Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in part of Al Fasher, North Darfur

• In the besieged area of Al Fasher in North Darfur, Famine (IPC Phase 5)¹ is confirmed to be currently ongoing in Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) based on reasonable evidence² that all three Famine thresholds were passed in June. It is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also ongoing³ in nearby Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps, though data is too limited to confirm or deny this classification. Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to continue through at least October and, in the absence of large-scale food assistance and an end to intense conflict, will possibly extend beyond October into the harvest and post-harvest period. 
• Other areas across Greater Darfur and South Kordofan with high concentrations of displaced persons, as well as in areas of West Darfur, Khartoum, and Al Fasher locality of North Darfur, face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). If actions taken by armed parties – either through deliberate isolation or as a byproduct of escalating conflict and insecurity and humanitarian access denials – prevent households from migrating to safer areas in search of food and income for a sustained time, then hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality would likely pass the Famine thresholds in these areas. FEWS NET will regularly re-assess the likelihood of Famine (IPC Phase 5) based on available evidence; however, given the severity of acute food insecurity in Sudan already, the fluidity of ground conditions, and challenges affecting data collection, humanitarian and government actors should not await confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in other areas to take further action to save lives.
• Half of the localities in Sudan face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes from June to September, underscoring the scale and severity of the humanitarian crisis. At the peak of the lean season, humanitarian needs are expected to surpass 20 million people, over 45 percent of the population. While humanitarian access made important gains in June, the scope remains woefully inadequate due to conflict, insecurity, and bureaucratic and administrative barriers. An immediate and coordinated scale-up of multisectoral assistance is urgently required to mitigate further loss of life. 

Famine (IPC Phase 5) is confirmed in part of Al Fasher, North Darfur; in addition, multiple areas face a risk of Famine, particularly in areas with a high density of displaced populations

Since March 2024, FEWS NET has warned of a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in areas with high concentrations of displaced persons if actions taken by armed parties – either through deliberate isolation of households or escalation of conflict and insecurity – prevent households from migrating to safer areas in search of food and income for a sustained period of time. In April, this scenario began to materialize in Al Fasher, North Darfur, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began to lay siege to the area. In June, FEWS NET assessed that the levels of starvation, acute malnutrition, and mortality had accelerated and surpassed the Famine thresholds in Zamzam IDP camp, and FEWS NET’s conclusion was then confirmed by the Famine Review Committee’s plausibility review in July. It is also possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps, though available data is too limited to confirm or deny this classification (Figure 1). 

Through late 2023 and early 2024, Al Fasher of North Darfur received large numbers of IDPs due to the relative calm under a fragile truce between RSF, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and allied Darfuri armed groups. However, this truce began to fray in March and April 2024 as RSF razed villages and terrorized rural populations in Al Fasher locality, causing additional displacement into the town. By early May, RSF had tightened the siege and fighting within the town escalated, cutting off food supplies and humanitarian access, trapping thousands of IDPs, undermining household access to marginal income-generating opportunities, and devastating household purchasing capacity. While quantitative data are unavailable, all other evidence on food consumption and livelihood change – including the adoption of increasingly extreme coping strategies – strongly support the conclusion that starvation is widespread among IDPs in the main camps around Al Fasher. This evidence includes the severe impacts of the RSF-SAF conflict and current RSF-led siege on livelihoods and food availability, access, and utilization, spanning agricultural production and food stocks; trade flows, market functionality, market access, and food prices; remittances and social safety nets; humanitarian access and assistance delivery; and clean water availability, in addition to exacerbating factors such as high morbidity and poor sanitation and health services. 

Data from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) collected in January and March/April provide evidence that acute malnutrition levels (23.1-29.4 percent) are above the Middle Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5), while the non-trauma Crude Death Rate – estimated at 1.9 deaths per 10,000 per day in January 2024 – had likely surpassed the Famine threshold of 2 deaths per 10,000 per day by June. These findings triggered food assistance delivery by WFP and the initiation of a feeding program by MSF in April; however, the quantity of food aid was limited, and the efficacy of both approaches was likely diluted by community sharing amid the sheer scale of need. No food assistance deliveries occurred in May or June, and worsening hunger and disease incidence have likely accelerated acute malnutrition and mortality levels since then.   

Other areas also face a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5), including areas with very high concentrations of IDPs across Greater Darfur and South Kordofan, as well as in Al Fasher of North Darfur, parts of West Darfur, and in some neighborhoods of Khartoum. While FEWS NET currently assesses Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes in these areas, Famine (IPC Phase 5) would likely occur if households are deliberately or indirectly cut off from remaining sources of food and prevented from being able to migrate (whether due to threats to personal safety, inability to physically travel or afford transport over long distances, or other family-driven reasons). IDPs are of particularly high concern because they are often from the most marginalized and targeted ethnic groups and have experienced long-term erosion of livelihoods and assets that greatly increase their vulnerability to shocks and a more rapid descent into destitution. Emerging evidence of a high and rising number of cases of acute malnutrition in parts of Central and South Darfur, and of excess mortality as observed via satellite imagery analysis of graveyards around displacement camps, underscore that a humanitarian catastrophe is already unfolding and Famine (IPC Phase 5) will only be confirmed after many deaths have already occurred and mortality rates reach extreme levels. Meaningful action cannot wait – with such severe acute food insecurity outcomes ongoing across multiple areas, a large-scale, coordinated, and unhindered scale-up of food, nutrition, water, and health assistance must start immediately to address Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Al Fasher and the risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) elsewhere. 

Learn more

The analysis in this report is based on information available as of June 30, 2024. Follow these links for additional information: 

• Prior Sudan Food Security Outlook: February to September 2024
• Latest Sudan Food Security Alert: August 1, 2024
• Overview of FEWS NET’s scenario development methodology 
• FEWS NET’s approach to estimating the population in need
• Overview of the IPC and IPC-compatible analysis
• FEWS NET’s approach to humanitarian food assistance analysis

Sudan has been embroiled in a brutal and devastating war since April 2023. The war has been characterized by targeted violence against civilians, including massacres of women and children and widespread sexual-based violence that is reminiscent of the violence 20 years ago in Darfur. The origins of the conflict run deep, with roots in competition over access to land between farmers and herders, exacerbated by declining rainfall and episodes of drought. These divisions deepened into tribal and ethnic conflict, the politicization of which remains a dominant undertone in the current war. Combined with protracted displacement, the current conflict has rendered Sudan the world’s largest internal displacement crisis, with more than 10 million IDPs and an additional 2.1 million people crossing international borders into neighboring countries. 

The impact of the conflict has profoundly affected all aspects of life. The destruction of Khartoum and flight of the private sector, as well as the destruction and disruption to critical industrial capacity, fuel refineries, imports and exports, commerce and finance sectors, and agricultural productivity across the country, has led to severe economic contraction following years of macroeconomic decline. The healthcare system has all but collapsed amid the targeting of hospitals in cities and disruption to the supply chain. Extensive looting of private property and residences, another persistent characteristic of the conflict, combined with the loss of jobs and income sources, has contributed to the impoverishment of millions in a relatively short time. Markets have similarly been looted and damaged, and trade flows have been disrupted, leading to deepening food shortages as the lean season progresses, particularly in areas of Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Al Jazirah, Sennar, and Khartoum. 

In traditional, semi-mechanized, and irrigated agricultural areas, the upcoming main rainy season would typically involve land cultivation and planting in June and July, followed by limited green consumption in October and the main harvest between November and January (Figure 2). Agricultural labor opportunities in the irrigated and semi-mechanized areas of the southeast typically provide important income during the lean season. However, variable levels of conflict and insecurity are expected to interfere with household access to farms and these key sources of food and income. In addition, consecutive years of lack of access to credit and critical inputs are expected to reduce the cultivation and yields of those who do manage to farm. 

In agropastoral and pastoral areas, the rains between June and September typically replenish pasture and water resources which then enhance livestock body conditions, allow for reproduction, and improve household access to milk, typically through November. However, this year livestock ownership has likely declined due to the conflict and disrupted migratory routes. Insecurity will impact movements of herds and household access to critical resources. In addition, the disruption to the marketing of livestock and skyrocketing prices will contribute to deteriorating purchasing power.

Early warning of acute food insecurity outcomes requires forecasting outcomes months in advance to provide decision makers with sufficient time to budget, plan, and respond to expected humanitarian crises. However, due to the complex and variable factors that influence acute food insecurity, definitive predictions are impossible. Scenario Development is the methodology that allows FEWS NET to meet decision makers’ needs by developing a “most likely” scenario of the future. The starting point for scenario development is a robust analysis of current food security conditions, which is the focus of this section.

Key guiding principles for FEWS NET’s scenario development process include applying the Disaster Risk Reduction framework and a livelihoods-based lens to assessing acute food insecurity outcomes. A household’s risk of acute food insecurity is a function of not only hazards (such as a drought) but also the household’s vulnerability to those hazards (for example, the household’s level of dependence on rainfed crop production for food and income) and coping capacity (which considers both household capacity to cope with a given hazard and the use of negative coping strategies that harm future coping capacity). To evaluate these factors, FEWS NET grounds this analysis in a strong foundational understanding of local livelihoods, which are the means by which a household meets their basic needs. FEWS NET’s scenario development process also accounts for the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework; the Four Dimensions of Food Security; and UNICEF’s Nutrition Conceptual Framework, and is closely aligned with the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analytical framework.

Key hazards

Conflict and displacement: 15 months into the conflict, active fighting, insecurity, and displacement continue across key frontlines of North Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Sennar, White Nile, and parts of North and West Kordofan (Figure 3). Overall internal displacement has now surpassed 10 million people, 50 percent of whom are within Greater Darfur; this includes protracted displacement that occurred prior to April 2023, any re-displacements, and those newly displaced post-April 2023. External displacements also continue to rise to more than 2.1 million as of the end of June, with 35 percent fleeing to South Sudan, 30 percent to Chad, and 25 percent to Egypt.

