Food access declines as lean season peaks and northern conflict intensifies

• Acute food insecurity remains widespread, with Emergency (IPC Phase 4) persisting in the worst-affected areas. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected through May across the East Hararghe lowlands and among the most drought-vulnerable pastoral households in southern and southeastern areas (notably Afder, Liban, and Dawa). Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes remain widespread across drought- and conflict-affected areas. High market dependence and below-average livestock productivity are sustaining large to moderate food consumption gaps as crop-dependent households await the belg and/or meher and livestock-dependent households await rains to replenish pastures.
• Food assistance needs are expected to seasonally increase, peaking during the June to August lean season as household food stocks deplete and market reliance increases. In meher-dependent areas, rising staple food prices, constrained labor and self-employment opportunities, and conflict-related disruptions will likely drive food consumption deterioration starting in June. In pastoral areas, limited livestock recovery and low milk availability – followed by the June-September dry period – will sustain consumption gaps.
• Escalating conflict in northern Ethiopia and continued insecurity in Amhara, Oromia, and Afar are likely to disrupt trade corridors, increase displacement, and further constrain income and market access during the lean season. Large-scale troop mobilization and renewed clashes raise the risk of transport disruptions, localized price spikes, and reduced access to labor migration and trade, particularly in northern cropping and pastoral areas where market dependence is increasing.
• Humanitarian assistance is mitigating outcomes in select areas, but funding shortfalls and access constraints are limiting coverage and transfer values. Assistance has mitigated food consumption deficits, driving Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) in some areas, yet ration reductions – including in refugee operations – and delivery constraints in insecure areas are expected to prevent broader improvement and will be insufficient to offset seasonal deterioration through the lean period.

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of February 26, 2026. 

Ethiopia’s livelihood systems are shaped by rugged geography and multiple rainy seasons, defining production patterns and seasonal food and income dynamics. The three primary rural livelihood systems – pastoral, agropastoral, and cropping – are closely tied to rainfall. Rainfall timing and sequence vary by region and govern food and income availability.

The first rainy season begins in some northern and central areas with the February to May belg, overlapping with the March to May gu/genna rains in the pastoral south and southeast, and the April to May diraac/sugum rains in northern pastoral areas. The main rainy season for northern and central cropping areas – the June to September kiremt season – follows, coinciding with the July to September karan/karma rains in northern pastoral areas. Soon after, the main meher harvest begins in the north around September/October and advances south through the year’s end. Finally, the October to December deyr/hageya rains in the pastoral south and southeast close out the year. In cropping and agropastoral areas, the lean season typically aligns with peak rainy months, when household stocks are lowest. In pastoral areas, lean seasons align with dry periods when livestock births and milk production decline.

Across livelihood systems, market access is critical, as many poor households are net food buyers for much of the year. Structural factors – including high population density and land fragmentation in the highlands, limited income diversification, and widespread underemployment – constrain livelihoods even in average years. Chronic malnutrition remains prevalent, reducing households’ ability to withstand shocks. In many chronically affected areas, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) remains a substantial food source for poor households.

Between 2020 and 2023, compounding conflict, drought, and economic shocks severely eroded household assets and access to typical food and income sources, with northern Ethiopia and the pastoral south and southeast most affected. Poor households relied heavily on assistance, community support, and negative coping strategies. Recovery of herds, labor markets, and assets will take many years, leaving households highly vulnerable to shocks, such as the failed 2025 deyr/hageya rains.

In northern Ethiopia, livelihoods remain severely affected following the 2020-2022 conflict in Tigray. Although the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement formally ended large-scale fighting, insecurity persists in contested and hard-to-reach areas, including West Tigray and border areas with Eritrea. Internal divisions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) raise concerns about the durability of the agreement. In Amhara, clashes between “Fano” militias and government forces disrupt road access and market activity, while conflict between the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) and government forces constrains livelihoods in western Oromia.

