The 2026 wheat harvest is expected to significantly improve food access countrywide

• Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces through April 2026, where poor households are completely market reliant with severely limited income, and weak purchasing power. The continued influx of returnees has intensified labor competition and increased market demand, increasing food prices. Households are expected to face large food consumption deficits. In an effort to access market foods, poor households will likely engage in negative coping strategies, including distress asset sales, high-interest borrowing, and begging.
• In May, the likely average wheat harvest is expected to improve household food and income access countrywide, with widespread Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) most likely. Poor households in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces face a slow recovery, with accumulated debt, eroded assets, and below-average purchasing power expected to drive food consumption deficits. In other areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3), the harvest starts later, and households will continue to face difficulty accessing food as income will be insufficient for households to purchase market foods. Households with access to land or stable income sources are likely to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2).
• While improvements in food security are expected, the rainfed belt – particularly Faryab, Daykundi, and Ghor provinces – remain areas of highest concern. These provinces have been the most severely affected by the four-year drought, and households are likely depleting their assets to access food. These areas have also seen the highest influx of returnees, who increased labor supply in an already weak labor market.

• Food assistance needs in Afghanistan will be among the highest recorded since 2014, with an estimated 10.0–10.99 million people in need of humanitarian food assistance at the peak of the February to April 2026 lean season. Beginning in May 2026, needs are expected to decline moderately as harvests begin and market food stocks increase.

  The analysis in this report reflects information available as of February 26, 2026, and does not incorporate military developments involving Pakistan that began on February 27 or their broader regional implications. FEWS NET's analysis of the likely impacts on acute food insecurity will become available after March 31, 2026.

Afghanistan's staple food supply is dependent on a mixture of wheat imports, primarily from Kazakhstan, as well as domestic production. Both food and cash crop production are important to rural livelihoods, with opportunities for labor linked to seasonal activity. Most agricultural areas have a mix of rainfed and irrigated crop production. Most crop production (75-80 percent) is irrigated, largely from snowmelt from the mountains using gravity or solar irrigation systems. In the rainfed areas of northern Afghanistan, rainfall during the winter precipitation season (October-March) and the spring wet season (March-May) are important for crop production outcomes. Meanwhile, in the lowland irrigated areas – responsible for most of the national-level wheat production – the amount of snowfall deposited during the winter months, as well as the rate at which it melts during the spring, are important for crop production. As such, the availability of sufficient water is important for both rainfed and irrigated crop production and, consequently, for food security in rural areas.

From September to November, land preparation and planting of winter wheat occurs, along with the second season harvest of rice and maize. During the winter (November-March), much of the winter wheat is dormant, but can be impacted by warm temperatures or fluctuations in temperature. It is during this time that snow accumulation in the highlands is important to monitor, as spring snowmelt is an important source of water for the winter wheat and summer crops. Beginning in April/May, as snow melts, households begin land preparation activities for the spring season, and harvesting activities for wheat begin in eastern and northeastern areas.

Household cereal stocks typically last three to five months following a normal harvest with some regional variability. In surplus-producing provinces such as Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, and Helmand, cereal stocks can last up to seven months, as households typically have access to their own land and own-produced food. Conversely, in deficit-producing provinces that have limited access to land, cereal stocks from own production typically only last up to three months. Once households exhaust their own-produced food stocks, they depend on food from markets.

Afghanistan is prone to weather shocks, including earthquakes, floods, and, during La Niña years, a tendency for below-average precipitation. The last four (2021-2025) October to May precipitation seasons have been marked by drought conditions. The compounding impacts of consecutive years of drought, a stagnant economy, and high volumes of returnees have resulted in reductions in household assets, which were sold to access food, further reducing households’ capacity to cope with further shocks.

The influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan in early 2026 will further strain already limited labor opportunities. Returnees often settle in urban areas with strained labor markets or return to their village of origin due to the high cost of living in urban areas.

A common source of income is agricultural labor. Better-off households will typically own larger farms that grow crops to be sold at market, while low- or medium-income households will work on these farms. Non-agricultural labor opportunities are typically concentrated in urban areas, and include construction workers, street cleaners, garbage collectors, and porters. Casual labor opportunities in rural areas are typically limited during the lean season, while second season harvests will provide some agricultural labor opportunities. Reliance on remittances has remained high and has provided a relatively stable source of income. However, deportations from Iran and Pakistan have reduced the inflow of remittances, leading to the deterioration of a key source of income for many poor households.