The RSF-led siege of Al Fasher in North Darfur is ongoing, cutting off trade flows and humanitarian access and leading to severe food and medical supply shortages, steep price increases, and massive displacement. The IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reports that nearly 330,000 people have been displaced from Al Fasher locality between April and the end of June, of which an estimated 290,000 were displaced from Al Fasher town. This represents roughly between 25 and 30 percent of the resident and displaced population estimated to be in Al Fasher town. IDPs have mostly fled to other areas within Al Fasher locality, though many are also moving south to other localities of North Darfur and further into Greater Darfur. 

In other areas of Greater Darfur, few direct clashes between armed groups have been reported since the start of the year, though insecurity, criminality, and violence against civilians are rampant and affecting households’ mobility. SAF has occasionally engaged in airstrikes on key RSF targets in the major cities of Nyala, Ad Daein, and Zalingei, but the frequency is low. Checkpoints have proliferated with reports of high fees, looting, and violence against civilians moving along main routes. 

In Greater Kordofan, RSF has steadily increased its territorial control. On June 20, RSF captured the West Kordofan state capital, Al Fula, and by July 1, had captured Meiram, consolidating their control over most areas along the South Sudan border. SAF remains in control in only two locations: Babanusa – where heavy fighting has been ongoing for months, displacing over 50,000 civilians – and in Heglig along the border with Unity in South Sudan. In North Kordofan, heavy clashes were reported in May and June along the El Obeid-Kosti road and RSF consolidated control along sections in Um Rawaba and Al Rahad, which has restricted commercial trade into El Obeid from central and eastern Sudan. In mid-June, the RSF deployed additional troops to Bara along the Bara-El Obeid route. In South Kordofan, however, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) has re-established a firmer stance of neutrality after months of talks with SAF and RSF. 

In the southeast, clashes have escalated considerably with new fronts opening in Sennar (Figure 4)⁴. As of the end of June, the SAF offensive into Al Jazirah has largely stalled, though clashes continue to be reported along the Khartoum-Wad Madani road. This offensive in Al Jazirah was likely also undermined by the sudden escalation in Sennar. In late June, RSF rapidly took control of large parts of Sennar state, capturing the villages and towns of Jebel Moya, Suki, Dinder, and Sinja, though Sennar city remains contested. Characteristic of this war to date, the attacks have been accompanied by widespread looting and devastation of public and private infrastructure, violence targeting civilians, and mass displacement. Between June 24 and the beginning of July, over 136,000 people fled the state to areas in Gedaref and Blue Nile. 

After a few months of steady SAF offensives in Khartoum, RSF has slowed SAF gains in May and June. SAF has been increasingly on the offensive in Bahri, but progress has been slow and will be further complicated by the partial destruction on June 30 of the Halfaya bridge connecting Omdurman and Bahri. On July 2, SAF reportedly recaptured Omdurman’s Doha neighborhood which likely opens the offensive into the sprawling Ombada neighborhood west of Omdurman. However, RSF remains in control of much of the south of Khartoum.

Macroeconomic conditions: Severe disruption of economic activities, massive capital flight, a high and worsening exchange rate, and high inflation are compounding years of already severe economic challenges, including rampant inflation and widespread shortages of essential goods. In 2023, the economy contracted an estimated 37.5 percent. While the African Development Bank (AfDB) has projected that it could further contract by 5.9 percent in 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipates it could be as high as 18.3 percent.

The disruption in salary payments due to the conflict has significantly limited formal sector activities and contributed to a liquidity crisis, aggravated by the closure of many banks, factories, and service-providing institutions. The AfDB estimates an 80 percent reduction in state revenues due to the conflict-driven destruction of infrastructure, disruption to economic activities, and loss of control over key economic regions. This has severely impacted the government’s ability to generate income from taxes, natural resources, and other sources. 

The Sudanese pound (SDG) has depreciated significantly since the conflict began (Figure 5). In June 2024, the official and parallel exchange rates were 1,647 SDG/USD and 1,904 SDG/USD, 175 and 216 percent higher than pre-crisis (600-602 SDG/USD in March 2023), respectively. In addition, the inflation rate continues to escalate – according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the rate has increased from 48 percent in March 2023 to 158 percent in June 2024. The extremely high level of inflation is profoundly impacting the cost of living and economic conditions of the Sudanese population. 

Cereal prices (sorghum and millet) continue to soar. Seasonal upward trends are being magnified by the detrimental impacts of the conflict that have caused significantly below-average supply, widespread disruption in market functionality and trade flows, high production and transportation costs, and deteriorating economic conditions. Between May and June 2024, sorghum prices increased by 22 percent on average across the reporting markets (Figure 6). However, several markets showed steeper increases of between 25 and 50 percent, including Al Fasher (48 percent), Zalingei (41 percent), Wad Madani (38 percent), Kadugli (34 percent), Nyala (30 percent), El Obeid (26 percent), Gedaref (25 percent), and Nyala (25 percent). The markets with the largest increases compared to June of last year (June 2023) are Kadugli (438 percent), El Obeid (300 percent), Al Nuhood (200 percent), Ad Daein (200 percent), and Al Fasher (187 percent). In Kadugli and El Obeid, the high prices reflect severe shortages in the primary markets as the main routes into the cities are blocked; however, smaller markets are reportedly partially functioning with access to limited goods from South Sudan. Across all markets, the average increases year-on-year and compared to the five-year average were 175 and 540 percent, respectively. Follow this link for more information on prices in key reference markets.

Livestock prices in June have continued to rise atypically in most monitored markets. Typically, herders tend to sell more animals for grain purchases when confronted with unfavorable husbandry conditions, which would normally lead to a seasonal decline in prices at the start of the lean season. However, livestock prices are atypically increasing during the lean season due to the conflict. With rampant insecurity along trade routes, high risks of looting, and high transport costs, many herders are choosing not to take their livestock from areas of higher production across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan to consumption markets in eastern and northern Sudan. Even within livestock production areas, insecurity in the main markets is pushing livestock owners to sell in smaller rural markets, leading to lower supply and higher prices in the main markets. For example, in Rabak of White Nile, sheep and goat prices in the main market were 22 and 52 percent higher than in the rural markets, while in Nyala of South Darfur, they were 13 and 8 percent higher, respectively.  

In addition, the cost of fodder, still critical as pastures slowly regenerate with the start of the rains, is high and rising given the poor production last season and exacerbated by the deteriorating exchange rate. In June, demand also rose sharply for goat and sheep around the Eid holidays. As a result, some markets in the east saw goat and sheep prices rise between 20-75 percent, while most markets across Greater Darfur saw month-on-month price increases of less than 20 percent. In Greater Kordofan, price increases in June in the markets of El Obeid and Kadugli were also elevated by 50 to 55 percent compared to May but were attributed to the high levels of conflict around these cities that are sharply depressing supply. On average, the year-on-year increases were 110, 130, and 150 percent for goat, sheep, and cattle, respectively; the increases compared to the five-year average were 380, 330, and 450 percent higher for the three animal types, respectively. 

Weather: The start of the main June to September rainy season has been mixed across southern Sudan, though rainfall is broadly cumulatively average to significantly above-average in most areas as of the end of June (Figure 7). Across a band stretching from West Darfur through parts of Central and South Darfur, North Kordofan, and across most of the southeast, rains began largely on-time or up to 20 days early in some areas. Rains started 10 days late in South and West Kordofan, as well as in parts of Blue Nile. Despite the late start in parts of Greater Kordofan, the subsequent rains have contributed to cumulative rainfall ranging up to 110 percent above average by the end of June. In the southeast and parts of Greater Darfur, cumulative rainfall has been significantly above average, more than 145 percent above the long-term average. The recent heavy rainfall has contributed to flash floods in parts of southern and eastern Sudan in early July and is leading to concern for the risk of flooding in parts of Greater Darfur. 

Crop production: The 2023/24 harvest of all major cereals (sorghum and millet were harvested in November 2023-January 2024 and wheat in March-May 2024) was estimated to be below to significantly below average, between 30-50 percent lower. As described in FEWS NET’s February to October 2024 Food Security Outlook, the crop harvest was negatively impacted by the expansion of conflict into the highly productive semi-mechanized and irrigated areas of the southeast, which typically contribute over half of Sudan’s total cereal production. When combined with anticipated declines in wheat imports, this led to a large cereal gap for the 2023/24 consumption year. This cereal gap has been further exacerbated by over six months of continued attacks by RSF on main towns and surrounding rural villages of Al Jazirah and recent attacks in Sennar – the main areas for national grain storage – resulting in the massive loss of stocks at the market and household level due to the extensive looting and destruction of markets, storage facilities, and public and private properties. 

The start of cultivation for the 2024 agricultural season has been significantly disrupted for the second consecutive year by the ongoing conflict and associated massive displacement; lack of access to, scarcity of, and high cost of inputs; and disruptions to the banking system, imports, transportation, and trade flows. On average, fuel prices increased by nearly 170 percent, while seed and herbicide prices increased by 60-70 percent when compared to last year. Looting of agricultural inputs has been widely reported across the agricultural breadbasket of the southeast, further undermining cultivation efforts. Access to farms is significantly reduced in areas with recent heavy fighting – notably the historical agricultural breadbaskets of Al Jazirah and Sennar – due to active fighting and massive displacement. While exposure to heavy fighting is the primary driver of reduced access to farms, the risk of targeted atrocities against civilians based on ethnicity persists in areas with less direct combat but the continued presence of armed groups and elevated ethnic or tribal tensions. Risks to personal safety are of particular concern for displaced populations in Greater Darfur who already have limited access to farmland for own-production and typically rely on agricultural labor opportunities, which conflict has likely already severely reduced.

