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Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in north and east due to La Niña conditions

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in north and east due to La Niña conditions

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  • Key Messages
  • Analysis in brief
  • Food security context
  • Current food security conditions as of October 2024
  • Analysis of key food and income sources
  • Humanitarian food assistance
  • Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of October 2024
  • Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through May 2025
  • Projected acute food insecurity outcomes October 2024 to May 2025
  • Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes
  • Key Messages
    • Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected in the Northern and Eastern Lowlands and Imbo Plains during the lean period of October 2024 to January 2025. The depletion of household food stocks and increased reliance on markets, combined with rising food prices and limited income access, are reducing food access in these areas. The situation is exacerbated by below-average agricultural opportunities in the north and east due to La Niña, the closure of borders with Rwanda in the north, and the effects on both agricultural and non-agricultural labor opportunities due to flooding and the overflow of Lake Tanganyika in the Imbo Plains.
    • Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are projected to persist in the north and east during the post-harvest period from February to May 2025. Given the anticipated below-average 2025 Season A crop production, household food stocks are expected to be rapidly depleted, maintaining below-average food access for poor and very poor households that are already facing rising food prices and diminished agricultural labor opportunities.
    • Among the populations of highest concern are refugees, returnees who exhausted the three-month food assistance received up on arrival, flood-affected IDPs, and very poor households in the north, east, and west. FEWS NET estimates that between 500,000 and 749,999 people are likely to need urgent humanitarian food assistance to prevent Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes, with October to December being the peak period.
    • Increased food consumption gaps are anticipated for refugees and IDPs between October 2024 and May 2025, due to reduced levels of humanitarian assistance. Due to resource constraints, refugees are currently receiving only 70 percent of their monthly food rations, and food assistance will either be further reduced or remain at the same level during the analysis period.

    The analysis in this report is based on information available as of October 31, 2024.

    Analysis in brief

    Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in the Northern Lowland livelihood zone during the lean period from October to December 2024, as well as through early 2025. Due to the rapid depletion of food stocks from own crop production, households are likely to rely predominantly on market purchases for food access in a context of reduced purchasing power for poor and very poor households:

    • Food purchases are competing with expenses for school fees and agricultural inputs for 2025 Season A amid well above-average staple food prices. 
    • La Niña conditions expected from October to December 2024 are likely to result in below-average rainfall, leading to reduced agricultural activities, cash crop production, and livestock activities, which in turn will decrease labor opportunities for about 40 percent of the total population. 
    • The closure of borders with Rwanda has reduced cross-border economic opportunities, diminishing income access and increasing food gaps in the north.

    Macroeconomic conditions are worsening food insecurity across the country. A persistent drop in the export of cash crops and minerals is exacerbating the country’s significant trade deficit, with related macroeconomic indicators remaining at critical levels. This precarious economic situation is the root cause of the instability of the Burundi franc (BIF) and the declining official exchange rates, which are currently around 250 percent higher compared to the parallel market. The reduced capacity for imports is forcing traders to increasingly depend on the parallel market, resulting in higher prices for imported goods, including food and essential items. Fuel, which has been in short supply since early 2024, is particularly affected. This scarcity has repercussions across various sectors of the economy, notably increasing transportation costs and food prices.

    The rise in the water table and the level of Lake Tanganyika: Driven by above-average rainfall in 2023 and early 2024, the water table and Lake Tanganyika levels remain elevated, even during the dry period from June to September (Figure 1). The current levels of the water table and Lake Tanganyika put households and their assets at risk of flooding, specifically in the Imbo Plains livelihood zone as the rainy season begins. The floods and the overflow of Lake Tanganyika led to the displacement of 300,000 people and the destruction of 40,000 hectares of crops in early 2024.

    Figure 1. Highest lake levels in decades

    Source: IPAD/USDA

    Increased food consumption gaps are expected throughout the analysis period for IDPs, refugees, and returnees, who primarily depend on humanitarian food assistance and have limited access to their own income and food sources. This population includes 102,824 IDPs and 347,100 refugees, registered asylum seekers, and returnees needing life-saving aid.

