Food access expected to improve for millions in October with meher harvest

• Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected from June to September in northern conflict- and drought-affected areas. The aftermath of the 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray, northern Amhara, and northwest Afar – as well as the ongoing conflict in Amhara – continues to constrain sources of food and income, leaving poor households heavily reliant on humanitarian food assistance and social support. There is a risk of more extreme outcomes until the meher harvest becomes available in September/October. 
• While relative improvement to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are likely in most of the conflict-affected north from October to January, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely persist in Afar. Staple food prices are expected to decline with the meher harvest, and average cash income from agricultural labor should improve household purchasing power across the country. However, poor households in conflict-affected Zone 2 and Zone 4 of Afar, along with several woredas in Zone 1, poor households are still expected to engage in severe livelihood coping strategies amid poor purchasing power.  
• In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected from June to January. Pastoralists’ access to food and income from livestock remains low due to the lingering impact of 2020-2023 drought, including among the large internally displaced population. Forecast models show an increasing likelihood of a below-average October to December deyr/hageya rainy season. Households in these areas have only had three favorable seasons to start recovery of their assets from the prior drought; however, heavy rainfall in 2023 and early 2024 drove livestock and crop losses and slowed recovery in many areas. Poor and displaced households still have very few livestock. If rainfall deficits in late 2024 are severe, this may lead to rapid deterioration in acute food insecurity during the subsequent early 2025 dry season. 
• The gradual recovery of livelihoods and markets from the 2020-2022 conflict in the north and 2020-2023 drought in the south is reducing the severity of acute food insecurity in much of Ethiopia, aided by sustained humanitarian assistance. However, food assistance needs remain high as these shocks significantly eroded poor households’ coping capacity, and persistently poor economic conditions prevent broader improvement. Additionally, ongoing conflict in Amhara has driven acute food insecurity in a more densely populated area, contributing to high overall needs in the country.

While food assistance aids in the recovery of northern Ethiopia, the risk of more extreme outcomes persists 

Despite improvements in the severity of acute food insecurity amid recovery from the 2020-2023 drought and 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia is still facing high humanitarian food assistance needs. Localized improvements in livestock conditions and prices, favorable early 2024 harvests in belg and deyr/hageya producing areas, and increases wage labor rates are lessening the severity of acute food insecurity in the country; however, persistently poor macroeconomic conditions and conflict in northern and southern areas are maintaining high needs. Additionally, humanitarian food assistance is playing a notable role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity, notably in northern Ethiopia. Humanitarian food assistance coupled with social support remain critical to preventing severe acute food insecurity and subsequent livelihood collapse, acute malnutrition, and hunger-related mortality, particularly in northern Ethiopia. 

In Tigray and Wag Himra, and adjacent woredas in the north Gondar zones of Amhara, many households continue to face insurmountable barriers to accessing food and are nearly completely reliant on food aid and community support. While household terms of trade have somewhat stabilized in recent months, they remain at below-average levels and poor and displaced households have minimal income with which to purchase at these levels due to low livestock herd sizes, few remaining assets, and an inability to migrate for labor. During the ongoing lean season, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected across much of the region with some households remaining in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). In some areas of the region where humanitarian food assistance is notably lower than the need – including in hard-to-reach areas along the Eritrean border – Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes persist. In Tigray, Wag Himra, and some adjacent areas, there is continued risk of more extreme outcomes through September. More severe outcomes could emerge if social support and food assistance do not continue at current levels (at a minimum) during the lean season. The meher harvest starting in October is expected to alleviate some of the most extreme levels of hunger and acute food insecurity in Tigray and Amhara as households access food from own-production or sharing of harvest. Additionally, households are expected to start accessing increased income from available harvesting activities, improving purchasing power amid decreasing food prices. However, poor households are still expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, and a small subset of the population Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes, because some poor households have limited access to land and will still be reliant sharing of the available harvest and on income for food purchases with improving purchasing power. From October onwards, the risk for more extreme outcomes is expected to be low.

Food security conditions are not expected to improve in adjacent areas of Afar, where Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely to persist. In pastoral communities, livestock are the key food and income source, but households in these areas of Afar have faced severe livestock losses and recovery has been slow. Households with very few or no livestock are nearly completely reliant on wage labor, humanitarian assistance, community support, and selling their last livestock. Households’ ability to access food is expected to only moderately improve as food prices decline in late 2024 and early 2025; however, households are still expected to be selling their last livestock, migrating, and accessing small amounts of income for food purchases. The large food consumption deficits are also expected to be reflected in high levels of acute malnutrition. 

In south and southeastern pastoral areas, widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are also expected. Livestock conditions have generally improved, but poor and very poor households will require additional consecutive seasons of improvement to fully replenish their herds; however, this is not expected to occur due to the forecast for a below-average season in late 2024. Given households lost a significant proportion of their drought by early 2023 and livestock have only had three seasons with a few birthing cycles if rainfall is poor in late 2024, then impacts on livestock production would be more severe and may lead to deterioration in acute food insecurity outcomes, particularly during the subsequent dry season in early 2025. 

Food assistance is expected to reach around 6.4 million people during the June to September period, significantly lower than the estimated population in need. Due to resource shortfalls, WFP is planning to cut rations by decreasing the amount of grain beneficiaries receive from 15 to 12 kg of cereals. In October, as the harvest becomes available, humanitarians plan to reach 5.1 million people, but this target is unlikely to be met given resource limitations. Assistance delivery plans beyond October were not available at the time of the analysis and, as such, FEWS NET’s area-level classifications for the October to January period are in the absence of humanitarian food assistance. 

Learn more

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 30, 2024. Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest February to September 2024 Food Security Outlook 
• Latest April 2024 Food Security Outlook Update 
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Ethiopia's livelihood systems are complex, influenced by the many rainy seasons and rugged geography, which in turn define multiple marketing systems. Ethiopia contains three major rural livelihood systems: pastoral, agropastoral, and cropping. The livelihood systems are deeply rooted in seasonal change, with livelihood activities dictated by the onset of rains, peak of the rainy season, and end of the season. In June, the February to May belg seasonal rainfall is typically ending as the harvest in these areas is beginning. The main rainy season for nearly the entire country (besides the south and southeast) is the June to September kiremt season. The kiremt season is also known as the karan/karma season in the northern pastoral areas, where rainfall tends to dominate in July to September. The other main rainy season occurring during the projection period is the October to December deyr/hageya season, which occurs in the south and southeast pastoral areas. In Ethiopia, the main lean seasons typically align with the main rainy season in cropping and agropastoral areas; in pastoral areas, the lean seasons coincide with the dry seasons when livestock are not likely to be giving birth or milking. 

Ethiopia has faced multiple compounding conflict, drought, and economic shocks across multiple areas of the country since 2020. The shocks were most severe in northern Ethiopia and southern/southeastern pastoral areas of Ethiopia, where household assets and the ability to access typical food and income sources have been severely eroded. Poor households in these areas are now heavily reliant on humanitarian food assistance, community support, and negative coping strategies. The full recovery of livestock herds, labor markets, and overall household assets from conflict and drought is expected to take multiple years, with past shocks increasing household vulnerability to future shocks. 