• Greater Darfur: In North Darfur, escalating conflict – particularly in the Al Fasher locality – has severely disrupted or ceased household cultivation due to massive displacement and reduced access to farms. High tension and widespread insecurity in other localities significantly constrain household mobility and access to fields for cultivation. While information on the level of cultivation is limited in most parts of Greater Darfur, some households in the relatively calm rural areas of Central and South Darfur are engaging in relatively more cultivation, but still far below normal levels. In contrast, cultivation in East Darfur is likely proceeding better than all other areas of Darfur, given relatively calmer conditions. 
• Southeast: In the southeastern states of Al Jazirah, Sennar, and Gedaref, direct clashes and high levels of conflict in recent months and weeks have caused massive displacement and significantly disrupted land preparation and planting. Shortages and high costs of agricultural machinery are widely reported in Al Jazirah, Sennar, and parts of Gedaref due to looting, conflict-related damage, and destruction, or loss of access as farmers fled with their machines. In both Al Jazirah and Sennar, state authorities have warned of expected, massive losses in agricultural production capacity this season with enormous consequences for overall food availability in the months following the next harvest and the next lean season. In neighboring Gedaref and Blue Nile, available field information indicates that as of the end of June, farmers were still able to engage in land preparation due to the relative stability and lack of direct fighting, but the reduced access to financing from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS), combined with shortages and high prices of agricultural inputs including fuel, are critically affecting cultivation in these calmer states and driving increased production costs. 
• Greater Kordofan: While information is limited on crop cultivation in Greater Kordofan, available evidence indicates that conflict, insecurity, and displacement – particularly in many areas of North Kordofan (Um Rawaba, Al Rahad, Bara, and parts of Sheikan), South Kordofan (Abukarshola, Kadugli, and parts of Al Abasiya), and West Kordofan (Babanusa, Al Fula, and Al Meriam) – are likely limiting access to farms and contributing to a reduction in cultivation among farmers. Production will be further negatively affected by shortages and high prices of agricultural inputs. 

Livestock production: Overall, pastoral and agropastoral livestock production activities continue to be significantly constrained by the impact of the conflict and economic deterioration of migratory and trade routes, access to pasture and water resources, livestock exports, cost of inputs, and access to veterinary services. 

• In June, pasture and water resources were slowly improving with above-average rainfall conditions, but deficits (up to 20 percent below normal vegetative health) remain across most southern areas, except for the southeast corner of Blue Nile State and parts of Sennar (Figure 8). According to CHIRPS waterpoint data, as of late June surface water points in South Kordofan were improving albeit still under “watch” conditions (as much as 50 percent below long-term median water levels). Conversely, in North Kordofan (around El Obeid) and in Blue Nile State, they had already surpassed long-term median levels. Conditions were mixed in monitored sites in White Nile State. 

• Seasonal migration patterns that typically begin in mid-June have been disrupted by the conflict. Nomads that typically migrate northward from summer season grazing areas (in the southern parts of Sudan, parts of South Sudan, and Central African Republic [CAR]) to wet season grazing pasture in mid-June have been delayed by insecurity and seasonal farmer-herder conflicts associated with the passage of pastoral migration routes through farmland. In parts of Sennar and Blue Nile, many nomad groups have migrated south instead of north or have remained longer than normal in the grazing areas in South Sudan; others, particularly in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and White Nile, have delayed animal migration to the summer season grazing areas due to blockage of some migratory routes. 
• The disruption of livestock migration and service provision is negatively impacting livestock health and pasture and water availability in areas with a high concentration of livestock, and overcrowding is expected to lead to increased livestock disease outbreaks and losses during the rainy season. While no major disease outbreaks were reported in 2023, vaccinations were greatly disrupted, compounding overall poor health status and increasing vulnerability to disease outbreaks this year. While the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has managed to initiate a vaccination campaign in recent months, the targeted head is below typical levels due to insecurity and lack of access. Inadequate pasture and water availability were reported in some areas of North and East Darfur and in the western parts of North Kordofan in June, particularly in areas dependent on boreholes as main sources of water; many boreholes are unusable due to fuel scarcity and insufficient maintenance and replenishment. 
• The official exports of live animals from Port Sudan and across the northern border to Egypt are continuing, but at lower levels than normal due to the insecurity along primary and secondary routes around the country and around the main area of livestock supply in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Between April and June 2024, official sheep and goat exports to Saudi Arabia were 88 and 68 percent of the quantity exported in the same period of 2022, respectively. Some informal trading of livestock is also reportedly occurring across the Libyan border with North Darfur. 

Market supplies: Overall, food continues to be generally available in most markets but in limited quantities and at exceedingly high prices making it unaffordable to a growing proportion of the population. Conflict and insecurity along major transportation routes continues to impede the movement of food and goods between SAF-controlled and RSF-controlled areas (Figure 9). Alternate, comparatively long-distance, unpaved roads are being used more frequently, but at higher costs which are being passed on to consumers through extremely high prices (for example, fuel prices have risen 150-250 percent compared to March 2023 in the official and parallel markets). As previously assessed in FEWS NET’s February-October 2024 food security outlook, the lack of effective distribution from surplus to deficit areas, combined with the restricted ability of humanitarian food assistance to reach people in need, is exacerbating the gap in grain availability as the lean season progresses. Cross-border flows from Chad, Libya, Egypt, and South Sudan are mitigating the gap to some extent in main markets across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, particularly in markets in closer proximity to the borders, but imports face considerable bureaucratic impediments (including irregular enforcement of customs and proliferation of checkpoints), quantities are limited, import and transport costs are high, and prices continue to soar. 

• Greater Darfur: Amid the ongoing siege, Al Fasher markets have minimal to no activity with routes in and out effectively cut-off, though some smuggling at very high costs is likely occurring. Elsewhere in the region, the reduction in conflict intensity has enabled limited resumption of economic activity in main markets, though activity in some secondary and tertiary markets is reportedly depressed. Markets in parts of West Darfur have better supply due to informal flows across the border from Chad and a relative decline in violence, while some markets in East Darfur (Ad Daein and Abu Matarig) have better informal supply flows from South Sudan. In Central Darfur, important progress was made on negotiating the re-opening of the Zalingei-Nartiti-Kas-Nyala road on July 4 (closed by SLM-AW for the last five months), which will further improve flow through the region. Nonetheless, flows and market activity remain significantly below normal.    
• Greater Kordofan: High levels of insecurity and active fighting are restricting access to Dilling and Kadugli and contributing to rapidly escalating prices, with Kadugli recording some of the highest in the country. However, key informants report that most households are now accessing smaller markets in the area with limited supplies from South Sudan and SPLM-N-controlled areas. Routes in and out of El Obeid remain significantly disrupted amid ongoing fighting.    
• Southeast: Main markets and trade routes in the southeast, including Madani, Sennar, Sinja, and Al Dinder, and trade routes connecting Sennar and Al Jazirah to the neighboring states of White Nile, Gedaref, and Blue Nile, are currently assessed to have minimal activity following the escalation of violence and large-scale looting under RSF attacks. Meanwhile, in Kosti and Ad Damazin, limited trade is flowing from South Sudan. 

Sources of income: In most urban centers across the country, consumer and private sector activity – and associated sources of household income – continues to decline due to the breakdown of trade and export supply chains, damage and disruption to businesses in Khartoum and many other industrial and trading centers, and the inability of the government or private sector to consistently pay employee salaries. The informal sector, which constitutes a significant portion of Sudan's economy and is a major source of household income, has been particularly hard hit. The livelihoods of informal laborers, who depend on daily wages, have vanished as markets close and economic activity stagnates. Many are now living in deeper poverty.    

In rural areas, poor and very poor households are increasing their dependence on the collection and sale of firewood, charcoal, and bush products, as well as on migration in search of non-agricultural unskilled labor opportunities, such as informal labor in artisanal mining sites and in safer towns, where feasible. A number of media reports have indicated increased artisanal gold mining in parts of Kordofan as well as in River Nile, likely driven by the importance of gold as a key source of revenue for belligerents in the war and the rising demand for wage labor opportunities. Nonetheless, access to wage labor opportunities is negatively impacted by insecurity constraining household mobility and a reduction in wage labor opportunities across several sectors in destination areas. As a result, the sale of assets (including liquidation of remaining assets in some cases) and dependence on remittances and gifts/zakat, are expected to increase; however, the latter is likely limited by overall strain on community resources and volatility of mobile networks and connectivity critical for such transactions.

Household purchasing capacity: Overall, livestock and wage prices are increasing but have not kept pace with the rising costs of staple foods, leading to persistently low or deteriorating terms of trade (TOT) in most areas (Figure 10). For example, the labor-to-sorghum TOT in June in Kassala was 50 and 40 percent below June 2023 and the five-year average, respectively, while the goat-to-sorghum TOT in El Obeid was 47 percent below both June 2023 and the five-year average. While not captured by the TOT, rising prices of non-cereal food items and the overall cost of living are further accelerating the deterioration in overall household purchasing capacity. For example, prices of sugar, edible oil, and meat increased 60-190 percent between June 2023 and June 2024, driven by inflation and local currency depreciation, in addition to the reduced supplies and high cost of transportation.  

Wild foods: Access to wild foods continues to be restricted by insecurity and constrained movement, and increased demand for and reliance upon wild foods may also be placing pressure on supply. Wild foods are normally collected by poor households (even in years of good production) to store in anticipation of food shortages. Since the start of the conflict there are indications of increased consumption of wild foods, including leaves and grass – as well as resorting to eating dirt – among IDPs and poor households, particularly in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. Mukheit (Boscia senegalensis) is the most common wild food in drier areas of Darfur and is the main species consumed as an emergency food to mitigate food shortages: it is typically harvested late in the season and can be stored for years but requires a high level of processing. Earlier maturing wild foods include deffra and koraib, which are typically harvested before the cereals. In Greater Kordofan, consumption of wild edible plants (WEPs) is a traditional practice in many rural areas, including different species of shrubs, trees, herbs, and grasses. Edible fruits that are generally consumed without processing include lalob (Balanites aegyptiaca) and nabag (Ziziphus spina).

