Despite resource constraints, humanitarian aid mitigates consumption deficits

• Humanitarians continue to provide food assistance in areas of high concern, reaching 3.8 million people in April. Food aid distributions are not consistent month to month, with occasional wide variation; in Oromia, the number of recipients declined by 50 percent from March to April, while in northern Ethiopia and Somali Region, food assistance levels increased. In Tigray, 2.0 million people received assistance in April, increasing the reach of aid relative to February and March. In Afar and Somali regions, humanitarians increased food aid distributions by around 250 and 25 percent, respectively, between January and April. While available resources are likely adequate to reach similar numbers of people through August, the population in need is expected to increase through September, outpacing aid supply and resulting in widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes. 
• In Tigray, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are ongoing and expected to persist through at least the next harvest expected in September. Humanitarians have increased the reach of food assistance, supporting household food consumption among recipients; however, high levels of food aid sharing are ongoing and reducing the ration size per household. In areas where food assistance is not significant, households are still engaging in severe livelihood coping strategies such as sending children to beg, selling their last livestock, and migrating to towns and Saudia Arabia. Furthermore, livestock conditions are poor, with little demand for livestock as the conflict in Amhara is deterring traders from traveling to Tigray. If humanitarian food assistance and social support notably decline or are disrupted for an extended period, more extreme outcomes could occur. 
• In the pastoral south and southeast, favorable rainfall early in the 2024 March to May rainy season is driving improvements in livestock body conditions and reproduction. Goats began to give birth in April; however, this is not a significant source of income/food for many households due to the low consumption of goat milk. Camel and cattle births expected in May/June will likely support more significant improvements in household milk consumption and sales. As resources among communities increase, households are expected to share available resources with poor, destitute, and some displaced households to support a moderate increase in their food consumption. Recent distributions of food aid have also helped to moderate food consumption deficits in some areas. As a result, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected to ease in Borena, Afder, Dawa, Liben, and Shabelle zones, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes expected by June. 

Conflict: In early 2024, conflict declined across Ethiopia; however, levels of conflict in February and March remain higher than in the same months of 2023 (Figure 2). Conflict continues to be concentrated in areas of Amhara and Oromia. Attacks in Oromia by the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) declined due to large-scale Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) ground operations. In general, calm has prevailed across most of Tigray; however, in mid-April clashes between Tigrayan and Amhara armed groups did occur in areas of Raya Alamata. Meanwhile, conflict increased in March and April between the Afar and Somali-Issa over land disputes – this conflict is increasingly close to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti trade routes – raising concern for the possibility of disruptions to trade. Across conflict-affected areas, livelihood activities are disrupted, population movement and trade flows are limited, and infrastructure is sometimes damaged/destroyed.

Displacement: Displacement continues to occur in conflict-affected areas of the country. In areas where general calm persists, returnees are returning to their places of origin as is feasible. Additionally, those displaced due to the impacts of the 2020 to 2023 drought in the pastoral south and southeast are also returning to their places of origin. According to OCHA, mid-April conflict in bordering areas of Amhara and Tigray resulted in the displacement of over 50,000 people fleeing violence in areas of Southern Zone in Tigray to neighboring areas in Wag Himra and North Wollo zones of Amhara. Most of the displaced households are located among the host community, with some residing in informal settlements. Additionally, based on FEWS NET’s late April field assessment in Tigray, key informants indicate that populations and households are still migrating to towns, including Addis Ababa and Mekele, as well as Saudia Arabia, due to the lack of food.

According to East and West Hararghe zonal governments, there are reports of migration by some households and individuals to towns in search of food. Most households are migrating toward town centers such as Awoday, Dire Dawa, Harar, Jijija, and Hargessa. FEWS NET is investigating these reports further, but migration is not currently at levels that indicate a large proportion of the population are resorting to severe coping strategies. 

Crop production: Across much of the country, the favorable start of the belg season allowed for timely land preparation and planting of belg crops and long-cycle meher crops; however, planting occurred slightly late due to delays in distribution of seeds and fertilizer in northern Ethiopia and areas of Oromia, as well as conflict-related disruptions to agricultural activities. Nationally, growing crops are in generally good condition. Belg crops are in the growing to vegetative stage while planted long-cycle meher crops are in vegetative stages. 