    Currently, refugees receive only 70 percent of the standard food ration due to resource constraints, and fewer than 25 percent of IDPs are covered by food assistance. Refugees, especially within their first two years of arrival, cannot meet essential non-food needs and will likely need livelihood interventions after their three-month food assistance package is exhausted. They are expected to face food consumption gaps or engage in stressed coping mechanisms during the projected period. Further reductions in food assistance are expected, leading to persistent Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes for most IDPs and refugees between June 2024 and January 2025.

    Food security context

    Agriculture: In Burundi, subsistence and smallholder farming are widely practiced, with most households cultivating small plots of land. Farmers have limited access to improved agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, and they primarily rely on rainfed farming, leading to low production despite the availability of three different growing seasons each year. The high population density exacerbates land scarcity and results in fragmented land holdings, further restricting agricultural productivity. Over 90 percent of the population depends on agriculture, which is particularly vulnerable to weather hazards, especially in the northern and northeastern regions. Delayed rainfall or dry spells significantly reduce crop yields, and the degradation of natural resources—including landslides, soil erosion, and loss of soil fertility—compounds these challenges.

    In October, Season A planting starts, coinciding with the harvest of Season C. It also marks the beginning of the major lean season (October to December), as food stocks become depleted and most poor and very poor households face food consumption gaps (Figure 2). Planting of Season A crops, weeding, and harvesting for Season C are carried out during this period, providing labor opportunities to poor households. Burundi faces severe nutrition outcomes, with over 55 percent of children stunted, according to UNICEF, indicative of chronic malnutrition caused by cumulative long-term poor dietary diversity, inadequate healthcare services, and frequent disease outbreaks. The Season B harvest covers 50 percent of annual crop production and plays a crucial role in increasing access to food, stabilizing food prices, and providing employment opportunities for poor households, thereby increasing their purchasing power and access to sufficient food. The Season C harvest runs from October through December and accounts for 15 percent of annual food production, while the Season A harvest is available from December to February and contributes 35 percent of annual food production. 

    Burundi's economy is among the least developed in the world, characterized by high levels of poverty and unemployment, limited industrialization, and poor infrastructure. The country's economy is heavily reliant on rainfed agriculture, which is susceptible to weather variations and environmental degradation. High inflation rates and the rapid currency devaluation further diminish households' purchasing capacity, making it difficult for many poor households to access sufficient food. Burundi has recorded a high trade deficit of about 86 million USD, coupled with a decline in exports of cash crops and minerals, accelerating macroeconomic challenges. 

    Conflict: In 2015, Burundi faced a major political crisis and instability following the presidential term extension, which sparked widespread protests and a violent crackdown by security forces. The unrest led to an attempted coup, escalating violence, and ongoing political instability, displacing hundreds of thousands of people to neighboring countries. Those displaced people are currently returning to their home villages with the support of the government, UN, and humanitarian agencies. However, due to localized floodings and landslides, Burundi has over 300,000 IDPs who seek urgent humanitarian assistance. The mass displacement disrupted farming activities, resulting in significant losses of lives and livelihoods.

    Figure 2: Seasonal calendar for a typical year

    Source: FEWS NET

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    Current food security conditions as of October 2024

    Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section. 

    Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

    Key hazards 

    Localized below-average rainfall: Key informants report that insufficient rainfall in the Northern and Eastern Lowlands and the Imbo Plains livelihood zones has delayed land preparation and seeding for 2025 Season A crops and led to below-average pasture availability for livestock.  

    Rise in the water table and the level of Lake Tanganyika: Driven by above-average rainfall in 2023 and early 2024, the water table and Lake Tanganyika levels remain elevated, even during the dry period from June to September. This situation, along with the lake's overflow, has led to the displacement of 300,000 people and the destruction of 40,000 hectares of crops in early 2024. The current levels of the water table and Lake Tanganyika put several households and their assets at risk of flooding as the rainy season begins.