In northern cropping areas, including Tigray and Amhara, households depend primarily on crop production, labor migration, and PSNP. Crops are planted at the start of the kiremt rains, with green harvests beginning in September ahead of the main meher harvest. In a typical year, households rely on own-produced stocks through February, after which market purchases increase. Seasonal labor migration during the kiremt typically supplements incomes, but insecurity and access constraints have reduced opportunities.

In northern pastoral areas such as Afar and northern Somali, livestock births and milk production typically peak in both April/May and July/August, providing critical food and income. Conflict-related livestock losses have left many poor households with few animals. Poor households also rely on casual labor, firewood and bush product sales, and PSNP assistance, particularly between February and July.

In eastern agropastoral areas, including much of eastern Oromia and adjacent lowlands, households pursue mixed livelihoods based on rainfed cereals, pulses, and small ruminants. In East and West Hararghe, khat production often accounts for roughly half of household income.

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, food and income from livestock production – particularly milk, births, and sales – typically peak following seasonal improvements from gu/genna and deyr/hageya rains, with additional income generated during periods of strong domestic and export demand, including around Hajj. Food and income are lowest during dry seasons (January-March and August-October), when pasture and water shortages worsen livestock conditions. The 2020-2023 drought sharply reduced herd sizes, leaving many poor households with minimal livestock. Since then, mixed seasonal performance – including the very dry October-December 2025 deyr/hageya – has slowed herd recovery, leaving some households increasingly reliant on agricultural labor, community support, or limited cropping near rivers.

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Ethiopia Food Security Outlook: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Ethiopia Key Message Update: January 2026
• Latest Ethiopia Food Security Outlook Update: December 2025
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Macroeconomic conditions remain weak, sustaining high living costs countrywide. According to the Ethiopian Statistical Service (ESS), while annual inflation stabilized in January, the ETB depreciated 60.5 percent against the USD since the July 2024 economic reform, contributing to an increase in food prices in areas that are more heavily reliant on imported staples, such as in southern and southeastern pastoral areas. 

Average 2025 meher crop production helped stabilize staple food prices overall; however, in areas with below‑average harvests – including East and West Hararghe (Oromia), North Gondar, Wag Himra, and North Wollo (Amhara), and in the Southern Zone of Tigray – staple prices are rising or remaining atypically high instead of declining seasonally. 

Although fuel prices have stabilized over the past two months, transportation costs remain elevated, contributing to elevated grain prices in the local market.

Ethiopia hosts more than 1.1 million refugees, primarily from surrounding countries. The largest concentrations of refugees include South Sudanese in Gambela Region as well as Somalis in Somali Region. In 2025, approximately 60,000 refugees arrived from South Sudan, with additional arrivals continuing into Gambela following the recent escalation of conflict and severe food access constraints in South Sudan’s Sobat River corridor.

Eastern agropastoral areas (East and West Hararghe zones of Oromia)

Failure of the 2025 meher means many poor households became market dependent as early as November in the lowlands and early in 2026 in the midlands and highlands. Declining khat prices since mid-2025 have reduced casual labor demand and daily wages, while increased firewood and charcoal sales have oversaturated markets and depressed prices and income. Severe pasture and water shortages have sharply worsened livestock health, productivity, and milk availability. In contrast, livestock production remains relatively better in midland and highland areas, as well as in riverine and valley areas where some herds have migrated.

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas (southern Somali, Oromia, and South Ethiopia)

Poor performance of the March-May 2025 gu/genna and October-December 2025 deyer/hageya rains resulted in atypically severe shortages of pasture and water, especially in Afder, Liban, Dawa, and Korahe (Somali), and Borena (Oromia). Livestock body condition significantly deteriorated, especially during the following dry season, and remain extremely poor ahead of the start of the 2026 gu/genna. Poor livestock conditions have led to declining prices and poor terms of trade. Additionally, according to the Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management in February, increased livestock migration from neighboring areas and across borders has intensified competition for pasture and other natural resources, with movement exceeding typical patterns and leading to overgrazing in destination areas.