The 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray Region severely affected livelihoods in Tigray and neighboring areas of Amhara and Afar. While the signing of the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 ended the war, areas remain contested, including West Tigray, areas of South Tigray, and hard-to-reach areas along the border with Eritrea. New conflict erupted in Amhara in late 2022 between FANO militias and government forces. While this conflict has been largely isolated to towns and roadways with limited impacts to civilians, it is negatively impacting trade flows between Amhara and Addis Ababa. Additionally, localized conflict is also a driver of acute food insecurity in areas of Oromia and along the Afar and Somali border. Overall, active conflict disrupts households' normal livelihood activities by limiting their movement to access fields and markets for buying and selling goods, as well as limiting livestock migration in pastoral areas. 

In northern Ethiopia, crops, livestock, and labor migration – along with the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) – are typically the most important sources of food and income throughout the year. Households typically plant crops at the start of the June to September kiremt rains and harvest green crops in September before the main harvest in October. In a year with normal production, the average household can typically rely upon own-production and stocks through at least February. Thereafter, households rely on earning income to purchase food. In Afar, livestock births and milking provide opportunity for food and income, with peak livestock births typically occurring in April/May and July/August. The conflict in northern Ethiopia resulted in few livestock per household (notably the very poor), as livestock were stolen, killed, or used for income during the conflict and drought. Poor households typically engage in labor migration during the kiremt season to work on larger farms in West Tigray and other areas of the country, but these options are currently limited due to continued tensions. Lastly, households also typically rely heavily on PSNP from February to July, which was unavailable from late 2020 to 2023 and PSNP households were then eligible for humanitarians food assistance. In 2024 the program resumed and the duration of the program has been shortened by two months. 

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, food and income from livestock milk production, reproduction, and sales typically peaks as rainfall occurs with the gu/genna season early in the year and deyr/hageya late in the year. Seasonal improvements typically occur from March to May (gu/genna) and October to December (deyr/hageya), and domestic and export demand peaks in June during the Hajj. Food and income are typically lowest during the dry season from January to March and August to October, when livestock body conditions and salability decline along with pasture and water availability. The 2020 to 2023 drought severely eroded livestock herd sizes, and poor households have only minimal livestock holdings. Since the end of the drought, goats have given birth twice; the first meaningful cattle and camel livestock births occurred in May/June 2024. While most households in the last year have benefited from livestock births, meaningful recovery from drought is slower in pastoral communities as livestock herds take time to recover. Some pastoral households rely on agricultural labor and community support for food and income. Households in areas where cropping is possible have started engaging in cropping, mostly in riverine areas. The first half of the projection period, June to September, will be dry. During the second half, the October to December rainy season will be followed by a dry season from January to February. Birthing of cattle and camels will only occur at the start of the analysis period, with shoats giving birth in October/November. 

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards 

Conflict: In the first half of 2024, conflict continued in localized areas of Ethiopia at higher levels than in the same period of 2023. Conflict was concentrated in Oromia and Amhara, with isolated events in Tigray and Somali regions (Figures 3 and 4). Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) activity in Wollega, Guiji, and Shewa zones of Oromia declined from February through March, likely in response to the sustained Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) operations, including airstrikes. In April, OLA violence rebounded as the group increased attacks, particularly against civilians. While the frequency/severity of confrontations and the number of incidents associated with the OLA have generally decreased, sporadic attacks on vehicles and kidnappings persist. Despite ENDF efforts, the OLA has continued intermittent road blockades in some woredas of Wollega and central Oromia (including Dera, Abichu, Kimbebit, Abe Dengoro, Kiremu, Amuru Gidami, and Anfilo), impeding supply flow out of the woredas to other areas. 

In Amhara, conflict between FANO fighters and the ENDF persists across the region, with the highest incidence observed in March in Oromia and South Gondar zones, followed by North Wello and North Shewa; incidence is declining in West and East Gojjam zones. Sporadic road blockages have affected the transport of market supplies and other social and economic activities. After an attack, households typically return to their normal livelihood activities after several days of fighting, especially returning to their fields. In Tigray, escalation of hostilities with armed forces from Amhara began in February/March over disputed territories of Southern Tigray. Reports that the ENDF would take over the administration of Southern and Western Tigray from Amhara by mid-July prompted thousands of ENDF and Tigrayan forces to deploy to these disputed territories. Localized conflict has been ongoing in Raya Alamata, Ofla, and Alamata woredas of South Tigray and along the Tekeze River in Western Tigray as Tigrayan forces have moved to capture these areas, displacing thousands of ethnic Amhara. 

The Afar/Somali conflict along the border of the West Sitti Zone of the Somali Region has been ongoing since early 2024. Due to its proximity to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti road, this conflict will likely resolve quickly; the road is a lifeline for imports into Ethiopia, and the government will likely take steps to protect it. 

Refugees: According to UNHCR, as of April 2024 the refugee population in Ethiopia reached 1.1 million, making it the second-largest host country in Africa. Forty percent of refugees are from Sudan who are primarily hosted in the Kumer and Awlala camps located in West Gondar Zone (Amhara Region). Reportedly, refugees in the camps left in early May for Gondar City due to dissatisfaction with camp services and heightened safety concerns.

Rainfall: The early 2024 rainfall seasons were broadly favorable across much of Ethiopia; however, localized seasonal deficits and poor temporal distribution of rainfall was observed (Figure 5). 

Belg-reeiveing areas of Amhara and Tigray received below-average rainfall, with most areas receiving rainfall for only a few days. Localized areas of southern Tigray and South and North Wello zones of Amhara received average rainfall. 

In Oromia, including the Central Rift Valley and East and West Hararghe zones, the rainfall onset was timely with small amounts of rain, followed by two- to four-week dry spells. The rainfall also ceased near mid-May with overall below-average rainfall. In northern pastoral areas, the March to May 2024 sugum/diraac rains started atypically early and were favorable overall, with most areas receiving average to above-average levels. Localized areas of Zones 1, 2, and 5 in Afar and Fafan and Sitti zones in Somali Region observed rainfall deficits.

In the south and southeast pastoral areas, the 2024 gu/genna season was mixed, but resulted in broadly average to above-average levels of rainfall: in Somali Region, onset was delayed in many areas, followed by heavy rainfall combined with extended dry spells and an early end. In pastoral areas of southern and southeastern Oromia Region, rainfall had a timely onset; however, early cessation of the rainfall was reported in parts of East Borana and Guji zones. Heavy rain resulted in water logging and flooding in Guji, West Guji, East Borana, and Borana zones of Oromia and some areas in Central, Southwest Ethiopia, and Sidama regions. Flooding also occurred in the Somali Region, which FEWS NET reported in the May Key Message Update.

Despite its typical onset in June, kiremt rain has yet to start in eastern and central areas of the country. Rainfall deficits are slight at the very start of the season (Figure 6); however this slow start of season is not of high concern given the forecast for above-average seasonal rainfall. 