    Macroeconomic challenges and inflation: In June 2024, Burundi experienced a trade deficit of 200 billion BIF (approximately 70 million USD), with imports totaling 230.4 billion BIF compared to exports of only 30.4 billion BIF. This persistent trade deficit highlights the fragility and unsustainability of the country's macroeconomic indicators. A major factor contributing to the deficit is the ongoing decline in coffee exports (Figure 3), which account for nearly 70 percent of total export items. Coffee production fell from 18,500 tons in 2020 to 7,500 tons in 2024, as small-scale farmers were unable to compete in the market. The decline in other exports, such as minerals and cotton, is exacerbating the deficit. Moreover, cotton production was cut in half in the first quarter of 2024 compared to 2020, while gold and coltan production has also decreased by 50 percent between 2000 and 2023.

    Figure 3. Coffee export trend, 2022

    Source: IWACU/BRB

    These critical macroeconomic indicators have contributed to the instability of the BIF and a decline in official exchange rates, which are around 250 percent of the parallel market rate. This precarious economic situation limits import capacity, prompting traders to increasingly depend on the parallel market for imports, leading to higher prices for imported goods, including food and essential non-food items. Although near-average harvests in the 2024 season have helped stabilize food price inflation, the overall inflation rate remains high, at nearly 20 percent as of August 2024, up from 15 percent in June and 10 percent in May.

    Above-average food prices: Despite relative stability compared to last year (Figure 4), staple food prices in September 2024 are still 20 to 45 percent higher than the five-year average. This increase in food prices is driven by high national inflation, rising costs for agricultural inputs, and elevated fuel and transportation expenses, which restrict food access for low-income households. 

    Figure 4. Food commodity price dynamics

    Source: SIP/WFP

    Conflict and political tensions: Political tensions and insecurity in the region and in Burundi have reduced food and income access in localized areas. The war in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has displaced civilians, including around 90,100 refugees and asylum seekers being hosted in Burundi in five refugee camps located in Ruyigi, Cankuzo, and Ngozi provinces as well as in urban areas in Bujumbura and Rumonge. These refugees are entirely dependent on humanitarian aid for food and non-food items. In addition, due to political tension between Burundi and Rwanda, both countries decided to close their border, restricting the movement of people and the flow of food and non-food items. This closure has reduced income access from cross-border opportunities for both labor and petty trading.

    Analysis of key food and income sources

    During the current lean period, most food is sourced from the market, supplementing remaining 2024 Season B food stocks. As a result, access to food is heavily dependent on income. According to the WFP Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) baseline survey conducted in August 2023, households in Burundi generate a significant portion of their food and income from various sources. Approximately half of their total income comes from staple crop production and agriculture, with an additional 20 percent coming from labor sales, 15 percent from livestock-related activities, 10 percent from petty trading, and 5 percent from cash crop-related activities (Figure 5).

    Figure 5. Share of total household income by source, among rural households, based on an August 2023 national survey (n = 2,705 households)

    Source: WFP/CFSVA

    Crop production: Remaining food stocks from the near-average 2024 Season B harvest are expected to supplement market purchases, particularly for middle-income and better-off households. In contrast, poor and very poor families rely on the market for food, as their stocks are typically depleted. The first harvest of 2024 Season C crop production, started in October, enhancing food access for middle-income and better-off households owning marshland plots. Season C represents 15 percent of the annual crop production and provides food stocks for about three weeks between October and December to around 45 percent of the total population possessing marshland plots. 

    Livestock production: According to the August 2023 WFP/CFSVA baseline survey, 55 percent of households keep livestock, including cows, goats, sheep, and chickens. The livestock are predominantly kept for organic fertilizer, self-consumption, and partially for sale as a coping strategy during periods of stress. 