Mutual social support: Community and family support as part of informal social safety nets are likely alleviating the severity of household food consumption deficits to a variable degree, depending on location and local food availability. According to a February 2024 paper by the Institute of Development Studies, mechanisms of social support are diverse and have historically had a high level of support and participation across both rural and urban settings, with strong local leadership both for regular support mechanisms and more ad hoc community mobilization and support. Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) have emerged in major cities across Sudan, responding to the needs of civilians through the establishment of community kitchens, medical services, and other activities (mostly in Khartoum, but also in other cities including El Gedaref, Sennar, and Al Fasher). Less formalized mechanisms of sharing also have deep roots in Sudanese culture, including gift-giving between families and relatives (the more formalized version being Zakat), community-led support for IDPs via the provision of cooked meals and shared food, and practices of sharing such as Darra, where multiple households come together to share meals even if not every household can contribute to the meal. 

Social support mechanisms are likely functioning among the most vulnerable populations of IDPs, particularly across Greater Darfur where needs are very high; however, they are likely under severe pressure given limited and overly-strained resources. For example, within the city of Al Fasher, the siege conditions are likely limiting ERR functionality. Among IDPs, the primary forms of community and social support are joint meals, sharing available food items with relatives and those in need, borrowing cash, and, in some cases, women’s groups preparing and distributing food to new arrivals in IDP camps/gathering points. However, these activities are constrained by reduced supplies, limited access to market purchases, and reduced stocks at the household and market levels and are not expected to be sustainable in the short-to-medium term due to the limited local community capacity vis-à-vis the scale of needs.

Humanitarian food assistance – defined as emergency food assistance (in-kind, cash, or voucher) – may play a key role in mitigating the severity of acute food insecurity outcomes. FEWS NET analysts always incorporate available information on food assistance, with the caveat that information on food assistance is highly variable across geographies and over time. In line with IPC protocols, FEWS NET uses the best available information to assess where food assistance is “significant” (defined by at least 25 percent of households in a given area receiving at least 25 percent of their caloric requirements through food assistance); see report Annex. In addition, FEWS NET conducts deeper analysis of the likely impacts of food assistance on the severity of outcomes, as detailed in FEWS NET’s guidance on Integrating Humanitarian Food Assistance into Scenario Development. Other types of assistance (e.g., livelihoods or nutrition assistance; social safety net programs) are incorporated elsewhere in FEWS NET’s broader analysis, as applicable.

Between January and May, WFP reported reaching 2 million people with food assistance at half rations and supporting 300,000 people with cash transfers. However, monthly food aid achievements varied between 600,000 and 1.2 million people reached. In the areas of greatest concern in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, food assistance delivery was at best intermittent and overall insufficient to meet the high needs, and some of the most severely food-insecure areas remained inaccessible for months due to a combination of active fighting and administrative barriers, such as travel permit delays or refusals. According to OCHA, approximately 1.78 million people that were targeted for humanitarian assistance were unable to receive it in June 2024, including 836,000 people in Darfur, 617,000 in Kordofan, and 114,000 in Khartoum. 

Recent negotiations in May and June did lead to relative improvements in humanitarian access, with WFP preliminarily reporting reaching 2.07 million people with food aid and over 600,000 with cash assistance in June alone. Negotiations included cross-line access to East and South Darfur via the Port Sudan-Al Dabbah-North Darfur route; implementation of more consistent procedures at the Al Tine border crossing; and initiation of weekly meetings with the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SAHRO) – which has replaced the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in RSF-controlled areas – to address access challenges in RSF-controlled areas. Agencies continue to advocate for other Chad border crossings to be re-opened but as of early July they remain closed. As a result of the negotiations, WFP and partners reported sending a number of convoys across the border at Al Tine in June, with destinations in West, Central, South, and East Darfur; some of these areas received assistance for the first time in months, as well as cross-line movement to access populations in South Kordofan. 

However, it is uncertain how long recent improvements in humanitarian access will be sustained or if it will lead to more widespread improvements that permit a significant scale-up in food assistance, given volatile political and security conditions. For example, the recent fighting in Sennar and the southeast combined with the onset of the rainy season has rendered major cross-line routes to Kordofan and onward to Darfur from the east inaccessible. Moreover, the looting of a convoy in Central Darfur on June 30 highlights the continued risks facing assistance delivery in areas marked by rising insecurity if not active fighting. Given these continued obstacles to delivery of in-kind assistance, organizations are simultaneously working to scale up cash assistance, though as of June, levels of cash assistance distribution remain low relative to total needs: an estimated 121,000 and 113,000 people received cash in May and June, respectively, compared to 78,000 in March and 45,000 in April. While more than half of those receiving cash in June continue to reside in accessible areas of the east, approximately a quarter of the beneficiaries were in Greater Darfur and nearly 20 percent were in Greater Kordofan. However, cash assistance faces significant challenges related to liquidity given the significant impacts of the conflict on the banking system, currency devaluation, as well as to highly variable market functionality.  

Based on the analysis of food security conditions, FEWS NET then assesses the extent to which households are able to meet their minimum caloric needs. This analysis converges evidence of food security conditions with available direct evidence of household-level food consumption and livelihood change; FEWS NET also considers available area-level evidence of nutritional status and mortality, with a focus on assessing if these reflect the physiological impacts of acute food insecurity rather than other non-food-related factors. Ultimately, FEWS NET uses the globally recognized five-phase Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale to classify current acute food insecurity outcomes. In addition, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of ongoing humanitarian food assistance.

In June, over 14 months into the devastating conflict, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse area-level outcomes are ongoing across the entirety of Sudan. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is most widespread across Greater Darfur, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) is confirmed in Zamzam camp and possibly also ongoing in Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps of Al Fasher, North Darfur. In the worst conflict-affected areas, particularly in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah, the lean season started as early as March/April following conflict-driven disruptions to last year’s agricultural season that reduced production and inhibited flows of food from surplus to deficit areas. With food supplies depressed and transport costs rising, prices continued to escalate steeply, on top of consecutive years of upward inflationary pressure on prices. Moreover, the rampant insecurity, widespread looting, and unprecedented displacement has undermined access to traditional livelihoods and income sources, and further eroded household coping capacity. In the areas with highest need, humanitarian access has been sporadic and insufficient to mitigate the deterioration in acute food insecurity. Community support, social support, and remittances are expected to be among the few remaining, significant sources of food and income, particularly in urban areas that have access to community kitchens run by ERRs and with mobile network connectivity sufficient to access remittances from family in safer areas of Sudan and overseas. Targeted attacks on health, water, and nutrition services contributing to increasing outbreaks of diseases including measles and cholera have contributed to rising acute malnutrition rates as confirmed by screenings of nutritional status in accessible areas; while available data on nutritional status are limited, it is highly likely that levels of acute malnutrition are even worse in the most conflict-affected, hard-to-reach areas and among IDPs who are living in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. According to the National Nutrition Cluster, an estimated 3.66 million children under 5 and 1.2 million pregnant and lactating women were assessed to be malnourished as of March 2024, a 22 percent increase over the beginning of 2023.      