Displacement: According to IOM data collected in late 2023, nearly 3.2 million persons are internally displaced, primarily located in Somali, Tigray, and Oromia regions (Figure 7). Conflict is the primary cause of displacement (accounting for nearly 2.2 million IDPs, or 69 percent), followed by drought. Due to access and operational constraints on assessments, IOM estimates that displacement is likely slightly higher, specifically in Amhara and South Ethiopia. Since IOM’s report, it is FEWS NET’s assessment that displacement has moderately increased due to conflict. 

According to the Afar regional government, the renewed Afa-Issa communal clashes in March/April led to over 38,000 displaced people, many of whom have not returned to their places of origin due to ongoing safety concerns. According to IOM, Tigray hosts more than 840,000 IDPs, a decrease due to planned and spontaneous returns of IDPs. However, in the April conflict in the South Tigray Zone, over 50,000 people have been displaced. In Amhara, conflict has constrained access for assessments, but government sources estimate the current IDP number at approximately 815,000, including 206,000 recently displaced from the North Shewa, Awi, Wag Himra, and North Wello zones.

According to OCHA, flooding due to heavy rainfall in April/early May throughout the country affected 590,000 people, and displaced around 95,000 as of late May. According to the local authority of the Sitti Zone, a new displacement reportedly affecting about 8,000 households resulted from conflict. Due to a shortage of cash income and food access, people from some woredas of the East and West Hararghe zones started migrating from their places of origin in search of labor opportunities and support. 

Macroeconomy: The continued low availability of hard currency and the limited ability of the government to earn income amid high spending are maintaining poor macroeconomic conditions, characterized by elevated headline and food inflation rates and depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr (ETB) on the official and parallel markets. The IMF and the Ethiopian government continue discussions on loan negotiations. In late June, creditors extended the June 30 deadline for the IMF and Ethiopian government to reach a deal for restructuring its debt. In March 2024, the government announced the intention to open the economy to foreign investment in order to help to liberalize the economy and increase government revenue. 

According to the Ethiopia Statistical Services, annual headline inflation in June was 19.9 percent, nearly a 10 percentage point decrease since the start of 2024 and a three-year low (Figure 8). Despite the relative decline in food inflation since the beginning of 2024, food inflation remains high (23 percent as of June) and the primary driver of the elevated inflation rate. 

On the official market, according to the National Bank of Ethiopia, the ETB was trading at around 57 ETB/USD in June, about 5 percent higher than the same time last year. Meanwhile, according to WFP, the ETB was trading at 114 ETB/USD in May on the parallel market. According to WFP, the ETB has lost 5 percent of its value on the official market over the last year, and 14 percent on the parallel market as of March 2024. The ETB on the parallel market is over 100 percent higher than the ETB on the official market (Figure 9). 

Intermittent fuel shortages on the parallel and formal markets persisted. Fuel prices on the formal market remain similar to December 2023, but higher than last year and the three-year average. For example, the price of gasoline on the official market in Addis Ababa in May was about 77.7 ETB/liter, or 15 and 82 percent higher than the same month last year and the three-year average, respectively. Fuel prices on the parallel market generally trend well above that of the official market. 

Crop production: Households across the country are taking advantage of favorable cropping conditions in early 2024 and engaging in the agricultural seasons to the fullest extent possible. Agricultural input utilization, especially soil fertilizer during the season, was better compared to last year, but improved seed is well below the actual requirement due to low supply nationwide and very high input prices in official and parallel markets. The belg rainfall also allowed for the timely planting of long-cycle meher crops, such as maize, groundnut, and sorghum, sown during the belg rainy season in April and May. 

Belg crops are generally in the vegetative to harvesting stage in good condition following satisfactory conditions from planting and crop development. Despite some reported dryness in Amhara and the lowlands of Tigray, where they predominantly planted teff, the stage of growth is at grain filling and maturity. In Sidama, Central Ethiopia, South Ethiopia, and Southwest Ethiopia, root crops (sweet potatoes, potatoes, cassava), haricot beans, and other crops are at the ripening and harvesting stage. While the belg rainfall was generally favorable, the long dry spell and early end to the season resulted in below- average rainfall and negatively impacted crops in areas of East and West Hararghe, West Arsi, and East Borena zones of Oromia; crops planted late were particularly affected, as the lack of moisture impacted the crops at vegetative stages. 

In agropastoral and riverine areas of the pastoral south and southeast, flooding in May and June resulted in crop damage and destruction. According to OCHA, the heavy rains and flooding damaged around 60,000 hectares of cropland in Somali, Oromia, Sidame, Southern Ethiopia, and Central Ethiopia as of late May. According to the regional government of Oromia, as of late April, over 33,100 hectares of crop land were damaged in Arsi, West Arsi, and in the southern/southeastern parts alone. Flood-affected farmlands are expected to be replanted by short-maturing crops in June; however, the input shortage will limit the ability to cover all land unless farmers receive support. In riverine and the flood plains of the Somali Region, receding river water levels left most farms waterlogged through mid to late May, preventing households from replanting in time for the main gu harvest in July, although planting of crops is currently ongoing as flood waters recede. However, in most other rainfed agropastoral areas, favorable agricultural performance is observed. 

Nationally, planting of meher crops (for harvest in October) started on time and is ongoing at generally average levels; however, some delays have been reported due to dry soils. In Oromia, according to the Regional Bureau of Agriculture, the planting of long-cycle meher crops is progressing well, with some crops in the vegetative growth stages. According to the Amhara Regional Bureau of Agriculture, as of mid-June, only 65 percent of land was prepared and 10 percent planted. Land preparation continued, and planting of the short-cycle meher crops will be complete by the end of June/beginning of July. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, as of the third week of June, 73 percent of the planned areas are plowed, 40 percent of which is already planted with different crops, nationally.

Livestock production: The favorable rainy seasons in 2023 and early 2024 in southern and southeastern pastoral areas have enhanced the availability of pasture and water, which in turn improved livestock body conditions. Consequently, there has been a modest increase in livestock productivity, especially among shoats. Nonetheless, due to the reduction of herd sizes, the overall number of milking livestock, births, and milk production is below average, primarily due to the lingering effects of the 2020 to 2023 drought. Additionally, flash floods in April/May killed more than 2,600 livestock in Oromia Region, further impacting pastoral livelihoods. However, cattle and camels started giving birth in late May, which continued through June, leading to a seasonal increase in milk availability for consumption and sale, in addition to goat milk availability.