    • Cows, mostly owned by middle-income and wealthy households, offer consistent income and food (milk), but also serve as a source of labor employment for poor and very poor households. Average livestock ownership in the High Altitude livelihood zones ranges from 1 to 2 cows, while the national average is 0.6 livestock per household. 
    • Goats and sheep, averaging about 1.5 per household, are common across all provinces and serve as a reliable income source for middle-income households. 
    • Chicken and other birds, averaging 1.5 per household, are primarily raised for sale in the market as a crucial part of household livelihoods, serving as a coping strategy to supplement income or fill food consumption gaps. Around 70 percent of households engage in selling chickens in the market, while 24 percent utilize them for their own consumption and for selling products like eggs.
    • Rainfall in September and October in most of the country improved pasture conditions, leading to a rise in livestock production in Burundi. This enhancement resulted in greater yields of milk, meat, and eggs, which were sold in markets, increasing the incomes of livestock owners. About 60 percent of this income increase primarily benefited middle and better-off households. However, the additional income from livestock also created job opportunities for poorer households in the country.

    Income sources: Due to above-average food prices, the near-average 2024 Season B crop production provided above-average income to better-off households selling their crops. This increased income encourages more intensive crop production, leading to near-average agricultural labor opportunities for poor and very poor households.

    • Labor income serves as the second main source of income for about 40 percent of the population, particularly benefiting poor and very poor households. Labor wages have risen significantly, increasing by approximately 20 to 50 percent compared to the previous year. Improved access to cross-border opportunities in Tanzania has been especially advantageous, complementing farming activities and labor-based employment. This development has progressively raised income levels for households in the Eastern Lowlands, Eastern Dry Plateaus, and Buragane regions. Daily wages in Tanzania are significantly higher than those in Burundi, substantially boosting household incomes and reducing competition for local jobs. In contrast, labor wages in the Northern Lowlands livelihood zone are approximately 30 percent below the national average. Additionally, the complete closure of the Burundi and Rwanda borders since early 2024 has limited cross-border opportunities, specifically for poor households, leading to below-average income prospects in those areas.
    • Favorable rainfall conditions in early 2024 helped to narrow the income gaps in cash crop production despite the national downturn in coffee, tea, and cotton production. However, floods in April severely impacted oil palm production in the Imbo Plains livelihood zone, leading to reduced incomes for producers and fewer labor opportunities for poor households engaged in related employment such as tourism, transport, and construction. FEWS NET’s assessment in May 2024 confirmed that floods and the overflow of Lake Tanganyika had decreased labor opportunities for poor and very poor households by 25 to 50 percent. However, the rainfall in October revitalized cash crop activities such as weeding, creating above-average labor opportunities for poor and very poor households, who are also benefiting from increased labor wages.

    Petty trade: The WFP/FSMS assessment conducted in May 2024 reveals that petty trade accounts for about 10 percent of total income, primarily in the border areas of major cities and near the borders with Tanzania and the DRC. While petty trade around cities remains steady, the depreciation of the BIF against the Tanzanian and DRC francs has resulted in below-average imports and income from these activities. Additionally, the closure of borders with Rwanda has significantly reduced income from petty trade in the Northern Lowlands livelihood zone.

    Market supplies and fuel shortage: Major provincial marketplaces, including cross-border and import markets from neighboring countries, supply staples such as beans, maize, and cassava. However, fuel shortages severely hinder food transportation and limit the diversity of food items available in these markets. Due to the diesel shortage, trucks are driving long distances to source fuel from neighboring countries, leading to prices that are double the usual rate. In the informal market, fuel prices are two to three times higher. Due to mobility constraints, crops specific to certain livelihood zones are typically sold in nearby markets, resulting in localized price declines. When food is transported to deficit areas, prices rise sharply due to high transportation costs. Additionally, a scarcity of foreign currency and dependence on the parallel market to access USD have led to below-average availability of imported foods. As a result, food consumption gaps are widening across the country, especially in regions where local crop production fails to meet demand. 