Regional economic pressures, including sanctions on Iran and increased returnee flows from Pakistan, have reduced economic activity, cutting jobs and wages in construction, agriculture, and informal sectors where Afghans typically work. Weakened economic conditions in Iran have further eroded the value of remittances sent home. Additionally, economic pressure has intensified the enforcement of migration policies, leading to the return of undocumented Afghans and further limiting remittance flows. 

Learn more

Follow these links for additional information: 

• Latest Afghanistan Food Security Outlook: October 2025 to May 2026
• Latest Afghanistan Key Message Update: January 2026
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need  
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis 

Precipitation: Precipitation for the October 2025 to May 2026 season, as of late February 2026, is below-average in central, southwestern, eastern, and northeastern regions. Conversely, average to above-average precipitation is observed in southeastern and western regions. The October 2025 to May 2026 precipitation season began with atypically dry conditions across northern, central, southeastern, and eastern Afghanistan from early October to late December 2025, while western and southwestern areas experienced favorable early-season precipitation. Precipitation in February was generally below average countrywide, with average precipitation in northern and western regions. 

Heavy precipitation in late January 2026 decreased precipitation deficits, driving average precipitation in central, northwestern, and northeastern regions. Storms in late January sharply increased snowpack and snow water volumes in the central highlands to above average levels; however, in February, little snowfall combined with high temperatures caused snowpack to rapidly decline to below-average levels (Figure 1).

Spring wheat planting: Spring wheat planting is ongoing at levels higher than last year; however, similar to the five-year average due to favorable soil moisture conditions across the northern, northeastern, and western regions. Field reports indicate that planting started earlier than normal in higher-elevation areas of Balkh, Samangan, and Jawzjan, ahead of the typical mid-March start, due to above-average temperatures. Partial planting has also been reported in parts of Badakhshan. 

Winter wheat planting, which concluded in November 2025, was limited associated with below-average precipitation and four consecutive years of drought, eroding farmer confidence. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), area planted for winter wheat in the northern regions, central highlands, and southwestern parts of the country was below last year and average.

Livestock conditions: Livestock body conditions are below average to average countrywide. In areas with below-average livestock conditions, this is driven by low fodder availability, as pasture regeneration was poor in 2025. Households are relying on market-purchased feed; however, above-average feed prices are restricting adequate feeding in northern and western regions. Livestock conditions remain average in southern, southeastern, and eastern regions, where households have fodder available, as these areas had better pasture regeneration in 2025. Additionally, irrigated agriculture supported by deep wells provides crop residues and straw as supplementary feed, further supporting livestock body conditions in these regions.

Returnee influx: The forced deportations of Afghan nationals from Iran and Pakistan continue to strain already limited resources and intensify competition for income-earning opportunities. In 2025, 2.8 million people returned from Iran and Pakistan, while around 287,000 have returned since the start of 2026, with most settling in Nangarhar, Kabul, and Kunduz. Afghans continue to return from Iran and Pakistan in large numbers, although deportations have steadily decreased since mid-2025. Between January 1 and February 25, 2026, approximately 145,000 individuals left the country, with more than 50 percent of returnees arriving from Iran. The decline of Afghans leaving the country is driven by stricter migration policies in Iran and Pakistan, compounded by ongoing political tensions between the two countries and Afghanistan. Compared to the same period last year, the current outflow is nearly 70 percent lower. Around 3 million Afghans still reside in Iran or Pakistan. 

Labor opportunities: While labor availability is typically low during winter months, wage work availability declined atypically in January. The influx of returnees has increased competition for already limited income-earning opportunities, while multiple years of drought have reduced income for landowners, who can no longer afford to hire workers. Daily wage work availability decreased by 16 percent compared to December and is 26 percent lower than at the same time last year, while unskilled daily wages declined by 7 percent compared to last year. These declines weaken purchasing power for wage-dependent households, the impacts of which are particularly pronounced during the ongoing lean season, when reliance on market purchases is highest. The wage labor-to-wheat terms of trade (the amount of wheat purchasable with a day of unskilled wages) fell by nearly 20 percent in January compared to December and by 40 percent compared to last year, and is around 15 percent lower than the five-year average.

Staple food prices: Wheat and wheat flour prices increased marginally in January compared to December; however, they are 15 percent higher than the same time last year. Wheat and wheat flour prices are 17 percent below the five-year average. Wheat prices remain stable as supplies continue to flow through key trade routes from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; a strong AFN is also supporting price stability. 