Pasture and water availability also improved seasonally in the northern pastoral areas with favorable rainfall. Livestock body conditions are generally favorable, with conceptions beginning across all species, albeit at lower rates than normal due to low herd sizes. Births are not expected until January. However, in localized areas of Afar, pasture availability is lower than normal due to localized rainfall deficits with the sugum/diraac season (Figure 10). Along the Tigray border, below-average herd sizes are limiting household ability to access food and income from livestock. In parts of Amhara and Tigray, notably along the Tekeze River catchment, Wag Himra, areas of North Gondar, and woredas in Eastern zones of Tigray where the 2023 kiremt was below normal, the poor 2024 belg has exacerbated poor forage/pasture conditions, and livestock feed and water shortages are widespread. In the Tekeze River catchment areas, livestock deaths have been reported, indicating the severity of livestock body conditions. This is compounding the small herd sizes caused by conflict-related losses, resulting in overall below-average productivity. Households are migrating livestock to better grazing areas, buying supplemental feed at high prices, or selling animals to mitigate losses.

Off-own-farm sources of income: Key off-own-farm income sources at this time of year vary across the country, with households engaging in migratory labor, the sale of firewood and charcoal, petty trading, grass sale for livestock feed, remittances, salt-mining, gum arabic and incense collections, and sales of wild crops. Poor households are engaged in activities relevant to their location, and generally opportunities are available at normal levels with higher than normal wage rates due to inflationary market pressure. However, the demand for construction labor (particularly in Afar, Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Somali regions), and khat packing labor (particularly in Oromia Region) is below average because of security risks and a drop in price, respectively. 

In northern Ethiopia, economic activities have not fully recovered from the war, and the availability of most income-earning opportunities are below normal. Exceptions include normal levels of charcoal, firewood, and eucalyptus tree sales. Modest recovery of the economy in Tigray has been observed in the last couple months but lingering effects of conflict continue to reduce labor migration opportunities. In Tigray, labor migration typically occurred to Humera and Wolkayit for agricultural activities like weeding and harvesting, but this is still inaccessible due to political disputes. Similarly, the number of people moving from Amhara to the western regions for sesame production has also declined for conflict-related reasons. Wage rates are averaging 350 and 450 ETB/day in Amhara and Tigray, respectively, similar to previous months. Despite the improvements in the economy and income, the labor market is still not able to support opportunities for all seeking them, leaving many people unable to access income. Community social support also remains a crucial source of income and food, particularly in Tigray.

In Afar, off-own farm activities – including casual labor and self-employment – are below average due to the lingering effects of conflict, displacement, and recurrent droughts and flooding. Trading and social networking is still very limited, particularly in Zones 2 and 4, which border the Tigray and Amhara regions. However, according to the Afar Region Agriculture Bureau and Disaster Risk Management Office (DRMO), the favorable 2024 sugum/diraac season rains and relatively stable security situation in the region have improved local casual agricultural labor opportunities and self-employment when compared to the 2023 karma/karan season, particularly in the agropastoral livelihood zones (in Zones 1 and 3, and parts of Zones 4 and 5).

In Somali Region, demand for agricultural labor increased early in the season, particularly for onion production in riverine areas; however, labor opportunities declined in May/June with the onset of the onion disease and the destruction of crops due to flooding, and many farmers were unable to replant. Other self-employment activities are improving in June with the dry season, including firewood collection, salt-mining, gum arabic and incense collection, and wild crops, providing some income for poor households. Community support, especially the sharing of milk, remains below normal due to constrained herd sizes; however, it is a critical food source for poor households.

Market supplies: Across much of the country, trade is occurring normally with normal market supply and activity for this time of year. However, some disruption due to conflict in areas of central, western, and southeastern Oromia, central and eastern Amhara, and localized areas of Afar and Tigray is ongoing, driving regional and subregional variation in supply availability (Figure 11). In Amhara, conflict along major routes intermittently disrupts trade flows. Amhara is one of the main source markets for Addis Ababa, therefore conflict in this region can drive lower-than-normal supplies in the capital. It has also caused the redirection of trade flows through Afar to bring supplies to Tigray, and conflict in South Tigray is disrupting trade flows to hard-to-reach areas. Additionally, the resumption of humanitarian food assistance, especially in Tigray, has reduced market demand, in turn increasing supply.

Currently, there are no meaningful trade blockades in Amhara and market supply is normal – especially in belg-producing areas where the harvest is ongoing and reaching the markets – driving overall stable grain prices since January 2024. However, prices remain significantly above those in 2023 and the four-year average (Figure 12). Addis Ababa maize prices were stable in the first half of 2024, albeit nearly 30 percent above May 2023, and 100 percent of the four-year average (Figure 13). In Somali Region, imported food prices (e.g., rice, oil, sugar, and wheat flour) significantly increased in recent months due to high market demand, local currency depreciation, and high import costs.

Livestock supply is near normal in most northern markets. Nationally, livestock prices have increased compared to the previous month and last year’s average. In Amhara and northwestern Afar, livestock are not being brought to markets for sale due to restricted movement from conflict and low herd sizes, driving relatively stable or decreasing prices. In Logia (Afar), goat prices in May are stable compared to April, but 8 percent higher than the same month last year. In Sekota (Amhara), goat prices in May decreased by 7 and over 20 percent compared to April 2024 and May 2023, respectively. However, prices remain well above average. In the rest of Afar, livestock market supply improved to near-normal levels across most markets as traders are incentivizing households to bring sellable livestock to the market. However, this opportunity is limited for poor and conflict-displaced households who have very small herd sizes. 

In the pastoral south and southeast, livestock market supply is below average as impacts (particularly low herd sizes) from the drought linger. However, prices are increasing, primarily due to improved body conditions and inflationary market pressures. In Chereti, goat prices rose by nearly 10 percent from April to May and are nearly 75 percent and 115 percent higher than the same time last year and four-year average, respectively.

Household purchasing capacity: Household purchasing capacity remains constrained across most of the country. While some localized improvements in income are reported (e.g., increased cash income from the sale of livestock, inflation-driven increases in self-employment income), these income sources are largely unable to keep pace with food prices amid rampant inflation (Figure 14). 

Nationally, the average daily wage rate is about 360 ETB per day: 28 and 65 percent higher than the same month last year and the three-year average, respectively. However, household purchasing capacity from wage labor is predominantly determined by maize grain prices in marketing basins across the country. In East and West Hararghe, declining khat prices and insecurity are preventing many from engaging in the agricultural labor market despite stable wage rates. Previously conflict-affected areas of the north have not recovered sufficiently to offer substantial migratory and casual agricultural labor opportunities. While these opportunities have not fully recovered, terms of trade have improved in Tigray in recent months as food prices stabilize amid declining market demand. In Mekele, maize prices as of May were 11 percent lower than in November 2023 and similar to April, although still well above average and pre-conflict levels. In May, a wage rate of 450 ETB per day could purchase 12 kg of maize, compared to only 8 kg last year.

In the south and southeastern pastoral areas, improved livestock body conditions have led to livestock price increases compared to previous years, but in many areas the livestock price increases are not keeping pace with the increase in staple food prices. As a result, the TOT for goats to maize remains below average. Additionally, herd sizes remain low, keeping household ability to sell livestock low. In May at the Chereti market, a household could purchase approximately 44 kg of maize by selling a medium-sized goat (equivalent to roughly 11 days of minimum kilocalories for a household of 7 people). However, in the same month of the previous year, the same goat would have bought around 49 kg of maize (Figure 15). Pastoralists in northern regions are facing similar decreases in TOT, particularly those in conflict-affected areas where livestock prices are stable. In May in Logia, a household selling a medium-sized goat was able to buy about 55 kg of maize, nearly 90 percent lower than the same time last year. Additionally, pastoralists in both northern and south and southeastern pastoral areas have not fully recovered from the impacts of drought and may have low herds or no livestock at all, further decreasing their purchasing power. 