    Humanitarian food assistance

    Humanitarian food assistance—defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher)—may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.. 

    According to UNHCR, 90,000 refugees and asylum seekers received humanitarian food assistance from WFP in September. Due to funding constraints, however, this food aid has been reduced to only about 70 percent of their usual monthly food rations since early 2024, with only 30 percent of 2024 humanitarian needs funded as of September. Additionally, humanitarian food assistance covering a three-month ration has been provided to 3,000 returnees, while around 18,000 malnourished children under five years received specialized nutritious foods for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition. WFP provided humanitarian food assistance to nearly 230,000 flood victims in the Imbo Plains, while Kirundo and Ngozi provinces received food aid through combined cash-based transfers (CBT), allowing them to purchase food and basic non-food items from the market. Food consumption gaps are expected to increase through the projection period due to limited humanitarian funding and above-average food prices among refugees and asylum seekers.

    Current acute food insecurity outcomes as of October 2024

    Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

    At the national level, food availability has decreased since mid-September during the ongoing lean season, following the depletion of food stocks from the near-average 2024 Season B. Access to food is primarily through markets for most poor and very poor households, and expenses for food are competing with costs for 2025 Season A inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, and labor payments), as well as school fees due at the end of September. Although there has been a 20 percent increase in labor wages compared to last year, the 5 to 25 percent rise in food prices compared to the previous year limits the purchasing power of poor and very poor households.

    Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates show increased acute food insecurity: A SMART survey conducted during the lean period from March to April 2024 found that the national GAM prevalence was 8.0 percent, indicating an Alert level (GAM 5–9.9 percent). The severity of acute malnutrition varied by province, with Serious (GAM 10–14.9 percent) levels observed in the Northern and Eastern Lowlands and Imbo Plains livelihood zones covering Kirundo, Ruyigi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, and Makamba provinces, correlating with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in those areas. Other provinces exhibited Alert levels of acute malnutrition, except for Ngozi, Muramvya, and Gitega, which had Acceptable levels (GAM <5 percent). Admission data from therapeutic feeding programs followed similar declining seasonal patterns, but cases admitted from May to August 2024 were lower than the five-year averages for the same period, indicating a somewhat improved nutrition situation (Figure 6).

    Figure 6. Admissions in malnutrition centers

    Source: SIP/WFP

    The Northern Lowlands livelihood zone: Given the lack of income from cross-border activities with Rwanda and below-average agricultural labor income due to insufficient rainfall in September and October, the near-average 2024 Season B food stocks have been the primary income source since June and are now rapidly depleted, particularly for poor and very poor households. Additionally, staple food prices have risen by 10 to 25 percent compared to last year, further diminishing purchasing power and food access. Only 25 percent of households have access to marshland for Season C cultivation, compared to the national average of 45 percent, further limiting current food availability. These factors have created an atypical lean period, resulting in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food security outcomes. 

    The Eastern Lowlands livelihood zones: Access to cross-border opportunities with Tanzania increased income earnings from agricultural activities, such as land preparation and seeding carried out in September and October. Despite limited market access, the remaining food stocks from the near-average 2024 Season B provide most households in the area with sufficient access to food, resulting in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) food security outcomes. However, the current below-average agricultural labor income has led to the atypical sale of remaining food stocks to cover inputs for the 2025 Season A farm input and school fees, leaving poor and very poor households, an estimated 40 percent of the area’s households, facing high food prices and increased food consumption gaps.

    Imbo Plains livelihood zone: Due to below-average food stocks following the destruction of crops by floods during the 2024 Season B, households have become unusually dependent on the market for food access in the second half of the year. Alongside increased food prices due to higher crop production costs, shortages of fuel, rising transportation costs, and below-average labor opportunities have further diminished households’ purchasing power. As a result, the area is anticipated to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes.