In contrast, the closure of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has disrupted trade and raised transportation costs, particularly affecting rice and vegetable oil prices. Vegetable oil, largely imported from Gulf countries and shipped through Pakistan, has been particularly affected. Recent disruptions along regional trade and transit routes have tightened market supply, increasing prices compared to December and January and compared to the same time last year.

Remittances: Remittances to poor households from Iran and Pakistan remain below average, driven by mass deportations of Afghans, rising visa costs, and employment eligibility restrictions abroad. Remittance inflows from Gulf countries have remained at average levels, primarily benefiting households in the southeastern and eastern provinces. 

Humanitarian food assistance

Between December and January, national winterization programs from WFP reached around 2.7 million people with humanitarian food assistance to cover three months, a decrease from the typical five months of food rations. Distribution efforts in remote provinces, including Ghor, Bayman, Badakhshan, Daykundi, and Nuristan provinces, ended before severe winter weather, which typically blocks road access due to heavy snowfall.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are ongoing in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi during the ongoing peak lean season. Poor households have long exhausted food stocks and are completely market reliant. Despite stability in food prices, poor households have limited income for purchasing food on the market. Households are expected to earn some income from agriculture, livestock products, and casual labor. In an effort to access more cash for market purchases, households are likely engaging in negative coping strategies, including selling their last female livestock, early marriage of underage girls, selling their home or land, and begging. Large food consumption deficits are likely ongoing, with associated atypically high levels of acute malnutrition. 

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are ongoing in areas of the north, northeast, west, and southwest, as households face the cumulative impacts of drought, exhausted food stocks, and below-average labor opportunities. In northern and western provinces, households are unable to meet food needs due to limited labor opportunities during winter and below average purchasing power. Farmers who rely on rainfed crops have experienced repeated crop failures, reducing on-farm labor demand and limiting sharecropping arrangements for land-poor households. To earn income for food purchases, households are engaging in negative coping strategies, including atypical livestock sales, taking on high-interest debt, reducing meal size and frequency, and relying on community support and informal credit networks. 

In southeastern provinces, households are likely facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, as stable income from vegetable and fruit production, casual labor opportunities, and steady remittances from Gulf and Western countries support food access. However, some households are unable to afford essential non-food needs without engaging in coping strategies such as borrowing food and reducing non-food expenses.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are ongoing across many urban areas. Urban areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) have large populations of returnees, driving high competition for already limited income-earning opportunities. Given the limited availability of casual labor, many poor urban households are unable to secure consistent employment and have below-average purchasing power. Households are increasingly employing coping strategies such as borrowing, purchasing food on credit, reducing meal size, and reducing expenditures on health care, education, and heating to access food. Conversely, urban areas facing Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are generally able to access more stable income sources, such as remittances and casual labor. Additionally, some households engage in mixed livelihood activities, such as small-scale agriculture and petty trading, helping maintain adequate food consumption.