Northern meher cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

Conflict intensified in early 2026, particularly in Tigray, where heavy clashes were first reported in late January in Tselemit woreda of North Western Zone between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), and Amhara militias. Fighting later spread to the Southern Tigray Zone, involving heavily armed confrontations between the TDF and the Tigray Peace Force (TPF). Although conflict has eased in some areas between ENDF and TDF, tensions remain high, with sporadic fighting and reports of significant troop movements into the area and displacement events. In Amhara, clashes between the ENDF and Fano forces persist despite lower intensity compared to late 2025. 

The escalation in conflict has resulted in panic purchasing, cash shortages, banks limiting cash withdrawal, rising food prices, and fuel constraints. Trade flows between Tigray, Amhara, and Addis Ababa face significant disruptions (Figure 1). Movement restrictions are also limiting access to western surplus-producing areas and constraining labor and income-earning opportunities. 

Northern pastoral areas 

Clashes between the TDF and TPF along the border areas of Megale, Yalo, and Abala have renewed instability and displacement. Local Afar militias intervened to prevent fighting from encroaching into Afar. In Afar, failure of the typical five‑day deda rainfall during the dry season between December and early January exacerbated pasture shortage and water availability challenges.

Humanitarian food assistance

According to the Food Cluster, around 1.8 million people received food assistance in January, excluding distributions by the Ethiopian Disaster Risk Management Commission (a 5 percent decline compared to December, when roughly 1. 9 million people received food assistance). Funding shortfalls have forced the WFP to reduce rations for most refugees to 60 percent of minimum caloric needs, and registration delays leave some new arrivals without assistance. Assistance remains concentrated in Tigray, Somali, Oromia, Afar, and Amhara. Insecurity in Amhara and Oromia continue to impede deliveries, and resource constraints have led to reduced rations in many rural areas.

Eastern agropastoral areas (East and West Hararghe zones of Oromia)

In the East Hararghe lowlands, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing as poor households face extreme constraints to food access. With no income from crops from the 2025 harvests and declining livestock income, households are increasingly market dependent amid extremely high and rapidly rising food prices. In lowland areas, lack of income and food triggered atypically high and rising levels of labor migration to urban centers to access income-earning opportunities for food purchases. Excess livestock sales are also increasing; however, market saturation and poor livestock body conditions due to limited fodder availability are suppressing prices, significantly reducing returns from these sales. Nonetheless, households face large food consumption gaps as households increasingly reduce meal frequency and portions. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist in several other lowland and midland areas due to a lack of food stocks and below-average purchasing power. Households are selling livestock despite low prices due to poor body conditions, migrating for labor, and expanding firewood and charcoal sales to access income. Khat income has fallen sharply. Despite these efforts, households face food consumption gaps and are engaging in consumption-based coping strategies such as reducing meal portion size and frequency. In contrast, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes continue in the midlands and highlands as households are still consuming remaining own-produced food stocks and are able to purchase from markets.

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas (southern Somali, southern Oromia, and South Ethiopia) 

Widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes persist across the region, with food assistance driving localized improvements to Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!). Some of the most destitute households in Afder, Liban, and Dawa zones are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Households are increasingly selling livestock, producing charcoal and firewood, and seeking casual labor opportunities in towns to access cash for food. Community support mechanisms – including irmansi (wealthy households lending milking animals to poorer households) and zeka (redistribution of food and cash to households in need) – remain important but insufficient to meet households' food needs. Many households continue to face food consumption gaps and are employing coping strategies such as skipping meals and reducing portion sizes.