    Key assumptions about atypical food security conditions through May 2025

    The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

    National assumptions

    • La Niña conditions predicted from October to early 2025 over the Horn of Africa are expected to result in below-average rainfall in semi-arid areas of the Northern and Eastern Lowlands livelihood zones, while average rainfall is anticipated in the southern and southwestern parts of the country. Additionally, given the forecast of above-average temperatures by the end of 2024, soil-evapotranspiration is likely to increase, leading to below-average soil moisture levels.
    • Due to supports from the government and partners, crop production is anticipated to be around 15 percent above average for the 2024 Season C, which takes place primarily in the marshlands.
    • Localized below-average rainfall and nationally below-average soil moisture from high temperature towards the end of 2024 are likely to result in a below-average 2025 Season A harvest in the Northern and Eastern Lowlands, Eastern Dry Plateaus, and Imbo Plains livelihood zones. 
    • Near-average rainfall from February to May 2025 is anticipated to lead to near-average crop production. This will be supported by the cultivation of more rainfall-tolerant crops such as tubers, maize, and bananas, which are expected to bolster national crop production for the 2025 Season B.
    • Due to anticipated below-average agricultural activities and reduced cash crop and livestock production from localized below-average rainfall and soil moisture in the north, east, and west, labor opportunities are expected to be limited from October to December 2025. This is likely to decrease income for poor and very poor households that rely on agricultural labor, the primary income source for about 40 percent of the total population. Although labor wages have risen by 20 to 60 percent compared to last year and the five-year national average, they are expected to remain stable through May 2025. 
    • The inflation rate, which has followed an upward trend since June, is expected to continue rising during the lean period from October to January 2025, before slightly decreasing during the next harvest period from February to May 2025.
    • The continued decline in export of cash crops and minerals is expected to worsen critical macroeconomic indicators through the projected period, including the trade deficit, external debt, foreign currency reserves, and loans. Thus, low hard currency reserves are expected to cause persistent instability of the BIF, worsening official exchange rates up to 150 percent lower than the parallel market, and decreasing import capacity. Traders are likely to increasingly rely on the parallel market to import goods, causing price increases for imported items, including food and essential non-food items. 
    Figure 7. Gitega, bean integrated price projections

    Source: SIP/WFP

    Figure 8. Gitega, maize integrated price projections

    Source: SIP/WFP

    • Fuel and diesel shortages are expected to persist through the analysis period, and the supply of fuel will likely be from the unofficial market at rates two to three times above the normal prices, increasing food transportation and food costs.
    • According to FEWS NET’s price projections for Gitega market reference market, food prices are anticipated to remain above the five-year average throughout the scenario period, showing a mixed comparison to last year. Bean prices are projected to be 20 to 50 percent higher than last year and 50 percent above the five-year average (Figure 7). Maize cultivated in middle and high-altitude regions, which are less vulnerable to the expected La Niña conditions, is expected to yield near-average production for the 2025 Season A around January. This will likely result in prices similar to last year and around 15 percent above the five-year average (Figure 8). Similarly, prices for tubers (such as cassava and sweet potatoes) and rice are expected to be in line with last year and the average.
    • Between October 2024 and May 2025, UNHCR is likely to facilitate the return of 20,000 out of the 257,033 refugees in neighboring countries, approximately around 2,500 returnees per month. Around 40 percent of the refugees are hosted in Tanzania refugee camps, and most of the returnees are expected to be hosted in eastern, northern, and southern Burundi.  
    • Political intimidation against opposition supporters, insecurity, and localized armed attacks are expected to persist and increase in frequency as the May 2025 elections draw nearer. The conflict in eastern DRC and the political tension between Rwanda and Burundi are likely to reduce cross-border trades. 
    • Intercommunal conflicts in eastern DRC are expected to intensify, increasing the number of asylum seekers to Burundi from 89,000 people in August 2024 to nearly 100,000 through May 2025, according to UNHCR. 
    • Nutrition outcomes are likely to deteriorate from October to December due to reduced food access during the lean period, characterized by depleted food stocks and high staple food prices. At the national level, acute malnutrition is likely to remain at an Alert level (GAM 5–9.9%), but Serious levels of acute malnutrition (GAM 10-14.9%) are likely to persist in the northern, eastern, and western regions, primarily driven by expected below-average labor opportunities linked to below-average rainfall associated with anticipated La Niña conditions. Critical nutritional status is expected to persist in the north and east due to a projected below-average harvest for the 2025 Season A. 