In belg areas of eastern Amhara and southern Tigray, impacts of active conflict and minimal assets will limit household ability to plant belg crops as well as prepare land for planting meher crops in the coming months. During FEWS NET’s April field assessment in Tigray, farmland was being prepared for planting of short-cycle meher crops; however, there are poor households who are renting their land to others for cultivation during the 2024 season. According to East Hararghe Zone of Oromia, only 15 percent of the planned area was covered with seed, attributed to insufficient rainfall and delayed planting of belg and long-cycle meher crops. Most planted belg crops are in the vegetation and flowing stage

Localized flooding and outbreaks of pests are impacting the ongoing agricultural season in southern and southeastern Ethiopia. Flooding and waterlogging in localized areas of West Arsi, Guji, and West Guji zones and pests in Arsi and West Arsi zones have resulted in damage to crops, reducing likely yield sizes. In Selamago, Benatsemay, and Hamer woredas of South Omo Zone of South West Region, Fall Army Worm invaded about 1,300 hectares of maize, about 2 percent of the total area planted. In Somali Region, the recession of March and April floodwaters are providing ample moisture to support off-season gu cultivation in southern riverine and lowland agropastoral areas.

Pasture and water availability: Pasture conditions in northern, southern, and southeastern pastoral areas are generally favorable (Figure 3), enabling pastoralists and their livestock to return home. The recent rains have replenished water sources, ensuring that water is generally accessible throughout most of the areas, except a few localized areas of East Hararghe Zone in Oromia. Areas impacted by drought along the Tekeze River basin in northeastern Amhara, as well as much of east Tigray, continue to experience dry conditions with minimal pasture available for livestock. 

Livestock condition and productivity: Livestock body conditions across much of the country are favorable, including in southern and southeastern pastoral areas, due to the availability of water and pasture. In the pastoral south and southeast, milk access has improved with shoats giving birth, and cattle and camel births are imminent. However, total milk availability remains below average due to persistently low numbers of livestock. 

In Afar, livestock body conditions have also improved to near normal levels due to the increased availability of pasture and water; however, variability in the region exists, with some woredas not experiencing improvements. Overall, livestock productivity and milk output are still below average, affected by the impact of prolonged dry periods, conflict, and drought during the previous seasons. Similarly, in drought-affected woredas in Tigray and Amhara, especially in the Tekeze River catchment, pasture shortages are driving poor livestock body conditions. While livestock in some areas of Zone 1 and Zone 3 that are close to the Awash River catchment and less affected by the drought have near normal body conditions, resulting in births and milk production, overall levels of livestock production in these areas also remain below average.

Macroeconomy: Poor macroeconomic conditions persist as the government’s ability to earn income and foreign reserves remain low, driving elevated inflation rates and depreciation of the Ethiopian Birr (ETB) on the official and parallel markets. In April, the government continued discussions with the IMF regarding a loan. Negotiations are ongoing; however, an agreement is likely in the coming months. One of the loan terms under discussion is that the currency will need to be devalued; there are multiple ways in which this may be accomplished, but regardless of method, any devaluation of the currency on the official market is expected to have negative implications on prices of all goods, including food and fuel, therefore increasing inflation. 

According to the Ethiopia Statistical Services, annual headline inflation decreased by two percentage points from February to March, reaching the lowest inflation rate since June 2021. However, inflation remains high at 26.2 percent (Figure 4). The relative decline in annual inflation was attributed to a decrease in the prices of both food and non-food products. 

On the official market, the ETB was trading at around 56 ETB/USD for much of April, about 5 percent higher than the same time last year. Meanwhile, according to anecdotal reports, the ETB is trading at over double on the parallel market with a value of 115 to 120 ETB/USD. 

Low government revenue and reserves are negatively impacting the country’s ability to import goods, notably food, medicine, and fuel. Anecdotal reports indicate many fuel tankers are in Djibouti ready for fueling; however, limited payment power among importers is decreasing their ability to purchase fuel for formal imports. Shortages of fuel are occurring on the official market; some fuel stations have no fuel at all, while low supply at others is resulting in long lines. Fuel is more readily available on the parallel market in some areas, but at much higher prices compared to the official market. Official market prices are controlled by the government, while parallel market prices are dictated by traders and the parallel market exchange rate. The fuel shortages on the official market and high and increasing prices on the parallel market will continue to drive increases in transportation costs and disruptions to supply chains. Traders are likely to pass these higher costs onto the consumers, resulting in persistently high and increasing food prices, especially as market supply decreases. 