Northern cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is ongoing across several areas facing depleted food stocks and high market reliance amid poor purchasing power; however, food assistance is driving localized Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes. Ongoing conflict continues to restrict mobility, disrupt market and trade activities, and limit access to safe income-earning opportunities. Poor households are engaging in risky labor migration to the Middle East or artisanal mining to access cash. Many households are reducing meal size and frequency, resulting in food consumption gaps. The nearly 1 million people that remain displaced in the north continue to face limited access to typical livelihoods and may face worse even outcomes, particularly those still residing in camps. In contrast, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) persists where households still have access to own-produced food stocks. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes also persist in belg-dependent areas, as households are market-dependent atypically early with below-average purchasing power. Conflict continues to constrain income-earning opportunities and overall income. Low income is restricting access to food as own-produced stocks are exhausted. To access cash for food purchases, households are increasingly selling sheep and eucalyptus. Some households are also reducing meal sizes.

Northern pastoral areas (Afar and northern Somali)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing across areas of northern Afar and northern Somali, with Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes present in areas with ongoing food assistance and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in the remaining areas. A combination of below‑average herd sizes and limited income and food sources is constraining food access. Weak market connectivity with neighboring Tigray and Amhara has reduced livestock sales and access to markets. Households are increasingly relying on excess livestock sales, firewood and charcoal production, limited casual labor opportunities, inter-clan sharing, and gifts of food, livestock, and cash to mitigate consumption gaps.

Central and Southern agropastoral areas (Sidama, Central Ethiopia, South Ethiopia)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are present in belg-producing areas. Most households have exhausted own-produced stocks from 2025 belg and meher harvests and are increasingly market dependent amid increasing staple food prices. Despite deploying numerous livelihood strategies – including labor migration, collecting firewood and grass for sale, and producing charcoal – most poor households are reducing meal size and frequency. 

Refugee camps

Based on available information, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes at a minimum are ongoing in refugee camps and settlements following recent reductions in WFP food assistance. Refugee households, already displaced from typical food and income sources, are heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance, which they complement with limited income from petty trade and small-scale agricultural activities. Critical levels of acute malnutrition were identified by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in camps in Gambela, Afar, and Somali. In Gambela, unregistered South Sudanese refugees are unable to access food assistance, and recent screenings indicate high levels of acute malnutrition among newly arrived children and pregnant and lactating women.

• The March to May 2026 gu/genna rains are expected to be average and timely.
• Clashes in Amhara between “Fano” and the ENDF are likely to escalate through at least September 2026, particularly along strategic trade routes, though fighting is expected to decrease in rural areas through at least April 2026.
• Conflict in Tigray is likely to escalate beyond the levels seen since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement. Tensions between rival Tigrayan political factions and disputes over the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement are likely to result in increased clashes between armed actors through September 2026. A recent deployment of ENDF forces to Tigray indicates an expected increase in ENDF intervention in the region, with likely flashpoints in Southern Tigray and Western Tigray. However, despite significant volatility, a larger-scale war is not expected to unfold within the projection period.
• OLA attacks will most likely increase through September, resulting in clashes with the ENDF and federally backed forces.
• The total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is expected to increase through September due to expected escalations in armed conflict in the north.
• Nationally, the refugee population is likely to increase through September, driven by continued conflict in the border regions of Sudan and South Sudan.
• Market function and trade flows are expected to function normally, except for disruptions in conflict-affected areas in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray. The conflict in the northern areas will also likely temporarily disrupt the movement of goods between Addis Ababa and Amhara and Tigray, leading to supply shortages in the north.
• High fuel prices and fuel shortages are anticipated to continue to increase transportation and supply costs. Additionally, the steady increase in electricity prices are expected to drive up overall costs, leading to higher business operating expenses and rising inflation.
• Food prices are expected to increase from February as market supplies decline, with prices likely to remain well above last year's and average, peaking in August and September. In northern areas, disruptions to trade routes will also likely result in localized price increases compared to the rest of the country. In belg-producing areas, staple food prices are likely to stabilize in July/August as the harvest becomes available.
• Overall income is expected to remain below average, driven by atypically high numbers of agricultural laborers relative to available opportunities.
• Migratory labor opportunities are expected to remain limited, particularly for poor households in central and eastern Tigray, as the Wolkayit and Raya administrative disagreement has not been resolved.
• In northern pastoral areas, pasture availability in February will be seasonally sparse and below average. Pasture availability will likely improve moderately during the March-May diraac/sugum season in Fafan and Sitti zones of Somali Region and near average across remaining areas. The onset of the July-September karan/karma season is anticipated to further enhance pasture and water availability.
• In northern pastoral areas, livestock production and productivity, particularly from cattle and camels, are anticipated to improve as births begin between January and April. However, births will remain below typical levels (particularly in areas with low herd sizes related to the conflict).
• In the south and southeast pastoral areas, pasture and water availability are anticipated to be below average for livestock consumption until the gu/genna season starts in March. Pasture and water availability are expected to begin to improve to average with the onset of gu/genna season, but will likely decline again once the dry season begins in June.
• In the south and southeast pastoral areas, the atypical heat in late 2025, coupled with the consecutive below-average rainfall in late 2024 and 2025, is expected to adversely affect livestock body condition, saleability, and milk production. Moreover, livestock body conditions are expected to deteriorate to near- emaciation with productivity also well below average during the mid-2026 dry season.
• Livestock prices in the south and southeast pastoral areas are expected to remain above average despite anticipated poor body conditions, mainly due to inflationary pressure. A slight increase in prices is expected during the holidays.
• PSNP is expected to continue to provide food through cash and in-kind assistance as is typical through the projection period for both direct support and public works households.
• Remittances from urban to rural households are likely to remain below average as increases in the urban cost of living are reducing the amount urban households can afford to send.