• Famine (IPC Phase 5) is confirmed in Zamzam camp and possibly ongoing in Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps of Al Fasher of North Darfur. The besiegement of Al Fasher has cut off market supplies and food aid and curtailed population mobility, resulting in severely limited food availability and access within the town. The impact of food shortages and lack of access to markets is exaggerated in the camps as they are largely dependent on food supplies from Al Fasher town. In addition, displaced populations who have historically few to no assets, lack access to traditional livelihoods, and whose coping capacity has been heavily eroded from years of marginalization and frequent re-displacement, are facing further severe declines in traditional sources of food and income amid the conflict-driven mobility restrictions, including in-kind payment for agricultural labor, non-agricultural labor, and self-employment (including petty trade, sale of firewood/charcoal, and migratory labor). The lack of income sources combined with sharply escalating food prices are driving a severe deterioration in purchasing capacity. In addition, several attacks on Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps resulted in high levels of re-displacement of IDPs into relatively safer areas within the city as well as to Zamzam camp, putting additional pressure on already limited resources and services. Due to humanitarian access constraints imposed by the siege, the collection of representative data on food consumption and livelihood change has not been possible; nevertheless, the evident severity of food security conditions strongly supports the conclusion that starvation is likely widespread and exceeds the threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5) among IDPs in part of Al Fasher. The physiological impact of protracted hunger had already led to high acute malnutrition levels prior to the siege, as indicated by the results of two MSF assessments in Zamzam: in January, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) levels based on Middle Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) were at 23.1 percent, and in March/April 2024, a mass screening of GAM-MUAC levels identified a prevalence of 29.4 percent, both of which were already above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold. Given worsening food security conditions, combined with rising disease outbreaks amid crowding, poor sanitation, and limited health services, acute malnutrition levels likely remain above the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold as of June, and it is expected that excess mortality has deteriorated from an estimated 1.9 non-trauma death rate in January 2024 to beyond the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold of 2 deaths per 10,000 people per day (see Featured Area of Concern for additional details).    
• For the resident population of Al Fasher locality that have not fled the area, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be widespread and a substantial population likely faces Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the poorest and conflict-affected households. While they were better off than displaced households prior to the siege, they currently face similar conditions as described above. These populations are now understood to be relying heavily on liquidation of assets, remittances, sharing of resources, joint meals, and support provided by ERRs. However, these sources are not expected to be sustainable long-term due to funding shortages and restrictions on trade flows. 
• In much of the rest of Greater Darfur, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are widespread in June. While direct fighting has been relatively subdued in recent months allowing for marginal resumption of economic and livelihood activities, the impact of the conflict is still felt through destruction of infrastructure, looting of assets and food, severe atrocities and deaths of family members and relatives, and massive displacement. Access to typical income sources including sale of firewood/charcoal and bush products, casual local labor, and migratory labor is likely reduced due to the persistent insecurity. March 2024 SMART survey results using weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ) in Zalingei of Central Darfur and Nyala of South Darfur indicated GAM-WHZ levels of 15.3 percent and 15.6 percent, respectively, and acute malnutrition prevalence has likely increased through June due to reduced food intake. In less directly conflict-affected areas of East Darfur, southern parts of South Darfur, and western parts of North Darfur with stronger links across borders and/or with ties to the RSF, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are assessed.
• Protracted and newly displaced populations are of particularly high concern in Greater Darfur given the scale of violence, destruction, and looting in urban centers earlier in the conflict – particularly around large camps and main towns of Nyala in South Darfur, Zalingei in Central Darfur, Geneina in West Darfur, and Ad Deain in East Darfur – as well as among urban poor households. Most of these displaced populations have experienced historical loss of coping capacity due to limited population movements and reduced access to livelihood options under protracted conflict and insecurity. While data is limited to confirm, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are expected among the IDP and poor urban households, as are rising, atypically high levels of acute malnutrition. 
• In Greater Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are present in western contested areas of South and West Kordofan, and southern areas of North Kordofan, with some households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the displaced in Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan, and in Sheikan of North Kordofan. The deterioration is driven by continued fighting between SAF and RSF in North Kordofan (Sheikan, Um Ruwaba, Al Rahad, and parts of Bara), West Kordofan (Babanousa, Al Mairem, Al Salam, and Al Fula), and in South Kordofan (Al Quoz, Dilling, Kadugli, and Habila) which is disrupting movements along the main roads. Households’ ability to engage in traditional livelihood activities such as cultivation and livestock rearing in addition to other typical income-generating activities (including seasonal agricultural wage labor, sale of charcoal and firewood, and petty trade) is significantly constrained, which when combined with sharply rising prices is reducing household purchasing power. 
• In Khartoum, the worst-affected areas of Tuti Island in Khartoum locality; Mayo and Alingaz in Jebel Aulia; and much of Bahri and Omdurman are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) with increased numbers of households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Income sources have been critically undercut for millions who remain in the state, particularly among the poor and very poor who depend on daily wage labor and the remaining salaried workers who have not received payment since the start of the crisis in April 2023. The extensive destruction of infrastructure, dramatic reduction in trade flows, and widespread looting of markets and shops continue to limit food availability and sustain extremely high food prices. Household mobility remains limited amid continued insecurity affecting access to remaining marginal sources of food and income. While remittances, community safety nets, and support from relatives are likely playing an important role in sustaining households, access to money transfers remains intermittent given ongoing disruptions to banking and telecommunications systems and hefty access costs (e.g., 10-20 percent fee imposed by some vendors). 
• In the southeast, outcomes vary depending on the extent of direct conflict. Al Jazirah is facing the most widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes given the persistent attacks and terrorization of the local population since the RSF invasion in mid-December 2023. Looting of food and limited trade flows has reduced market supplies and increased prices. Meanwhile, pervasive looting of critical agricultural assets has undermined the current agricultural season and widely reduced income-earning opportunities for households. 
• In Northern, River Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states, the high burden of displaced persons is straining available resources including food and access to available income-generating opportunities. Those with access to land along rivers are engaged in small-scale cultivation and likely have some (albeit below-average) wheat stocks remaining from the harvest in March/April 2023. Other households are expected to be relying heavily on remittances (typically high in this area), and increasingly accessing gold mining and other casual wage labor opportunities available in urban areas. While markets are benefiting from increased supplies from Egypt and Port Sudan, import and marketing costs are high and translate to high prices for consumers that are contributing to the erosion of purchasing power. As a result, most areas are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), while some areas in Red Sea with traditionally low coping capacity face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).  

The next step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to develop evidence-based assumptions about factors that affect food security conditions. This includes hazards and anomalies in food security conditions that will affect the evolution of household food and income during the projection period, as well as factors that may affect nutritional status. FEWS NET also develops assumptions on factors that are expected to behave normally. Together, these assumptions underpin the “most likely” scenario. The sequence of making assumptions is important; primary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to weather) must be developed before secondary assumptions (e.g., expectations pertaining to crop or livestock production). Key assumptions that underpin this analysis, and the key sources of evidence used to develop the assumptions, are listed below.

National assumptions

Conflict: 

• At the national level, conflict between SAF and RSF is expected to continue as peace efforts have stalled, despite regional and international attempts to revive negotiations. Renewed offensives within the last six months have led to concrete gains for both sides and will reduce incentives to engage in peace talks. Moreover, while some foreign actors will continue to push the parties to negotiations, they lack the leverage to compel or incentivize them to commit to a ceasefire. At the same time, other foreign actors are expected to continue providing unofficial support to rival sides which will prolong the conflict. However, overt and significant foreign military intervention is unlikely and would significantly complicate the conflict's dynamics. In the absence of a national ceasefire, RSF will likely continue to establish governance structures in areas under their control, leading to a gradual de facto partition of the country.  

Displacement: 

• Displacement is expected to continue for the entire projection period, both internally and across international borders. Flows are expected to be especially large in heavily populated parts of the southeast as conflict expands in Sennar, White Nile, and Gedaref. Tracking of displacement is expected to be complicated by extensive re-displacement of those originally displaced from Khartoum into the north, east, and southeast states (nearly 65 percent of the total displaced population have come from Khartoum) and challenges of accounting for any returns post-active fighting.

Macroeconomic conditions: 

• The ongoing contraction in the economy is expected to continue in the near-term and will likely be more modest with the slowdown in the conflict towards the end of the projection period. The currency is expected to continue to depreciate to 2300-2500 SDG/USD through January 2025, a decline of 287-315 percent compared to March 2023 (the pre-conflict period), and 32-35 percent compared to June 2023. This will contribute to further increases in the prices of imported and locally-produced goods across the country and sustain extremely high inflation.

Weather forecast: 

• Based on the NMME and WMO forecast models, the June to September rainy season in Sudan is likely to be above average with an elevated risk of flash floods. Combined with the release of the water from the Jinja Dam in mid-May, there is also an elevated risk of severe flooding along the White Nile in Sudan in August/September. 

Livestock production: 

• Seasonal northward livestock migration to the wet season grazing areas is likely to continue to be disrupted by the expansion of conflict, increased intercommunal clashes, and widespread insecurity across most of the major livestock migration routes. Arab herders from parts of Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are likely to extend their stay in parts of South Sudan, CAR, and Chad longer than normal, with some remaining through January due to continued insecurity in Sudan. Livestock diseases are expected to increase with the rains, exacerbated by the lack of veterinary health services.

Crop production: 

• Planting, which typically takes place between June and August, is expected to be below average nationally and significantly below average in localized areas that are facing a continued, high intensity of fighting, insecurity, and displacement, such as in North Darfur, Sennar, White Nile, and parts of Greater Kordofan. Overall, national cereal production in 2024/25 (sorghum, millet, and wheat) will likely remain significantly below the five-year average.
• Main season harvest (December 2024-January 2025): The main season harvests in the traditional rainfed areas across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are likely to be significantly below average in areas near urban localities that experienced heavy fighting at various times through the current agricultural season, with pockets of average harvest in areas that are largely unaffected by direct clashes. In the semi-mechanized and irrigated areas of the southeast, harvests will be below to significantly below average, with largest declines expected in Sennar and Al Jazirah. 
• Wheat harvest (March-April 2025): This year’s wheat planting and production are expected to be significantly below average due to insecurity-driven disruptions in planting, particularly in the Gezira scheme. Shortages and high costs of agricultural inputs and limited access to agricultural finance are expected to further negatively impact wheat cultivation in most wheat cultivation areas across the country.

Wheat imports: 

• Import requirements in 2024/25 are expected to be higher than normal, given the expected significant disruption to local wheat cultivation and the roll-over impact of below-average production last season (2023/24). However, Sudan’s ability to import wheat will continue to face challenges through the rest of 2024 and into 2025, given the continued conflict and economic crisis in the country.

Trade flow and market functionality: 

• Overall, trade flows and market functionality are expected to remain highly disrupted across the country. The expansion of the conflict and direct fighting in central and southeastern Sudan, the recent attacks by RSF in Sennar, and limited movement across the main roads linking eastern and western Sudan will likely continue disrupting trade flows and market functionality from east to west. Additionally, the anticipated expansion of fighting deeper into the east and southeast will most likely further disrupt flows within the relatively calm areas of the east. The main routes linking Khartoum state to most of the rest of the country will remain highly insecure, with periodic disruption along the only functional Dongola-Omdurman route.

Staple food prices: 

• Given the scale of disruption to production, trade flows, and markets, food prices are expected to remain significantly above average throughout the entire projection period. Prices will continue to rise through the peak of the lean season during August and September and will likely range between 55-110 percent above last year and 250-450 percent above the five-year average. Between October and January (the post-harvest period), prices are expected to moderate slightly, but are not expected to exhibit a sustained decline in most areas given speculation and below-average harvests. In areas of severe fighting and continued siege-like conditions, prices are not expected to decline seasonally.

Livestock prices:

• Livestock prices will remain above average throughout the analysis period. Significant variations across different markets are anticipated during the peak of the lean season between August and September, driven by the impact of conflict on market functionality and the livestock supply chain. Livestock prices are anticipated to increase in the main consumption markets of the relatively calm urban areas due to reduced supply from the main producing areas and high transportation costs. Meanwhile, prices are likely to atypically decrease across most of the rural and main supply markets despite improved body conditions; this will be driven by continued livestock supply chain disruptions and reduced access to consumption markets due to insecurity, high informal fees along primary and secondary trade routes, and reduced export activities, as well as an elevated need among pastoralists to sell more animals to afford food at significantly above-average prices. Price trends are expected to stabilize subsequently from October to January.