PSNP: PSNP distribution is ongoing, following the 2024 PSNP program adjustments. In most areas, the March and April allocations are ongoing/completed, and the third round of distribution has started. However, there have been notable delays, such as a three-month delay in Afar, where the first round of cash distribution is now ongoing. While the program targets up to five family members in most regions, it targets all family members in Sidama, Central, and Southwest Ethiopia. In Amhara and Tigray, the focus is on reaching a greater number of households rather than every individual within a household. This approach aims to strike a balance between addressing widespread poverty and managing the finite PSNP resources. Unfortunately, the reduction in the number of distribution months and the increase in staple food prices have rendered the cash transfers inadequate to purchase the intended 15 kg monthly grain ration; instead, households are only able to purchase only 10 to 12 kg.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

Available information as of June suggests that in May, humanitarians assisted around 4.1 million people nationally, a slight increase from April when roughly 3.8 million people were reached. This includes the distribution made by the Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC) to around 579,000 beneficiaries. Between April and May, food aid distributions were generally stable across most regions; however, some regional variation was observed between January and May distributions (Figure 16).¹

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

In Tigray and Wag Himra and adjacent Woredas in the north Gondar zones, significant food assistance is preventing outcomes beyond Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) in many areas; however, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain ongoing in some areas. Livelihoods, assets, and income continue to be undermined in the aftermath of conflict in Tigray and northeastern Amhara. While terms of trade have somewhat stabilized at low levels, poor and displaced households have minimal ability to purchase food due to limited livestock herds, an inability to migrate for labor, and low economic activity. Poor households are nearly completely reliant on food aid and community support to access food. While food assistance has minimized the need to engage in negative emergency coping strategies, some households are still resorting to activities such as begging and migration. Households are also employing food-based coping strategies including reducing meal size and frequency and consuming cheaper, less-preferred foods. In areas where food assistance is not significant, households are heavily reliant on social support and what minimal income can be earned for food purchases, leading to large food consumption deficits. Some households are expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5); these households are relying primarily on food from neighbors and minimal income-earning activities such as fetching water. 

Much of Afar is experiencing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes despite ongoing food assistance. Livelihood activities in Zone 2 and Zone 4 continue to be constrained following the two-year-long conflict and the impact of the recent drought. Some households are engaged in off-own-farm activities, selling remaining livestock (if available), and adopting food-based coping strategies to mitigate significant food consumption gaps. Additionally, many households in this area are displaced, and therefore have few productive assets and limited income-earning options beyond charcoal/firewood sales, salt mining, and providing transportation services. A significant number of households in these areas are currently experiencing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes with the aid of humanitarian assistance, while some woredas – not reached by humanitarian assistance – remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

Food insecurity across much of the pastoral south and southeast moderately improved in recent months as many poor households are now able to access food and income from their own livelihood production. Poor households have also benefited from agricultural labor opportunities. The deyr/hageya 2023 crops (harvested in April 2024) has resulted in some improved household stocks in the riverine and agropastoral areas. However, some poor and displaced households still face difficulty accessing food and income despite improvements in livestock prices and the births of shoats and cattle, due to persistently low herd sizes and lack of productive assets. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) levels of food insecurity are persisting in the south/southeastern areas. 

In the East and West Hararghe zones, the 2023 drought-driven below-average harvests, as well as the decline in khat price and associated drop in labor opportunities, is limiting incomes and subsequent access to food. June is the peak lean season in the area, and households have exhausted their food stocks and are market-dependent in the context of soaring staple food prices. The presence of IDPs, conflict, and the cholera outbreak are exacerbating the situation. Poor households in particular are experiencing food consumption gaps and facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. Meanwhile, areas where households with access to milk from livestock for food and income, food from vegetable production, and the ongoing belg harvest are facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

In the lowland areas along the Central Rift Valley in Sidama, South Ethiopia, and Central Ethiopia regions, households have no food stocks and are nearly completely market reliant. Chronically food-insecure households have received PSNP distributions since March, somewhat stabilizing income access and purchasing capacity. The start of the green harvest is also supplementing food access in some areas. However, current food and income access is inadequate to fully meet household food needs; most poor households face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. The mid and highland areas of Sidma, South Ethiopia, and Central Ethiopia currently have root crops (including sweet potato, potato, and cassava) and are bridging food consumption gaps during the lean season. PSNP distributions, labor opportunities, and the start of some green harvests are enabling most households to meet their minimum food needs, but not their essential non-food requirements; most of these areas are therefore Stressed (IPC Phase 2). According to the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) April 2024 TFP data for South Ethiopia, admissions have increased by about 8.4 percent compared to the previous month. In Sidama, the April 2024 TFP admissions have declined by 35.6 and increased by 32 percent compared to the same month last year and the five-year average, respectively.