Conflict in the Red Sea has disrupted southern shipping lanes due to security risks. Ethiopia is one of the countries that is negatively impacted by the disrupted trade, as over 60 percent of wheat imports that come from the United States typically pass through the Red Sea. While wheat is an important food source for households, it is not a commodity widely consumed by rural poor households; therefore, wheat trade disruptions and subsequent price increases are not expected to have notable impacts on the populations of concern for acute food insecurity. 

Staple food supply and prices: Staple food prices are generally stable, albeit well above both average and 2023 levels. In Addis Ababa, maize prices in March were similar to those in February, but more than double the three-year average and over 50 percent higher than last year (Figure 5). In northern Ethiopia, market prices of staple foods are more or less stable, although some anomalies are occurring in areas where trade and supply routes are impacted by ongoing conflict. 

In southern and southeastern pastoral areas, food price trends are mixed: prices are increasing in Somali Region and stable or slightly decreasing in Oromia Region. Maize prices in Chereti market in Somali Region increased by 8 percent from February to March, and are double the three-year average. In Oromia Region, grain prices slightly declined or remained stable from February to March. In Shashemene, March maize prices were similar to those in February, but 30 percent higher than the same time last year and over 75 percent higher than the three-year average.

Livestock supply and prices: Favorable pasture conditions and improving livestock conditions have led to increasing livestock market values in many areas of the country. In March, goat prices in Chereti market of Somali Region increased by 7 percent and are double that of both the three-year average and last year. In Chereti, the sale of one goat can purchase around 77 kgs of maize in March, slightly higher than the three-year average (Figure 6). The sale of a goat in Chereti could therefore provide the average family of seven with a maximum of 22 days of food. 

However, significant constraints on livestock supply and income persist in the north. In Afar, many pastoralists are not selling livestock due to persistently low numbers following drought and conflict; selling livestock for income is therefore limited and/or unavailable for many poor households. In Amhara, the ongoing conflict continues to restrict trader movements, therefore decreasing demand for livestock and negatively impacting prices. In eastern Tigray, livestock trade and purchases on the market are below normal due to the impact of drought conditions on livestock body conditions, low purchasing power among households, and trade disruptions associated with the conflict in Amhara. 

Agricultural and non-agricultural labor: Nationally, with ongoing belg/genna/gu agricultural activities, the availability of agricultural labor has increased and is typical for this time of year. However, while wage rates remain similar to those of October 2023 and higher than recent years, wages are suppressed compared to the long-term average. 

A key anomaly from the national trend is that agricultural activities have not fully begun in northern belg-producing areas of Ethiopia due to a slow start of the belg-rainfall. Furthermore, income from labor employment has been affected by the reduced availability of labor opportunities in Amhara and Tigray due to the compounding shocks of conflict and drought over the last four years. Labor migration, a key income source at this time of year in Tigray, is severely restricted. Likewise, conflict in Amhara is constraining income-earning activities, notably those from self-employment. However, the increase in the cost of living has driven a higher daily wage rate for casual labor employment in some big towns. For instance, in Sekota, the labor wage rate is 400 ETB per day, double the rate since the northern Ethiopia conflict ceased. 

Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP): The first PSNP distribution occurred nationally in March and April. In Tigray, over 823,000 people are targeted for PSNP. Households receive around 500 to 600 ETB per household member in Tigray, with a maximum of five family members able to receive PSNP. Though the rate for the PSNP has increased compared to the previous years, it remains inadequate to purchase the intended amount of staple foods. Moreover, households that receive PSNP are not eligible for humanitarian food aid. In Oromia, the transfer payments for March are yet to be completed and will continue in April. 