• Above-average temperatures are likely to persist through September 2026, with extreme high temperatures possible.
• Cumulative precipitation for the October 2025 to May 2026 rainy season is expected to be below-average countrywide, with localized average to above-average precipitation in some southern, southeastern, and western areas.
• Precipitation for the March to May spring season is likely to be below average in the northern rainfed belt and southern region, with average precipitation and pockets of above-average precipitation expected in central, eastern, southern, and southeastern areas.
• Snowpack and snow water equivalent values are expected to decline to below-average levels across all basins countrywide through May 2026, with above-average temperatures expected to drive atypically rapid snowmelt.
• Rapid snowmelt depletion, driven by anticipated above-average temperatures and average rainfall, increases the risk of flooding and landslides in the northeastern, eastern, and central highlands through May. However, the risk of flooding is expected to be low in the northern highlands due to below-average snowpack.
• Vegetation and pasture conditions are expected to remain sparse through March, after which pasture is expected to seasonally improve to average levels through June 2026. From June through September, pasture availability is expected to gradually decline across most areas due to seasonal depletion. Groundwater availability is expected to remain below average due to the cumulative impacts of multi-year precipitation deficits and continued extraction. While seasonal rainfall and snowmelt may lead to localized gains, these gains are unlikely to result in sustained groundwater recovery. Forecast below-average precipitation through May is expected to diminish surface water availability, increasing the reliance on groundwater countrywide, particularly in northern, northeastern, and central regions.
• Area planted for spring wheat is expected to be average, supported by favorable soil moisture conditions and cumulative precipitation.
• The wheat harvest, which begins in May, is expected to be average countrywide, with regional variations likely. In northern and northeastern provinces, while spring wheat planting is expected to moderately offset below-average winter wheat planting, the wheat harvest is expected to be below average. Surplus-producing southern, eastern, and southeastern provinces are anticipated to have an average wheat harvest and will likely offset the below-average wheat harvests in other regions of the country.
• Vegetable production in eastern and northern provinces will most likely be average and similar to last year. Income from vegetable production is anticipated to be average, supported by higher domestic demand following Pakistan's ban on vegetable exports to Afghanistan and the ongoing border closure.
• The influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan will likely continue through the projection period, placing additional pressure on already limited casual labor opportunities and increasing demand for staple foods. The number of returnees is expected to continue to decrease marginally monthly based on recent trends.
• Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain poor through September due to lean season pressures, limited labor opportunities, large-scale returnee inflows from Iran and Pakistan, and continued disruptions to trade and mobility due to border closures with Pakistan.
• Agricultural labor opportunities will remain atypically low through May but are expected to improve during the main harvest from June through August; however, they will remain below average in the north, northeast, south, and east. In the surplus-producing southeast, above-average availability is most likely from June to August. In September, agricultural labor opportunities are expected to seasonally decline, with activity focused on winter wheat planting.
• Non-agricultural labor availability is expected to remain below average through April, improving to average levels from May through September as construction activity resumes.
• Staple food prices between February and April, particularly for vegetable oil and wheat flour, are expected to remain moderately above-average compared to last year due to increases in market demand and higher transportation costs. From May through September, decreased market demand associated with the harvest and road access will likely contribute to stable prices.
• Livestock body conditions and productivity, including milk production and reproduction, are expected to remain below average through the projection period. Although near-average rainfall between February and May 2026 is expected to support pasture regeneration in some areas, above-average temperatures are expected to accelerate pasture drying, shortening the period of fresh green pasture availability and limiting livestock body condition recovery. Livestock prices in drought-affected areas are expected to remain below average due to poor body conditions, while prices in areas less affected by drought are likely to be average through the projection period.

Humanitarian food assistance

• WFP plans to target 2 million people per month in prioritized provinces with Emergency levels of food insecurity, winter-isolated districts, and returnee hubs. Food assistance is likely to continue during the projection period; however, detailed plans on assistance distribution at the time of this analysis were not available, and as such, the impacts were not included.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are anticipated to persist in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces through April 2026 as the lean season peaks. Poor Households are expected to be entirely reliant on markets for food, with minimal income for food purchases. Households are expected to earn income from agriculture, livestock products, and casual labor; however, income is expected to be minimal from these sources, which only allows for limited food purchases. This is expected to drive an increasing number of poor households to rely on negative coping strategies such as selling their last female livestock, early marriage of underage girls, selling homes or land, taking out high-interest loans, or resorting to begging. 

As seasonal labor opportunities and the wheat harvest become available in May, seasonally improving income and food access, acute food insecurity is expected to improve with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) expected in Faryab, Ghor, and Daykundi provinces. While poor households will most likely experience improvements in income and food access, the high burden of debt, low assets, and continued weak purchasing power are anticipated to limit the scale of improvement with the harvest. In low-elevation areas of Faryab Province and urban areas of Ghor and Daykundi, labor opportunities such as construction are expected to increase in March and continue through September. The wheat harvest is expected to improve household access to own produce foods and provide agricultural labor income for poor households. Poor household food stocks are expected to deplete during the projection period. Despite these seasonal gains, poor households will continue to face food consumption gaps, as income earned from harvest labor will remain insufficient to cover market food purchases amid weak purchasing power. Poor households are likely to continue adopting coping strategies through the end of the projection period, including reducing meal size, selling productive assets, and taking on further debt.

In the rest of the northern, western, southeastern, and central highlands, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected to continue through May. Households in these regions are facing completely exhausted food stocks, limited access to income-earning opportunities, and reduced remittances from Iran. The ongoing influx of returnees is further straining access to food and income. However, conditions are expected to improve to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) starting in June as the wheat harvest provides households with increased access to income-earning opportunities and food, as well as increased income from livestock sales due to Eid al-Adha.

Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist across northeastern provinces, including Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, and Panjsher, through the projection period. Remote and mountainous terrain increases transportation costs, reducing market availability and raising prices, while limited wage labor opportunities drive below-average purchasing power. Despite some expected improvements in food access as the harvest becomes available, below-average agricultural production, livestock herds, and seasonal labor demand are expected to drive food consumption deficits. Even where staple food prices are stable, below-average income from crop sales, milk production, and labor is expected to limit poor households' ability to purchase food.

In eastern provinces, such as Nangarhar and Laghman, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September 2026. High returnee numbers through Torkham are expected to continue increasing labor competition and placing downward pressure on wages and household purchasing power. Periodic border closures are expected to continue disrupting cross-border trade, daily labor movement, and small-scale businesses, particularly in Nangarhar, limiting income-earning opportunities and market activity. However, an expected average spring wheat harvest is expected to provide households with improved access to food and income, and casual labor opportunities are expected to increase countrywide from mid-March.

In southwestern regions, such as Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September. These areas are likely to benefit from larger areas of irrigated agriculture, higher wheat production potential, diversified cropping systems, and earlier harvests, which support food availability and seasonal labor demand. In addition, households in these areas have relatively greater access to stable income sources linked to public-sector employment, contributing to more consistent cash flow and supporting local market activity, while also being less directly affected by concentrated returnee inflows. Households in these areas typically receive remittances from Gulf countries, providing extra income and improving purchasing power. However, these provinces are facing increased strain from the ongoing border closure with Pakistan, resulting in interruptions in cross-border trade and constraining economic activity. Reduced trade flows have limited informal labor opportunities, while disrupting imports and supply chains. 

In the southwest, Nimroz is expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes throughout the projection period due to the combined effects of disrupted informal cross-border trade with Iran—a primary source of income for households—and slower drought recovery relative to neighboring provinces. Nimroz has less agricultural land available compared to its regional counterparts. Combined with below-average agricultural and livestock production, access to food and income is limited, and households reliant on trade-related income face increased pressure on purchasing power with limited alternative livelihood opportunities.

Urban areas are expected to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes through the projection period.  Urban areas facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes rely predominantly on casual labor, where poor economic conditions and increased competition from the returnee influx will leave households with limited options to bridge food consumption gaps. In contrast, urban areas in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) benefit from relatively more stable and diversified income sources, including remittances from Gulf countries and mixed livelihood activities such as small-scale agriculture and petty trade, which are expected to support minimally adequate food consumption.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is a methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. 

FEWS NET’s scenario development process applies the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assess acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity depends not only on hazards (such as drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to these hazards (e.g., the level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both the household’s ability to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET bases this analysis on a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

• How does FEWS NET analyze current acute food insecurity outcomes? FEWS NET assesses the extent to which households can meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of current food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change. FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, focusing on whether these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity. FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes, and the analysis is IPC-compatible. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET develop key assumptions underpinning the most likely scenario? A key step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is the development of evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security. These include hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will impact the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions about factors expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions form the foundation of the “most likely” scenario.
• How does FEWS NET analyze projected acute food insecurity outcomes? Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET projects acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs over time. FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance.
• How does FEWS NET analyze humanitarian food assistance? Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that such information can vary significantly across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance). In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a crediblealternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

Escalation in conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: 

On February 26, ongoing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated into open conflict. Eight official border crossings have been closed since October 2025, disrupting trade, raising transportation costs, and constraining livelihood activities, particularly in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces. If tensions continue to escalate, food prices for goods commonly traded with Pakistan—including vegetables, fruit, vegetable oil, and rice—are expected to rise further, as alternative routes and a higher likelihood of perishability and spoilage drive higher prices. Diesel and petrol prices have been increasing, but are expected to rise further if tensions escalate, as alternative trade routes through Central Asia will increase transportation costs. Reduced import flows and higher costs will exacerbate price volatility for key food and non-food items. Elevated transport and transaction costs are likely to shift Afghan exports into informal trade channels, widening the trade deficit as alternative routes through Central Asia remain costly and operationally constrained. 

Households that rely on labor opportunities related to cross-border trade activities would see a significant decline in these income sources. As income from cross-border trade declines, households would likely start searching for work in Afghanistan, further driving up labor demand and compounding an already weak countrywide labor market. Reduced wage work, declining petty trade, and income-generating opportunities could further decrease household income for market food purchases, constraining poor households' ability to meet their food and non-food needs. Households in border provinces that depend heavily on cross-border trade, particularly Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Kunar, face the greatest risk of deteriorating food security. The compounded impacts of price volatility, reduced labor opportunities, and worsening purchasing power could result in an increase in the population in need as more households would likely experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes.