Humanitarian food assistance

Although the detailed humanitarian food assistance plans for 2026 are not yet available, the current global funding environment makes it unlikely that an expanded allocation sufficient to meet the needs of host communities, IDPs, and refugees will be secured. It is expected that food assistance will continue to some degree, however, with continued prioritization on areas of greatest concern.

Eastern agropastoral areas (East and West Hararghe zones of Oromia)

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely through May in lowland East Hararghe before improving to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in June. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in other lowland and midland areas is expected through May, improving to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in June. Across the lowlands, market reliance and below-average livestock sales and milk availability will force poor households to continue depending on increasingly unsustainable coping strategies; however, their ability to continue drawing on these limited resources is expected to weaken. Consequently, households will likely reduce meal size and frequency, with large food consumption gaps likely elevating levels of acute malnutrition through May. In higher elevations, income from khat will likely support market access and improve household consumption. Following the onset of the March/April belg rains, slightly increased milk availability for household consumption – largely from goats that migrated to riverine areas – will partially reduce food consumption gaps. Household income from agricultural labor will increase following the onset of the belg rains, and by late June, the availability of short-maturing belg maize, haricot beans, and both Irish and sweet potato for consumption and sale is expected to support food access and availability. 

Southern and southeastern pastoral areas (southern Somali, Oromia, and South Ethiopia) 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely persist in the pastoral south and southeast, with some of the worst-affected households in Afder, Liban, and Dawa in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Households will face below-average access to milk for consumption and atypically low income from livestock sales from selling poor-quality animals in saturated markets. Households will face constrained income for food purchases amid limited opportunities for herd recovery during the June to September dry season and rising staple prices. To cope, poor households are expected to increasingly rely on selling charcoal and firewood, seeking nearby labor opportunities, and relying on irmansi and zeka community-based support. Nevertheless, many poor households will face food consumption gaps, reducing meal size and frequency through September.

Northern cropping areas (Amhara and Tigray)

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through September in many meher-dominant lowland areas and areas bordering Eritrea. In other meher-dominant areas, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through May before deterioration to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) during the June to August lean season. Households in the worst-affected lowlands already exhausted food stocks early in January and are market-dependent; other meher-dominant areas are expected to follow by April. Conflict-related disruptions, limited income beyond PSNP, and rising staple prices are likely to constrain purchasing power. Poor households will likely intensify labor migration, firewood and charcoal sales, eucalyptus cutting, risky artisanal mining, borrowing, and reliance on social networks; however, consumption gaps are expected to persist in lowland areas and emerge more broadly by April, expanding through the June-August lean season.