    Subnational assumptions for the Imbo Plains livelihood zone

    • Expected average rainfall in the south and west is likely to cause the Tanganyika Lake and its tributary rivers to overflow again, approaching last year's conditions. As a result, the number of IDPs is expected to reach around 100,000 in the Imbo Plains, while floods and landslides affect livelihood assets for approximately 300,000 people, similar to last year.

    Subnational assumptions for the Northern Lowlands livelihood zone

    • Access to cross-border opportunities is expected to remain below-average through the projected period due to the closure of the Burundi and Rwanda borders because of political tensions. Below-average rainfall is likely to further decrease income-earning opportunities for poor and very poor households.

    Humanitarian food assistance

    National assumption

    According to the WFP, humanitarian food assistance is expected to continue at the current year’s level throughout the projected period. Refugees are expected to receive around 70 percent of their monthly ration. Additionally, IDPs affected by seasonal floods are likely to receive cash transfers (CBT) meeting their full minimum monthly energy needs.

    Table 1. Key sources of evidence FEWS NET analysts incorporated into the development of the above assumptions 

    Key sources of evidence:
    Weather and flood forecasts produced by NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center, USGS, the Climate Hazards Center at the University of California Santa Barbara, and NASA

    National Institute of Burundi Statistics (INSBU) report of inflation

    Burundi Inflation- August 2024 report 

    UNHCR report of repatriation and humanitarian assistance

    FEWS NET East African Regional Global Price Watch

    East Africa Price Bulletin September 2024

    Report on the ranking of countries according to their wealth in 2024.

    Produced by Global Finance

    Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) survey conducted by WFP August 2023
    Joint Government and United Nations System press release on the impacts of the El Niño phenomenonWFP humanitarian food assistance report to refugees and affected by floods and Tanganyika Lake overflow

    Report on Global Hunger Index, 2024 

    Analyzed by Welt Hunger Hilfe, Concern Worldwide and IFHV 

    Projected acute food insecurity outcomes October 2024 to May 2025

    Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned—and likely to be funded and delivered—food assistance. 

    At the national level, food access is projected to decline between October and December due to the depletion of the near-average 2024 Season B harvest, rising inflation, and limited foreign currency reserves, which will constrain food imports. During this period, overall nutrition outcomes are expected to worsen, potentially reaching an Alert level (GAM 5–9.9%). However, better-off and middle-income households with access to marshlands and stable income opportunities will have better outcomes, maintaining food access at a Minimal acute food insecurity level (IPC Phase 1) across most livelihood zones. Additionally, a near-average 2025 Season A harvest is expected to further improve food access from February to May 2025. 

    In the Northern Lowlands livelihood zone, below-average rainfall linked to La Niña conditions is expected to reduce agricultural labor income and 2025 Season A crop production through the projected period. During the lean period from October to December 2024, most households will rely on market purchases to access food, amid above-average prices. While 2025 Season A crop production is expected to be below-average, it is likely to meet part of households’ food needs in early 2025, although some of it will be used to repay debts incurred for food and agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers, for the 2025 Season A. Additionally, the closure of borders with Rwanda is expected to further limit income and food sources for poor and very poor households, diminishing their purchasing power and access to food. As a result, limited food availability from both own production and markets is expected to lead to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through May 2025.