Humanitarian food assistance: In April, humanitarians assisted around 3.8 million people nationally, a slight increase from March when roughly 3.4 million people were reached with food aid. This represents a modest increase in distributions from February and March (Figure 7). The Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Commission (EDRMC) is distributing some additional food assistance, but information on woreda-level government distributions is unavailable at the time of this analysis. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the Joint Emergency Operation Program (JEOP) are providing a full ration while the government is distributing 15 kg of cereals per person. There were some initial logistical issues with rolling out the new vulnerability-based targeting (VBT) system in early 2024; however, partners report that logistical challenges have now been resolved, and distributions are occurring on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, humanitarians are still facing resource shortfalls which are impacting their ability to reach all of the population in need; this constraint is most acutely impacting distributions in areas outside of northern Ethiopia, as the severity of need in northern Ethiopia remains a necessary priority. 

At the regional and subregional level, there has been some variation in the number of people reached monthly in early 2024. In Tigray, for example, over 2.0 million people received food aid in January and February, a figure that then decreased to 1.1 million people in March, before rebounding to 2.0 million people once again in April. While the total number of people reached in Tigray was variable month-on-month, humanitarians reached more woredas from January to April, resulting in wider coverage of food aid in Tigray. 

In Somali Region, humanitarians only distributed assistance twice to 20 woredas (ten of which are newly targeted) between January and April due to resource limitations. 

Acute malnutrition: Levels of acute malnutrition remain elevated in many areas of the country, associated with cholera and other disease outbreaks and the multiple shocks impacting households' ability to access food. In Tigray, coverage of screening is not consistent month to month; as such, it is difficult to interpret the trend of acute malnutrition levels. However, there were visible signs of acute malnutrition among some children during FEWS NET’s field assessment in April. Additionally, households, health centers, and local government officials indicated that higher levels of acute malnutrition and mortality are being prevented among households through community sharing and support, as well as malnutrition programming at reestablished health centers.  

In Afar Region, cases of acute malnutrition continue to be reported, particularly from conflict and drought-affected areas. SMART+ survey findings from the Afar Regional Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit in Asale Pastoral (ASP) livelihood zone in March found a GAM rate of 11 percent, indicative of Serious levels of acute malnutrition. Ongoing food aid distributions and nutrition programming are allowing for some modest improvements in levels of acute malnutrition. 

The assumptions used to develop FEWS NET’s most likely scenario for the Ethiopia Food Security Outlook from February to May 2024 remain unchanged, except for the following:

• The February to May belg rainy season is forecast to be above average, with isolated areas receiving above-average rainfall over the eastern-most southwest Rift Valley regions. Similarly, the March to May gu/genna rains in southern and southeastern Ethiopia are forecast to be above average. The diraac/sugum rains in the northern pastoral areas are forecast to be average, with localized above-average rainfall. 
• The June to September karan/karma rainfall season in northeastern Ethiopia is now forecast to be above average.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor due to lack of hard currency and insecurity, with deterioration likely during the scenario period as the IMF and Ethiopian government reach a loan agreement which will result in the depreciation of the ETB on the official market. As a result, an increase in the price of all goods – both essential and luxury – is expected, along with a subsequent increase in the inflation rate to above 30 percent. 
• There is significant concern that the concessions by the Tigray and Amhara administrations will trigger sporadic clashes between Tigray and Amhara forces in the disputed areas and further protests by residents, as well as escalate attacks against ethnic Tigrayans in occupied areas of the region.
• Conflict in Amhara is likely to continue at a higher intensity than previously projected through September 2024. The conflict is likely to occur along main roads and may therefore compound existing transport and trade disruptions, and would likely result in the imposition of curfews and movement restrictions between cities and towns. 
• Humanitarians are expected to reach a similar number of people with food aid throughout the rest of the projection period, similar to  early 2023. Distributions are likely to continue to be prioritized in areas of greatest concern, like northern Ethiopia. FEWS NET assumes that the share of the population receiving food assistance at the woreda-level will continue at amounts observed in February to April, at a minimum, from May to September. 

During the June to September period, food assistance needs are expected to peak seasonally for a third consecutive and record-breaking year¹, driven by drought, conflict, and poor macroeconomic conditions. The population in need is expected to gradually increase throughout the projection period as the more populated areas of the country enter the lean period and households exhaust their food stocks and become increasingly market-reliant amidst below-average purchasing power. In early to mid-2024, food security conditions are expected to deteriorate in northern, central, and western areas of the country as households become increasingly market-reliant amidst atypically low purchasing power and increasing food prices. In the pastoral south and southeast, households are expected to have improved food security conditions due to the favorable rainy seasons driving improvements in food and income from livestock. 