Income sources: 

• In relatively secure rural areas, poor and very poor households are likely to increase their dependency on agricultural labor, remittances, sale of bush products, and migration for non-agricultural labor as their main sources of income mainly during the June to September 2024 cultivation season. In conflict-affected areas, people will likely increase dependency on the collection and sale of firewood and charcoal, gifts, and remittances throughout the projection period. In more conflict-affected areas, access to forest products and agricultural labor is likely to remain constrained by insecurity and will likely remain below average through the projection period. In the affected urban centers and areas with high displacement, reduced income opportunities, limited cash retrieval, and widespread looting and pillaging will continue to limit cash availability and purchasing capacity. 
• Agricultural labor opportunities are expected to remain below to significantly below-average during cultivation and weeding season (June to September) and during the harvest period (October to January). Based on FEWS NET’s projections, labor wages will likely remain 15-30 percent higher than last year, driven by high inflation. 
• Migration to calmer areas to access non-agricultural and unskilled labor opportunities is expected to increase throughout the projection period, particularly among households in areas with limited access to agricultural labor and bush products. This trend is expected to intensify after the main harvest season concludes, when agricultural labor demand seasonally declines. 

Sub-national assumptions for Greater Darfur

• While major organized battles between the RSF and SAF are unlikely to extend beyond North Darfur into Greater Darfur through the projection period, an increase in intercommunal violence is likely in response to RSF targeting of non-Arab communities and communities perceived as having supported the SAF. This is likely to be exacerbated by the RSF’s likely inability to manage and control violence between communities over land disputes.
• In Al Fasher, a local ceasefire is not expected in the absence of a broader national ceasefire. The city is of significant strategic importance for both sides. For the RSF, the capture of Al Fasher would consolidate their control over Greater Darfur, and together with pushes for expanding territorial control in Greater Kordofan, would further their aims towards a separation of the country, which the SAF would not allow. In addition, any indication of SAF entertaining a local ceasefire might jeopardize the fragile coalition built with the local Darfuri armed groups. As a result, siege conditions will likely continue through at least August/September, with an escalation in intensity of fighting between SAF and RSF. Between October and January, violence is expected to remain elevated in the likely event that RSF captures Al Fasher as RSF is likely to target ethnic minorities and groups seen as supportive of SAF. 

Sub-national assumptions for Greater Kordofan

• Urban areas of West and South Kordofan are likely to see intense conflict, particularly Babanusa city and other urban areas of West Kordofan, in the near-term. Dilling, Kadugli, and other urban areas of South Kordofan, as well as some rural areas at the edge of territory at least nominally controlled by a major armed actor, are likely to see continued conflict between RSF, SAF, SPLM/A-N (Al Hilu), and other armed actors at least temporarily aligned with these larger actors; this is likely to occur through both projection periods. Conflict between RSF and SAF along major transportation corridors in North Kordofan remains likely through the entire projection period.

Sub-national assumptions for the southeast

• SAF and aligned forces are likely to continue to make incremental advances in Al Jazirah state through the first half of the projection period, while the RSF will likely launch a counteroffensive in the second half. While fighting in Sennar and White Nile is likely to continue throughout the projection period as RSF seeks to cement gains against any SAF counter-offensive, the pace of fighting will likely slow during the rainy season. SAF will likely remain in control of Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, River Nile, and Northern states through the projection period. 
• The battle for Khartoum is likely to continue in the coming months, with the SAF offensive expected to expand in Omdurman and Bahri. However, SAF will likely remain unable to fully oust RSF from critical parts of Khartoum and remain unable to consistently secure major transit routes into the city. The RSF is likely to continue besieging or partially blocking bases and civilian neighborhoods deemed vital to SAF logistics and supply lines into the city from the north and northeast. 

Humanitarian food assistance

• While humanitarians plan to scale up deliveries to over 7.6 million people across the country, this represents just one-third of the population in need. Moreover, the provision of food assistance will continue to face considerable challenges amid precarious security conditions; administrative hurdles including closed borders, delayed travel permits, and denial of visas for humanitarian staff; significant looting and loss of humanitarian assets; exorbitant fees and informal taxation; and destruction of facilities. Furthermore, access will further deteriorate between June and September as roads become impassable due to heavy rainfall. As a result, assistance is not expected to consistently reach the IPC 3.1 threshold for significant – at least 25 percent of a population receiving at least 25 percent of kilocalorie needs from HFA – in any locality.   
• Humanitarian access across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan is expected to be especially intermittent and volatile. Insecurity in North Darfur will continue to prevent or severely limit humanitarian access from Chad or Port Sudan. In other areas of Greater Darfur, sustained access will be limited by insecurity, banditry, involvement of increasing armed actors, and the progression of the rainy season. In Greater Kordofan, recent territorial advances by both RSF and the SPLM-N will further complicate access. In the absence of an end to heavy fighting and actions to ensure access, levels of food assistance to Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan are expected to remain low and inconsistent. 

Using the key assumptions that underpin the “most likely” scenario, FEWS NET is then able to project acute food insecurity outcomes by assessing the evolution of households’ ability to meet their minimum caloric needs throughout the projection period. Similar to the analysis of current acute food insecurity outcomes, FEWS NET converges expectations of the likely trajectory of household-level food consumption and livelihood change with area-level nutritional status and mortality. FEWS NET then classifies acute food insecurity outcomes using the IPC scale. Lastly, FEWS NET applies the “!” symbol to designate any areas where the mapped IPC Phase would likely be at least one IPC Phase worse without the effects of planned – and likely to be funded and delivered – food assistance. 

In Al Fasher of North Darfur, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is expected to continue in Zamzam camp through at least October, and it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will persist in Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps through October as well. With conflict and insecurity anticipated to continue, agricultural production will be significantly reduced, trade flows and humanitarian access will remain severely constrained, and mobility for IDPs in particular will be threatened, either by direct fighting or by elevated risk of targeting based on ethnicity. The upcoming rains are expected to exacerbate poor WASH conditions and increase disease outbreaks such as cholera, already suspected in the camp. The interaction of hunger and disease is expected to further accelerate levels of acute malnutrition and mortality. While the main harvest usually begins gradually around November/December, IDPs have had little to no opportunity to cultivate and it is unlikely access to food and income will notable improve after October. In the absence of an end to violence and delivery of large-scale food and nutrition assistance, FEWS NET assesses it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will extend into the harvest and post-harvest periods beyond October as well. 

Severe acute food insecurity outcomes marked by high levels of acute malnutrition and mortality are also expected across Al Fasher locality more broadly, though likely at levels below the Famine (IPC Phase 5) thresholds due to local residents’ relatively higher access to food and income prior to the siege compared to the displaced. FEWS NET assesses the area will likely remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) through January, with a proportion of households likely experiencing starvation indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5); the proportion of residents in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is anticipated to marginally decline between October and January with the availability of limited harvests in rural areas. According to FEWS NET’s Household Economy Approach (HEA) Outcome Analysis, which builds upon baseline data to analyze the impact of current and forecasted hazards on food and income sources and estimate the size of household consumption deficits, very poor household groups will likely face caloric deficits indicative of Emergency (IPC Phase 4), with the severity of caloric deficits partially mitigated by access to remittances, community support, and household sharing. Very poor households who cannot access these sources would face caloric deficits indicative of Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The proportion of households in Al Fasher facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to increase as these resources are unsustainable in the long-term, and active fighting and insecurity continue to interfere with household livelihood activities, suppressing cultivation and income-generating activities such as the sale of firewood and charcoal, grass, and firewood; impede trade flows; and contribute to significantly above-average prices in the few functioning markets. Furthermore, food assistance is expected to remain highly constrained. 

Across the rest of Greater Darfur, widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected between June and September with increasing populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), particularly among the protracted and newly displaced populations in camps across the region and among the poorest and conflict-affected households in previously affected urban centers. While direct fighting between the main belligerents is expected to remain subdued in most parts of the region with the exception of North Darfur, high levels of insecurity and targeting of marginalized populations are expected to continue to restrict household mobility and access to typical food and income sources, including own-production, in-kind payment from agricultural labor, and sale of bush products. With steeply rising prices and deteriorating access to income, the displaced, conflict-affected, and very poor households who have very few assets will increasingly employ extreme coping strategies, including consumption of wild foods, liquidation of assets, and begging, and will rely heavily on community support and sharing of extremely limited resources. In addition, the forecasted above-average rains are likely to increase the prevalence of waterborne diseases, which together with poor food consumption will contribute to deterioration in acute malnutrition.

During the October to January harvest and post-harvest period in Greater Darfur, acute food insecurity outcomes in some of the region’s calmer rural areas are expected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as the harvest will relatively improve food availability. However, the relief provided by own-harvests is expected to be short-lived under expectations of below- to significantly-below average production. As a result, the next lean season in 2025 is expected to start even earlier. In areas of Greater Darfur where high concentrations of IDPs are sheltering and have little access to land to cultivate, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes are expected to persist regardless of seasonality. 

In Greater Kordofan, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to be similarly widespread between June and September, with some households facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in the most heavily conflict-affected areas, as well as among displaced populations in Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan and Sheikan of North Kordofan. The severe outcomes are driven by direct clashes between the conflicting parties (RSF, SAF, and SPLM-N) and are expected to continue disrupting population movements, trade and humanitarian flows, and reduce IDPs’ ability to move out of the area. Access to wild foods will improve during the rainy season and likely slightly mitigate the further deterioration in parts of the Nuba Mountain areas of South Kordofan and parts of West Kordofan, but levels of hunger and malnourishment will nonetheless remain severe.  