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

• The June to September kiremt rainfall season and July to September karan/karma rains are expected to be above average, with isolated areas of average rainfall.   
• Forecasted above-average kiremt rainfall in western and central Ethiopia and wet soils in Somali Region will likely cause flooding along the Shabelle and other rivers in Somali Region from June to September. Kiremt-related flooding is also likely in riverine areas of western and central Ethiopia, specifically in low-lying areas where perennial rivers are crossing such as Awash in Afar, Wabi Shebele in Somalia, Baro in Gambella, and Omo in South Ethiopia regions.
• October to December 2024 rainfall in southern and southeastern areas of the country will likely be moderately below average based on the La Niña forecast for late 2024.
• Nationally, conflict is expected to slightly increase through late 2025. This is due to the potential for future deterioration of macroeconomic conditions, which may exacerbate competition for resources, as well as the perception among various actors that the ENDF is currently stretched thin between multiple armed conflicts nationwide. 
• The number of armed clashes, attacks, and kidnappings perpetrated by the OLA in Oromia is likely to increase slightly through January 2025 as the group seeks leverage for expected negotiations with the government. The ENDF will likely periodically re-escalate pressure on the OLA in an attempt to limit attacks and blockades on major roadways.
• The long-standing land dispute between Afar and Somali is anticipated to escalate tensions and result in intermittent clashes until August, after which it is expected that the situation will de-escalate.
• The total national displaced population is expected to decline moderately, with some subnational variation expected. In most conflict-affected areas of Oromia and Afar, the displaced population is expected to continue to increase moderately. 
• Nationally, the total refugee population in Ethiopia is expected to increase moderately as further conflict in Sudan will result in people fleeing to Ethiopia. Most refugees living in and entering Ethiopia are expected to reside in camps. 
• Nationally, average belg production is anticipated due to the favorable belg rainfall and planting. However, in some woredas of East and West Hararghe zones, dry spells and late rainfall onset delayed the planting of belg crops two to four weeks, affecting the planting of short-maturing crops.
• National area planted for kiremt short-cycle crops is likely to be near normal and crops are expected to develop normally.
• Nationally, the meher harvest, starting in October, is expected to be normal. In western surplus-producing areas, the meher harvest is likely to be average. In the eastern half, the meher harvest will likely be below average due to limited access to agricultural inputs. 
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor and further deteriorate during the projection period – particularly with the likely loan agreement between the IMF and Ethiopian government – which will likely cause a sharp devaluation of the ETB in the official exchange market. Until an agreement is reached, the parallel market exchange rate is expected to increase, driving elevated inflation. An increase in the price of all goods – both essential and luxury – is expected, and when the IMF and government reach an agreement the inflation rate is projected to rise above 30 percent.
• Market functionality and trade flow disruptions are anticipated in conflict-affected areas of Amhara, Oromia, bordering areas of the Afar and Tigray regions, and parts of Afar and Somali regions. In these areas, traders’ movements will be limited due to insecurity, resulting in disruptions or declines in the movement of goods to and from these areas. The conflict in Amhara will also likely disrupt the movement of goods between Addis Ababa and Amhara, which is expected to lead to supply shortages, particularly during the lean season in the northern areas and the eastern half of the country.
• High prices and fuel shortages will continue to increase transportation and supply costs. The movement of goods will likely be disrupted in areas with long fuel lines/shortages.
• Market supply will be much lower than normal in localized areas in eastern deficit markets during the June to September lean season. The anticipated depletion of stocks from the previous harvest will likely result in a limited supply to the market, even from typically surplus-producing areas.
• Staple food prices are likely to increase, peaking above 2023 and average levels in August and September. A modest reduction in prices is anticipated from October to January 2025 due to the anticipated above-average meher harvest.
• In belg-producing areas, food prices are likely to stabilize during June/July with the availability of belg production; however, prices are expected to remain higher than last year and the five-year average. 
• In much of the country, opportunities for self-employment such as petty trading, firewall/charcoal sales, and construction labor in towns are likely to remain average and associated income is expected to be normal. However, in areas affected by the drought and conflict, self-employment income is expected to be below normal as economic recovery is insufficient to generate typical opportunities.
• Agricultural labor opportunities and wage rates in most meher-dependent areas will be near normal due to the forecasted favorable kiremt season. Local and migrant labor wages and agricultural labor income will improve relative to current levels and are likely to be above average. 
• Remittances from urban to rural households are likely to remain below average; increases in the urban cost of living reduce the amount of remittance people living in urban areas can send to their relatives. 
• PSNP distributions are ongoing and will continue through June/July for the Public Work PSNP beneficiaries and until the end of 2024 for direct support beneficiaries.

Sub-national assumptions for northern cropping areas, Amhara and Tigray

• The ongoing conflict between FANO with ENDF and the regional government forces is expected to continue to create instability and pose challenges to the administrative power of the regional government.  As such, there is a high likelihood that violence will increase in Southern Tigray and areas of Amhara directly to the south, particularly North and South Wello zones. 
• Periodic intensifications of conflict and resultant disruptions to road travel will likely disrupt deliveries of vital commodities and humanitarian assistance to Amhara through January 2025.  
• Low levels of violence – such as ENDF attacks against civilians, small-scale clashes between Tigrayan returnees and farmers that have occupied their land, and communal violence stemming from land disputes – is likely to continue, albeit at significantly lower levels than those observed during the conflict from November 2020 to November 2022. 
• In Tigray, displaced households are likely to continue to return to their area of origin and the overall displaced population is expected to decline.
• In Amhara, due to ongoing conflict and the likely return of households from Alamata, Tigray, the displaced population is expected to increase. 
• In both Tigray and Amhara regions, the availability of construction labor is expected to remain limited due to conflict and insecurity; individuals seeking labor opportunities will outpace demand. 
• Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to slightly increase to normal levels during the October/November harvest period. 
• Meher planting is expected to be average, with near average harvest most likely. 
• Despite limited conflict in Tigray, migratory labor opportunities are expected to remain limited, particularly for poor households in Central and Eastern zones of Tigray. Disagreement over the administrative issues of Wolkayit and Raya remain unresolved amid continued tensions and likely to negatively affect labor movement.

Sub-national assumptions for northern pastoral areas

• Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to improve from July to September with the karma/karan rainy season. However, flooding will most likely result in some damage to irrigation systems, crops, fields, and infrastructure. 
• Water and pasture availability is likely to improve to average levels within a month of the karan/karma rainy season onset and remain normal until the typical seasonal decline begins in mid-December.  
• Livestock body conditions are expected to improve to normal levels by August/September. However, livestock production and milk availability, particularly for cattle and camels, is expected to be below normal due to low numbers of livestock able to conceive. Shoats are expected to give birth starting in July; production will likely improve going forward. 
• Livestock market prices are expected to follow seasonal trends while remaining higher than recent years and average. However, high prices and supply are expected during holidays (e.g., New Year festivals and other religious ceremonies). Income from livestock sales will also be low due to few sellable livestock.

Sub-national assumptions for southern and southeastern pastoral areas

• Conflict is expected to remain low in most southern areas, but some insecurity is likely, and the intense security measures along the bordering areas of Konso, Burji, and Derashe woredas will remain in place.
• Forecasted floods during the June to September kiremt season in the western highlands will likely damage or destroy planted crops; replanting is unlikely due to the forecasted below-average October to December deyr/hageya season. 
• The harvest starting in July/August is expected to be average following the gu/genna season.
• The harvest will most likely increase agricultural labor opportunities and income to average levels in riverine and lowland areas.
• Overall, the displaced population in the pastoral south and southeast is expected to remain stable. The number of people displaced due to flooding is expected to increase, then decline once the floods recede. People displaced by the 2020 to 2023 drought are expected to remain in camps or among host communities and not return to their area of origin. Overall, the displaced population in the pastoral south and southeast is expected to remain mostly stable. 
• Pasture and water availability is expected to remain favorable and sufficient to support livestock needs during the July to September dry season. However, in October/November pasture availability is expected to decline to below-average levels which will persist through at least January. 
• Livestock body conditions are expected to remain favorable through late 2024, when they will likely deteriorate along with pasture conditions. Milk availability from livestock born in May/June is expected to be available through September but at below-normal levels due to low herd sizes. Milk availability will decline inOctober/November as pasture conditions and water availability worsen. Sheep and goats are expected to give birth from October to January but at below-average levels. 
• Livestock prices are expected to increase following seasonal trends, remaining higher compared to 2023 and average. A temporary increase in the supply of livestock is anticipated between May and July with the peak Hajj demand.