Trade impacts on Afghanistan if conflict occurs in Iran

Likely impact on acute food insecurity outcomes: 

Given Iran's critical role as both a trade partner and transit route, particularly for western and southwestern markets, if conflict were to occur in Iran, it could drive deterioration in acute food insecurity in Afghanistan. Iran currently accounts for 30 percent of Afghanistan's imports, including fruits and vegetables, eggs, poultry, processed foods, pulses, diesel, petrol, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), medicines, medical equipment, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and construction materials, such as cement and iron. Disruptions to these flows would compound ongoing trade constraints stemming from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border closure. 

Instability in Iran poses a direct risk to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway through which goods transit to Iranian ports. Disruption to the Strait could raise regional shipping and insurance costs and disrupt Gulf/Iranian port operations; however, the most direct risk for trade partners, such as India, is operational disruption within Iran and reduced overland transit from Iranian ports to Afghanistan. India currently ships food commodities, primarily rice and wheat, to Afghanistan via the Chabahar Port; continued conflict would halt or severely reduce these flows. Chabahar Port also serves as a transit point for goods from other trading partners, including vegetable oil from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Southeast Asia, and vehicles and machinery from the UAE and China. 

Beyond decreases in the level of imports, traders would not move goods from Iranian ports to Afghanistan under conditions of active conflict, constraining market availability of key food and non-food commodities. Additionally, disruptions would also impact supply chains, as the potential for low domestic fuel supplies would raise domestic transportation costs, likely driving food price increases countrywide. 

Lastly, Afghans residing in Iran may return to Afghanistan to escape the conflict, potentially exacerbating the returnee crisis. Displaced Iranian civilians or Afghan returnees will likely settle in Herat and Nimroz, particularly in urban areas such as Herat City, Zaranj, Lashkargah, Kandahar City, and Farah City.

Provinces along the Iran-Afghanistan border, including Herat, Nimroz, Farah, and Helmand, face the greatest exposure to these risks. Poor households in urban areas would be at risk of deteriorating to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) due to rising prices, reduced income-generating opportunities, and constrained purchasing power. However, given that this period coincides with the post-harvest season, increased household food stocks from the harvest may partially buffer deterioration in rural areas, potentially limiting the scale of acute food insecurity even as the number of households at risk increases. In rural areas, while Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes would continue at the area level, an increase in population facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes would occur.

In 2025, Afghanistan experienced an exceptionally large number of returnees from Iran and Pakistan. Approximately 2.9 million Afghans voluntarily returned or were forcibly deported from Iran and Pakistan in 2025. Since September 2023, total returnees have exceeded 5 million people, equivalent to approximately one-tenth of the national population. Strict government measures and deteriorating conditions for Afghans in host countries drove most of this movement, often compelling families to depart suddenly and return under difficult circumstances. Around 476,000 people entered Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan between January 1 and February 25, 2026.

The large influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan has placed significant pressure on already limited labor opportunities, particularly during the lean season when wage work availability typically declines. Drought impacts over several consecutive years have also reduced landowners' ability to hire agricultural wage laborers for planting, further reducing labor demand. Although most returnees initially settled in urban areas, where access to markets is relatively better than in rural areas, the high cost of living and intense competition for scarce wage labor opportunities have compelled many to return to their places of origin. As households return to their area of origin, many no longer have access to their former livelihood activities and are reliant on community support or humanitarian assistance. Remittance inflows to poor households are below average due to the mass deportations from Iran and Pakistan, high visa costs, work restrictions on Afghans, and the impacts of elevated inflation. Reduced job opportunities in Iran and Pakistan have further limited migrants' ability to send remittances, negatively affecting an important income source in poor households in western, central highland, northern, and northeastern provinces, where dependence on remittances during the lean season is particularly high. With deportations expected to continue and prospects for improved conditions for Afghan migrants remaining low, the outlook for remittance inflows is poor through the end of the projection period.

The large-scale influx of returnees from Iran and Pakistan is expected to further strain an already weak labor market and reduce remittances through September, eroding household purchasing power and increasing food consumption gaps, particularly in urban areas. This, coupled with the impacts of consecutive years of drought, is driving Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes countrywide, with an elevated population in need of humanitarian food assistance.