From October to January, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist in parts of the western and eastern Nuba Mountain areas of South Kordofan given the impact of the fighting, as well as the heavily conflict-affected areas in West and North Kordofan where people are not able to cultivate due to the conflict and displacement. Conversely, acute food insecurity outcomes are expected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in some of the calmer rural areas of Greater Kordofan where households have been able to engage in agricultural production as food availability improves with the harvest, and with support from in-kind payments from agricultural labor and improved access to wild food and animal products. 

In Khartoum, acute food insecurity outcomes are expected to remain severe among the populations remaining in the state through at least January. Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will likely remain widespread with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in heavily contested cities in most parts of Khartoum, parts of Omdurman, and Bahri. Trade flows are expected to remain severely disrupted, resulting in low supply and exceedingly high prices through the lean season and harvest and post-harvest periods. Seasonal improvements in market supplies between October and January will likely be marginal; while harvests will become available in surrounding areas where conflict has been less intense, the disruption of trade flows to Khartoum will prevent more substantial relief. With food and income sources extremely limited, people will likely rely on remittances, community support such as ERRs, and fish for those who can access the rivers.

In the southeast, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist across most of Al Jazirah and in the most heavily conflict-affected areas of Sennar and White Nile between June and September. The scale of looting and terrorization of civilians has reduced access to typical sources of income (both agricultural and non-agricultural wage labor), while prices are soaring, and people will likely increase dependency on remittances and community support. In Gedaref and Blue Nile, which are expected to remain relatively calm, most areas will remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), but with rising proportion of IDPs in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Food assistance is expected to partially mitigate the severity of food consumption deficits among direct and indirect recipients given high levels of community sharing, but at insufficient levels given the very high scale of need.

Between October and January, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes will persist despite the harvest in this typically highly productive area due to expectations of below- to significantly below-average production as a result of the expansion of fighting deeper into this area and large numbers of IDPs.     

In the relatively calm areas of the north and northeast, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected despite the lack of direct fighting, relatively better trade flows, and humanitarian access. Namely, available resources among host communities are inadequate to absorb the needs of the influx of displaced amid rising prices and deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, in Northern and River Nile, food assistance needs are expected to continue to increase through January as the main wheat harvest for the area will not occur until March/April 2025. Still, households are expected to partially mitigate their food consumption deficits from the limited availability of horticulture and irrigated vegetables between June and September, as well as from wage labor income (including in artisanal mines) and remittances, which are typically higher in this region. Households that own livestock will also have improved access to livestock products during the rainy season. Finally, some remote areas of Kassala and Red Sea will likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes during the lean season due to traditionally very low coping capacity. Comparatively better Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in these areas between October and January once the harvest in the Halfa Al Gadeeda irrigated scheme and Delta Al Gash flood retreat scheme in Kassala state become available, in addition to the winter season cultivation in the flood retreat areas of Red Sea state. 

Significant constraints on humanitarian access are preventing humanitarian partners from collecting representative data on food consumption, acute malnutrition, and mortality in areas of highest concern, including in Greater Darfur, South Kordofan, and Khartoum. Emerging evidence underscores that FEWS NET’s assessment of most likely outcomes in Sudan may change rapidly depending on how ground conditions and access to information evolve. For example, recent data collected by Mercy Corps from health clinics in parts of South and Central Darfur suggest very high caseloads of acute malnutrition and elevated child deaths due to malnutrition. In addition, Reuters investigative reporting in June documented via satellite imagery analysis atypical expansions of graveyards not only in and around Zamzam camp in North Darfur, but also in Kalma and Kas IDP camps in South Darfur and Nertiti and Hamidiya IDP camps in Central Darfur. According to interviews with community leaders, the leading causes of deaths in the camps were malnutrition and disease. FEWS NET will closely monitor and regularly re-assess whether available evidence indicates the thresholds for Famine (IPC Phase 5) are being or will likely be passed; however, given the severity of outcomes present in Sudan already and the challenges of collecting conclusive evidence, humanitarian and government decision makers should not await confirmation of Famine (IPC Phase 5) in other areas to take action to save lives. In addition to the essential need for a national ceasefire and an end to heavy conflict, humanitarian and government actors must act swiftly to remove all impediments to assistance, ensure sustained and scaled-up humanitarian access to populations in need, and stem the spread of starvation and deaths both in Famine-stricken Al Fasher IDP camps and across other areas facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). 

While FEWS NET’s projections are considered the “most likely” scenario, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the assumptions that underpin the scenario. This means food security conditions and their impacts on acute food security may evolve differently than projected. FEWS NET issues monthly updates to its projections, but decision makers need advance information about this uncertainty and an explanation of why things may turn out differently than projected. As such, the final step in FEWS NET’s scenario development process is to briefly identify key events that would result in a credible alternative scenario and significantly change the projected outcomes. FEWS NET only considers scenarios that have a reasonable chance of occurrence.

Greater Darfur, South Kordofan, and Khartoum 

Event: Conflict, coupled with humanitarian access denials, either directly isolates or indirectly prevents households from migrating to safer areas in search of food and income for a sustained period of time, particularly in Al Fasher locality of North Darfur (resident populations); areas of Greater Darfur and South Kordofan hosting high concentrations of displaced persons; and parts of West Darfur and Khartoum. 

Impact on food security outcomes: While not the most likely scenario, FEWS NET assesses there is a credible alternative scenario that would result in Famine (IPC Phase 5) in Al Fasher locality of North Darfur (resident populations); areas with high concentrations of displaced persons across Greater Darfur and in Kadugli and Dilling of South Kordofan; and in parts of Khartoum and West Darfur. These areas have faced some of the highest and most intense levels of conflict and related disruption to trade flows, market supplies, and livelihood activities, as well as massive displacement and/or re-displacement. Living conditions are poor and access to health and water services is minimal given widespread destruction of infrastructure and facilities, resulting in high levels of morbidity and acute malnutrition. Humanitarian access is severely limited by conflict, insecurity, and administrative obstacles imposed by SAF and RSF, and food assistance is either very low or absent. FEWS NET assesses that Famine (IPC Phase 5) would occur in these areas in the event that households are further cut off from markets, community support, and remittances, either through tactics of deliberate and prolonged isolation, or as a byproduct of severe insecurity and conflict that prevents households from migrating, whether due to threat to personal safety, inability to afford transport or physically travel long distances, or other family-driven reasons. Displaced populations are of particularly high concern given they are often from the most marginalized and targeted ethnic and tribal groups and have experienced long-term erosion of livelihoods and assets that greatly increase their vulnerability to shocks and a more rapid descent into destitution. 

National 

Event: The conflicting parties reach an agreement on and commit to abide by a ceasefire with support from international actors, agreeing to an extended timeline for a return to civilian rule and ensuring humanitarian access is sufficient to permit a large-scale food assistance response

Impact on food security outcomes: This will likely bring the fighting to a stop, reduce political tensions, restore security in some of the conflict-affected areas, facilitate trade flows across the country and across borders, and enable the return of some displaced people to their homes. However, intercommunal conflict will likely continue in the short-term in some areas and the devastation wrought by 14+ months of conflict will undermine any significant recovery in the medium-term. Given the erosion of Sudan’s food system and economy, a ceasefire agreement alone will be inadequate to halt Famine (IPC Phase 5) among IDPs in Al Fasher; a ceasefire must be accompanied by actions to ensure humanitarian food assistance reaches populations in need at large-scale, sustained levels. Should this occur, then there is a credible alternative scenario in which Emergency! (IPC Phase 4!) outcomes emerge in Zamzam, Abu Shouk, and Al Salam IDP camps in Al Fasher, though the timeframe for that improvement depends on the timeline, quantity, and frequency of food and nutrition assistance delivery. Similarly, large-scale humanitarian food assistance would still be required in other severely conflict-affected areas and those with high levels of displacement to prevent Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) area-level outcomes; if significant levels of food assistance are delivered quickly and consistently, then this would likely mitigate area-level outcomes to Crisis! (IPC Phase 3!) and Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!). In the least conflict-affected areas of the east and northeast, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes will likely return.  

Event: RSF expands into Gedaref and challenges SAF stronghold areas to the north and northeast 

Impact on food security outcomes: This would likely result in massive disruption to cultivation, a significant reduction in harvest and food stocks, and further widening of the expected food gap; additional looting of public and private property; increased displacement and concentration of IDPs in the limited remaining calm areas; and higher numbers of people seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Moreover, this would likely result in the central government’s loss of control in most parts of the country and complete collapse of the economy. The ability of the government, international community, and local community to provide support to the affected people would be significantly limited. Intercommunal clashes and ethnic tensions would likely increase, resulting in further destruction of infrastructure and basic services, displacement, and loss of lives and livelihoods. Area-level Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes would become more widespread in the north and northeast. 

Zamzam, Abu Shouk, and Al Salam displacement camps of Al Fasher in North Darfur (Figure 11)

Reasons for selecting this area: There are multiple areas of high concern in Sudan and multiple areas facing a risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5). FEWS NET has assessed and received confirmation from the IPC’s Famine Review Committee that Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Zamzam displacement camp of Al Fasher; additionally, FEWS NET assesses it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Abu Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps of Al Fasher, but available evidence is limited and reduces the ability to confirm or deny this classification. FEWS NET would also flag that, given the dynamic conditions on the ground and significant constraints on humanitarian access preventing humanitarian partners from collecting representative data in Greater Darfur, there are considerable limitations on the ability to precisely identify which additional IDP camps could deteriorate to Famine (IPC Phase 5) and within what timeframe. Consequently, FEWS NET’s assessment of most likely outcomes in other areas may change in future reporting depending on how ground conditions and access to information evolve.