Humanitarian food assistance

National assumption

• The targeted level of food assistance for July to September is around 11 million people; however, based on available levels of funding and trends of assistance delivery in 2024, FEWS NET expects humanitarians to reach around 6.4 million people through the peak of the lean season in September with food aid. Humanitarians will most likely face a shortfall of cereals for distribution in August and will reduce the ration slightly for some beneficiaries from 15 to 12 kg of cereal. FEWS NET assumes that the share of the population receiving food assistance at the woreda level will continue at current levels (from March to May), at a minimum through September. The number of people targeted for assistance is expected to decline to 5.4 million people from October to January; however, it is unlikely that the target will be reached based on historical trends of distributions. Food aid will likely be prioritized in areas of greatest concern; however, detailed information on plans were not available at the time of the analysis as the seasonal belg assessments are still ongoing. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

In much of Tigray and Wag Himra zones and adjacent Woredas in the north Gondar Zone of Amhara, humanitarian food assistance, alongside social support networks, are expected to be the primary food source for households and is critical in preventing livelihood collapse and even higher levels of acute food insecurity and subsequent acute malnutrition until the meher harvest begins in September/October. From June to September 2024, no major change to household food availability is expected. Households are expected to be primarily reliant on food assistance and community sharing which will support widespread Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes. In these areas, some households are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), most notably among the displaced and very poor households who have few resources and are likely to engage in begging and migration. In areas where food assistance is not expected to be significant, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected from June to September as households face difficulty accessing income for food purchases amid likely food price increases. Some households are expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), relying primarily on food from neighbors and income-earning activities with minimal income. Humanitarian food assistance coupled with social support will remain critical to preventing livelihood collapse and high levels of acute malnutrition from escalating to high levels of hunger-related mortality.

In October 2024, households are expected to gain access to food and income from their own harvest and related agricultural labor opportunities. Staple foods price stability will help enhance purchasing power. These changes will most likely mitigate the most severe food consumption deficits for many households, but poor households will continue to struggle with the lingering impacts of conflict on livelihoods and income-earning activities, and are not expected to fully meet their food needs. Moderate food consumption gaps are still likely. Levels of acute malnutrition are expected to improve from Serious (GAM of 10 -14.9%) to Alert (GAM of 5-9.9%) levels. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely from October 2024 to January 2025. A smaller subset of the population, notably those with no social networks, no harvest/own-production, and minimal ability to earn income, are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 

In most of Afar, the upcoming karan/karma season is expected to improve the food security situation in the second half of the projection period. Most of the households in the conflict- and drought-affected Zones 2 and 4 are expected to be engaged in off-own-farm labor to earn income. However, a significant number of households are not expected to have major improvements in household food access amid high and increasing food prices. Households are expected to primarily earn cash for food purchases from labor, self-employment, and remittances, but at very low levels. Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected in many areas where significant assistance is expected to mitigate some of the most severe food consumption deficits. However, several woredas like Kunneba, Abaala town, Wasama in Zone 2, and Mabay in Zone 4 will remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through September amid low levels of humanitarian food assistance. Poor households’ engagement in severe coping strategies such as selling last livestock, migrating, and/or begging is expected.

From October 2024 to January 2025, most areas of the region (including the northern conflict-affected areas) are expected to benefit from the two favorable, consecutive rainy seasons (2024 sugum and karma), improving access to milk and livestock sales which are expected to benefit even households with small herds. Off-own-farm sources of income, such as casual agricultural labor, are also expected to improve. Staple food prices will be relatively stable following the seasonal supply flow from crop-producing areas of other regions, and humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue in most woredas of Zones 2 and 4, which will help reduce household food consumption gaps. However, displaced and poor households with limited livestock in the previously conflict-affected woredas of Zones 2 and 4 will most likely remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the October 2024 to January 2025 period. Households continue to have significant difficulty accessing food and income given the scale of livestock losses associated with the 2020-2022 conflict, drought during the 2023 karan/karma season, and the need for several reproduction cycles to rebuild livestock holdings to sustainable levels. Disease outbreaks—such as heightened malaria cases, measles, and cholera—due to expected flooding will exacerbate the nutritional status of children, resulting in elevated levels of acute malnutrition. These households are likely to continue selling remaining livestock, further depleting their livelihood assets. 

Much of the southern and southeastern pastoral areas are expected to have normal livestock body conditions and productivity (including access to milk) through September; however, low herd sizes are expected to constrain access to milk and cash income from sales throughout the projection period. Cash income from agricultural labor is expected to be near average and the remaining PSNP distributions are expected through July/August. However, the increase in staple food prices is reducing household purchasing power and making it difficult to meet minimum food needs. It is customary for wealthy households to give milking animals (irmansi) to poor households to provide support during the peak of livestock milk production, and this is expected to continue from June to September. Recessional cultivation following flooding in July/August will likely increase labor demand and income-earning opportunities. Poor households in southern and southeastern Somali Region pastoral areas, Borena, the lowlands of East Bale and Guji zones, and southern woredas of the South Omo zone are expected to be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from June to September, including conflict-affected areas of Sitti and Fafan zones.

Livestock demand typically declines seasonally in October and livestock prices are expected to also decline slightly. Livestock products and productivity are also expected to decline from current levels, as most of the large ruminants are expected to remain milking with declining milk production trends. Agricultural labor opportunities will remain high in riverine areas as kiremt floods occur in lowland areas of Somali Region, while agricultural activities in other rainfed areas of the region are expected to decline. Areas of Sitti and Fafan zones and the flood cultivation lowland riverine areas of Somali Region are expected to have a favorable kiremt harvest in September. Despite these relative improvements, the anticipated negative impact of La Niña driving a below-average October to December 2024 rainfall season will likely cause a slight deterioration in food insecurity. Households have only had three seasons to recover from the historic 2020 to 2023 drought after many poor households completely or nearly lost  their herds. These households are expected to continue to face difficulty accessing food. While late 2024 rainfall is expected to be below average, pasture and water availability is currently above normal, livestock health is quite good, and good conception rates in early 2024 are expected to support livestock births and milk production in late 2024 despite the below-average rains. If rainfall deficits are slight to moderate, then the rains will partially support pasture and water availability and moderate declines in livestock body conditions are expected, with some negative effects on salability and livestock conception rates. However, if rainfall deficits are large or there is rainfall failure, then the impacts on livestock production would be more severe and may lead to rapid deterioration in acute food insecurity outcomes, particularly during the subsequent dry season in early 2025. Poor households in southern and southeastern Somali Region pastoral areas, Borena, the lowlands of East Bale and Guji zones, and southern woredas of the South Omo zone will likely face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. 

In meher producing areas, the anticipated 2024 meher production will improve food access. In northeastern Amhara; East and West Hararghe; Central Rift Valley; the lowland woredas of Arsi; and parts of Silte, Gurage, and Halaba of Central Ethiopia Region, household food stocks are severely depleted and households are heavily dependent on market purchases in a context of high staple food prices. Between June and September, households will be in the peak of their lean season and food insecurity will worsen. Households will cope with available income expansion strategies such as the sale of trees, firewood, and charcoal. Food-based coping strategies will include purchasing cheaper staples and reducing meal size. Households will be in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). In October onwards, the anticipated near-average harvest from the meher season will likely improve access to food from own-harvest. Staple food prices are expected to decline, and average cash incomes from agricultural labor are anticipated. Households in these areas will therefore mitigate large consumption deficits, and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected.

