begins between June and September. These outcomes are driven by conflict and insecurity in the north and parts of Oromia, weak macroeconomic conditions, high fuel and food prices, and recent agricultural losses (maize and sorghum stocks are already below the five-year average nationally). Across different regions of Ethiopia, El Niño-related rainfall anomalies are expected to compound existing shocks and further constrain household food and income access. 

The kiremt rains support the October to December meher harvest, Ethiopia’s main annual cereal harvest, which contributes over 85 percent of domestic production. As a result, while the performance of the kiremt rainfall season will shape household food availability in crop-dependent areas, it also influences national cereal supply, import requirements, and staple food prices over the following year.

Meher-dependent cropping areas: Through September, the most immediate impacts in meher-dependent areas are expected through reduced agricultural labor demand and lower purchasing power during the peak lean season. Delayed, erratic, or below-average rainfall is likely to reduce cropped area and delay planting and weeding labor demand, lowering poor households’ income when food stocks are low and staple food prices are seasonally high.

From October through January, below-average kiremt rainfall is expected to reduce meher production, particularly rainfed maize and sorghum in eastern Amhara, Tigray, northeastern Oromia, and other central-northern and northeastern areas. Short-cycle crops planted in June or July and harvested around October are also likely to be affected where dry spells occur during critical growth stages. Western and southwestern areas are expected to face less severe production impacts. Production losses are expected to be particularly consequential for very poor and poor households in crop-dependent areas, where crop production covers on average 50 percent of annual kilocalorie needs across livelihood zones. Historical anomalies suggest that yields for maize and sorghum could be 30 percent or more below average (Figure 4). Market and input conditions are likely to compound the price impacts of poor production, with high fuel prices expected to raise transportation and production costs and increase upward pressure on staple food prices as domestic supply tightens after the meher harvest.

Northern agropastoral and pastoral areas: Below-average karma/karan rainfall is expected to limit pasture and water regeneration during a critical period for livestock recovery. These areas have already experienced the cumulative effects of prior below-average rainfall, reduced pasture and water availability, and weakened livestock body conditions. As a result, below-average karma/karan rainfall and above-average temperatures are expected to limit improvements in livestock body conditions, reduce milk availability, and lower livestock sale values. Poor households are likely to face weaker livestock-to-cereal terms of trade, particularly as staple food prices remain high.

In some areas of southern Afar and northern Somali, there is a chance that unseasonable rains will occur between October to December during what is typically a dry period for the area. These unseasonable rains could improve pasture and water availability and contribute to improved livestock conditions and damage crops that are nearing harvest-time.

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas: Anticipated above-average October to December deyr/hageya rainfall may improve pasture and water availability from October, supporting some recovery in livestock body conditions, milk production, births, and sale values. However, the scale of improvement will likely be limited by depleted herd sizes, high debt, weak purchasing power, and limited assets following prior drought and recent poor or mixed seasonal performance. At the same time, El Nino conditions – particularly if reinforced by the Indian Ocean Dipole – increase the risk of heavy rainfall and severe flooding in the eastern Horn. Given the experience of past El Niño/IOD events, including 2019, intense rainfall could drive flash floods and riverine flooding, displacement, market and trade disruptions, livestock disease, waterborne disease outbreaks, and post-harvest losses. As a result, the deyr/hageya rains present both recovery potential and significant downside risks before more meaningful livelihood improvements can materialize.

Overall, El Niño is likely to negatively impact acute food insecurity across Ethiopia through January 2027, with impacts varying by rainfall season and region and extending into 2027. If below-average rainfall, high temperatures, and conflict-related disruptions reduce the 2026 meher harvest, households will enter the post-harvest period with lower food stocks, weaker income, and greater market dependence. As stocks decline and prices rise seasonally, food consumption gaps and acute malnutrition risks are likely to widen, with needs potentially peaking during the June-September 2027 lean season.