The city of Al Fasher (capital of North Darfur and last contested city in Greater Darfur) has been besieged since May 2024, causing massive civilian displacements. The area experienced relative calm under a fragile truce from June/July 2023 through the latter half of 2023, resulting in an influx of IDPs from other areas of Greater Darfur and contributing to population increases in the three main displacement camps in and around Al Fasher, the largest of which (Zamzam) reportedly increased to an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 people as of April. However, the truce began fraying in late 2023, with escalating tensions between RSF and SAF plus their allied Darfuri armed groups, that deteriorated significantly in March and April 2024. By May, RSF had escalated the siege on the town, with analysis of thermal scarring from Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) confirming targeting of civilian dwellings, notably in southeastern parts of the city heavily populated by minority groups (Zaghawa, Fur). In late May and again in late June/early July, the RSF also attacked the displacement camp of Abu Shouk in the north. In June, attacks on public infrastructure were also reported, including hospitals, clinics, markets, and the town’s water reservoir. 

Displacement has escalated under the tightening siege conditions and heavy fighting. Between April 1 and May 31, the IOM DTM reported 130,000 people were displaced, mostly within the locality of Al Fasher, but with additional flight to surrounding localities and beyond into parts of Greater Darfur. Additional reporting in June by MSF and Yale HRL confirmed large-scale displacement out of the city; MSF reported many IDPs stopped at Zamzam camp and the camp had likely swelled to an estimated 500,000 people by June. Located approximately 15 kilometers south of Al Fasher, the camp infrastructure has already been overwhelmed by the influx from over 14 months of fighting. 

The siege is increasingly constraining commercial and humanitarian access, severely limiting market flows and humanitarian assistance. While some movement was reportedly occurring on southern roads in April and May, these routes are likely increasingly restricted. Weekly markets in Zamzam camp depend on traders bringing goods from Al Fasher, but checkpoints have also reportedly increased, making movement difficult and dangerous for traders and households, thus leading to a precipitous decline of supplies in the camp. In Abu Shouk and Al Salam, households’ access to central markets in Al Fasher town is severely limited by direct attacks and high levels of risk associated with movement. As a result, both household access and market supplies are expected to be significantly restricted.

Prices are soaring amid minimal income-earning opportunities. FEWS NET price data collected in Al Fasher suggest sorghum and millet prices increased by 25-32 percent between March and May, and prices as of May were 60-85 percent higher than May 2023 and 160-180 percent higher than the three-year average. Prices are likely even higher within the camps given the disruption of supply flows from Al Fasher town to the camps, although data is unavailable to confirm. IDP households – especially those who recently fled conflict – have few to any assets and lack durable livelihood options and/or income-earning opportunities, with most populations reliant on daily wage labor (often migratory), petty trade, or market engagement; these typical marginal sources of income have been rapidly undermined by insecurity and restrictions on mobility. Dependence on markets and assistance would already be high at this time of year (the lean season) when stocks from prior cultivation are depleted, but in the present context, deteriorated purchasing capacity is further worsening access to food and outcomes.

Food assistance deliveries have been blocked since April, cutting off another key food source. WFP provided half rations of one-month food assistance to 22,395 households in Zamzam camp and 2,388 in Al Salam camp in April. Given the size of the Zamzam population and the expectation of sharing, the benefit of this assistance is anticipated to have been heavily diluted: if each beneficiary shared with three others, the rations would cover just 13 percent of the daily kilocalorie requirement. MSF provided nutrition assistance to nearly 14,000 children under 5 years and over 5,000 pregnant and lactating women in April, with supplies of Ready-to-use Therapeutic Foods (RUTF) expected to last for two months. However, malnutrition treatment programs are designed to prevent mortality, not reduce or prevent acute malnutrition, and efficacy of such a program is greatly undermined by high levels of sharing and lack of integrated treatment and prevention programs.

Health and WASH services are minimal and overwhelmed by the influx of population. Health service availability in Zamzam camp has been low historically, consisting of two older clinics plus a third clinic set up by MSF in 2022. It is unknown how long the two non-MSF clinics were functioning. The closest main hospital is in Al Fasher, which was recently shut down (June 5) following an attack by RSF. Water supply is limited and increasingly strained by the rising population. According to MSF, there is no adequate clean water supply in the camp, with people queuing daily in front of two water wells or drinking from stagnant water supplies. New arrivals are living either with host families or in informal gathering sites/structures that are mostly clustered around the perimeter of the camp and provide poor shelter and very poor sanitary conditions, likely aggravating water, sanitation, and health (WASH) conditions.   

Disease outbreaks are high and expected to worsen, exacerbated by overcrowding and poor WASH conditions. According to the Nutrition Cluster, 65 percent of the population lacks access to health care across Sudan; access is expected to be even lower in the Darfur states, where health infrastructure has been destroyed and looted and between 70-80 percent of health facilities are reported as nonfunctioning. The Cluster also reports a 50 percent decrease in vaccination coverage and 60 percent decrease in maternal, newborn, and child health services coverage. In a mortality assessment conducted by MSF in January 2024 in Zamzam camp, 54 percent of deaths were linked to diseases such as malaria (25.9 percent), respiratory infections (10.6 percent), dengue fever (8.2 percent), diarrhea (5.9 percent), and measles (3.5 percent), with very poor nutritional status and food consumption levels likely playing a major role in weakening immune systems. With the rains anticipated to start in late June and early July, the disease burden is anticipated to worsen. Indeed, at the time of this report’s publication, MSF had already reported suspected cases of cholera in the camp in July. 

While data is limited amid humanitarian access constraints imposed by the siege, convergence of available evidence of food security conditions support the conclusion that starvation is likely widespread and exceeds the threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5) among IDPs in the main camps around Al Fasher in June. With very limited access to farmland, any food stocks that IDPs harvested from their own-production in late 2023 were long-depleted, leaving IDP households heavily dependent on markets and inconsistent food assistance. Under the siege, these sources of food have become increasingly inaccessible, as the weekly market in Zamzam is no longer functional, physical access to markets in Al Fasher town is severely limited by conflict, supplies in Al Fasher have been depleted, and available price data suggest sorghum and millet prices in Al Fasher town have surged 160-180 percent above the three-year average. At the same time, typical marginal sources of income used to purchase food have rapidly declined under siege conditions, especially among recent IDPs who lost their livelihoods when fleeing conflict and protracted IDPs who were reliant on daily wage labor, petty trade, or other market-based activities. Furthermore, humanitarian food assistance deliveries have not occurred since April, as humanitarians are unable to securely access the area. 

Prior to the siege, MSF collected representative acute malnutrition and mortality data in January 2024 in Zamzam IDP camp that indicated levels of acute malnutrition based on MUAC were already above the MUAC threshold for Famine (IPC Phase 5) at 23.1 percent, while the non-trauma Crude Death Rate was near the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold at 1.9 deaths per 10,000 per day (95% CI: 1.5-2.4). Subsequent screenings conducted by MSF, the Sudan Ministry of Health, and partners suggested similar-to-higher levels of acute malnutrition. Notably in March/April 2024, MSF conducted a mass screening in Zamzam camp that found a 29.4 percent GAM-MUAC prevalence with an 8.2 percent SAM prevalence. While the MUAC data were collected using color-coding instead of actual measurements thus limiting the ability to conduct plausibility checks, FEWS NET would argue the data should be considered with appropriate caveats as part of the full body of evidence. While it is possible the results among children 6-59 months may be biased upward in the event of over-representation of children under two years of age (though unverified) and it may not be possible to correct for potential bias by weighting for age, the substantial decline in food security conditions that occurred during the same timeframe suggest that GAM levels would remain persistently high or worsen. 

Based on the evidence of worsening starvation in Al Fasher, levels of acute malnutrition have likely risen further, while levels of non-trauma mortality have likely accelerated and surpassed the Famine (IPC Phase 5) threshold by June. Supporting evidence includes a recent Reuters investigative report, which analyzed satellite imagery of graves in and around Zamzam camp in North Darfur; Kalma and Kas IDP camps in South Darfur; and Nertiti and Hamidiya IDP camps in Central Darfur. The analysis suggested a disproportionate increase in graveyards adjacent to these specific camps, with a 26 percent faster growth observed in Zamzam between mid-December 2023 and early May 2024 when compared to a similar period last year. According to interviews with community leaders (none interviewed in Zamzam), the leading causes of death in the camps were malnutrition and disease. 

Based on reasonable evidence of escalating levels of starvation, acute mortality, and hunger-related mortality, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is confirmed in Zamzam camp in June, and Famine (IPC Phase 5) will most likely continue through at least October. FEWS NET assesses it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) is also currently ongoing and likely to continue in nearby Abu Shouk and Al Salam camps, given that any displaced populations remaining in these camps are subject to similarly severe food security conditions as in Zamzam. However, available evidence on acute malnutrition and mortality in these camps, specifically, is unavailable and therefore reduces the ability to confirm or deny a Famine (IPC Phase 5) classification. 

The anticipated continuation of siege conditions is expected to prevent household access to fields – to the extent IDPs had access to land even prior to the war – and other income sources, while also interfering with humanitarian and trader access. Levels of population displacement are expected to remain high and attempts to leave the locality are likely to be affected by the threat of RSF violence in surrounding rural areas. Disease outbreaks are expected to accelerate in the rainy season, exacerbated by overcrowding and lack of health services; the interaction of hunger and disease are expected to maintain or accelerate levels of acute malnutrition and mortality. Moreover, as the population swells, the capacity of the MSF clinic to absorb and support populations in need will be limited particularly following staff evacuations and reduced capacity to replenish basic medicine, health, and nutrition supplies. While MSF will continued to distribution nutrition assistance as feasible, it is not expected to be at scale or sufficient to meaningfully reduce levels of acute malnutrition or levels of excess mortality. While the availability of wild foods will improve into the October-January period, physical access is expected to gathering areas remain severely limited due to insecurity. Mutual support and community sharing of resources, which have been critical survival mechanisms to date, will be increasingly strained and unsustainable. In the absence of large-scale food assistance and an end to intense conflict, FEWS NET anticipates that it is possible Famine (IPC Phase 5) will extend into the harvest and post-harvest seasons beyond October.