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

National 

Disruption in food assistance delivery due to a pipeline break 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: This scenario is based on a disruption to food assistance distributions for several months, meaning if humanitarian aid does not reach populations where Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are currently considered most likely in areas of Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Somali, and Oromia regions. In the absence of assistance, households would lose a key source of food that was expected to mitigate food consumption gaps. As a result, more widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes would be mapped across both projection periods. 

Escalation in conflict (beyond the level in FEWS NET’s most likely scenario)

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: An escalation in conflict exceeding initial expectations would further limit population movement and disrupt trade, likely causing more declines in typical livelihood activities and market functioning/supply, and increased population displacement would be likely. Additionally, if there is an uptick of conflict during the 2024 meher agricultural season beginning in April/May 2024, agricultural labor opportunities could be further disrupted, decreasing income as well as access to own production among households. This could result in more widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes during October to January in meher producing areas.

Areas of Tigray and northeastern Amhara regions 

Humanitarian assistance and social support

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: In the most likely scenario, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!)  and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected; however, if social support combined with the gradual scale-up of humanitarian food assistance does not continue, at a minimum during the lean season, then household coping capacity would more rapidly decline and more severe acute food insecurity outcomes than currently mapped would likely occur during the June to September period. In October as the meher-harvest becomes available the relative risk of more severe outcomes is expected to decline to low levels as household food access to own-produced foods improves and food prices decline improving food access and mitigating the large food consumption deficits across large proportions of the population. 

Flood-prone areas (particularly in Afar, Somali Region, SNNPR, and Gambella Region)

Flooding would be at more severe levels than currently anticipated

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Flooding would occur in many flood-prone areas of the country, particularly in river catchment areas. This would result in displacement and damage to assets, property, and agricultural fields, along with an increased incidence of water-borne diseases. This would result in a higher population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, notably among displaced households.

Pastoral areas of southern and southeastern Ethiopia 

October to December 2024 deyr/hageya season fails or is significantly below average

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely during the October 2024 to January 2025 period under the scenario where rainfall is moderately below average. However, amid the limited time for recovery to rebuild household assets, notably livestock, from the historically severe 2020 to 2023 drought, there is the potential for acute food insecurity among households to rapidly deteriorate in the event rainfall is poor. This would result in an increase in the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher outcomes. Additionally, while outside the projection period, if the deyr/hageya season fails, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are possible in early 2025. 

Eastern Plateau (EPL) Livelihood Zone (Figure 17)

Reason for selecting this area: This area of concern illustrates the impacts of the 2020-2022 conflict on household livelihoods and income, as well as the compounding impacts of drought in the kiremt 2023 rainy season (June to September).

Households have already exhausted food stocks from own-production atypically early in January/February and are heavily reliant on market purchases and humanitarian assistance to meet their minimum food needs. Households are currently undertaking land preparation for the 2024 meher at normal levels. Additionally, obtaining sufficient inputs, such as seeds, is a barrier for many households. The government and some NGOs have indicated possible assistance in providing seed access may occur, but households may resort to loans and/or buying from the market. There is sufficient agricultural labor, but some households rely on shared oxen to plow which can lead to timing concerns.

Persisting political tensions continue to limit access to livelihoods and are limiting household income-earning opportunities. Migration to western Tigray (Wolkayit and Humera) for agricultural labor remains inaccessible due to political disputes and insecurity. Livestock herd sizes were decimated due to looting and slaughter of livestock during the conflict, and the current moisture stress driving poor crop production has also resulted in poor pasture and livestock body conditions (Figure 18). As a result, income from livestock sales for poor households remains limited as they lack saleable livestock. Construction labor opportunities are only 75 percent of pre-conflict levels, as reported by households interviewed during FEWS NET’s field assessment. Credit access has resumed, but the major credit provider lacks the financial capacity to provide all required loans, and collateral requirements exclude households who are asset-poor as a result of the conflict. Other possible sources of income include petty employment, such as collection and sale of firewood; however, income-earned from these sources are below normal due to lingering impacts from the 2020 to 2022 conflict and the conflict in Amhara.

In 2024, only one round of PSNP transfer was completed, and the wage rate was 565 ETB per person, or 80 percent of what is typically transferred. While the resumption of PSNP is a significant step forward in enhancing households' food security, households report that the cash they receive can only purchase 2.6 kg of maize and 1.6 kg of wheat per person/per day; this is less than they might receive from in-kind humanitarian food assistance.

Humanitarian food assistance resumed in November 2023, following an eight-month pause. In the EPL livelihood zone, 31 percent of the population was reached with assistance, and households are additionally sharing with neighbors considered to be critically food insecure. Beneficiaries received assistance from January to May, and the caseload is slightly increasing as the lean season nears. According to Food Cluster information and FEWS NET’s March to May HEA analysis, households received 80 to 90 percent of their kilocalorie requirement via food assistance. JEOP is the main operator in the livelihood zone, distributing in-kind food assistance with ration sizes of 15 kg of wheat, 1.5 kg of pulses, and 0.5 kg of oil per beneficiary/per month.

Households are heavily reliant on market purchases and humanitarian assistance to mitigate consumption gaps. Staple food prices declined slightly in the first half of 2024, but remain significantly higher than the five-year average, constraining household purchasing capacity. Income from labor employment and credit are major sources contributing to food purchases, but are insufficient in the context of poor availability of labor/livelihood activities, which have not fully recovered post-conflict. Households are coping by employing some negative, food-based coping strategies, like reducing the frequency, quality, and number of meals per day. Interviewed households reported that some severe levels of coping (e.g., begging) declined but are still ongoing, notably among households that are not receiving assistance. Some household members are migrating to urban areas including Mekele and Addis Ababa. Poor households are mitigating food deficit with ongoing assistance and are currently experiencing Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes.

Food insecurity will remain severe from June to September, but the October harvest may improve food availability and access. Humanitarian food assistance and market purchases, using income from PSNP and other activities, along with some community support, will be the main sources of food. Above-average food prices will continue to undermine household purchasing capacity, and households are expected to face large food consumption deficits. Households are expected to employ negative food-based coping strategies and seek out additional income through increased sales of firewood and charcoal, migration to urban areas, and increased begging to obtain necessary income and food. Poor households in the EPL livelihood zone will remain in Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) from June to September 2024.

Starting with the expected favorable meher harvest in October, households are expected to access food from own-production. Food from the harvest is expected to last through at least early 2025; however, households are also expected to be economical with their food stocks, conserving as much as possible. The expected slight decline in food prices will moderate purchasing power and access to market purchases, notably among those who were not able to harvest. Poor households will be able to shift away from use of negative coping strategies to rely on typical income sources like the sale of livestock (albeit at minimal levels for poor households), crop production, and labor employment. Humanitarian assistance will scale down, but the seasonal increase in typical food and income sources will maintain Crisis (IPC Phase 3) from October 2024 to January 2025.