    In the Eastern Lowlands livelihood zones, below-average income and rapid depletion of 2024 Season B stocks are expected to limit food access at the end of 2024. Below-average Season A crop production is likely to further restrict food access in early 2025. During the October to December lean period, rising food prices and depleted stocks, combined with lower agricultural income due to La Niña-driven reduced rainfall, are anticipated to weaken purchasing power and restrict food access for poor and very poor households. Although the 2025 Season A harvest is projected to be below average, it will still provide some food, though limited, into early 2025. As a result, restricted food availability from both household stocks and markets is likely to lead to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through May 2025.

    In the Imbo Plains livelihood zones, below-average incomes from both agricultural and non-agricultural activities, along with depleted food stocks caused by flooding and overflow of Lake Tanganyika in early 2024, are expected to persist through the end of the year, limiting food access. Most households will depend on market purchases for food, despite high prices. Consequently, below-average income and limited food access are expected to result in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes during the October to December lean season. However, anticipated near-average rainfall towards the end of 2024 in the livelihood zone is expected to support near-average agricultural and non-agricultural activities, improving crop production and food access in early 2025. This improvement is anticipated to lead to Minimum (IPC Phase 1) acute food security outcomes from January to May 2025.

    Refugees, mainly from the war in the east of DRC, will continue to receive reduced humanitarian food assistance due to funding shortages. These refugees are hosted in five refugee camps in Ruyigi, Cankuzo, and Ngozi provinces and exclusively depend on humanitarian assistance for food access. The food consumption gap is expected to persist through May 2025, and refugees are anticipated to receive around 70 percent of their monthly caloric needs. IDPs will continue to face highly limited access to income and remain heavily dependent on market purchases for food amid high food prices. Given the anticipated scale-down in humanitarian assistance, many poor households will continue to face food consumption gaps, despite expectations for seasonal improvements in the availability of food and income in surrounding rural areas. 

    Returnees will need about two years to restart their normal livelihood activities and will depend on the market for food access amid high food prices. According to UNHCR, approximately 75 percent of returnees have access to their land, but it typically takes around two years to restore their normal livelihood. After returnees exhaust the three-month humanitarian assistance provided upon their arrival, they are expected to face widened food consumption gaps through the projected period.

    Events that may change projected acute food insecurity outcomes

    While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

    National 

    Event: Large-scale political and social disruption as the election approaches 

    Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: Localized political issues are expected to trigger public discontent due to the deterioration of the economy and declining purchasing power. Political parties may mobilize the population, potentially sparking widespread insecurity and social unrest around May 2025. This heightened insecurity is likely to lead to asset losses, restrict movement between provinces for labor and food access, and further weaken purchasing power.

    Event: La Niña conditions are expected to extend over a larger area than initially anticipated, followed by near-average rainfall from October to December 2024.

    Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: The expansion of La Niña's impact to other areas, such as the middle and low-altitude regions—including the Eastern Dry Plateaus, Buragane, and Imbo Plains livelihood zones—is likely to reduce income and crop production. This will further decrease national food availability in early 2025 and increase the number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) acute food security outcomes. However, the below-average rainfall expected in the Imbo Plains livelihood zone may help mitigate flooding and reduce the overflow of Lake Tanganyika, stabilizing the rising water table that has been increasing since 2023.

    Event: Further devaluation of the BIF

    Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: A further devaluation of the BIF is likely to accelerate economic deterioration, leading to a significant reduction in food imports and driving a rapid increase in food prices. Poor and very poor households are expected to have limited purchasing power, particularly during the lean period from October to December, increasing the number of households expected to face Stressed (IPC Phase 2) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

    Recommended citation: FEWS NET. Burundi Food Security Outlook October 2024 - May 2025: Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes in north and east due to La Niña conditions, 2024.

    To project food security outcomes, FEWS NET develops a set of assumptions about likely events, their effects, and the probable responses of various actors. FEWS NET analyzes these assumptions in the context of current conditions and local livelihoods to arrive at a most likely scenario for the coming eight months. Learn more here.

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