In belg-benefiting areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through June, with improvement to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) likely following the belg harvest. As the lean season continues, households are expected to intensify sales of livestock, livestock products, and immature trees, and increasingly pursue labor migration, including higher-risk options to the Middle East and restricted areas of Western Tigray. Nonetheless, consumption gaps will persist through June, with households reducing meal size and frequency. Despite expected belg production in June, rising staple prices and conflict-related income constraints will likely limit access to non-food essentials.

Northern pastoral areas (Afar and northern Somali)

In northern Afar, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected through September. Although seasonal improvements in pasture are expected to modestly increase milk availability – supporting some communal sharing – gains are expected to be insufficient to offset peak lean season constraints. Ongoing conflict will likely continue to disrupt livestock trade and staple food supply chains, sustaining high prices and constraining food access. Poor households are expected to rely heavily on excess livestock sales, firewood and charcoal production, limited casual labor, and informal food and cash support. Food consumption gaps are likely to persist. 

Southern and central agropastoral (Sidama, Central Ethiopia, and South Ethiopia region) 

In belg-dependent agropastoral areas, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected during the belg lean season as households exhaust food stocks and become market dependent amid rising staple food prices. Despite near-average income, households will likely expand natural resource sales, borrowing, and communal support, though these efforts will be insufficient to prevent food consumption gaps and seasonal declines in nutrition. The anticipated average June belg harvest is expected to improve access, supporting Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

Conversely, meher-dependent agropastoral areas are expected to be Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through May before the meher lean season begins and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) emerges. As meher food stocks decline, staple food prices rise, and market dependence increases, poor households are expected to increasingly seek casual labor opportunities, expand natural resource sales, borrow from wealthier households, and rely on social support. However, these efforts will likely be insufficient to prevent food consumption gaps and seasonal deterioration in nutrition.

Refugee camps

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely to continue across refugee camps. Refugee reliance on food assistance will likely persist as the inability to engage in full livelihood activities prevents them from meeting their basic needs. Food consumption gaps are expected given likely continued WFP ration reductions. Conflict in South Sudan is expected to further strain overburdened camps across Gambela, with registration delays likely driving Emergency (IPC Phase 4) among new arrivals.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

National 

A shift to El Niño during the June to September kiremt 2026 rains results in below-average precipitation

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If El Niño develops during the June to September 2026 kiremt rainy season, the kiremt rains would likely be below average or erratic. A poor kiremt season would likely contribute to reduced seasonal agricultural labor demand in meher-dependent areas and weaker pasture regeneration and livestock productivity in agropastoral areas, resulting in lower wage income and reduced milk availability during the lean season. As a result, increased market dependence and widened food consumption gaps would be likely, particularly in areas already vulnerable to poor rainfall, while also substantially increasing the number of people in need of food assistance.

Northern cropping areas (Tigray and Amhara)

Intensified conflict across Tigray ahead of the kiremt rains

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Intensified conflict throughout Tigray and Amhara would limit population movement and further disrupt trade, causing a sharp decline in typical engagement in livelihood activities and market supply and function. This differs from the most likely scenario, in which intensified conflict is contained to flashpoints in Southern and Western Tigray. Additionally, an increase in conflict during the 2026 belg agricultural season (beginning in April/May 2026) and the 2026 meher cultivation season (June-August) could significantly disrupt agricultural labor opportunities, reduce income, and limit access to own-produced foods. This could result in more widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse outcomes for some households during the projection period, alongside a sharp increase in the population in need of humanitarian food assistance.

Eastern agropastoral areas (East and West Hararghe zones of Oromia)

February to May (belg 2026) rains are below average

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: If the belg season is below average, it will negatively affect long‑maturing meher crops and increase pressure on pasture and water resources for livestock. These unfavorable weather conditions would reduce crop yields, livestock productivity, and related labor opportunities. Consequently, household access to food and income will decline, creating a substantial gap in food consumption, especially among poor and very poor households. As a result, area‑level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are likely between June and September.