In much of Tigray and northeastern Amhara, the minimal assets and ability for households to access food and income through own-production alongside high reliance on food assistance and community members is expected until the next harvest begins in September, resulting in high concern and risk for more severe outcomes than mapped. Humanitarian food assistance and social support networks will likely remain critical for households to access some food and/or income, prevent livelihood collapse, and prevent even higher levels of acute malnutrition. Areas of the Tekeze River catchment along the Tigray and Amhara border and in eastern Tigray remain of highest concern: households in these areas have limited ability to earn income from In much of Tigray and northeastern Amhara, the minimal assets and ability for households to access food and income through own-production alongside high reliance on food assistance and community members is expected until the next harvest begins in September, resulting in high concern and risk for more severe outcomes than mapped. Humanitarian food assistance and social support networks will likely remain critical for households to access some food and/or income, prevent livelihood collapse, and prevent even higher levels of acute malnutrition. Areas of the Tekeze River catchment along the Tigray and Amhara border and in eastern Tigray remain of highest concern: households in these areas have limited ability to earn income from livestock activities due to poor livestock body conditions, along with poor casual labor and labor migration opportunities. Households are reportedly heavily reliant on assistance for food alongside extreme livelihood coping strategies such as begging, selling their last livestock (including donkeys), and migrating to towns within and outside of Ethiopia. Many households are still consuming one meal a day despite these coping strategies. As a result, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in localized areas where food assistance is not high enough; in areas where assistance is large-scale, Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are assessed. Some households are expected to be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5); these households are relying primarily on food from neighbors and income-earning activities with minimal income such as fetching water and selling it for as little as 5 ETB. Humanitarian food assistance coupled with social support will remain critical to preventing high levels of acute malnutrition from escalating to high levels of hunger-related mortality and preventing livelihood collapse. Although FEWS NET assumes humanitarian food assistance levels will continue and be sustained at levels similar to the early 2024 until the end of the lean season in September, a substantial decline in levels of food assistance and/or social support would likely result in extreme food insecurity outcomes.

In areas of Afar bordering Tigray, livestock herds remain low due to conflict and drought, with expectations for minimal improvements in these areas driving continued Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. While there have been improvements in livestock body conditions, the lack of livestock and other productive assets is severely hindering the ability of households to benefit. Poor and displaced households are expected to earn small levels of income from petty trading and self-employment activities; however, purchasing power is expected to remain low amid high food prices. Households are likely to continue to engage in severe coping strategies such as minimal meal consumption, selling productive assets to access food, incurring more debt, and consuming wild foods. In some areas, humanitarian food assistance delivery is expected to mitigate food consumption deficits where Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are likely. 

In the pastoral south and southeast, food insecurity conditions are mostly expected to gradually improve as households continue to recover from the 2020 to 2023 drought. While goats have started providing milk following births in March/April, this milk is typically not sold and is not signficant enough for household consumption. Households will most likely continue to incur debt using credit for food purchases to some extent; however, available credit is minimal as households already have high levels of debt from the drought. In some areas of Borena, Afder, Dawa, Liban, and Shabelle zones, livestock holdings are minimal, and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) outcomes are expected amid food assistance deliveries through May/June. In the rest of the pastoral south and southeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed! (Phase 2!) outcomes are expected through May/June, particularly in agropastoral areas where the harvest is supporting some household access to food and/or where the impacts of the drought were less severe. 

In May/June, cattle and camels are expected to give birth, which is anticipated to provide improved food and income availability across most of the pastoral south and southeast and support more substantial improvement in food security outcomes. Milk availability from these livestock will not only enable own-consumption and income, but also benefit households who have lost their livestock through the expected sharing of both milk and food purchased through milk sales. The increased milk and food availability throughout the community is expected to mitigate large food consumption deficits, and more widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) outcomes are expected to emerge. However, across Somali Region, some households who remain displaced and/or destitute with minimal ability to access food and income through sharing or without incurring further debt are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).