Southern and southeastern pastoral area (Somali and Oromia)

March to May 2025 gu/genna season is below average 

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are most likely during the February to May 2026 period in a scenario where rainfall is average during the gu/genna. If this rainfall season is below average – with a deficit of 40 percent or more – an increase in the population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes could occur, with area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes between February and May.

El Niño and the kiremt Forecast 

Global forecast monitoring centers indicate an increasing likelihood of El Niño conditions developing in mid-2026, potentially coinciding with Ethiopia’s June to September kiremt rainfall season. The latest ENSO outlooks from the NOAA Climate Prediction Center (CPC) indicate elevated probabilities of a transition from ENSO-neutral to El Niño conditions, explaining that “for the late summer and beyond, there is a 50-60% chance of El Niño forming, though model uncertainty remains considerable and forecasts made this time of year tend to have lower accuracy” (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the International Research Institute (IRI) models indicate that El Niño could arrive sooner: “Starting in May-July, El Niño probabilities become higher than ENSO-neutral and remain in the range of 58% to 61%” (Figure 3).

When El Niño overlaps with the typical kiremt season, the volume and durability of the kiremt rains are negatively affected because warm water in the equatorial Pacific can reorganize large-scale winds in a way that makes air sink over Ethiopia and reduces moisture inflow, both of which suppress kiremt rainfall. El Niño events are historically associated with below-average kiremt rainfall cross much of Ethiopia’s kiremt-receiving areas. However, rainfall deficits tend to be more pronounced in northern, northeastern, and eastern parts of the country, where baseline rainfall totals are lower and seasonal variability is higher than in the western highlands. The timing of that shift to El Niño is likely to play a role in how substantial the impact is in terms of magnitude, geographic extent and temporal distribution. While the most likely scenario continues to be for average levels of precipitation during the kiremt, long-term forecasting comes with a high degree of uncertainty. 

Potential food security impacts through September 2026 

Because the meher harvest typically begins in October, after FEWS NET’s current projection period, below-average kiremt rainfall would most immediately affect food security through income generation and labor demand associated with long-cycle crop production rather than through direct harvest losses before September. In meher-dependent areas, land preparation can start as early as March/April, and May through August is a critical period when planting and weeding provide seasonal income for poor households during the lean season. Reduced or delayed rainfall could limit cropped areas or delay agricultural activities, thereby reducing labor demand and associated wage income. Lower earnings during a period of seasonally rising staple food prices would likely constrain purchasing power and increase market dependence, potentially widening consumption gaps during the peak lean season. Early-season rainfall deficits may also dampen production expectations, which can influence local market behavior and contribute to price volatility.

In contrast, short-cycle crops in lowland and some midland areas may experience more direct production impacts within the projection period. Crop varieties planted in June and July in these areas are typically harvested in early September, meaning that rainfall deficits during the kiremt season could reduce yields before the main meher harvest. On many past occasions when El Niño developed during or before kiremt, short-cycle crops have been less productive compared to seasons with typical rainfall. In addition, water availability in major dams, rivers, and tributaries has already been reduced due to the late onset of rains, prolonged dry spells, and low rainfall last July and August, which could further constrain crop development in irrigated areas.

In agropastoral areas, kiremt rainfall supports pasture regeneration and water availability. Below-average rainfall would likely limit improvements in livestock body conditions and milk production that poor households rely on during the peaklean season. Reduced milk availability directly constrains household food access, while weakened livestock conditions may suppress sale values and livestock-to-cereal terms of trade. 

Overall, if kiremt rainfall performs significantly below average, food security deterioration through September would most likely manifest through reduced seasonal labor income, constrained livestock productivity, and increased reliance on market purchases during the lean season. The severity of impacts would depend on the spatial extent and duration of rainfall deficits and pre-existing vulnerability levels.